707
1 INTRODUCTION
Maritime transport, has for centuries, been a main
factor contributing to international trade and
economicdevelopment(Kristiansen2005),and90%of
tradeingoodsandrawmaterialsisdonebymaritime
transport (Oltedal & Lützhöft 2018). However,
maritime operations entail risks and threats, with
potentially disasterous consquences in
terms of the
lossof human lives, the environment,and economic
losses.
Until the early 2000’s, the issue of maritime
security was almost absent in the academic field
(Germond2015).However,followingtheterrorattack
on the World Trade Centre 9/11 2001, terror strikes
directed at ships (USS Cole in
2001, French tanker
Limburgin2002)andanincreaseinmaritimepiracy,
theissuegainedincreasingattention(Germond2015).
By maritime security, we refer to sabotage, acts of
terror and crime in the maritime domain (Smith &
Brooks2013).Inparticular,piracyhasraisedtheissue
ontotheglobalagenda(Bueger
2014)duetoitsdirect
and disruptive effects on the freedom of navigation,
maritime trade and international peace (Hasan &
Hassan2016).ThoughtheGulfofAdenhasbeenan
internationalfocalpoint(Winn&Lewis2017),piracy
also occurs in other waters, such as, the Gulf of
Guinea,Southeast
ChinaSea,theMalakkaStrait,and
theBayofOman(Hasan&Hassan2016,Mandanda&
Ping2016).
Thereisagrowingbodyofliteratureonmaritime
security. Some focus on the effectiveness of
internationalmeasurestakentocombatpiracy(Winn
& Lewis 2017, Vespe et al 2015, Shortland &
Vothknecht
2011). In addition, there are a series of
studies on the root‐causes of piracy, such as,
unemployment, poverty, corruption, and others
(Baniela & Rios 2012, Bueger 2015, Onuoha 2009,
Fawcett2010,Winn&Lewis2017).
Maritime Security and Threat Assessments
I.Eidnes,B.M.Batalden&A.K.Sydnes
UiT–TheArcticUniversityofNorway,Tromsø,Norway
ABSTRACT:Maritimesecurityisstillachallengeininternationaltrade.Inthiscase‐studyweanalyzehowthe
Norwegian Shipowners’ Mutual War Risks Insurance Association (DNK) provides Norwegian maritime
companieswithregionalassessmentsofthreat‐levels.Throughasurveyandaseries
ofinterviews,westudy
factorsthataffectthecommunicationandperceptionofthreats,inadditiontohowmaritimecompaniesmake
security decisions regarding operating in different areas. The study concludes that the DNK and maritime
companieslargelyhaveacommonassessmentofthreatlevels.ThoughcommunicationbetweenDNKandits
member companies has challenges, the members largely consider DNK threat assessments to be reliable.
Securitydecisionsinmaritimecompaniestypicallyinvolvemultipleactors,considerationsofeconomyversus
security,andmultiplesourcesofsecurityintelligenceinformation.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 13
Number 4
December 2019
DOI:10.12716/1001.13.04.02
708
Arichbodyofliteratureonriskhasevolvedsince
the early 1960’s (Slovic 2000). Risk and risk
perception,havebeenstudiedinpsychologicalterms
as individual traits and responses, or as social and
culturalphenomena(Renn2008).Therearestudieson
the nature of threats and risks, finding that
humans
respond more strongly to man‐made than naturally
occurringevents(Sjøberg2000).Asmostrisksarenot
experienceddirectly,thereisalsoincreasingfocuson
risk‐communication (Renn 2008) and how this
provides a basis for decision‐making (Slovic et al.
2000).
Herewestudyhowthemaritimeindustry
seeksto
reduce the security risks of maritime operations by
including intelligence advice and assessments of
threat‐level as part of their risk management. We
address this issue through a case‐study. The
NorwegianShipowners’MutualWarRisksInsurance
Association (DNK) provides its members with
regional assessments of threat‐levels based
on
international and regional intelligence sources. We
have formulated a series of research topics. First, is
there a common perception of regional threat‐levels
between DNK and its member companies? We
address this by comparing DNK’s regional
assessmentsofthreat‐levelswithshipcompaniesown
threat assessments. Second, what factors
affect the
member companies’ perception of DNKs threat
assessments? We focus on DNK’s internal processes
for formulating and communicating threat
assessments and how these, in turn, are assessed by
the member companies. Third, how are decisions
takenbymembercompaniesregardingthreat‐levels?
Inparticular,weaddresswhoparticipateindecision
‐
making at the company level, whether there is a
trade‐off between economic and security concerns,
and the companies’ use of alternative sources of
intelligence.
2 THEORY
Allhumanactivitiesentailsomelevelofrisk.Tothe
extentthattheproductionalsoposesarisktopublic
values(health,economy,
environment),organizations
are required to introduce measures to manage them
(Reason1997).In highly competitive markets – such
asmaritimetransport–thereisaconstantpressureon
companiestoreducecostsandseekshort‐termgains
(Rasmussen 1997, Batalden & Sydnes 2014). Under
such conditions, safety management is frequently
considered
a cost to be weighed against production
costsandeconomicreturns(SmithandBrooks2013).
This dilemma has been discussed theoretically, inter
alia,byReasoninthe‘Unrocked boat’model(1997),
in Rasmussen’s ‘Migration model’ (1997) and by
Hollnagel’s ´Efficiency‐Thoroughness Trade‐Off´
(ETTO) model (2009). These models discuss
organizational
performance within economic and
safety boundaries, while being subject to conflicting
pressures.Inthecontextofthisstudy,thedecisionsto
operate in regions with different threat‐levels,
constitutesuchadilemmaforthemaritimeindustry.
Itisthereforeimportanttounderstandhowdifferent
factors filter in as companies make risk
‐based
decisions on the information they have available on
existingthreat‐levels.
‘Risk’ and ‘threat’ are key terms in this study. A
threatisrelatedto the ‘…intention and capabilityof
an adversary to undertake actions that would be
detrimental…’ (Cox 2008: 1749) to e.g. crew, vessel
and cargo. Introducing
threat‐levels implies a scale
basedoncriteriathatranksthelevelofthreatoneis
exposedtoundergivenconditions.Riskmanagement
concerns introducing meas ures to reduce ones
vulnerabilities and/or the consequences of a threat
occurring.Therearenouniversallyacceptablecriteria
onwhichtoevaluaterisks(Psarrosetal.
2009)orhow
thetermistobedefined.Herewedefineriskbroadly:
‘Risk is a situation or event where something of
human value (including humans themselves) is at
stake and where the outcome is uncertain” (Rosa
1988: 28). It is common to distinguish between
quantitativeandqualitativerisk
approaches(Aven&
Vinnem2007).Inthisstudy,thefocusisonthelatter,
asweconcernedwithhowthreatsofsecurity‐related
incidents are perceived and communicated between
actors in the maritime industry, DNK and maritime
companiesinparticular.
Perception is the cognitive process of how we
makesenseof
objectsandeventsinourphysicaland
social world (Kaufmann & Kaufmann 2009).
Perceptions of an incident, situation or activity that
canleadtonegativeconsequencesisoftenreferredto
as risk perception (Renn 2008). Risk perceptions are
establishedbyindividuals,groupsorsocieties(Aven
& Veland 2012) and depend
on personal attributes,
experiences, social processes, norms and collective
assessments(Onggo2017).Assuch, riskperceptionis
notmerelyfactbased(Renn2008),butalsorelatedto
expectations, ideas, hopes and fears, and emotions
(Aven&Veland2012).Consequently,riskperceptions
maynotcorrespondtoreality(Slovic2000)andmay
lead
both to an overestimation of risk or risk denial
(Sjöberg2000).
The main topic here is to analyse DNK’ and its
member‐companies’perceptionsofthreat‐levels.One
factorinthatregardishow theactorscommunicate.
The purpose of risk communication is to provide
actors the information needed to
make sound
decisions that reflect the best available knowledge
andtheirownpreferences(Aven&Renn2010).Most
threats and risks are not experienced directly but
through communication (Renn 2008). Good
communication is about finding ways to
communicate complex issues that entail uncertainty,
in an effective and understandable manner (Slovic
2000).
The communication process itself is a relation
between a source, a sender and a receiver; whereby
the sender communicates a message, based on a
source of information, which in turn is
interpreted/decoded by the receiver before being
actedupon(Renn2008).Itiscriticalforthesenderof
informationto
understandtheculturalcontextofthe
receiver, the communication channels, the
appropriatemodesofcommunication,thecompeting
sources of information, and such (Hallahan et al.
2007). Humans have selection strategies for
information(Renn2008),andinformationoverloadis
an increasing problem as information is being
disregarded or overlooked (Aven & Renn
2010). In
this context, trust in both the quality, source and
sender of information is important (Renn 2008). The
709
general model of risk communication has been
developed further by Kasperson et al in their Social
amplification of risk model (1988). Here focus is on
how information is intensified or weakened as it is
transmitted between individual or social actors
(Kasperson et al. 1988). Information is filtered,
decoded, transmitted and
interpreted in different
socio‐culturalcontextsandformalframeworksasitis
passed between actors, and consequently being
altered in the process (Kasperson et al. 1988, Renn
2008). For an actor, such as DNK, providing
intelligence information and threat warnings, it is
criticalhowtheirinformationandthreatwarningsare
interpreted and acted upon by member companies.
Forthemaritimecompaniesitiscriticalwhetherthey
havetrustintheinformationandthreatassessments
that are provided by DNK as a basis for decision‐
making.
3 METHODSANDDATA
This study is based on data from semi‐structured
interviews, document studies
and a questionnaire
retrieved from Norwegian ship‐owners, their
crewmembers,andDNK.
Allinterviewsareanonymousbothwithrespectto
companies and individual informants, except for
DNK. The interviews were conducted in February
2018. The companies and informants were selected
based on the criteria of being a member of DNK,
havingvesselsoperatingininternationalwaters,and
the informants having a central role in handling the
security of their ships. All the companies operate
large fleets of ships. Further, the companies were
selected so that different ship segments were
represented. The first author conducted all the
interviews.
Table1.Listofinformantsandshipsegments.
_______________________________________________
CompanyShipsegment
_______________________________________________
DNKProviderofthreatassessment
CompanyATank,Bulk
CompanyBRollon/RollOff(Ro/Ro)
CompanyCLiquefiedNaturalGasTank
_______________________________________________
The informants, shown in table 1, were asked to
assessthethreatlevelinfivedifferentwatersknown
to have a heightened threat. In addition, the
interviews were used to identify factors regarding
ship segment, established security measures and
internal decision‐making in the company. Some
additionalquestionfocused
onvoyageplanningand
the organizations focus on security. The interview
with DNK focused on how the association
communicatestheirthreatassessmentsandhowthese
were perceived by the member companies. All
interviews were recorded and later transcribed. The
first author coded the interviews to systemize the
response for comparison with
results from the
questionnaire.
Thequestionnairewasdevelopedfollowinginitial
discussionswithDNKand an experienced company
securityofficer(CSO).Similartotheinterviewguide,
the questionnaire addressed the main topics of
perceptions of threat, communication, security, and
decision‐making in the organization. The
questionnairewasdevelopedusingbotha
5pointand
a7pointlikert‐scale,andwaspublishedonasecure
web page in English. The questionnaire was sent to
262 respondents of which 39 replied (15 %), which
waslowbutstillgavesomevaluableinsight.
It is not uncommon for shipowners to operate
within several segments.
Typically, companies can
operatebothinthedryandwetsegment–tankand
bulk. As seen in table 2, several of the respondents
represented companies that operated ships in
differentsegments.
Table2.Respondentstoquestionnaireandshipsegments.
_______________________________________________
SegmentCompaniesPercentage N
_______________________________________________
Bulkcarriers 1230.839
Tankers1948.739
Ro/Ro37.739
Container717.939
Offshore1333.339
Passenger12.639
Other923.139
_______________________________________________
Theresponsefromthequestionnairewasanalyzed
using the statistical software SPSS. The analyzes
mainlymakesuseof descriptive statistics butaone‐
way ANOVA test was conducted to assess whether
there were differences in the respondents threat
assessmentofthedifferentareas.
4 RESULTS
In this section, we
present the results from the
questionnaire, the interviews and the threat
assessmentsprovidedbyDNK.Informationfromthe
threat assessments of DNK is exempted from public
disclosure,andisthereforereferredtoasreportsfrom
January,February,MarchorAprilinthispaper.
4.1 Perceivedthreat
Theinformantswere asked to
assessthe threat level
intheareasDNKassessedinthetimeperiodJanuary
– April 2018. The participants answering the
questionnaire assessed the threat level according to
DNK’scategorization;low(1),moderate(2),high(3)
andcritical(4).WitharepeatedmeasureANOVAtest
withpost‐shocktestand
withaBonferronicorrection
shows a difference between the areas F (5.190) =
121.21, p> 0.000). The test also shows that Gulf of
GuineaandYemenissignificantlydifferentfromGulf
ofAden,LibyaandSouthEastAsia.
Table3 show that the participants experience the
threat level in Gulf
of Guinea to be relatively high,
witharesultof2.69andastandarddeviationof1.10.
From the interviews, the companies evaluate the
threat differently based on how far from shore their
operations occur. CompanyA and C, which operate
closetoshoreratethethreatlevelashigh–
similarto
DNK,whilecompanyBratesthethreatlevelaslowas
theirvesselssailfar off the coast. Though the threat
710
levelvariesindifferentareasofWestAfrica,Gulfof
Guineaisanareathatremainsdangerous,according
toDNK’sinformant.Eventsoccurweekly, alltypeof
vesselsaretargeted:“…wearejustwaitingforoneofour
vessels to be hit, and we had a case this fall,
but it went
well.”(Inf.DNK).Ahigherthreatlevelclosetoshore
isreflectedinthereportsfromDNK,wherethearea
oftheNigerdeltaisratedashigh.
Table3.Comparisonofthreatassessments
_______________________________________________
Threatareas Interviews Questionnaire DNK
A B C MeanSD
_______________________________________________
GulfofAden 3 1 3 1.98 0.74 2
GulfofGuinea 3 1 3 2.69 1.10 3
Yemen3 1‐ 2.46 1.34 2
Libya‐‐‐1.90 1.46 2
SouthEastAsia 1‐‐ 1.62 0.59 2
_______________________________________________
Although Yemen is associated with the Gulf of
Aden, the results indicate that the shipping
companiesexperienceahigherthreatlevelinYemen
withathreatlevelbetweenmoderateandhigh,scoring
on average of 2.46. It should be noted that the
standarddeviationis1.34whichexpressesa
relatively
largevariationintheparticipantsperception.Gulfof
Aden is perceived as moderate with an average of
1.98 and a smaller standard deviation of 0.74. From
the interviews, it seems that the owners assess the
threat level based on which shipping segment they
operate within. Company B operates vessels with
high freeboard, and thus feel less threatened. The
companies operating vessels with lower freeboard,
suchastankersandbulkers,considertheareatopose
a high threat level. Company B argues that private
maritime security companies have exaggerated the
threat level, and therefore boosted the maritime
security industry, and expresses
the importance of
usingsomecommonsenseandatthesametimebeing
vigilant during voyages in the Indian Ocean.
According to DNK, the threat outside Somalia is
mostly linked to piracy. After many years of
standstill,DNKexperiencedthatpiracyactivitybegan
topickupin2017duetothe
withdrawofthemilitary
forcesinthesewaters.Ithasalsobeendiscoveredthat
“vesselshavebeenattacked300nauticalmilesfromshore,
and that is far offshore” (Inf. DNK). DNK’s threat
assessmentconsiderthethreatlevelforpiracyinGulf
of Aden to be moderate. For Yemen, Company A
ratedthethreatlevelashighwhileCompanyBrated
itaslow.The twocompaniesassess theinfluenceof
the armed religious‐political Houthi movement very
differently. DNK report that the threat in Yemen is
relatedtorebellion and terrorism, wheretheyassess
thethreatasmoderate.Thearea
isofgreatconcernfor
DNK,sincetherebelshaveturnedagainstmerchant
vesselsearlier;“thedangerofamerchantvesselbeinghit
is increasing, because Houthis,…in Yemen, are under
strongpressure,whichmeansthatinadesperatesituation
theymaystrikeatamerchantvessel”(Inf.DNK).
Therespondents
perceivethethreatlevelinLibya
asmoderatewithascoreat1.90andwithastandard
deviation of 1.46. The situation in Libya is
characterized by conflicts within the country, which
indirectly affect the maritime industry. DNK set the
threat level for this area to moderate. Onwards, the
forecaststated
areducedthreatlevelandremainedso
inFebruary.InMarchandApril,thethreatlevelwas
reported moderate with a stable forecast. According
totheshippingcompanies(A‐C),theconditionsinthe
Libyaareofamilitarynature.Itisdescribedasavery
complexpicture,wherethere
isalotofdevelopment
among both the terrorist organization ISIS and
refugees.
ForSouthEastAsia,theresultsshowathreatlevel
betweenlowandmoderate,scoringanaverageof1.62
withastandarddeviationof0.59.Shippingcompany
A consider the threat level in South East Asia to be
low, but unstable. There seems to be a similar
perception among the other shipping companies.
ShippingcompanyBseldomsailinthesewaters, but
does not consider the area critical for them. Nor
Shipping Company C did assess this area. DNK
gradedthethreatleveltomoderatebuttheirforecast
indicatessomeuncertaintyinthedevelopment.
The perceived threat by the companies are
congruentwiththeassessmentsinthereportsofDNK
withsomevariations. From the interviews,thereare
largerdiscrepanciescomparedtothereportsofDNK.
Thisseemstobe based on, inter alia, voyage pattern
andvessel
segment.
4.2 Norwegianshippingcompanies´assessmentsof
DNK’sthreatproducts
The second research question addresses factors that
influence the Norwegian shipowners assessment of
DNK’sthreatassessments.
Table4NorwegianshippingcompaniesassessmentofDNK
threatproductsona7pointlikert‐scale
_______________________________________________
MeanSDN
_______________________________________________
Reliable5.10 0.85 39
Decisionbasis5.08 0.93 39
Updatepicture5.05 0.92 39
Unclearterms1.79 1.11 39
Unclearmodels1.64 1.14 39
Sufficientinformation4.69 1.04 39
_______________________________________________
In order to assess how the member companies
experiencedthethreatassessmenttoDNK,questions
formulateddirectlyrelatedtothethreatassessments.
The questions were measured on a 7 point Likert‐
scalerangingfromnevertoalways.Accordingtotable
4, the member companies experience the threat
assessmentsas
reliable,scoring 5.10 with a standard
deviation(SD)of0.85.Thethreatassessmentprovides
a good decision basis, scoring 5.08 (SD of 0.93) and
provideanupdatedpicture,scoring5.05(SDof0.92).
Furthermore,respondentsexperienceDNKtopresent
understandable threat assessments, as respondents
have scored low on whether DNK
uses unclear
models, scoring 1.64 with SD of 1.14, and low on
unclear terms, scoring 1.79 with SD of 1.11. The
respondents find that the threat assessments from
DNK provides sufficient information, scoring 4.69
withSDof1.04.
According to shipping company A’s informant,
DNK “... has quickly become one of
the world ʹs best at
threat assessments, using increased resources at the
securitysection or emergency department.” (Inf.A). The
711
threatassessmentsusethesameterminologyasinthe
militaryintelligence,aterminologyknowntoseveral
of the informants. The informant from shipping
companyAaddedthatDNKisveryconsistentinthe
design and uses the color index to categorize the
threatlevel.Theintelligenceinformationmayvary.
“…
There is, of course, a degree of uncertainty
sometimes, because intelligence environments are after all
intelligence environments, they have not been present.
They are based on rumors and reports, and information
they can obtain. So that there will always be some
uncertaintywithintelligenceinformationʺ(Inf.A).
For DNK, the
first priority while preparing the
threat assessment is to discover which area has the
greatestpotential forunwanted events andwhatthe
problem is: “…thus we define a prioritized intelligence
need.” (Inf. DNK). DNK uses at least two different
companies as information providers when making
threatassessments.Thisiscompared
totheirgeneral
understandingofthearea.DNKranksthethreatlevel
aslow,moderate, high or critical. This are the same
categories as both The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization(NATO),theNorwegianPoliceSecurity
ServiceandtheNorwegianIntelligenceService uses.
Alldistributedthreatassessmentsexplaintheranking
categories.
To ensure a common understanding of
terminology, DNK also invites their members to
meetings.Still, several members are unable to
distinguish the difference between threat and risk
(Inf. DNK). DNK experience that the members mix
the terms. DNK is in no position to provide risk
assessments, the shipping companies must do
it
themselves;“…theyowntherisk,andtheycanchooseto
taketherisk,whilethethreatbitorintelligenceisdecision
support.”
It is challenging to ensure that the correct
stakeholders receive the information from DNK, as
theinformationmustgothroughseveralstages.
As a conclusion from
the questions posed
regardingDNKʹsthreatproducts,itmayindicatethat
the respondents experience the assessments as very
credible. It can be commented that not all questions
score equally high on the table, but that the threat
assessmentsareperceivedasreliable.
4.3 Decision‐makingandsecurity
This section addresses
who participate in decision‐
making,howtherelationshipbetween economy and
security affects decisions, and whether multiple
intelligencesourcesareused.
4.3.1 Decisionstosailinthreatareas
Thedecisiontoenter threatareasdiffers between
the shipping companies. Table 5 shows that among
the responders to the questionnaire, the
captain had
thedecisivepowerin13ofthe39companies(33.3%),
whiletheCSOhadthedecisive powerin9companies
(23.1%). Company Executive Officers had decisive
power in 13 companies (33.3%). In one company
(2.6%), the chartering department had the decisive
powerand inthreecompanies (7.7%),thechartering
department had the decisive power to operate in
threatareas.
Table5.Decisionstoenterthreatareas.
_______________________________________________
CaptainChartering Company Operation Senior
Department Security Department Manage‐
Officerment
_______________________________________________
13 19313
_______________________________________________
According to shipping company C, the threat
picturemustbeapproacheddifferentlyfromtheother
shipowners,asthecompanyhasstationedfacilitiesin
the same location for up to 20 years. First, an
assessment is done by the CSO when a project is
awarded them. Then the captain evaluates
if the
sailing route involves a high risk. In contrast,
shipping company B operates with fixed routes
globally – and thereby doesn’t find it necessary to
discusstheroute.Ifthethreatpictureweretochange,
a risk assessment is conducted and the decision is
made either by the CSO or
a person in a higher
position in the company. According to shipping
company A, decisions are based on the informants
consulting: “… depending om how dangerous it is, how
highwewanttoliftit,butitcanbeentirelyuptotheboard
andowner.SoIhavequarterly
updatesoftheboardonthe
securitysituation…”(Inf.A).
4.3.2 Theuseofmultipleintelligenceservices
The results from the questionnaire, shown in
figure1,indicatesthatmostshippingcompaniesuses
several intelligence services. Most respondents said
theyeitheroften(33.3%),veryoften(25.6%)oralways
(20.5%)usedseveralintelligence
services.
Figure1.Theuseofmultipleintelligenceservices.
Noneoftheparticipantsansweredneverontheuse
of several intelligence services. On the other side of
the scale, some participant meant that they rare
(12.82%)orveryrare(2.56%)usedseveralintelligence
services, and some participants did not know/or
neither(5.13%).Asitemergesfromtheinterviews,it
seems
natural to use several intelligence services to
assess the threat level in an area. According to
shippingcompanyA,theyusedatleasttwoorthree
sources of information in order to compare their
answers. The informant from shipping company B
told that they collected information from multiple
sourcesfrom
EU,USandothers.ShippingcompanyC
followedthesameapproach.
4.3.3 Therelationshipbetweensecurityandeconomy
The response from the participants, shown in
figure2,indicatethatthereisanexperiencedconflict
712
between security and economy while operating in
threat areas with 53.85 % of the participants
answering in the range often to always. In contrast,
38.46%oftheparticipantsansweredintherangefrom
rarelytoneveroccurredconflictsbetweensecurityand
economy,while7.60%wasuncertainornoneof
the
optionsmatched.
Itappearsfromtheinterviewsthatthereisagreat
focusonsecurityduringvoyages.Alltheinformants
were familiar with Best Management Practices for
Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4),
which was widely used during voyages in threat
areas. The informant from shipping company A
announced
that they related to BMP4 in all security
contexts, worldwide. Shipping company B have
carried out several of BMP4’s recommended
measures, as well as local adjustments based on the
shipʹs shipment. They also operated with their own
guidelinesfordifferentareas,whichwereperiodically
revised. According to shipping company C,
they
operatedwithacontinuousmonitoringofthe whole
world.
Figure2.Conflictbetweensecurityandeconomy.
4.3.4 Summarizingtheresults
The findings indicate that decisions are made by
differentpositionsintheshippingcompanies.Eithera
CSO, CEO or captain makes the decisive decision.
Furthermore, the results show that it is common to
assess the threat level in an area on the basis of
several (intelligence) sources.
Finally, it seems like
there is a great focus on security, but it’s not
uncommon for conflicts to arise between economy
andsecurityduringvoyagesinthreatexposedareas.
5 DISCUSSION
Thissection presentshighlightsfrom theresultsand
discusses the findings in relation to the research
questions and theory
presented above. The first
research topic to be addressed was empirical in
nature, in investigating the correspondence between
the threat‐assessments provided by DNK and those
by its member‐companies. Table 3 illustrated the
different threat assessments provided by the
questionnaire, informants and DNK threat
assessments. The questionnaire and DNK threat
assessmentscorrespondedtoarelativelyhighdegree.
However,therewerevariationsinabsolutetermsand
in standard deviations between regions. The
informant data (companies A‐C) provide an
illustrationofthisvariance.
When providing threat assessments DNK first
identifies a need for intelligence information. They
will gather relevant information from
one or more
sources. DNK will then focus on specific aspects of
the threat based on the information provided (Renn
2008). As such, DNK amplifies certain aspects and
perceptions of the threat identified when
communicating further to the member‐companies
(Kasperson et al. 1988). DNK threat assessments are
based on a
4‐level scale in line with NATO and
Norwegianintelligenceservicesandarepresentedin
color code. As such, they are based on well‐known
andtrustedformats.ApriorityforDNKistoestablish
clear terminology and open lines of communication
withdecision‐makersinthemaritimecompanies(Inf.
DNK).
This brings us to the question of how companies
perceiveDNKriskassessments.WeusecompaniesA‐
Ctoillustratethisissue.Throughoutitwasclearhow
CompanyBconsideredtheregionallevelofthreatas
lower then companies A and C and DNK. In some
cases,itisclear
thatCompanyBassesthethreatsas
lowduetothebarrierstheyhave established(sailing‐
routes, vessel‐types and‐operations, high freeboard,
trainingpersonnel,monitoringtools). Wethenmove
fromageneralthreat‐levelforanareaasprovidedby
DNK, to a more specific risk‐assessment for the
individualCompany B and its vessel. Consequently,
DNK (threat) and Company B (risk) are assessing
different phenomena. This reflects the challenge in
establishing a common terminology when
communicatingthreatsorrisk(Hallahanetal.2007).
Ontheotherhand, Informant B also demonstrates a
level of distrust to maritime security companies,
in
that they boost threatsto sell their products (Aden).
He/she also believes that vessels from certain flag
states(Yemen)orvesseltypes(SoutheastAsia)arenot
under threat (INF B). This reflects on both the
importance of trust in communication (Renn 2008)
and whether DNK as an intelligence provider
amplifies threats/risk (Kasperson et al. 1988) beyond
whatCompanyB perceivesto bethe‘reality’(Slovic
2000).Anotheraspectcouldalsobethatthisisacase
ofrisk denial(Sjöberg2000). The data heredoesnot
allowustoconcludeonthis,howeverithighlightsthe
challenges in communicating threats
and risks.
CompaniesAandContheotherhand,inmostcases
considered the threat‐levels as higher than DNK in
theregionswheretheyoperated(table3).CompanyA
responded by establishing barriers such as armed
guardsorescort(AdenandGuinea),whileCompany
Cchoosetomonitor
andassessthesituationclosely.
This demonstrates how shipping companies may
perceive threat‐levels differently, when facing the
same situation (Renn 2008, Sjöberg 2000). Also, that
there will be deviances among companies receiving
thesamethreat‐assessmentsfromDNK.
Notably, despite these disparities, all Companies
consider DNK threat assessments to be
reliable. The
data from the questionnaire (table 4) illustrates that
on reliability, a basis for decision‐making and
providing an updated threat‐picture, the scores
rangedfrom5.10‐5.05onthe7 ‐pointLikertscale.On
whether the DNK threat‐assessment provides
713
sufficientinformation,thescorewassomewhatlover
(4.69).OnquestionswhetherDNKthreatassessments
had unclear terminology (1.79) or models (1.64), the
scores were low. Overall, this demonstrates a high
level of satisfaction with DNK threat assessments.
This is also confirmed by the three Company
informants (A‐C) interviewed in
this study. In
particular Informant A stated that DNK ‘… quickly
has become one of the worlds´ best on threat
assessments…’. The somewhat lower score on
whetherDNKprovidessufficientinformation,willbe
discussed further under the issue of sources of
intelligenceinformation.
Afinalissuetobeaddressedin
thisstudyishow
decisions are made by companies, based on threat
assessments. We saw in the data that there are a
variety of roles involved in making security related
decisionsregardingsailinginanarea:Captain,CSO,
CEO, chartering department and operations
department. Notable, when measuring degree of
involvement in
decision‐making the CSO ranked
highest (5.67/7), and the Captain lowest (4.23/7).
However, in terms of the final decision to enter an
area, the captain most frequently had the final say
alongwiththeCEO(both33%).Thisislikelytointer
aliareflectthethreat‐level,orchangestherein,
ofthe
givenareainquestion.AsnotedbyInfB,ifthereare
changesinthelevelofthreatinanarea, anew risk‐
assessment will be conducted and the decision be
liftedtohigherlevelsinthecompany.Italsoreflects
onDNK’sconcernregardingtheroleof
theCSOand
reachingthe rightpeopleinthe member companies,
when communicating threat‐levels. If not the threat‐
assessmentsmaybecomesubjecttoachainofsender‐
reciever relations affecting how the assessemtn is
perceivedandappliedindecision‐making(Kasperson
etal.1988).
Striking the balance between threats,
risks and
economic benefit is a main issue within risk
management (Reason 1997, Rasmussen 1997,
Hollnagel 2009). In this study, we also find this
dilemma. Our questionnaire data demonstrate that
53.85% experience a conflict between security and
economywhileoperatinginthreatareas.Thisreflects
the highly competitive maritime industry where
manycompaniesfeelforcedtooperateatthema rgins
(Rasmussen1997).Thereislittledoubtthatthisaffects
the decisions being made on whether to enter areas
withelevatedthreat‐levels.
Finally, we investigated to what extent maritime
companies use multiple sources of security
informationwhenmakingdecisions.Thiswas
clearly
confirmed by the questionnaire data and by
informants.79.4%inthequestionnaireeither `often´,
`very often´ or `always´ made use of several
intelligence services. In summary, shipping
companies, in general involve a range of company
actors on making security decisions regarding
operating in areas with elevated threat‐levels, with
the
final decision pending on the actual thereat
situation. The economy versus security dilemma is
experienced by a majority of respondents
interviewed.Finallydecisionarecommonlybasedon
multiplesourcesofintelligenceservices.
6 CONCLUSION
This study demonstrate that numerous factors affect
communication between DNK at the member
companies,andhow
thelattermakedecisionsbased
on, among other sources of input, DNK threat
assessments. Perception, communication, economic‐
security dilemmas, the specific characteristics of
vesselsandoperations,andinternaldecision‐making
processes all have an influence. However, DNKs
threat assessments provide important inputs to
companies when they are to make decisions for
individual vessels regarding risks of conducting
operationsinanarea.Ifthecompaniesdonothavean
adequateunderstandingofthenature(piracy,terror)
orlevel(low‐critical)ofthethreat,theywillnotbein
a position to establish adequate security measures
(monitoring, armed guards), or to consider whether
ornottooperateinthearea.Thisisalsoreflectedin
that the companies in this study, overall consider
DNKthreatassessments asimportantandreliableas
asourceofinformationformakingsecuritydecisions.
REFERENCES
Aven, T. & Renn, O. 2010. Risk management and
governance: concepts, guidelines and applications.
Berlin:Springer.
Aven, T., Renn, O. & Rosa, E.A. 2011. On the ontological
statusoftheconceptofrisk.SafetyScience49:1074‐1079.
Aven,T.&Veland,H.2012.Riskcommunicationinthelight
ofdifferent
riskperspectives. ReliabilityEngineering&
SystemSafety,110,34‐40.
Aven, T. & Vinnem, J.E. 2007. Risk management with
applications from the offshore petroleum industry.
London:Springer.
Baniela,S.I&Rios,J.V.2012.PiracyinSomalia:AChallenge
to The International Community. The Journal of
Navigation,65:693–710.
Batalden,B.‐
M.,&Sydnes,A.K. 2014.Maritime safetyand
the ISM Code: a study of investigated casualties and
incidents.JournalofMaritimeAffairs,13:3‐25.
Bueger,C.2015.Learningfrompiracy:futurechallengesof
maritime security governance. Global Affairs, 1(1): 33‐
42.
Cox, Jr., L.A. 2008. Some Limitations of “Risk =
Threat ×
Vulnerability × Consequence” for Risk Analysis of
TerroristAttacks.RiskAnalysis,Vol.28(6):1749‐1761.
Fawcett, J.A. 2010. Challenges to apprehension and
prosecution of East African maritime pirates. Maritime
Policy&Management,37(7):753‐765.
Germond,B.2015. Thegeopoliticaldimension of maritime
security.MarinePolicy54:137‐
142.
Hallahan, K., Holtzhausen, D., Ruler, V.B, Verčič, D. &
Sriramesh, K. 2007. Defining Strategic Communication,
InternationalJournalofStrategicCommunication1(1):3‐
35.
Hasan, S.M. & Hassan, D. 2016. Current Arragements to
Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region: An
Evalutation.JournalofMaritimeLawandCommerce
47
(2):171‐217.
Hollnagel,E.2009.TheETTOprinciple.Surrey:Ashgate.
Kasperson, R., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H., Emel, J.,
Golbe, R., Kasperson, J. & Ratick, S. 1988. The Social
Amplification of Risk: A Conseptual Framework. Risk
Analysis8(2):177‐187.
Kaufmann, G. & Kaufmann, A. 2009. Psykologi
i
Organisasjon og Ledelse. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget
Vigmostad&BjørkeAS.
714
Kristiansen, S. 2005. Maritime transportation. Elsevier
Butterworth‐Heinemann.
Mandanda,D.L&Ping,G.2016.TheGulfofGuineapiracy:
ImpactandEffectuvenessof Control Measures.Journal
ofLaw,PolicyandGlobalization55:105‐130.
Onggo,B.S.2017.SocialAmplificationofRiskFramework:
An Agent‐Based Approach. Springer International
Publishing:335‐339.
Onuoha,
F. 2009. Sea piracy and maritime security in the
Horn of Africa: The Somali coast and Gulf of Aden in
perspective.AfricanSecurityStudies18(3):31‐44.
Oltedal,H&Lützhöft,M.2018.ManagingMaritimeSafety.
Routhledge.
Psarros, G., Skjong, Rolf., Eide, Magnus S. (2009). The
acceptability of maritime security
risk. Journal of
TransportationSecurity2:149‐163.
Rasmussen,J.1997.RiskManagementinadynamicsociety:
amodellingproblem.SafetyScience27(3):183‐213.
Reason, J. 1997. Managing the risks of organizational
accidents.Ashgate.
Renn, O. 2008. Risk Governance Coping with the
UncertaintyinaComplexWorld.London:Earthscan.
Rosa, E.A. 1998. Metatheoretical foundations for post‐
normalrisk.JournalofRiskResearch,1(1):15–44.
Shortland,A.&Vothknecht,M.2011.Combating”maritime
terrorism”offthecoastofSomalia.EuropeanJournalof
PoliticalEconomy27:133‐151.
Sjöberg,L.2000.Factorsinriskperception.Riskanalysis, 20
(1),1‐
11.
Smith, C.L & Brooks, D. 2013. Security science. USA:
Elsevier.
Slovic, P. 2000. Perception of risk. P. Slovic (Red.), The
PerceptionofRisk.(p.220‐231).London:Earthscan.
Slovic, P. Fischoff, B. & Lichtenstein, S. 2000. Response
mode, framing and informationprocessing effects. P.
Slovic (Red.), The Perception of Risk. (p.
154‐167).
London:Earthscan.
Vespe, M., Greidanus, H. & Alvarez, M.A. 2015. The
decliningimpactofpiracyin maritimetransport inthe
Indian Ocean: Statistical analysis of 5‐year vessel
trackingdata.MarinePolicy59:9‐15.
Winn, N. & Lewis, A. 2017. European Union anti‐piracy
initiatives in the
Horn of Africa: linking land‐based
counter‐piracy with maritime security and regional
development.ThirdWorldQuarterly38(9):2113‐2128.
