612
4 GOVERNANCEANDDEVELOPMENTOFTHE
PORTANDTERRITORIES
Port city, which serves as a link between local
territoriesandtheglobaleconomy,isaninteractionof
both urban and port systems, giving rise to its
complex and dynamic nature (Xiao & Lam, 2017).
Mutationsininternationaltradehaveforced
portsto
transform and generally move away from the city.
Nowadays, in order to be competitive, ports must
effectively interact within their own territory. This
containsbuildinginfrastructures,coordinatingactors
andcargoflows,creatinglong‐termrelationshipswith
private entrepreneurs and public parties… (Debrie,
Lavaud‐Letilleul, Parola, 2013). So, it
can be more
difficultformunicipalrepresentatives,forinstance,to
understand what are the current trends in the
maritimeindustryandtheneedforportdevelopment
of any magnitude in order to remain competitive.
Thereisarisingseparationofthecityfromtheport,
fuelledby institutionaland organizational rationales
peculiartoeachstakeholderandterritory.
Consequently, despite standardisation of the
modalities of governance according to the landlord
port model (Verhoeven, 2010), there is no single
archetype. For that matter, this model already
distinguishesthehanseaticconfiguration.Thismodel
describes a “governance of proximity”, striking the
rightbalancebetweenprivate
portandLatinpattern
(inwhichtheportisundertheinfluenceoftheState)
(Tourret,2014).Furthermore,eachportisexposedon
a variable basis to political bodies of the different
institutional levels (municipal, regional, provincial,
national, international). Associated to this is the
impactofthemechanismsfordeliveringgoods,
which
aredecisionstakenbytheprivatesector.Thisvariety
of scales and multiplication in the number of
stakeholders make up the general framework in
which the modes of governance of world seaport
systemsfit(Comtois,2014).
In this context, the organization of the urban
project and port project, spatial
planning or the
drafting of urban planning documents reveal the
nature of relations between stakeholders as they
represent the fundamental issues of territorial
development. The geopolitics of urban‐port
developmentisbasedonconflictsofpracticesandis
expressed fairly classically. National, regional or
municipalinterestsareoftenatoddswith
eachother
(Brooks,Cullinane,Pallis,2017).Onthisoccasion,the
imperatives concerning the environment, the
economy, the well‐being of inhabitants, fishing,
logistics and industrial activities, etc., may raise
objections to port development. In the case of
Klaipeda, for example, the development of tourism
andprotectionoflivingconditions,promoted
bythe
municipality, encounter negative externalities and
landrequirementsforportactivity.InthecaseofLe
Havre, the particular interests of the port authority
(duplicated by its land management mission) might
lead it to rein in the economic and industrial
developmentoftheterritory:
“Ihaveastakeholdertoday,the
port,which has areal
land policy which can even conflict with economic
development.Thereareareasofinterestbutwhereindustry
won’tbesetup.Becauseindustrydoesn’tprovideactivity
andasaport,whatintereststheportisdevelopingtraffic.
Sowhatyoufindisaportwith
alandstrategywhichhasto
legitimately provide activity but which in reality won’t
providetheeconomicandespeciallytheindustrialactivity
oftheterritory”.Amanagerofachamberofcommerce
andindustryoftheSeine‐Estuary,April2017
Consequently,theabilityofstakeholderstosetup
regulatoryareas,formal
andinformalarenaslikelyto
reconcilethedifferentprojects,isfundamental.AtLe
Havre, the alignment of port and urban projects
benefits from the “quadripartite” regulation. Strong
local government (municipal and intercommunal)
guarantees that there is mutual recognition between
stakeholders. In the Lithuanian case, the
“interlocking/interconnecting” of projects seems to
sufferfromaformofmanipulationof theportissue
driven by the mayor in order to express his
inclinationstoresistinthefaceofcentralgovernment.
The lack of reciprocal recognition culminates in a
development which would benefit from more
reconciliation:
“Therearetwoofthem[projects]…becausethey
arenot
combinedandtherearetwodistinctdevelopments,notjust
one”.ThemanagerofLithuania’smaritimeacademy.
“The port has its vision, the city has its own…”. A
manager of the public maritime transport company,
April2017
Consequently, urban projects and port projects
will produce games and strategies
which are
illustrated most notably through attempts to
appropriatespaces:
“Thecityisalwaysintimidatingtheportsoastoregain
access to the water, to increase its surface area for port
activities”. A stevedoring company director, a
managerofLJKKA.
Thisunstablegovernance,whereleadershipofthe
local, central
and portauthorities is endlessly under
discussion, accentuates the areas of uncertainty for
economic stakeholders who require institutional
stability:
“We need clear, legitimate boundaries for the
development of the future port of Klaipeda. The port and
the municipality don’t want to come to an agreement…
We’re very willing to determine the
areas for future
developmentforthenext25years”.Anotherstevedoring
companydirector,amanagerofLJKKA.
The partisan dimension (political parties) also
characterizes local governance. Depending on the
context, it can have an impact on the dynamics of
territorial development. In the case of Klaipeda, for
example,nationalbipartite
oppositionscanbeseenat
locallevelintheportsector:
“Inallofthisyoucanseearedolenceofpolitics[…]we
now have a liberal party at the head of the municipal
council. If the director of the port authority were of the
sameparty,Idon’t
thinkwe’dhaveaconflict.Butatthe
moment,thedirectoroftheportauthorityisinthesocial‐
democratpartyandtheheadofthemunicipalcouncilinthe
opposingparty”.Adirectorofa stevedoringcompany,
amanagerofLJKKA.
The drafting of territorial planning documents is
therefore
a considerable political issue. In the two
cases examined, they enable the communal block to
“regain control” in a relationship where the State