291
1 INTRODUCTION
Conducting activities related to oil and natural gas
exploitationinseaareasissubjecttotheriskofmajor
accidents, breakdowns, dangerous situations and
other events. The fact is that the threat posed by
spilledpetroleuminseaareasmayposeathreattothe
life and health
of people not only staying on the
installation but also as a result of contact with the
contaminated natural environment and its
degradationformanyyears.Inaddition,threatsthat
occurred in the marine exploitation fields show that
they negatively affected the regional and global
economyandshapedtheexploration
andproduction
aswellas oil priceson thelocal andglobal markets
[6].
In connection with the above, conducting work
requirestheuseofhighlyadvancedtechnologiesand
high‐classspecialistsworkinginoffshoreindustries.
TheeventsthattookplaceonApril10,2010inthe
Gulf of Mexico began
an international debate on
improvingsafetywhileconductingoilandgaswork.
This resulted in the establishment of numerous
regulations and coherent actions for operators and
owners conducting exploration and production
activities in maritime areas, such as: Directive
2013/30/EU. The introduction of the Directive
2013/30/EU aims to reduce the risk
of hazards by
defining the frameworkof activities for EUMember
States conducting mining operations and, above all,
obliging operators and owners to implement
appropriatesolutionsinthisarea.TheDirectivelays
down minimum requirements in the area of major‐
accidentpreventionrelatedtooilandgasactivitiesin
How to Improve Safety on the Offshore Installations
A.Mrozowska
PolishNavalAcademy,Gdynia,Poland
P.Mrozowski
GdyniaMaritimeUniversity,Gdynia,Poland
ABSTRACT:Revivingis noticeableinthefieldofoilandgasproductionlocatedundertheseabed. The of
f
‐
shoreprojectsarebeingimplemented.Duetothis,theriskofaccidentsateachstageofproductionshouldbe
considered continually. The offshore market, both oil and gas as well as renewable energy, is estimated to
increasesteadilyinthecoming years. Therefore,the operations on the production oilfield
mustbesuitably
protectedateverystageofperformingwork.ThepaperdescribeshowimportantJobSafetyAnalysesarefor
properoperations.ThemainaimofthearticleistoindicatestepsandthebestwayofperformingJSAonboard
oftheoffshoreinstallationtoreducetheriskofemergency.
Theselecteddisastersandmajoraccidentsindicate
thattheconductedactivityisexposedtotheriskofhazardstothenaturalenvironmentandtopeopleatevery
stageofthereservoirexploitation.Theauthorsusetheanalysisofavailableinternationalreports,theexperience
gained while working on different types of
the offshore vessels and installations as well as in the Polish
offshorecompany.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 13
Number 2
June 2019
DOI:10.12716/1001.13.02.04
292
maritimeareas.Theoperatormustshowanumberof
documentsthat must be submittedto the competent
supervisoryauthorityinconnectionwiththeactivities
carriedout.
Inaddition,theoffshorecompanymustestablisha
safetyandenvironmentalmanagementsystemthatis
incorporatedintotheoverall managementsystem. It
shouldbe
notedthatinadditiontotherequirements
of the directives, the entity must comply with a
number of international and local standards, related
totheexplorationandproductionofenergyresources
locatedundertheseabed.
Moreover, improving safety while conducting
workshouldbeconsideredinabroadersense,which
can
alsobeunderstoodasamaritimesafetyculture.
This means transferring more knowledge and
understandingtothematters relatedtoensuringthe
safeoperationsofshipsandallactivitiesrelatedtothe
safe exploitation of the sea resources [4]. Ensuring
safetyaswellasitsimprovingshouldbeconsidered
in terms
of an individual, that is, every installation
employee as well as supervisors and end with the
managersoftheinstallations,ownersandcontroland
supervisorybodies.
The accidents that took place in the marine
exploitation fields indicate that they cannot be
eliminated,butallmeasuresshouldbetakentolimit
themtoamaximum.Theeventsareoftenasequence
ofunfavourableeventsthatprogressslowly,oftenin
the long‐term, or occur suddenly without preceding
warning signals. Therefore, the introduction of
appropriatesafetytoolsinthephaseofplanningwork
and then ensuring proper monitoring of work is
fundamental to
reducing the risk of a dangerous
event.
Thepaperwasbasedprimarilyontheexperience
of the authors gained while working on specialized
offshore ships, work on the installation and in the
ship ownersʹ office, as well as on various legal
regulations,suchas:InternationalSafetyManagement
Code,Directive 2013/30
/EU, local legalregulations,
includingclassifiers,suchas:LloydsListIntelligence,
European Union Commission reports, Health and
SafetyExecutiveUK.
Theaimofthearticleistoindicatesafetysolutions
during routine activities as well as work performed
on the basis of written licences, and to discuss the
proper implementation
of the Job Safety Analysis
(JSA). The paper shows fundamental is proper
planning, implementation and supervision of both
daily and high‐risk activities in implementing
international postulates in relation to improving
safetyintheoffshoreindustry.
2 ANALYSISOFACCIDENTSINTHEOFFSHORE
INDUSTRY
Workintheoffshoreindustryis
consideredasoneof
themostdangerousbecauseofconstantthreatdueto
thetypeofoperationcarriedoutandtheimpactofthe
natural environment on work. Activities must be
carried out throughout the year, both at high
temperatures and extremely low temperatures,
during intense rain as well as strong
winds. This
causesanumberofmajoraccidentswhichoccurredin
theoilfieldsorwasconnectedwithoffshoreactivities.
Thetotalnumberoffixedandfloatinginstallation
is586.
The vast majority of offshore installations in EU
waters are located in the North Sea. In the
Mediterranean Sea, Italy
is the most active Member
Stat followedby Croatia. In the Black Sea, Romania
andBulgariahasanoffshoreoilandgasindustry.In
theBalticSeaonlyPolandproducesoilandgas[7].
In 2016 there were conducted 735 inspections on
the installations. The inspections covered all
departments of the
installation. There were checked
381 installations. In the Baltic Sea there were four
inspectionsandallinstallationswerechecked.During
the inspections, indicated that the works were not
carriedoutinaccordingtotheprocedures.Moreover,
discovered that works were not well‐ planned and
documents were not filled correct. The
inspections
also showed that the crew did not stick to the
completeddocuments, including JobSafetyAnalysis
andPermitToWork,asintegrated.Asaresult,they
can lead to accidents, as evidenced by the statistics
presentedabove.
According to Annual EU report 59,5 % of all
accidentswerecategoryof
unintendedrealize– 59,5
% of the total, 26,2 % connected the loss of well
control(blowout/divertedactivation),7,1%failuresof
safety and environmental critical elements and 4,8
lossofstructuralintegrity.Oneincidentrequiredthe
evacuation of personnel [8]. According to Summary
reportifEuropeanComparisonpublished31October
2018fromlasttenyearstherateoffatalinjuryathas
been decreasing. In Poland according to the annual
assessments report of health and safety issued by
Polish Mining Authorities, in 2018 there were 35
accidentsatwork, there were no fatalities.Itis1,3%
all accidents at work in
mining industry (including
activatesonshoreandatsea)[1].
3 PROVISIONSOFTHEOFFSHOREDIRECTIVE
The following chapterpresents the guidelinesof the
Directive2013/30/EU,which,asalreadymentioned,
wasdeveloped to reduce theriskofmajor accidents
associatedwithoilandgasexploitation.Therefore,it
requires
identification and management of serious
threats, as well as the introduction of effective
reaction strategies in the event of their occurrence
fromtheownersandoperatorsconductingoperations
related to oil and natural gas exploitation. The
specificity of the conducted activities indicates that
they are subject to the risk of a
hazard occurrence.
Therefore, at every stage of the operations it is
necessarytomaintainthesafetyrulesandkeepthem
at the optimal and acceptable level throughout the
entire operation. Ensuring the level of safety is the
resultofthesynthesisofelementswhichinteractwith
each other. These include,
among others, external
factors,technicalfactors,operationalfactors,personal
factors, as well as a number of factors which have
direct and indirect impact on exploitation, but also
supportordisrupttheexploitationprocess.
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The abundance of provisions in the Directive
ensures that first of all every person who conducts
offshore operations will implement uniform
regulations which are imposed on all operators of
offshore installations and also will take appropriate
measures to prevent major accidents, i.e. to provide
complete supervision and responsibility even if
it is
donebyanotheroperator[5].
Therefore, each company has developed and
implemented measures necessary to ensure safe
working conditions, rules for controlling the risk of
occurrence of dangerous events and accidents in
terms of minimizing the occurrence of risk,
eliminationofitsconsequencesaswellasgeneraland
environmental safety. They have been identified in
the functioning systems with safety and
environmental management as well as with other
occupationalhealth andsafety management systems
and quality management systems. Each enterprise
related to oil and gas operations in maritime areas
must have appropriate certificates to meet specific
requirements.
4 SAFETY
ANDENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENTSYSTEMS
Asalreadymentioned,thecompanymustestablisha
safety and environmental management system that
becomes an integral partof the managementsystem
functioning in the enterprise and a part of the
corporatepolicyrelatedtothecontrolofminimizing
theriskrelatedtotheactivities.
A
toolthatimplements,verifiesandimprovesthe
safe operation of installations can be established by
the above‐mentioned regulations such as the ISM
Code, environmental standards, safety regulations,
classifier regulations and Flag State in accordance
with the provisions of point 1.4 of the ISM Code, a
SafetyManagementSystemmustbe
developed‐SMS,
which obliges the owner of the installation and the
operatorastheentityresponsibleforthesafetyofthe
units to establish and implement SMS on the units
andintheoffice[3].
Inthecaseofoffshoreinstallations,thisappliesto
MobileOffshoreDrillingUnitsorfixed
installationsif
the Flag deems it appropriate, as is the case with
platformsintheBalticSeaunderthePolishflag.
It is a system that contains a set of procedures,
instructions and guidelines defined for a given
installation,takingintoconsiderationitsactivities.In
accordance with the provisions of the
ISM Code, a
regulation must be developed and implemented in
thefieldofproceduresandoperationsonboard,both
routine/daily, whichdonotrequirethe issuanceof
appropriatepermittowork,aswellasthoseforwhich
issuing the required permit to work is necessary to
performa
givenoperation.
The regulation of operations rules is aimed at
increasingthelevelofsafetyduringtheexecutionofa
given task on the installation, both for people
performing it, as well as for the environment and
property.
Itisobviousthatthewholecrewhasanimpacton
the
safe operation of the unit. It should be
emphasized that the work of the crew is burdened
with the constant risk of a dangerous event. In
addition,resttakesplaceconstantlyinthesameplace
where the installation`s crew work, it is often loud,
uncomfortable and exposed to unpredictable
situations
threatening health and even life. As a
result, decision making can be limited or slowed
down. Proper management of operations as a
protectionagainstaseriesofadverseeventsrequires
the implementation of procedures defined in the
implementedsystem.
Therefore, the Safety Management System on
board, despite its specific frameworkand
conditions
included in the procedures, should support the
possibility of taking appropriate actions. The
developedproceduresdonotexclude100%ofhuman
error or device failure. There are another safety
measure, which primarily causes an increase in
awareness of hazards during operations, and thus
improvement of work safety, such as
risk
assessments,analysisofriskassessments,controlof
whole work process, safety meetings and close up
reviewofworksteps.
5 THERULESOFSAFEOPERATIONSON
INSTALLATIONS
Performing operationson installationsis carried out
in accordance with specific requirements based on
maritime and mining regulations, defined, among
others, by the
International Association of Drilling
Contractors,theSocietyofPetroleumEngineersand,
firstofall,byʺGoodDrillingPracticeʺ.Serviceaswell
as maintenance and inspections of individual
components are also carried out in accordance with
documentedproceduresandinspectionbasedonthe
PreventiveMaintenanceSystem(PMSystem).
Thispart
ofthestudywillcoverthestagesofsafe
executionofnon‐routineoperationswhichmayresult
in emergencies. Figure 1 presents a set of formal
requirementsnecessarytoperformoperations.These
operations must be performed on the basis of a
written PermitTo Work (PTW).A work permitis a
documentissuedbythepersonsupervisingthework
everytimeitisneeded.Examplesofoperationsareas
follows:
workonhydrocarbontransmissionsystems,
hotwork,
pressuresystemchecking,
workatheights,
outboardoperations,
cargotransferoperationswithacrane,
operationsinenclosed
spaces,
electricaloperations(electricalisolation),
underwater operations performed with the
participationofadiver.
The document is divided into several parts,
containing, among others, a description of the
operations, identification of potential hazards,
applied protection measures, comments and
signaturesofallparticipantsoftheoperations.Dueto
thefact
that there isa risk ofaccidentor dangerous
situation,theso‐calledJobSafetyAnalysis(JSA)isan
294
integral part of such a document (before a work
permit is issued). JSA is a tool used for systematic
assessmentofhazardsbeforethecommencementofa
given operation and determination of activities
eliminating or limiting identified hazards for
individual stages, both during the preparation and
executionofagiven
operation.TheJSAsetshouldbe
specified for all operations performed on the
installationandthegenericJSAshouldbecompleted
incaseofthelackofinformation.
Figure1.Presentsasetofformalrequirementsnecessaryto
performoperations.
ApartoftheworkpermitisalsotheToolBoxTalk
carriedoutbythesupervisors.Itaimstodiscusshow
to perform a given job, to indicate hazards and
mechanismsthatreducetheriskofanaccidentduring
work, assignment of operations and other safety
issuesduringtheoperations.
Thisconversationtakes
placebeforethecommencementofoperationsandthe
checklistisattachedtotheworkpermit.
6 ANALYSISOFTHEVALIDITYOFTHEJSA
DEVELOPMENT
The JSA development is required when the hazards
and risks associated with the operations are not
sufficiently defined and controlled through the
applicable
procedures, instructions and
permits/licences (including work permits,
work/positioninstructions,technologicalinstructions,
manualsformachinesanddevices,etc.).Itsaimisto
reduce the risk of an accident.Therefore, JSA is an
important element of safety and is developed by a
teamconsistingof,amongothers:
workcontractor,
the person
allowing to perform operations
(Supervisior)
HSEOfficer,
specialists in particular industries depending on
thescopeofwork,
and other persons designated by the person
responsibleforJSAorwhoseworkitconcerns.The
JSAsequenceconsistsofthefollowingstepsandis
showninFigure2.
The
JSAorganizermanagesallthetasksrelatedto
the JSA implementation. He is responsible for
collecting all necessary data and specific conditions
for safe work performance, identifying people
involved in the JSA development, calling a meeting
andmakingappropriateentries.
Figure2.Stepsofplanningwork.
ThetasksoftheJSAteaminclude,amongothers:
division of the planned work into individual
stagesintheorderoftheirexecution.Ifpossible,it
isadvisable to inspectthe place/ areawhere the
workwillbecarriedout,
discussionofindividualstagesofwork,
identification
of hazards related to work
performed and determination of their impact by
estimating risk levels before and after applying
riskeliminationmeasuresandmethods,
determination and recording of each activity of
operationstolimitandcontrolrisks,togetherwith
assigning responsibility for individual actions,
295
while maintaining the principle of risk reduction
toapossiblylowerlevelatanacceptablelevel,
identification of personal protective equipment
(PPE) required during the operation and
determinationofothersolutionsreducingtherisk
andsecuringwork,
preparationofJSA
submissionofJSAforapprovalbythe
manager,or
a designated person in the area where the
operationswillbeperformed.
The following issues are considered when
developingaJSA:
1 Have operations and hazards associated with
them, as well as the method of performing
operations been recorded in the appropriate
procedures and / or instructions or
does the
implementation require a derogation from the
establishedrules?
2 Arethereanyderogationsintheplannedworkin
relationtotheestablishedprocedures?
3 Have all hazards and risks related to work been
includedintheworkpermit?
4 Areall riskfactors determinedand controlled by
theWork
Permit?
5 Havetherebeenaccidents/potentiallyaccidental
events,failuresinthistypeofwork?
6 Istheworkconsidered to beacomplex job, with
an increased risk, or will be performed by many
subcontractors?
7 Do employees have adequate experience in
performingtheplannedwork?
8 Are
newdevicesorworkmethods,whichhavenot
beenrecordedintheappropriateproceduresand/
orinstructions,usedforoperations?
7 CONDITIONSFORSAFEOPERATIONS.AREAS
OFSPECIALSENSITIVITY(WEAKPOINTS)
WHENPLANNINGWORK–DISCUSSION
Duringawell‐plannedandpreparedaction, the risk
of an accident is reduced
to an acceptable level.
However,tomaintainthislevelthroughouttheentire
workingtime,itisnecessarytofollowtheestablished
rules. In case of derogations, various types of
hazardoussituations andaccidentsmay occur.They
may be causedby errors made at the early stage of
workplanning,including
thedevelopmentofJSAand
theissuing of workpermits. Figure3 presentsweak
points (areas of special sensitivity) which appear at
theplanningstageofoperations.
Ifthe operations startwith errorsor weak points
occur, the work stage is exposed to the risk of an
accident and the occurrence
of further weaknesses
that may lead to a sequence of adverse events, and
thustheaccident.
Inthenextstage,which is the implementationof
operations, the biggest mistake can be a lack of or
incompleteJSA.Workpermitsmayalsonotbeissued
orbe incomplete. Asa result,
the commencement of
operationstakesplacewithoutproperregulationsand
preparation of the job sites, for example: bunkering
the fuel without the preparation of the place and
withoutapprovalofthepermit,andthecrewexplains
thateverythingwillbearrangedsoon,thattheyknow
whattodo.
Figure3.Weakpointsofplanningworks.
Itmayalsoturnoutthatthepermitwasissuedbut
thesupervisordidnotchecktheplaceofworkwhich
wasnotproperlyprepared.Otherissuesinclude:
Failuretofollowproceduresandarrangements,
Lack of established communication routes,
safeguardsandPPE,
Lackoftheworkleader‐a
personwhoknowsthe
job,aswellasalackofknowledgeofthemachine
operation / performing the work‐performing
workbyoperatorswithinsufficientexperience,
Failure to follow the manufacturerʹs instructions
andgoodpractice
Not informing other departments / people about
conducting operations, interruption at
work or
completionofwork,
The personsupervising theoperationssupervises
several operations, e.g. operations in two tanks
controlledbyone supervisor.Anotherexampleis
hot work without the proper location of fire
protective equipment and without the person
supervisingtheworkorswitchingoffthedetectors
intheplace
ofwork.
Workpermitnotincluded,
Overloadofoperations,
Anewcrewmemberjoinedtheoperationswithout
getting acquainted with JSA and specificity of
operations,e.g.reloading.Ifhewantstojoininthe
operations,heisobligedtocontactthesupervisor,
understand the scope of work,
approve the
requirements and regulations with signature and
thenproceedtowork.
7.1 ImprovingtheeffectivenessofJSA
The solutions introduced are intended to eliminate
irregularities and errors at an early stage of work.
However, the solutions that have already been
implementedarenotalwayscorrect.Theanalysesand
296
inspectionoftheappliedsolutionsshouldbecarried
outinordertoimprovethequalityofwork,identify
weak points, eliminate recurring errors and thus
improvesafety.Oneofthewaystoachievethisisto
conduct training sessions in the form of an open
discussion aimed at exchanging views,
applied
practices and experiences among installation
operators as well as specialists from various
industries or experts. During such discussions
everyone has the right to express themselves, and
indeed it is welcome if they get involved in the
debate,becauseitisrelatedtoaveryimportantissue,
namelytheincrease
intheawarenessoftheworking
environmentandtherisksthatmayoccurinit.
Owingtotheawarenessofhazards,employeesare
indirectlyforcedtomakecommentsandinformabout
irregularities. In accordance with the provisions of
Directive2013/30/EUsuchapproachtoworkmustbe
appreciated and rewarded.
The company must
develop a motivational system for employees to
detect irregularities, minimize the risk of accidents
andrewardthemforsuchattitudes.Theimplemented
systems may include various solutions, which
include:electronicsafetyandhealth atworkportals,
where each employee can individually report
dangeroussituations,periodicemployeeevaluations,
as well as incentive systems, with specified prize
amounts[2].
Anotherimportantfactorinimprovingthequality
of JSA is the analysis as to whether the work has
alreadybeencarriedoutandwhethertherehasbeen
anaccidentwhileperformingtheoperations.Ifso,the
accident report must be discussed
in detail and the
report results must be considered. An accident does
not have to concern a given installation / area on
which the work is planned, but it could have taken
placesomewhereelse.
Duringthemeetingdevotedtohealthandsafetyat
work,crewof the installationswere
askedquestions
about their personal application of principles
concerning the safe performance of operations. 34
participantstookpartinthesurvey.
Thefirstquestionwas:Doyousignworkpermits
before you start work? 100% employees responded
positively. The next question was related to getting
acquainted with the work permit. 79%
of the
respondents said ‘yes’, whereas 21% admitted that
theydidnotgetacquaintedwithPTW.
Then the issue of Tool Box Talk was discussed.
72% responded positively and said they were
participating in the talks and21% saidthey didnot
participatebecausetheydidnothavetimeor
heardit
many times, while 7% said they did not remember.
The employees were also asked the question: Have
they ever haddoubtsabout the safety at work?The
response of 39% was positive and of 61% was
negative.Intermsofdoubtstherespondentsreferred
mainly to a large number
of operations they had to
perform, lack of proper supervision and
communicationduringoperations.
Theconductedsurveysindicatethefunctioningof
the documentation during the performance of
operations,however,it is not fully sufficient. Such a
shortsurveyshowsthatsafetyissuesarefunctioning,
but they require continuous improvement. The
authors of the article will continue the analysis of
safetyonseaunitsintheirfurtherresearch.
8 CONCLUSIONS
The implementation of the above elements of
maintainingthelevelofsafetyontheship,aswellas
increasingitslevel,isestablishedbythemanagerand
mustbestrictlyobservedby
theshipʹscrewmembers.
Failuretomeettheformalrequirementsmaycausean
accidentandresultinthelackofpossibilitytorecreate
thesequenceofeventsthatledtoit.Thefunctioning
safety management system is primarily used to
identifysuchactivitiesearlyenoughtotakenecessary
actions
ortoavoidtheiroccurrence.
Despite the use of work permits for many years,
the occurrence of dangerous events or potentially
dangerous events has been observed in drilling. In
ordertoincrease work safety, additionalanalyses of
the safety level of individual operations have been
carriedout, byʺbreakingʺ individual operations
into
sequencesandpresentingthecorrectmethodsoftheir
execution, and presenting the hazards occurring
whileperformingtheseoperations.
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[1]Assessment of work safety, mining rescue and general
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the councilof 12 of June2013 onsafety of offshore oil
andgasoperationsandamendingDirective2004/35/EC.
L.178/66official
JournaloftheEU28.6.2013.
[3]International Safety Management Code ISM Code and
guidelines on implementation of the ISM Code 2014
Edition,London,IMOLondon2014.
[4]Królikowski, A. Mrozowska, A. Wróbel, R. 2015 Safety
cultureinmanagementsystemofsafeoperationofships
and pollution prevention, Zeszyty Wydziału
Nawigacyjnegono30.
[5]Mrozowska, A. 2018. Review of the provisions of the
European Parliament and of the Council Directive
2013/30/UEonsafetyofoffshoreoilandgasoperations.
Polityka Energetyczna – Energy Police Journal, AGH,
2018,Volume21issue4pages
[6]Offshore Statistic & Regulatory Activity Report 2017,
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UK
[7]Annual Report on the safety of offshore oil and gas
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