755
1 INTRODUCTION
The industry based on cruise ship tourism, born in
1958,hasexperiencedasignificantgrowthduringthe
90s (Monedero 2014). According to Cruise Lines
International Association (CLIA, 2017), about 24
million passengers, plus a high number of crew
membersinthistypeofvesselsinceitmustinclude
catering and entertainment services. The rise on the
number of cruises brings along a bigger concern
about their safety, taking into account how several
studies point at its worsening at this type of vessel
(Det Norske Veritas, 2016; Vukonic, Bielic & Russo
2016). This type of accident in cruiser ships also
represents considerable damage to the companyʹs
image, as studied by Mileski, Wang & Beacham
(2014). The most relevant incident was the Costa
Concordiadisasterin2012(Vidmar&Perkovič2015).
On the other hand, Eliopoulou, Apostolos &
Voulgarellis(2016)believethatactive(shipʹssteering)
and pasive (design and technology) safety measures
have been very efficient at reducing both frequency
and severity of accidents and their consequences
respectively; although it is essential to keep control
overcruisershipsbytheirflagstates,eitherdirectly
or through Authorized Organizations designated by
them(Rodrigo2015).
Because of the proliferation of Open Registers
(Piniella2009),severalinternationalagreements give
a portʹs countryʹs government the right to inspect
ships called within their waters to make sure they
Initial Approach to Safety on Cruises Ships: Structure of
the Sector
A.
Arranz,F.Piniella&M.M. Cerbán Jiménez
UniversityofCádiz,Cadiz,Spain
ABSTRACT:Theimportanceofsafetyonshipsisbeyonddispute,however,therearesometypesofshipfor
whichthismatterdeservesspecialconsideration.Oneofthesetypesofshipsarepassengercruises,duetothe
highnumberofhumanlivesthattravelonboard.
Forthisreason,webelievethataparticularstudyofsafetyincruiseshipsisneeded.
ThePortStateControl(PSC)mechanismofcoastalStatestotrytoensuresecurityintheirterritorialwatersin
respectofthetrafficofforeignshipsmay,apriori,beanimpartialandreliableindicatorofsecurity,according
tothedeficienciesitdetectinshipsandthedetentionsthatcarriedout.
Thus,wewillusethePSCinspectionsinthispaper.
ThesourceofinformationaboutPSCinspectionsisEQUASIS,whichistheinformationsystemofthemajority
ofregionalagreementsPSCandUSCoastGuard.
The study period is 5 years (2012‐2016) and the cruise ships analysed are belonging to the International
AssociationofCruiseLines(CLIA).
The objective of this work is an initial approach to safety on cruise ships and the structure of the sector
accordingseveralfactors(company,cruisetype,ageandpavilion).
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 12
Number 4
December 2018
DOI:10.12716/1001.12.04.15
756
keepin lineaccordingtosaidagreementsthrough a
regional regime of Memorandum about Port State
Control (PSC), the most important of which are the
ones signed in Paris, Tokyo and Viña del Mar
(Rodríguez‐Díaz 2016; Rodrigo 2015). Unfortunately,
for a long time the Open Registers have been
associated
totheconceptofʺFlagofConvenienceʺby
the International Transport Federation (ITF), (Barton
1999).
It is rare to find specific studies analyzing the
causesofanaccidentof a cruise ships, compared to
how much is published about other types of vessel.
There is no investigation yet that is
wide enough
about diagnosis (finding key factors or ships´s
deficienciesthatmightposearisk)andevaluationof
safety specifically about cruiser ships, which would
bethestartingpointwhen planning how to prevent
future accidents, as described by Vukonic, Bielic &
Russo(2016).
Ourglobalstudywillattempttoanalyze
thesafety
levels of cruiser ships using PSC inspection
deficiencies as indicators. On this article we will
presentafirstapproachtothestructureofthissector,
and the first conclusions that we have reached on
whatisaworkinprogress.
We looked directly at cruiser ships owned by
companiesthatoperateonaglobalscale,leavingout
smaller,regionalcompanies,companiesdedicated to
rivercruises,aswellthosewithtonnageunder10000
GT, since their characteristics and usage are quite
distinct (mostly private use or luxury, some sail‐
powered).
2 MATERIALANDMETHODS
Thelackofsourcesabout
thistopicforcedustomake
an exploration study first, to be able to make a
descriptivestudylater.
Thedatafromcruisershipsunderourstudy(IMO
number, Call sign, flag, gross tonnage and age),
inspections, deficiencies and detentions when
applicable,wereobtainedfromEQUASIS(Electronic
Quality Shipping Information
System) database,
whichwascreatedafterthe1998LisbonInternational
Conference, promoted by the EU or the USA Coast
Guardamongothers.
The chosen samples include the entirety of the
population,sinceitisrelativelysmall;besides,cruiser
ships are unequally distributed among companies
regardingtheirnumber,nettonnage,routesand
flag,
whichmeansthatanyothersamplingmethodwould
skewtheresults.
Thetimeintervalcoveredinourstudycomprises5
years(2012‐2016).
Aboutdeficiencies,wehaveworkedfollowingthe
categoriesandsub‐categoriesstablishedbyEQUASIS
ontheirdatabase.Inanycase,mostdeficiencies and
their categories are
very similar on each regional
system.
Onceconsidered,allthese deficiencies areplaced
on a results table according to their category and
numberofincidences.
3 RESULTSANDDISCUSSION
3.1 ShippingcompaniesfocusedonCruiseIndustry
As presented on table I and figure 1, this is the
distributionofthefleet
amongshippingcompaniesby
numberandsizeoftheirships.Wecanobservethat
thegroupofshippingcompaniesfocusedonmaritime
cruises with global nature, according to CLIAʹs
classification (2016), was formed by a total of 18
companies. The fleet managed by these companies
comprises178cruiseships
(39.73%).Lookingattheir
sharesof the market, twocompaniesrepresent14 %
each (Carnival y Royal Caribbean International).
Following them, 6 companies hold an important
segmentcoveringnearlyhalfofthisfleet(47.8%),and
the rest (24.2 %) is completed by 10 smaller
companies.
Table1.Distributionofthestudiedfleetbycompany
_______________________________________________
COMPANYNUMBER PERCENTAGE
OFCRUISES OFTHEFLEET
_______________________________________________
Carnival2514.0%
RoyalCaribbeanInternational 2514.0%
PrincessCruises179.6%
CostaCrociereSpa158.4%
HollandAmericaLine147.9%
MSCCruceros147.9%
NorwegianCruiseLine 137.3%
Aida126.7%
CelebrityCruises95.1%
OceaniaCruises63.4
%
SilverseaNewBuildSsix 63.4%
DisneyCruiseLine42.2%
Ponant42.2%
RegentSevenSeasCruises 42.2%
SeabournCruiseLine42.2%
Cunard31.7%
AzamaraClubCruises21.1%
PaulGauguinCruises10.6%
_______________________________________________
Source:OwnelaborationfromEQUASISdata
We had to discard Paul Gauguin Cruises and their only
cruise ship, the Paul Gauguin, from the analytical data,
since it is clearly not representative, because it is a cruise
ship older than 20 years with a single inspection
acknowledged.
3.2 Typologyofthefleet
Themaintypeofship(Fig.1)isthecruisewecalled
ʺbigʺ (79 ships representing 44.4 %) although the
proportion of the sum of mega‐cruisers of all three
series(1st,2ndand3rdgenerations)areveryclose(68
ships, 38.2 %). Of lesser
importance, medium‐sized
cruisers(24ships,13.5%),andasaminoritythesmall
cruises(3.9 %). Thisstructureofthefleetdependent
on typology is not surprising, since maritime
transport in other sectors like container ships has
evolved towards gigantism, searching for a higher
profitability, increasing offer and optimizing
expenditure.
757
Figure1.Distributionofthestudiedfleetbycruisetype
Source:OwnelaborationfromEQUASISdata
Lookingcloselyattheirage(TableII),sinceservice
lifeofcruisersisestimated ata wide rangebetween
20 and 30 years (Dinu & Ilie 2015), we can say that
thisfleetispredominantlymodern,with105cruisers
under half the age considered to be their maximum
service life (nearly
59 %) and 51 cruisers in their
ʺmaturityʺ, without having reached their minimum
servicelife(morethan28%).Only22arewithinthe
finalintervaloftheirservicelife(slightlyabove10%)
and4ofthemabove25yearsold(around2%).
Table2.Distributionofthestudiedfleetbyshipagerange
_______________________________________________
CRUISEAGE NUMBEROF PERCENTAGE
(years)CRUISES OFTHEFLEET
_______________________________________________
<52614.6%
5‐94022.5%
10‐143921.9%
15‐195128.7%
20‐241810.1%
≥2542.2%
_______________________________________________
Source:OwnelaborationfromEQUASISdata
Regarding their flags (Fig. 2), companies prefer
openregistersfortheircruisers,withashareof72%
of the fleet (Bahamas, Panama, Bermuda, Malta and
Marshall Islands). Exceptionally, Italy and
Netherlands hold a moderately notable number of
registers(15,2y7,9%);buttherestbarelygobeyond
2%
(likeinFrance,theUKandUSA).
Figure2.Distributionofthestudiedfleetbyflag
Source:OwnelaborationfromEQUASISdata
3.3 Firstapproachtostudysafetydeficiencies
Thenumberandratioofdeficienciesandinspections
arepresentedas follows: companies (Table III), type
ofcruiseronaverage(TableIV),agerange(TableV),
and flag on average (Table VI), all of them in
decreasingorderbyratio,exceptfortheage
range.
Table4. Number and ratio of deficiencies and inspections
bytypeofcruise
_______________________________________________
Cruisetype Average Average Average Ratio
Age InspectionsDeficiencies
_______________________________________________
Medium‐size14.5 21.023.01.09
Cruises
SmallCruises12.1 16.916.70.99
BigCruises14.7 16.916.30.97
Mega‐Cruises4.5 8.16.30.78
2ndGeneration
Mega‐Cruises9.4 14.010.20.73
1stGeneration
Mega‐Cruises5.4 8.85.80.66
3rdGeneration
_______________________________________________
Source:OwnelaborationfromEQUASISdata
Table3.Numberandratioofdeficienciesandinspectionsbycompany
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
COMPANYAVERAGEGT AVERAGEAGE INSP.DEFIC. RATIO
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
PaulGauguinCruises19170.020.0155.00
AzamaraClubCruises30277.017.044721.64
Cunard110287.310.3761001.32
RegentSevenSeasCruises43623.812.3801031.29
SilverseaNewBuildSix27913.014.31261531.21
HollandAmericaLine71620.914.0
2993451.15
RoyalCaribbeanInternational134501.813.03583861.08
PrincessCruises106474.212.73603560.99
NorwegianCruiseLine106821.211.21751620.93
OceaniaCruises42227.313.81691520.90
CelebrityCruises118665.911.11801560.87
CostaCrociereSpa92227.8
13.61741290.74
Ponant10968.05.071520.73
DisneySruiseLine106884.812.068490.72
MSCCruceros108035,38.6108730.68
Carnival97799.714.63682230.61
SeabournCruiseLine34824.05.572360.50
Aida72258.78.390400.44
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source:OwnelaborationfromEQUASISdata
758
Table5. Number and ratio of deficiencies and inspections
byagerange
_______________________________________________
Agerange Average Average Average Ratio
(years) Age InspectionsDeficiencies
_______________________________________________
<51.73 122800.66
5‐97.00 6083540.58
10‐1412.23 6295370.85
15‐1916.98 111012131.09
20‐2421.67 3053621.19
≥2526.00 45461.02
_______________________________________________
Source:OwnelaborationfromEQUASISdata
Table6. Number and ratio of deficiencies and inspections
byflag
_______________________________________________
FlagAverage Average Average Ratio
Age InspectionsDeficiencies
_______________________________________________
Netherlands 13.26 21.3624.641.15
Bermuda 12.81 23.6926.441.12
Bahamas 12.00 15.8715.951.01
Malta5.00 17.9316.710.93
Marshall 12.00 24.7121.860.88
Islands
France 11.22 17.7513.000.73
Italy10.64 9.786.260.64
Panama 14.00 11.907.000.59
UK11.40 14.258.250.58
USA10.50 0.000.000.00
_______________________________________________
Source:OwnelaborationfromEQUASISdata
Flagswithredshadowsareflagsidentifiedasconvenientby
theITFatURL:http://www.itfglobal.org/es/transport‐
sectors/seafarers/in‐focus/flags‐of‐convenience‐campaign/
(checkedon28/12/2018)
To have a first approach to the discussion of the
previous data, we firstly calculated the ratio of
deficienciesbyinspectioninthewhole fleet.Weuse
in this case the data from Paris MoU, using the
averagebetween2012and2016,whichhappenstobe
2.53,tocompareitwith
thedataobtainedfromthese
companiesthroughEQUASIS.Thisway,excludingas
anabnormalityPaulGauguinCruisesbecauseoftheir
insignificant representation, we can consider that
companies have a good behavioral index. The
company with the highest relative number of
deficiencies,Azamara ClubCruises, has a 1.64 ratio.
The rest
is placed within a low range, with two of
them notable for being under 0.50 (Seabourn Cruise
LineandAida).
4 CONCLUSIONS
Wemustkeepinmindthatthispublicationismerely
presenting the initial data of an investigation
programmed to have a deeper analysis and
prospective,plusawideningof
thehistoricalrecord.
Theindustrybasedoncruiseships,comprisedby
a total of 448 ships, is divided in two big groups:
those specialized on specific regions, and those
operatingworldwide.Bothofthemrunmaritimeand
fluvialcruises,althoughmostfocusinonetypeorthe
other. Equally, luxurious
or exclusive cruises are a
very specific business that can fall within either
category.
In particular, the worldwide, non‐exclusive,
maritime cruise which is object to this study, is
controlled by a limited number of companies that
exploitaroundtwohundredshipsofthistype,which
represent two fifths of the
whole fleet, unevenly
distributed. Not enough to speak of industry
concentration, but there is a remarkable unbalance
showing three quarters distributed among eight
companiesand theremainingquarter sharedamong
tensmallercompanies.
Cruises, just like the rest of maritime transport,
tendtobegiganticandmore than 80%
ofthem are
classifiedasbigormega‐cruisers,thelatterevenmore
numerous than the former, each new generation
increasingtheirgrosstonnageby50.000GT.
Regardingtheirage,with60%ofthefleetunder
halfoftheir servicelife, andwith only10 %attheir
finalstages,
wecanconsiderthemyoung.
We compared the ratio of deficiencies and
inspections made on the cruiser ships of our study
withthosemadeonmerchantships,whichingeneral
show a x1.5 higher ratio against the worst cruiser,
apparently meaning that this industryʹs reliability is
veryhigh.Said
reliabilitycouldhappenasaresultof
theʺyouthfulnessʺ of cruisers, although it could be
lesseneddependingontheirflag.
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