569
Table1.Riskassessmentfactors
_______________________________________________
LikelihoodSeverity Risk
_______________________________________________
HD CPA TCPA Stationary Speed
nm nm hours
_______________________________________________
10 1 210.05
5 0.510.5‐NO 52
2 0.25 0.51040
0.50.10.25 1.0‐YES 201600
_______________________________________________
These factors form multi‐dimensional RISK.
However, to get better visual representation lets
define HD = 1, CPA = 1 for a stationary target and
calculatetheRISKmatrix.
RISKlevelscanbedescribedasfollows:
BLACK(risk>400)–immediateactionsrequired
toavoidanaccidentortominimize
itsconsequences.
Speed has to be reduced in any possible way.
Assessment of possible catastrophic consequences to
bedone.
BLUE(risk>200)–immediateactionsrequiredto
avoid an accident or to minimize its consequences.
Speedhastobereducedinanypossibleway.
RED (risk > 100) –
Speed has to be reduced to a
levelwhereadditionalmeansofsteering(retractable
or side thrusters) can be utilized. As soon as safe
heading is achieved, assess options for emergency
anchorage. Try to regain the steering with main
meansofpropulsion.
YELLOW (risk < 100) – additional means of
steering
canbeutilized.Assessoptionsforemergency
anchorage. Try to regain the steering with main
meansofpropulsion.
Table2.Riskmatrix:lossofsteering
_______________________________________________
RiskTCPA,hours
1 0.75 0.50.25
_______________________________________________
Speed 1 1 1.33 2 4
knots 5 25 33 50 100
10 100 133 200 400
20 400 533 800 1600
_______________________________________________
4 POWERMANAGEMENTANDBLACKOUT
PREVENTION
Thereisavarietyofpossiblefaultsthatmayhappen
tothesteerablethrusters(IMCA2011&2012),which
goesallthewayfrompowergenerationtoadirected
thrustdelivery.
Thisstipulatesthesecondstageofofficerstraining,
dedicated to gaining a power
management skill for
the engine staff. This also includes changeover and
synchronization procedures between generators and
systemrestartafterblackout.
Generallyspeaking,ablackoutcanbeavoidedby
utilizingtwo different approaches(IMCA2000).The
first one is used on conventional DP II/III class
vessels, which usually have from four
to six
generators. During DP operations, a vessel usually
hasan open busbartie breaker,which splits power
delivery in two equal groups, feeding two separate
groupsofthrusters.
Suchapproachadvantagesareeliminationoftotal
blackoutincaseofanysingleelectricalormechanical
fault,greaterreliabilityandlessdiesel‐generator(DG)
restarting time in case of partial blackout.
Disadvantages are high fuel consumption at low
loads, low power plant flexibility, in addition
blackout on one side leads to inability to operate a
certaingroupofthrustersandapparentlyreducesthe
steeringability.
The second way of providing electrical
power
continuitywithoutsplittingbusbarsistheapplication
ofpowerplantadvancedprotectionsystem.
The primary function of protection schemesis to
isolatefaultycircuitsandlimitdamagetoequipment.
Thegreatestthreatto any systemisthe shortcircuit
fault, which can alter system operation in a sudden
and
possibly violent manner. Electromagnetic forces
generated by large fault currents can cause
mechanical damage to transformer and machine
windingsandtheintenseheatassociatedwitharcing
has caused fire at fault locations. In DP and other
operations,evengreateremphasismustbeplacedon
the need to maintain supplies for
propulsion. The
arguments for and against operating with bus
sections connected have been discussed earlier and
arestillthesubjectofmuchdebate.Operationofthe
power system with bus sections connected offers
manyoperationaladvantageswithonlyslightriskof
complete blackout. The risk cannot be considered
negligible, however, and
operators choosing to take
advantage of this mode of operation may wish to
considerinstallingoneofthehigherspecificationbus‐
bar protection methods. There are four types of
protectionthatperformthistask:
zoneprotection;
directionalprotection;
protectionbytimediscrimination;
opticalarcdetection.
Suchapproachallowsthepowerplanttobemore
flexibleinmostofknownships’operationmodesbut
requires more sophisticated and expensive power
management and protection equipment comparing
thesplitbusbarsoperation.
Engine team actions in case of full or partial
blackoutaregivenon
figure2.
5 EMERGENCYSTEERING
Inawiderscopeoftheproblemitisnotonlysolenoid
steering from the thrusters’ gear compartment, but
alsoallpossibleemergencyactionstakenbydeckand
engine departments, and communication between
them.Whichisthethirdstageoftraining.Thisincludes:
control transfer from autopilot to feedback and
non‐followupmodesonthebridge;
fullorpartialcontroltransferfromBridgetoECR
(onegroupofthrustersiscontrolledontheBridge,
another–inECR);
troubleshootingandequipmentrestartontheECR
side;
ensuring steerage and maneuverability or
emergencyanchoringontheBridgeside;
transferringthecontrolbacktoEngine room.