251
1 INTRODUCTION
Transportsecuritysystemsarehighlyequippedwith
different kinds of appliances, that are subject of
continuous miniaturization, caused by rapid
evolutiontakingplaceinthefieldofelectronics.The
appliancesareusedinstationaryandmobileobjects,
i.e. fire detection systems (microprocessor detectors,
control panels, power modules). Electronic
componentsandsystemsoperateunderlowervoltage
supplyandreducedpowerconsumption.
Therefore, electromagnetic fields of lower
intensity, can interfere with electronic devices,
causing disruptions in transport security systems
functionality, or even resulting with their failure –
Fig.1.
Figure1.Electromagneticinterferencesinarailwayarea
Following safety states of transport security
systemscanbedistinguished,takingintoaccountthe
impact of interferences [Dyduch & Paś & Rosiński
2011,Paś2015b,Rosiński2015a]:
1 transport security system not affected by inside
and outside interferences – the intensity of
interferences too low, their permitted level not
Low Frequency Electromagnetic Interferences Impact
on Transport Security Systems Used in Wide Transport
Areas
P.Dziula
GdyniaMaritimeUniversity,Gdynia,Poland
J
.Pas
M
ilitaryUniversityofTechnology,Warsaw,Poland
ABSTRACT: The article presents the impact of electromagnetic interferences of low frequency range, on
transport security systems used in wide transport areas. Intended and unintended (stationary and mobile),
electromagneticinterferences,impactingonitemsandcomponentsconstitutingtransportsystematwidearea
(seaport,railway,etc.),cause
changesofitsvulnerability,resistanceanddurability.Diagnosticsofinterferences
sources(amplitude,frequencyrange,radiationcharacteristics,etc.),appearingwithintransportenvironment,
andusage of appropriate technical solutions of systems (i.e.shielding, reliabilitystructures), allows forsafe
implementationofsafetysurveillanceofhumanbeings,propertiesandcommunicationmea ns.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 12
Number 2
June 2018
DOI:10.12716/1001.12.02.04
252
exceeded, the system stay in its actual operation
state;
2 theappliances,operatingwithintransportsecurity
systems, automatically compensate interferences
by means of passive or active filters, or other
devicessecuringtheirfunctionality;
3 theappearanceofinterferencescausestransitionof
transport security system, from the state of full
operational
ability, into the state of restricted
operationalability–returntothefullabilitystate
demands intervention of service [Rosiński 2015b,
Siergiejczyk&Paś&Rosiński2016,Siergiejczyk&
Paś&Rosiński2015];
4 the appearance of electromagnetic interferences
within transport security system results with its
partial
orcompletedamage–stateofunreliability
ofsafety.
Toanalyseelectromagneticinterferencesinfluence
on transport security systems, following criteria
shouldbetakenintoaccount:
system’s resistance to interferences, defined as
ability to continue proper functionality of its
appliances,underinterferencesappearance;
system’s susceptibilityto interferences – meaning
response
of functioning system to inside and
outsideinterferences;
system’s durability to interferences – understood
as its ability to maintain initial conditions until
interferencesdiscontinue.
According to European Directive 89/336/EEC,
concerning electromagnetic compatibility, all
components of transport security systems should
ensureappropriatelevelofresistancetointerferences,
allowing them to
maintain proper functionality in
particular electromagnetic environment [Ott 2009].
This applies not only to electronic security systems,
but also to others, that are built of electronic
components[Krzykowska&Siergiejczyk&Rosiński
2015, Siergiejczyk & Krzykowska & Rosiński 2015a,
Siergiejczyk & Krzykowska & Rosiński 2015b,
Siergiejczyk&Rosi
ński&Dziula&Krzykowska2015,
Weintrit&Dziula&Siergiejczyk&Rosiński2015].
Transportsecuritysystems,usedonthevastareas,
usually operate in hard conditions, caused by
fluctuations of air temperature and humidity,
precipitation, climate changes, water intrusion,
vibrations [Burdzik & Konieczny & Figlus 2013],
serviceabilities
[Laskowski&Łubkowski&Pawlak&
Stańczyk2015].Sourcesofintentionalelectromagnetic
fieldsappearinginportsandaboardships(radarand
radio‐navigational stations, stationary and mobile
radio‐communication stations, etc. [Kaniewski &
Lesnik&Susek&Serafin2015,Paszek & Kaniewski
2016]) and of non‐intentional ones (industry power
supplies, generators and electric engines, power
cablesandlines,etc.),arecontributingtoformationof
an“electromagneticsmog”,abletodecreaseworking
conditions of components of security systems, and
also other ICT systems [Kasprzyk & Rychlicki 2014,
Lewiński & Perzyński & Toruń 2012, Sumiła &
Miszkiewicz 2015].
The quality of information does
also mean, in case of mentioned exploitation
conditions[Stawowy2015,Stawowy&Dziula2015].
Transport security systems, operating in hard
environmental conditions, should meet the
requirements, specified in respective regulations
concerningtheirexploitation.
The exploitation phase of the transport security
systemsincludesco‐existingofminimum
threebelow
mentionedprocesses:
1 theexploitationprocess,whichaimistoperform
required utility task, meaning to result with
expectedexploitationeffect;
2 thedestructionprocess,resultingwithreducingof
utilitypropertiesofelectronicsecuritysystems,i.e.
disruptionsofinformationflowprocessatwireless
sensors, caused by electromagnetic
disruptions,
existing in the environment. Following kinds of
thedestructionprocessescanbedistinguished:
overtdestructionprocess,
hiddendestructionprocess
3 theanti‐destructionprocess,coveringinformation
collecting, and all other activities delaying or
stopping the destruction process, and recovering
its effects within subsequent phases of the
destruction
processevolution(the“therapy”).
Electronic security systems are impacted by
external‐
Z(t), and internal interferences‐W(t),
generated within wide area, described by random
processS(t).WhenlevelofinterferencesS(t)exceeds
allowed value S
d(t) (allowed level specified for the
securitysystem),failureofthesystemtakesplace.
Timeoftheelectronicsecuritysystemfunctioning,
until the failure takes place, can be assumed as one
havingexponentialdistribution,if:
external‐
Z(t),andinternal‐W(t)interferencesare
asymptotically independent, meaning
Z(t2) does
notdependon
Z(t1),andW(t2)doesnotdependon
W(t1);
relations between
Z(t1) and Z(t2), and W(t1) and
W(t2),decreasewithsimultaneousincreaseof:
,'''
12
tt
forZ(t);
,''''''
12
tt
forW(t)–Fig.2;
external‐
Z(t),andinternal‐W(t)interferencesdo
not show certain tendencies, meaning their peak
values appearances are random, and can not be
predicted, thus, interferences
Z(t) and W(t) are
stationary.
Figure. 2. The progress of impact of external‐z(t), and
internal‐
w(t) interferences generated within wide
transportarea,allowedlevelvalueofinterferences S
d(t)=Sd
doesnotdependontime;thesystemdefectappearsnotas
cumulatingofitsinternaltechnicalparameters,butratheras
aresultofimpactofexternalandinternalinterferences,that
exceed allowed level, defect of the system is caused by
interferenceslevelonly
When projecting transport security systems, it is
necessary to consider environmental conditions of
transport system’s area, and select appropriate
appliances, that are going to be included in the
systems (i.e. power supplies [Rosiński 2015c]). To
253
meet the requirements concerning electromagnetic
compatibility, for proper project works on transport
security systems, it is necessary to investigate
electromagnetic environment within particular area
[Paś & Siergiejczyk 2016, Siergiejczyk & Paś &
Rosiński2015,Siergiejczyk&Rosiński&Paś2016].
Todetermineindicatorsofinterferencesinfluence
on transport
security systems, within the area of
electromagneticinterferencesimpact,itisrequiredto
know characteristics of radiation sources. For this
purpose, electromagnetic interferences are divided
into two sub‐ranges: in regard to frequency range,
andfollowingpropertiesofelectromagneticfield:
1 thewayofpropagationofinterferenceswithinthe
transport
area;
2 attenuationofpropagationofinterferenceswithin
thetransportarea;
3 shieldingofinterferenceswithinthetransportarea
bywalls,buildingandmetalpartitionsofvarious
thickness,vegetation,etc.;
4 impact of interferences on transport security
system;
5 the way of protecting against interferences
impacting on particular components of transport
securitysystems–Fig.3;
6 strength of intentional and non‐intentional
interferences,occurringwithinrestrictedtransport
area.
Figure3.Impactofradio‐electricinterferencesontransport
security system: Z
o, Zc – impedance of power‐load and
centre,M–factorofinductivecoupling,UC–digitaldevice
(controlpanel)
2 TRANSPORTSECURITYSYSTEMCONSISTING
OFONETRANSMISSIONBUSANDMODULES
BASEDONRS‐485INTERFACE
Thesystemofabovestructure is shownin Fig. 4,in
distractedversion.Themodulesareconnectedtothe
mainunitbybuswithRS‐485interface.Theinterface
used,enablestoconnectcomponentsof
thesystemat
distance up to 1200 metres. The system structure is
modular [Rosiński 2008, Rosiński 2011], that can be
built of system enhancing modules, controllers, and
monitoringandcontrolcomputer[Duer&Zajkowski
&Duer&Paś2012,Paś2015a].
Figure4.Blockdiagramofthedistractedsystem,consisting
of one transmission bus and modules based of RS‐485
interface
Transport security systems are ones, whose
purpose is detection of threats appearingwithin the
transport process (for both stationary and mobile
objects) [Pa ś 2015c, Paś 2016]. The usage of the
systems,intra nsportprocess,increases,andtheyare
supporting safety of [Dziula & Kołowrocki &
Soszyńska‐Budny2013]:
1
humanbeings(i.e.monitoringsystemsinstalledin
stationary objects of airports, railway stations,
ports,etc.);
2 cargo stored in stationary objects (i.e. logistic
centres, land and sea cargo handling terminals,
etc.);
3 cargo transported by mobile objects (railway,
maritimeandairtransport,where,ifsupportedby
GPS system, allow to
monitor cargo conditions
andtrackmovementoftransportmeans).
Transport security systems function in various
climate conditions and various surrounding
electromagnetic environment, that can cause
occurrence of interferences. Proper functionality of
transportsecuritysystemdependson:
reliabilityofparticularcomponents,thesystem is
builtof;
internal reliability structure of
transport security
system;
undertaken strategy of exploitation of transport
securitysystem;
electromagneticinterferences impactingonsystem
operationprocess.
3 TRANSPORTSECURITYSYSTEMCONSISTING
OFTWOTRANSMISSIONBUSESAND
MODULES–EXPLOITATIONINDICATORS
Fig. 5 shows safety states defined for exploitation
processoftransportsecuritysystem,consistingoftwo
transmissionbuses andmodules,incaseofimpactof
electromagnetic interferences. The impact of
interferences has been indicated by transition
intensity linesγ
z andγ1z. In case of occurrence of
electromagnetic interferences of very high level, i.e.
254
atmospheric discharge (catastrophic event), the
system changes state from R
0(t) into QB(t)‐
unreliabilityofsafety.
Figure5. Transport security system consisting of two
transmissionbusesandmodules.
The problem of electromagnetic interferences has
appeared at the early stage of radio‐communication
evolution. There were already, before the Second
WorldWar,publicservicesinvolvedininterferences,
inmanycountries(i.e.inEngland–respectiveservice
was established in 1920). Rapid evolution of radio‐
communication and television after 1945, and
usage
ofhigherandhighertransmissionfrequencies,caused
the number ofcomplaints regarding interferences in
England, over the years 1947‐1956, increased up to
160thousand per year (to compare – number of the
complaints in 1934 was around 34 thousand). The
researches on influence of interferences on radio
reception,
startedinPolandin1935.Twoyearslater,
special services involved in eliminating of
interferences, were established. Polish Electric
Standard PN/E‐58: „Recommendations for
eliminating of interferences within radio reception,
caused by different electric devices”, was issued in
1935. Actually, within transport area, analogue and
digitalelectronicequipmentisused,that
themselves,
during operation, emit non‐intentional
electromagneticfield,andisalsoexposedtoexternal
fieldsemittedbyexternaldevices.
The system shown in Fig. 5 can be described by
followingChapman–Kolmogorovequations:
,
010 010
,
1102111
,
10 0 1 1 2 1
() () () ()
() () () ()
() () () () ()
BZZB
ZB ZB ZB ZB Z ZB
B B Z Z ZB ZB ZB
R t Rt Rt Rt
Qt Rt Qt Qt
Qt Rt Rt Qt Qt
Assuminginitialconditions:
0
() 1Rt
1
(0) (0) 0
ZB B
QQ
And by means of Laplace transform, following
linearsetofequationsisobtained:
*, * * *
010010
() 1 () () ()
BZZB
s
R s Rs Rs Rs
****
110 2111
() () () ()
ZB ZB ZB ZB Z ZB
s
Qs Rs Qs Qs
**** *
10 0 1 1 2 1
() () () () ()
B B Z Z ZB ZB ZB
s
Qt Rs Rs Q s Q s
Then,bymeansofschematicapproach:
1
01
11 121
1
(, , )
ZB
ZB B
B Z ZB ZB ZB
a
RQ Q
ba
b
sab
where:
11
Z
BZB
as
21
Z
BZ
bs
Marks„*”and„s”,associatedwithprobabilitiesof
systemstayatparticularsafetystatesR
0,QZB1,andQB,
havebeenskippedwhenformingfinalaboveresult.
By means of the inverse transform, following
resultsareobtained:
11
()
0
()
ZB Z B
t
Rt e
11 21
11
1121
exp[ ( ) ] exp[ ( ) ]
()
()
B Z ZB ZB Z
ZB ZB
BZZBZB Z
tt
Qt
1212 11
12
11 21
11 21
111211
11 2 11
1
1
()( )
exp[ ( ) ] exp[ ( ) ]
()( )
exp[ ( ) ] exp[ ( ) ]
exp[ (
()
ZB ZB B ZB ZB Z
ZB ZB
BZB ZB Z
BZB ZB Z
B ZB B ZB ZB Z
BZB ZB BZB
BB
BB
tt
tt
Qt
11 1
111121
11
11
111121
121111
1
11 121
)]
()( )
exp[ ( ) ]
()( )
exp[ ( ) ] exp[ ( ) ]
()(
ZB ZB
B ZB B ZB ZB Z
BZB
ZB Z
B ZB B ZB ZB Z
BZBZZBZBZ
Z
BZB BZB Z
t
t
tt
1
)
ZB
4 INFLUENCEOFINTERFERENCESON
TRANSPORTSECURITYSYSTEMS–CERTAIN
OPERATIONSTATES
The influence of electromagnetic interferences on
transport security system results with change of
probabilityvalueofthestateoffulloperationalability
R
0(tb) – Fig. 6. Increase of interferences level
(amplitude), results with change of R
0(tb) parameter
value. I.e. for parallel system reliability structure,
R
0(tb) decreases linearly, obtaining zero value for
indicator =1 (occurrence of electromagnetic
interferences of high amplitude, resulting with
catastrophic failure – induction of overvoltage in
power supply line, caused by an atmospheric
discharge). For series‐parallel system reliability
structure, increase of interferences level (amplitude)
tocertainvalue,doesnotresult
withchangeofR0(tb)–
255
electromagnetic interferences of low amplitude,
acceptablebysystemitemsandcomponents.Increase
ofinterferenceslevelabovethecertainvalue,results
withrapiddecreaseofR
0(tb)valueforthisstructure.
Figure6. Change of probability value of the state of full
operational ability R
0(tb), under the influence of
interferences
Fig.7indicateschangesofprobabilitiesofthestate
of full operational ability R
0(tb), state of restricted
operational ability Q
ZB1(tb), and the state of
unreliability of safety Q
B(tb), of the series‐parallel
transport security system. Transport means, having
transport security system installed, are under
influence of interferences of different frequency
ranges–i.e.interferencesofinductionBofmagnetic
fieldwithinVLFfrequencyrange(2–100kHz).For
determined level of safety of transport security
system
functionality, meaning system’s resistance to
mentioned frequency range, equals to 0,05 for the
function R
0(tb) leaning. The level of safety of
transportsecuritysystemfunctionality,ispermissible
value of the amplitude of interferences, which is
function of: frequency range of interferences,
spectrumofinterferences,amplitudeofinterferences,
values of particular components of electromagnetic
field – magnetic or electric field. Increase of level
(amplitude) of
interferences , results with the
decreaseoffunctionR
0(tb)value.Whiletheincreaseof
values of functions Q
ZB1(t) and QB(t) takes place.
Similar character of changes of parameters of
probability functions of safety states, takes placefor
thesystemhavingparallelreliabilitystructure–Fig.
8.
Figure.7. Changes of probabilities of the state of full
operational ability R
0(tb), state of restricted operational
abilityQ
ZB1(tb),andthestateofunreliabilityofsafetyQB(tb),
for the transport security system having series‐parallel
reliabilitystructure(impactofinterferences‐inductionBof
magneticfieldwithinVLFfrequencyrange)
Figure.8. Changes of probabilities of the state of full
operational ability R
0(tb), state of restricted operational
abilityQ
ZB1(tb),andthestateofunreliabilityofsafetyQB(tb),
forthe transportsecuritysystemhaving parallelreliability
structure(impactofinterferences‐inductionBofmagnetic
fieldwithinVLFfrequencyrange)
The character of changes of functions of
unreliability of safety Q
B(t), and of the state of
restricted operational ability Q
ZB1(t), of the transport
security system having series‐parallel reliability
structure,hasbeenshowninFig.9.
Figure.9. Changes of probability values of the state of
restricted operational ability Q
ZB1(t), of the transport
security system having series‐parallel reliability structure
(impactofinterferencesofELF(5‐2000Hz)frequencyrange,
andVLF(2‐100kHz)frequencyrange)
Transport security system is most resistant to
interferencesofVLFfrequencyrange–bothmagnetic
and electric field components. For the indicator of
interferences = 1 value (interferences caused by
signalofveryhighamplitude–catastrophicfailure),
all functions determining unreliability of safety of
transportsecuritysystemreachQ
B(t)=1value.Values
of probability of the state of restricted operational
ability Q
ZB1(t), for the system of series‐parallel
reliabilitystructure,fortheindicator=1 value,also
reachthezerolevel.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Basingonanalysisperformedinthearticle,following
conclusionsandobservationsarespecified:
thevalueofindicatorofthesafetylevel(meaning
resistance to interferences), of the
transport
security system, in case of impacting
electromagnetic interferences, from certain
frequency range, depends on chosen reliability
structure of items and components the system is
built of – series, parallel, series‐parallel, etc., the
structures are also influencing on safety and
reliabilityofthesystem;
the highest value of
reliability indicator RS, and
resistancetointerferences,isensuredbytransport
security system having parallel structure, with
controlcentresconcentrated,orspread;
256
electromagnetic interferences impacting on
transportsecuritysystem,thatisusedwithinwide
transport area, result with increase of the system
electronic components failure intensities,
independently of reliability structure, induced,
radiated or conducted interferences cause
unintendedincreaseofi.e.powersupplyvoltage,
change of the operation point of an active
item,
increaseofnon‐lineardistortions,etc.;
transportsecuritysystemhavingseriesstructureis
themostvulnerableonetointerferences;
transport security systems installed within wide
areas, in case of interferences, are having the
lowest value of intended operating time, because
the electromagnetic interferences are not damped
by
buildingstructures;
transport security systems installed inside
buildings,located withintransport areas, are less
vulnerable to interferences, due to shielding
influence of i.e. lightning grids, reinforced
concretes,walls,metalroofcovers– Fig.10;
Figure.10. The pyramid of electronic security system
projectingbasingonEMC
the value of resistance to electromagnetic
interferences,oftransportsecurity systemlocated
inside buildings within wide transport areas,
depends on the size of a lightning grid spacing
(especially in case of interferences of low
frequencies);
values of particular probabilities of the transport
security system stay at the operation states,
depend on properties of impacting
electromagnetic field, and which component –
fieldvector(electricormagnetic),isdominant;
thehighestinfluenceonprobabilitiesofthesystem
stayatcertainoperationstates,iscausedbytheB
induction of the magnetic field of the frequency
range ELF, the damping of
the B induction by
lightninggridisthelowestoneforthisfrequency
range–Fig.11;
Figure.11. Mechanism of impact of interferences on
electronicsecuritysystem
thelowestinfluenceonprobabilitiesofthesystem
stayatcertainoperationstates,iscausedbytheE
intensityoftheelectricfieldoftheVLFfrequency
range(2–100kHz).Forthiselectromagneticfield
component, values of probabilities R0(t), QZB1(t)
and QB(t), reach maximum values for different
sources
ofinterferences;
for low values of amplitude of electromagnetic
interferences, impacting on transport security
system,theprobabilityfunctionofthesystemstay
at the state of full operational ability, remains at
theconstantlevel;
permissible(limit)levelsofinterferencesinfluence
on transport security system, can be determined
by
means of resistance indicator, of particular
items and components of the system, to certain
frequencyranges;
the permissible level of interferences can be
definedas transport security systemresistance to
impact of electromagnetic interferences of certain
frequencyrange;
the maximum resistance, of transport security
system, to impact of interferences
of certain
frequencyrange,dependsonminimumresistance
ofallsystemitemsandcomponents,itisbuiltof;
transport security system resistance depends also
onpropertiesofimpactingelectromagneticfield–
ifitscharacterismainlymagnetic(E/H337[])
orelectric(E/H337[]);
the level of resistance of transport security
system,isthefunctiondependingon:
properties of electromagnetic field – values of
its particular field components E and H for
certainfrequencyranges;
particular items and components of transport
securitysystem,havingabilitiesforshieldingof
electromagneticinterferences;
locationsofitemsandcomponentsoftransport
security system – within open area
(environment), or in building structures,
dampinginterferences;
thelowestvalue,oftheresistance level,ofthe
transport security system appears for the B
induction of magnetic field of the ELF
frequencyrange;
transport security
systems, installed within wide
transport areas, where an atmospheric discharge
takes place, move to the state of unreliability of
safetyatthemomentt0[Ro(t)=0,QB(t)=1],ifthere
is no counteraction to direct or induced electric
impulses (no overvoltage means securing the
system);
in case of installation of overvoltage means
and
components, potential equalization sources, other
availablesolutionsprotectingpowersupplylines,
transmission buses, detection zones, etc., of
transport security system, there is certain time
period,allowingtocounteracttoconsequencesof
atmosphericdischarge(there isthen an ability to
start so‐called emergency process, preventing
against failure of whole
system or its most
importantcomponents,i.e.controlpanel).
The level of safety functioning of electronic
security system (resistance to electromagnetic
interferences), depends on the system installation
location–anopenarea(i.e.vessel’sdeck),closedarea
(vessel’scompartmentslocatedwithinherwidearea).
Valuesofparticula rprobabilitiesofthesystem
stayat
257
statesR
0(t)andQB(t),dependonelectromagneticfield
properties, range of interferences frequency,
dominating vector of electromagnetic field within
closest area, character of the system – magnetic or
electric,characterofthesignal–continuous,impulse,
modulated,etc.
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