173
1 INTRODUCTION
Mexico amended its Constitution and energy law to
opentheoilindustrytotheprivatesector.Thiswasa
priorityfortheactualgovernmentbecausesince2008
the government of the United States of America
startedtoleaseblocksclosetotheborderline,where
the bi‐national oil reservoirs from the “Perdido Folt
Belt”arelocat
edandinconsiderationtotheUSARule
ofCapture;pursuantto,“theownerofanareaofland
acquires title to the minerals produced from wells
drilledthereon,evenifitisprovedthatpartofsuch
minerals migrated from adjoining lands. This is
knownintheoilindust
ryasthestraweffect.”(Avila,
2008).
OnAugust12th2014thenewHydrocarbonsLaw
and the new Hydrocarbons Revenues Law became
effective.Thesearepartofasetofnewlaws andlegal
amendmentstoimplementtheConstitutionalEnergy
ReformthatbecameeffectiveonDecember21st2013.
After 75 years of monopoly in the oil indust
ry; the
Opening of Offshore Oil Business in Mexico and
Associated Framework to Cope with Potential Maritime
Security Threats
A.Ávila‐Zúñiga‐Nordfjeld&D.Dalaklis
WorldMaritimeUniversity,Malmö,Sweden
ABSTRACT: After 75 years of State oil monopoly, Mexico performed the first business oil round in 2015
involvingtheprivate sector.Thisauction‐round offered14oil explorationfields located onthecontinental
shelf to private companies. The development and exploitation of these hydrocarbon fields faces significant
challenges regarding security. The economic loss for theft of hydrocarbons through illegal connections to
pipelines is esti
mated to 973 million, 125 thousand U.S. dollar, only for the year of 2014. While productive
research has been made, it has mainly focused on transportation systems and basically, pipelines. The
development and establishment of policies prioritiz
ing maritime security and protection of critical offshore
infrastructureagainsttheftofhydrocarbons,drugsorganizationsandterrorattacksneedstobeincludedinthe
nationalagendatoimprovemaritimesecurityandmitigatepotentialsecuritythreatsatsea,includingdamage
tothemarineenvironment.Thiscouldincreasethetrustofinvest
orsandstakeholdersandwouldcontributeto
thefasterdevelopmentofnewexplorationandproductionfields.WhiletheInternationalShipandPortFacility
SecurityCode(ISPSCode)isthecornerstonefortheconstructionoftheport’ssecurityprogramandestablishes
the requirements of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), including oil port facilit
ies, it has not been fully
implementedinseveralimportantMexicanports.Itisconcludedthatsomeimportantportslackmanyofthe
core security processes, procedures and controls that should be included in any PFSP. This article briefly
reviewsthesituationoftheoilindustryfromasecurityperspectiveanddiscusseskeyelementsof ma
ritime
security; addressing the necessity of the inclusion of maritime security and protection of critical oil
infrastructureoffshoreinthenationalagendathatwouldprovideforfutureresearchdirectionsinthemaritime
securitydomainandcontributetotheestablishmentofa nationalmaritimesecuritypolicy.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 12
Number 1
March 2018
DOI:10.12716/1001.12.01.20
174
country performed the first oil business round and
offered 14 oil exploration fields located on the
continentalshelftoprivatecompanies.Whereas,this
firstroundwasnotassuccessfulasitwasexpectedby
the Mexican Government and only two bids were
receivedby internationalcompanies foratotalof
14
blocks;inthe round onesecondtender the National
HydrocarbonsCommission ofMexico (CNH)
awardedthreeoffiveshallow‐waterblocks(Comisión
NacionaldeHidrocarburos,2015).
Diverse factors may affect the interest of
international investors in the oil industry in Mexico
when participating in the oil fields blocks auctions,
like the low international oil prices during the last
two years or the fact that the first offer was of
exploration fields while the second one was of
productionfields,whichgivesmoresecurityoverthe
investment.
However, another factor that may affect the
interestofinternationaloilcompaniesisthe
security
of the oil installations both onshore and offshore. A
total of 4 thousand, 298 illegal connections to
pipelines have been discovered by Pemex and
authorities during the period of January 1
st
. to
October27
th
2015.
Even though the security challenges in the oil
industry are by now more evident ashore, it is
necessarytoincludemaritimesecurityinthenational
agendaaswell.
The development and establishment of policies
thatenhancemaritimesecurityandtheprotectionof
offshore installations would increase the trust of
internationalinvestorsinthenationaloilindustry.
Maritime security is a topic that has been
discussed for several decades at the International
Maritime Organization, yet some significant issues
remain in discussion and unsolved. The focus of
extensive research regarding maritime security has
been on piracy at sea, while terrorism at offshore
installations,portmaritimesecurityandprotectionof
criticalinfrastructurehasnotgotthesameattention.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code(ISPSCode)wasimplementedinMexicosinceit
enteredintoforceon1st.ofJuly,2004,followingthe
requirements and recommendations of the
International Maritime Organization. Nonetheless,
someofthemostimportantportsofMexicohavenot
fully implemented the ISPS Code yet. A set of
informationthataccordingtotherequirementsofthe
ISPSCodealltheportandportfacilitiesareobligated
to keep in logs was missing when such information
was requested to the port
authorities through the
National Institute of Access to Public Information,
which reveals a difference between the formal
statementsoftheportregardingthesecurityprogram
purpose and the actual implementation of the ISPS
Code.Thisputsinevidencetheurgencyofthereview
ofnationalpoliciesandnationallegislationin
orderto
enhancemaritimesecurityboth,attheportandatsea.
2 METHODOLOGY
Forthepurposesofthisstudytheauthorshaveused
themethodofdocumentreviewtoanalysetheactual
situation of the oil industry in Mexico from the
security perspective. The data was gathered from
different sources
that included official information
from Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), the Mexican oil
agency and different authorities published on their
webpages.Inadditionsomerelevantinformationwas
requested to Pemex and other different institutions
through the National Institute of Transparency,
AccesstotheInformationandProtectionofPersonal
Data(InstitutoNacionalde
Transparencia,Accesoala
Información y Protección de Datos Personales in
Spanish, and represented with the acronym INAI).
Once the documents relevant for this topic were
gathered, they were further selected and classified
according to their relevance to analyse what the
security challengesoftheoilindustryinMexico are
from
astrictsecurityperspective.
3 OBJECTIVES
Theobjectiveofthispaperistoreviewthesituationof
theoilindustryinMexicofromasecurityperspective
and discuss key elements of port and maritime
security;addressingthenecessityoftheinclusionof
port and maritime security and the protection of
critical oil infrastructure located in the Continental
Shelfinthenationalagenda,whichwouldprovidefor
future research directions in the maritime security
domain and contribute to the establishment of a
nationalmaritimesecuritypolicy.
4 RESULTS&GENERALDISCUSSION
The security of the oil industry in Mexico has been
seriously
affectedduringthelastyears,whichhasleft
significantnotonlylossofcivilianlife,butalsohuge
economic losses to Pemex, the Mexican government
andtheMexicansocietyasahole.
The results of this document analysis show that
thereisaninconsistencybetweentherequirementsof
theISPS
Codeanditsactualimplementationatsome
ofthemostimportant ports with oil facilities.These
factors need to be improved to enhance maritime
securityandtoavoidserioussecuritydeficienciesthat
couldresultinlossoflife, oilspillandenvironmental
damage. Other importantsecurity challenges for the
oil industry,
like the increasing tendency of theft of
hydrocarbonswerealsofound.
On September 19
th
2014, the general director of
PetróleosMexicanos(Pemex),EmilioLozoyaAustin,
presented the problematic and challenges of Pemex,
before the Commission of Energy of the LXII
Legislature‐group of the National Congress
(Parliament). In this presentation, the mentioned
director of Pemex said that “In the year 2014, up to
August,
it is estimated that the volume of crude oil
subtracted trough illegal connections to pipelines
amountedto7.5millionbarrels,whichequivalentcost
is 15 thousand, 300 million pesos. That is what is
175
stolentotheMexicanGovernment,atleastuptothis
presentation”.
Thetextualwording inSpanishofthe directorof
Pemexisasfollows:“Enelaño2014,alcierredelmes
de agosto se estima que el volumen de combustible
sustraído ilícitamente a través de las tomas
clandestinas ascendió
a 7.5 millones de barriles, con
uncostoequivalentea15mil300millonesdepesos.
Eso es lo que lerobanalEstadomexicano o, por lo
menos,alapresentacióndelinforme”.
AccordingtothefigurespublishedbytheNational
InstituteforStatistics,GeographyandInformaticsthe
annual
average of oil prices for 2014 is 86.5 USA
Dollarsperbarrel,whereastheaveragefor2015and
up to September that year, the oil price average is
46.6,asfiguresillustratedintableI.
Table1. Oil Price Indices per Barrel (Mexico), 2014‐2015.
Source:ElaboratedwithdatafromtheNationalInstitutefor
Statistics,GeographyandInformatics(INEGI);priceindices
series.
_______________________________________________
Period PriceOilBarrel AnnualAverage
_______________________________________________
2014/0190.6586.5
2014/0293.09
2014/0393.48
2014/0495.68
2014/0596.79
2014/0698.79
2014/0794.65
2014/0890.8
2014/0985.82
2014/1075.23
2014/1171.39
2014/1252.36
2015/0141.746.6
2015/0247.26
2015/0347.36
2015/0450.69
2015/0554.06
2015/0653.87
2015/0746.56
2015/0839.87
2015/0938.82
_______________________________________________
Therefore the estimated number of stolen barrels
fromJanuarytoAugust,2014amountsto7.5million
barrels;theeconomiclossamountsto648million,750
thousandUSdollars.
With this information the total economic loss
caused by theft of hydrocarbons for 2014 may be
estimated; considering that 7.5 million
barrels from
January to August gives a monthly average of 937
thousand 500 barrels; multiplying this figure for 12
months, it gives a total of 11 million, 250 thousand
barrels,whichcanbemultipliedbytheaverageprice
ofcrudeoilbarrelfortheyear2014;whichis86.5US
Dollars.
Thereforethetotaleconomiclossfortheftof
hydrocarbons for the year 2014, for Mexico, can be
estimatedto973million,125thousandU.S.dollars.
The total number of illegal connections to
pipelines discovered by Pemex and relevant
authorities for 2014 was 3 thousand 635, while this
figureincreasedto
4thousand298for2015andonly
up to October 26th. This figure means that the
number of illegal connections to pipelines increased
with18.24 percent from2014 to2015,whichcanbe
observedintable2.
Table2.Nr.ofIllegalConnectionsDiscoveredbyPemexor
Authorities, 2000‐2015. Source: SISI12857200255215, from
INAI
_______________________________________________
YearNr.ofIllegalconnectionsdiscovered
_______________________________________________
2000155
2001132
2002159
2003152
2004102
2005132
2006213
2007324
2008392
2009462
2010691
20111361
20121635
20132613
20143635
20154298
_______________________________________________
If this figure is applied to the loss of barrels for
2014;inthiscase11million,250thousandbarrels,the
increase would amountto2 million 52 thousand oil
barrels,givinga totalof13million 302thousandoil
barrelsfor theyear2015.Iftheestimatedamount of
loss
of barrels for 2015, in this case 13 million, 302
thousandbarrelsismultipliedbytheaveragepriceof
crude oil barrel for the year 2015 (In this case the
averagewas calculatedwithfigures fromthe period
January‐September,aspresentedintable1);whichis
46.5USDollars,
theestimatedeconomiclossfor2015
amounts to 618 million 543 thousand U.S Dollar;
under the condition that the production remain
unchanged and the average loss of barrels per
incidentremainsthesamefrom2014to2015.
The fact that the estimated economic loss caused
by theft of hydrocarbons from 2015
is less than the
estimatedlossfortheyear2014,evenconsideringthat
the number of incidents of illegal connections to
pipelineswaslargerin2015thaninthepreviousyear;
isbecausethedramaticfalloftheoilpricesin2015.
ItwasrequestedtoPemextoprovideinformation
about how many clandestine connections where
foundtopipelines,warehousetankers,oilterminals,
refineries and other oil installations, but this
classification had not been registered in the files.
However,thediscoveryofsuchillegalconnectionsto
Pemex installations to steal hydrocarbons have
resultedin14thousand547legalclaims,onlyfor
the
period2006to2015,(Pemexunidaddeenlacea travez
del INAI 2015, SISI 12857200255215) from which a
total of 324 persons have become sentenced with a
guiltyverdict,asobservedintable3.
According to the same document from the INAI,
clandestine connections to pipelines and other oil
installations have led to explosions, which have
causedthedeadoftwocivilianandseriousinjuriesto
other four persons in 2014, while in 2015 an
individuallosthislifebythesamecause.
The consequences of illegal connections to
hydrocarbon’s pipelines have also caused severe
damagestotheenvironmentpolluting
diverserivers
176
andvalleysbecauseofoilspill.Duringtheperiodof
2006 to 2015 a total of 571 legal claims for oil spill
pollutionhavebeenpresentedasillustratedintable4.
Table3. Nr. ofPersons Convicted for Theft of
Hydrocarbons,2006‐2015.Source:SISI12857200255215
_______________________________________________
YearNr.ofPersons Convicted
GuiltyVerdict AcquittalVerdict(NoGuilty)
_______________________________________________
20061913
20073616
20085535
20093019
20103431
20113552
20126869
20133546
20141212
201505
_______________________________________________
Total324298
_______________________________________________
Table4. Legal Claims for Oil Spill Pollution, 2006‐2015.
Source:SISI12857200255215
_______________________________________________
YearNr.ofLegalClaimsforOilSpillPollution
_______________________________________________
2006130
2007101
200865
200952
201024
201146
201246
201335
201454
201518
_______________________________________________
Total571
_______________________________________________
To connect illegal pipelines to Pemex’s
installations network requires a high degree of
expertise.Several employeesandex‐employeesfrom
the Mexican oil agency have been investigated for
participating in these crimes against the nation.
Information from another document also from the
INAI,withregisternumberSISI1857200171515(2015),
establishesthata
totalof136employeesfromPemex
had been investigated in relation to theft of
hydrocarbons,asillustratedintable5.
Table5. Nr. of Employees and Ex‐employees investigated
for theft of hydrocarbons, 2006‐2015. Source:
SISI1857200171515
_______________________________________________
Nr.ofEmployeesandEx‐employeesinvolvedand
investigatedintheftofhydrocarbons2006‐2015
_______________________________________________
Year Nr.ofEmployees Nr.ofEx‐employees
investigatedfortheftinvestigatedfortheft
ofhydrocarbons ofhydrocarbons
_______________________________________________
2006100
200773
2008190
2009100
2010142
201152
2012112
2013151
2014331
2015121
TOTAL13612
_______________________________________________
Thereareotherimportantaspectsofsecuritythat
reflect the urgency of implementing measures to
improvesecuritywithintheoilagency.From2006to
2015severalemployeeswerearrestedandputunder
investigationforothertypeoflaw‐breakingincluding
possession of cocaine, cannabis, falsification of
company’s card, terror attempts and
murder, as
illustratedintable6.
Table6. Pemexʹs employees investigated for other crimes,
2006‐2015.Source:SISI1857200171515
_______________________________________________
Pemex’semployeesinvestigatedforothercrimes
(2006‐2015)
_______________________________________________
CrimeNr.ofemployees
_______________________________________________
PossessionofCocaine9
PossessionofCannabis25
Falsificationofcompany’scard1
Possession/bearingoffireweapons7
Violencewithweapons8
ExplosionThreat1
Theftofproductionmaterial,ferricmaterial, 115
workingtools,machinery,cable,pipes,car
parts,cooperandcranesamongotherPemex’s
propertyitems.
Murder1
Kidnapping2
Fraudforsellingworkingpositions4
Improper(unmoral)Behaviouratwork2
Psychotropicmedicinedrugs1
Stealingotheremployeesproperties4
Falsificationoffueltickets1
Caraccident1
Fraud1
Attack/assault&Violence2
Beingmemberofthe“Z”narcoticorganization 1
Alcoholatwork3
_______________________________________________
TOTAL189
_______________________________________________
Pemexalsofunctionastheoperatorofseveraloil
terminals. The crimes made by some employees of
Pemex like falsification of the company card put
unacceptable risk to the company and measures to
stop these actions are essential regarding security,
sincethistypeofactionscouldberequiredforterror
attacks
inaterrorscenario.Ontheotherhand,crimes
like possession of weapons and drugs can lead to
serious accidents putting in risk the safety of the
personnel; the installations and the marine
environment because of oil spill pollution. It is
important to mention that even though maritime
security and
maritime safety are two different
concepts,theyaredirectlyconnected.
Piètre‐Cambacédès & Bouissou, (2013) analyses
the similarities and differences between the two
domains,safetyandsecurity.Theauthorswrotethat
while security is connected to risks originated or
exacerbated by a malicious action, independently
from the nature of the related
consequence; the
concept of safety is linked to accidental actions i.e.
without a malicious intention, but with potential
impact to the related environment (p.111). They
further clarify that in the security discipline it is
commontousetheterm“threat”,whileinthesafety
discipline the tendency is to use
the term “hazard”,
even though they are used to describe identical
concepts in several standards. An example given by
thecitedauthorsistheuseofthetermincident,asan
event with minor consequences in safety, while it
177
means an infringement or breach with regards to
security(p.112).
Klein, Rothwell, & Mossop, (2009 p. 242), states
that one of the main characteristics of maritime
securityisthattherearetwodifferentdimensionsin
terms of response to external threats faced by a
coastal state. The author establishes that
the first
dimensionsisthefactthatexistsacoresetofthreats,
values and responses, which any state will bring to
bearinseekingtosecureitsmaritimesecurity;which
isreflectedinthe national and internationaloutlook
of a state, its geographical location and maritime
domain, as well
as its bilateral and regional
relationships.Thesearefactorsthateveniftheymay
slightlyvaryovertime,theywillremainfairlystable.
The authors explained that the second dimension is
the“evolvingandemergingthreatstomaritimesecurity”.
Theyfurtherclarifiedthatsomeofthosethreatscould
periodic or
temporary, while others may suddenly
arise with little or no warning at all.Therefore,
planning and organizing maritime security requires
not only ongoing attention to the core values of a
state,butalsothecapacitytorespondtosuddenand
totallyunexpectedthreatswithdiversescenariosfrom
oil spills to
terror or nuclear attacks, as well as
transnational crime against the port or offshore
installations(Klein,Rothwell,&Mossop,2009p.242‐
243).
BycitingtoNgandGujar(2008),Vaggelas&Ng,
(2012p.674)establishedthatportsecurityincludesall
security and counter‐terrorism activities within the
port’s domain, including
the protection of port
facilitiesand thesecurityof the activities during the
interactionoftheshipwiththeport.
In an article written by J. Urbansky, W. Morgas
and M. Miesikowsky (2009) presented in the book
editedbyA.Weintrit(2009p.3),theauthorswrotethe
followingaboutmaritime
security:“isthesecurity from
theterrorism,piracyandsimilarthreats,aswellaseffective
interdiction of all the illicit activities on sea, such as
pollutionofthemarineenvironment;illegalexploitationof
sea resources; illegal immigration; smuggling the drugs,
persons, weapons and other matters that can be used for
terrorist
activities”.
Maritime security regulative framework
encompasses several international conventions like
SOLAS 1974 and respective protocols up to date,
MARPOL 73/78 with respective protocols, and the
SUAconventionfrom1998and2005withrespective
protocols, among others. The International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) came into
force on
July 1
st
of 2004 and it is a part of the
amendmentstothe1974ConventionfortheSafetyof
LifeatSea(SOLAS).TheamendmentstotheSOLAS
Convention included a new chapter XI‐2, about
special measures to enhance maritime security.
Kenneth (2009) defines the ISPS Code as the
comprehensive
setofmeasuresimplementedin2004
to enhance the security of ships and port facilities,
developedandagreedtobymembercountriesofthe
International Maritime Organization in response to
theperceivedthreatstoshipsandportfacilitiesafter
theSeptember11,2001,terroristattacksintheUnited
States.
Vaggelas&
Ng(2012p.677‐678)simplify that the
Codehasmainlytwomajorcomponents,whereasthe
first part illustrates the minimum mandatory
requirementsthatshipsandportsrepresentedbythe
contractinggovernmentmustfollow,thesecondpart,
which is not compulsory, provides guidelines and
recommendationsforthe implementationofsecurity
assessments
andplanswithmoredetail.Theauthors
clarifythatevenifcertainlytheISPSCodeincludesa
standardizedguidanceonmaritimesecurityforboth,
ships and ports, it focuses mainly on how terrorist
attackscanbedeterredandmitigated,whiledetailed
proceduresonhowtodealwiththeconsequencesof
such
security events, like crisis management or
recoveryarenotaddressed.Resilienceplansorpla ns
forcrisismanagementareinstrumentsthatshouldbe
considered as a part of any security program. By
citingSarathy(2006)Zhang,Payam,&Ekwall(2011)
expressed that a system of this type should be “a
robust,
resilient, and flexible that will require extensive
coordination both at national and international levels”.
Robustness and resilience are different features. By
citing to Husdal (2008), Zhang, Payam, & Ekwall
(2011) wrote that whereas resilience is the ability to
survive,robustnessistheabilitytorapidlyrecuperate
thestability.
A security
plan must rapidly respond to events
that threat security from a proactive perspective
rather than a reactive. However, it should include a
resilience plan to reduce consequences of a terror
eventinaproperlyreactiveway.
Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert, & Bateman (2008
p.4),saysthatpassenger ships,includinghigh‐speed
passengercraft,cargoshipsof500grosstonnageand
above,MobileOffshoreDrillingUnits(MODUs) and
all port facilities serving ships engaged in
internationalvoyagesarerequiredtocomplywiththe
ISPSCode,accordingtotheestablishedintheSOLAS
ChapterXI‐2.
The Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) is
a legal
instrumentembodiedintheISPSCodetoensurethe
application of security measures to protect the port
facility and its serving vessels, their cargoes, and
persons on board at the respective security levels.
Kenneth (2009 p.99), said that a port facility is
required to plan and effect security at
the levels
identified in the risk assessment process and as
established by the governmental entities with
statutory responsibilities for port security oversight.
TheauthoraddsthatthedevelopmentofaPFSPshall
include measures aimed to neutralize vulnerabilities
for criminal activities within the port; identify and
respond to safety matters;
minimize the threat of
terrorism; reduce opportunities of internal criminal
conspiracies; disrupt the connection between
corruption, terrorism and organized crime; share
intelligent and investigative information, with the
respectiveandcorrectlawenforcementagencies;and
promote opportunities for the interchange of best
practicesinportsecurity(p.100).
Vaggelas&Ng(2012),
clarifiedthatbasedonthe
requirements of the PFSA (Port Facility Security
Assessment),aPFSPmustbedevelopedforeachport
facilitywhichhasauthorizationforchangesaccording
to the different security levels for every security
operationandhighlightthataPFSPmaybeextended
to more than one facility
only provided that the
178
operator, location, operation, equipment and design
ofthosefacilitiesareverysimilartoeachother.
Requirements of the port facility security plan
establishanumberofsecurityrecordsthatmustkept
updatedasapartofthespecificsecurityplan.
Someofthe informationrequiredtokeep inlogs
was
requested to some important ports of Mexico
through the INAI. This included the number of oil
spillsbyvesselsunderoperationsattheport;number
of accidents at the port/port facilities, number of
fatalities that resulted in loss of life at the port
installations; number of dead and seriously injured
persons in accidents at work at the port; number of
employees arrested by committing crimes related to
theirworkingdutiesoragainsttheinterestoftheport
andthetypeofcrime.However,theanswerwasthat
theportagencydoesnothavesuchinformationandit
was suggested to further
require it to the terminal
operator. Since the terminal is directly connected to
theoperationoftheport,theportshallalsokeepthis
type of information. This reflects deficiencies in the
implementation of the Port Facility Security Plan at
thespecificports.
The ISPS establishes that the port and
port
facilities should keep security records including
security threats and incidents; oil spills, changes in
the security levels and internal audits and reviews,
amongothers.Whentheappointedauthorities,inthis
casetheMinistryofCommunicationsandTransport,
discover deficiencies in the implementation of the
PFSP their approach should be at
a first stage to
advice the port or port facility in correcting the
deficiency; the second stage is the persuasion of the
port or port facility on the need to correct the
deficiency;thethirdstageistheformalnotificationof
therequirementtocorrectthedeficiency;thenextstep
is the commencement of proceedings to impose
sanctions for the failure to correct the deficiency;
whilethelaststepistheimpositionofsanctionsfor
failing to correct the deficiency, according to the
provisionsestablishedintheISPScode(International
MaritimeOrganization,IMO 2012).Incase ofserious
securitydeficienciesthatput
inrisktheabilityofthe
portorportfacilitytocontinuetooperateatsecurity
levels1to3theauthorityisabletosuspendorrestrict
specified activities at a port or port facility and
cumulative security failingsata port or port facility
could lead to the
suspension or withdrawal of the
approved Port Facility Security Plan and the
respectivestatementofcompliance(IMO,2012).
Furthermore, once the statement of compliance
andapprovalofthePFSPhavebeenwithdrawn,the
nationalauthoritiescandemandcompletionofafull
Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and a
revised PFSP before
reinstating the approval and
statementofcompliance(IMO2012).Kenneth(2009p.
116)criticisesthatveryoftenthePFSPexists onlyin
paper but rarely is tested for its effectiveness. The
authoremphasizesthatthekeytoachievea successful
portsecuritymanagementintermsofthePFSPisto
understanditasalivingdocument.Headdsthatthe
PFSPshouldnotbe writtenasa one‐time effort,but
shouldreallybeaworkingdocumentaddressingthe
securitythreatstwenty‐fourhours aday,sevendays
attheweek,thewholeyear.
To avoid that port and port facilities
stop the
complianceofthePFSP,thegovernmentthroughthe
DesignatedAuthorityshallperformPFSPinspections.
The frequency of inspections may be programmed
and announced in advance could be totally without
warning.Inspectionsmaybeperformed inconnection
withtheinitial,intermediateandrenewalverification
of the port facility’s Statement
of Compliance,
investigating a security incident or concerning the
assessments of the port facility with the Maritime
Security Measures (IMO, 2012). The Government
through the Designated Authority has the
responsibility to ensure the compliance of the
provisions of the ISPS Code, as well as other
requirements established in International
Conventions from
which Mexico is signatory to
enhancemaritimesecurity.
5 DIRECTIONSFORFUTURERESEARCH
Maritime security is an area directly connected to
several issues that vary from immigration at sea, to
smugglingofdrugs,weapons;theftofhydrocarbons;
terrorism and piracy. All of these are areas have
research potential within the
context of the case of
Mexico. However, the compliance of international
conventions and national legislation should be
reviewedtoensure thattheinternationalobligations
ofMexicoareproperlyreflectedinnationallaw.
Another area is the examination of the
implementationoftheISPSCodeintheMexicanports
and port facilities,
including case studies from ro‐ro
terminals,containerterminals,chemicalterminalsand
oilterminals.Itisalsosuggestedtostudythecaseof
Pemex concerning security and safety systems to
improve security within the organization and to
reducethetheftofhydrocarbons.Researchaboutthe
penalties for theft of hydrocarbons
from a holistic
perspective, including the social and environmental
aspectisalsosuggested.
6 CONCLUSIONS&RECOMMENDATIONS
Accordingtotheresultsofthisdocumentreview,the
conclusion is that the oil industry in Mexico faces
substantial security challenges. The losses are not
limitedtoeconomicfactors,butalsotolossof
civilian
lifeandthemarineenvironment.
Eventhoughtheoilcompaniesasprivateentities
are responsible for implementing effective security
systemswithintheirownpropertyandresponsibility
areas; national authorities must cooperate to ensure
the operation of these business activities and to
improvethesecurityofvulnerableinfrastructurelike
pipeline
networks, offshore installations and port
facilities.
Maritimeandportsecurityisanissuethatshould
be included in the national agenda for the
development of analytical instruments that should
providethefundamentsforaneffectiveandproactive
maritimesecurityprogra mandtheestablishmentofa
nationalmaritimesecuritypolicy.
179
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