107
1 INTRODUCTION
An understanding of risk factors, risk mitigating
tools, and adequate rescue system capacities in
different areas is necessary for sustainable
development in the Arctic. Safe maritime operations
intheArcticarechallengedbylimitedinfrastructure
longdistancesbetweenharbors,asparse population
andharshweatherconditions.
Activity and probabilit
y of accidents differ in
variouspartsoftheArcticforgeographical,economic
and historical reasons. Marchenko, Borch et al. 2015
made an assessment algorithm and presented a risk
matrixforseveralseaareasoftheHighNorthregion
(Norway and Russia west of Novaya Zemlya).
Marchenko, Borch et al. 2016 considered av
ailable
SAR resources and identified capacity gaps. In this
paper,weelaborateontherangeofchallengesrelated
to remoteness, risk of ice and icing, and limited
governmentresources.Theexperienceandchallenges
ofthistypeofriskevaluationarediscussed.
2 THESEAREGIONSOFTHEATLANTICARCTIC
TheAt
lanticSector isdividedintofiveseaandland
areas in accordance with the definition specified in
the Artic Council’s Search and Rescue (SAR)
Agreement (Arctic Council 2011). A more fine‐
grainedcategorizationisusedinthispaperwherewe
look at the Russian Arctic by Novaya Zemlya and
dividetheNorwegianSectorint
onorthern(Svalbard)
andsouthern(Coastal)parts(seeFigure1).
Thesefiveregionsradicallydifferfromeachother
intermsofnature,shiptraffic andinfrastructure.In
thewesternpartoftheRussianArcticoffshoreoiland
gasactivityisemerginginice‐infestedwaters.Inthe
Norway, the cruise indust
ry are entering into the
northernmostwaters aroundSpitsbergenwith larger
vessels. Detailed characteristics of the eastern part
(Norway and Russia) (Numbers 3–5 in Fig. 1) are
given in (Marchenko 2015, Marchenko, Borch et al.
2015, Marchenko, Borch et al. 2016). This discussion
shows that in the eastern pa
rt the capacities for
Arctic Shipping and Risks: Emergency Categories and
Response Capacities
N.A.Marchenko
TheUniversityCentreinSvalbard,Longyearbyen,Norway
N.Andreassen&O.J.Borch
NordUniversityBusinessSchool,NordUniversity,Bodø,Norway
S.Yu.Kuznetsova
Northern(Arctic)FederalUniversitynamedafterM.V.Lomonosov,Arkhangelsk,Russia
V.Ingimundarson
TheUniversityofIceland,Reykjavik,Iceland
U.Jakobsen
TheUniversityofCopenhagen,Copenh agen,Denmark
ABSTRACT:TheseaiceintheArctichasshrunksignificantlyinthelastdecades.Thetransportpatternhasasa
resultpartlychanged withmoretraffic inremoteareas.This change may influenceontherisk pattern. The
criticalfactorsareharshweather,iceconditions,remotenessandvulnerabilit
yofnature.Inthispaper,welook
into the risk of accidents in Atlantic Arctic based on previous ship accidents and the changes in maritime
activity. The risk has to be assessed to ensure a proper level of emergency response. The consequences of
incidents depend on the incident type, scale and locat
ion. As accidents are rare, there are limited statistics
availableforArctic maritime accidents.Hence,thisstudyoffersa qualitativeanalysisandanexpert‐based
riskassessment.ImplicationsfortheemergencypreparednesssystemoftheArcticregionarediscussed.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 12
Number 1
March 2018
DOI:10.12716/1001.12.01.12
108
emergencyresponseisscarcewhenitcomestolarge
scale incidents, where the larger cruise vessels
representsadominatingthreat.Animportantpartof
the risk assessment is thus the availability of both
private and government emergency response
resources that match the sea region activity. In
Greenland (Region 1 on
Fig.1), Denmark has the
responsibility of emergency preparedness in open
waters. This is a huge territory, with a small
population concentrated in the south‐western part.
Onlyafewharbors,heliportsandairportsarelocated
along the extensive coastline (only 15% not covered
by ice). Engine failure in the small boat fleet,
grounding and collision with ice are among the
dominating risk factors. There are on average 80–90
SAR operations per year, performed by JRCC
Greenlandandpolice,and200–300personsindistress
everyyear(JointArcticCommand2016).
Iceland (Region 2 on Fig.1) is the largest and
warmest SAR‐region among the Arctic five regions,
with a rather sparse population concentrated in
coastalareas,adevelopedharborinfrastructureinthe
south‐westernpartandaratherintensiveshiptraffic.
However, the number of fatal accidents at sea went
downfromonaverage20peryearinthe1970stotwo
accidentsinthelastdecades.Thema inriskfactorsfor
maritimetrafficintheseaaroundIcelandareamong
others severe weather conditions related to ships’
robustnessandequipment;andfireonboardfarfrom
thecoast.TheIcelandicCoastGuard(ICG)isthekey
SAR actor in this region with coordinative
responsibility.
Figure1.ConsideredRegions.CreatedonthebaseofArctic
SearchandRescueAgreementMap(ArcticCouncil2011).
1‐Greenland, 2‐Iceland, 3‐Svalbard, 4‐Coastal Norway, 5‐
RussiansectoroftheBarentsSea
3 MARITIMEACTIVITYPATTERN
In this study, we have assessed the recent
developments(lastfiveyears)intheshiptrafficand
maritime activity, using Arctic Havbase (Norwegian
Coastal Administration 2017. The Arctic Havbase is
an online resource providing monthly AIS data
statistics since 2012. The number of port calls and
passenger
trafficovercrossinglinesarepresentedin
Figure2–5.
Inallports(exceptHammerfestandTromso),the
amountofportcallshasincreasedduringthelastfive
years. The larger the port, the more significant was
the increase in activity. The decrease of calls in
Hammerfest and partly in Tromso can be explained
byloweroilandgasexplorationactivityresultingin
lessvisitsbytheoffshoreservicevesselfleet.
Figure2.Numberofportcallsdynamics
The sizes of ports are clearly seen in the Fig.2.
GreenlandandSvalbardportsaremuchsmallerthan
CoastalNorway.
Figure3.TypeofvesselscomingtoArcticPorts.Createdon
thebaseof(NorwegianCoastalAdministration2017)
Figure4.Numberofpassengerscrossingconventionallines
(datafrom(NorwegianCoastalAdministration2017)
The activity level in the far north remote waters
can be estimated through the number of passengers
crossing conventional lines (Figure 4), and through
the type of vessels they were on (Figure 5)
(Norwegian Coastal Administration 2017). The
activity is fluctuating with fishing vessels and
passengervesselinmajority.
109
Figure5. Types of vessels crossing conventional lines
vessels(datafromtheArcticHavbase(NorwegianCoastal
Administration2017).Rednumbers–linenumber(seefig.
4). Blue numbers‐ total numbers of passengers in one
direction.
4 RISKASSESSMENTTHEORY
Riskisdifficulttodefine andestimate.Inthis study
the starting point is the traditional risk definition
emphasizingtheestimated amountofharm thatcan
beexpectedtooccurduringagiventimeperioddue
to a specific event. Risk is then the product of the
probability that an accident happens multiplied by
the negative effects on health, environment and
values that an accident may cause. A typical risk
matrix has rows representing increasing severity of
consequences of a released hazard and columns
representing increasing likelihood of an accident to
appear (Trbojevic 2000). On a standard
risk matrix,
red cells indicate high risk, yellow ones moderate,
and green ones low (see risk matrix for Iceland as
example‐Table2).
Afteridentifyingrisk,meas uring it,andestimating
the consequences, a traditional risk management
process encourages a response, which involves,
among others, a risk mitigation strategy (Crouhy,
Galaiet
al.2006).However,theassessmentofriskin
the Arctic sea regions is a challenging task, because
the conditions are changing and there is a lack in
incident statistics for calculating probabilities. There
are variations of accidents, depending on ship and
sailingpatterns,andnewaccidenttypesemerging,as
shown
intable1.Groundingmeansthattheshiphits
landoranunderwaterrock.Damageduetocollision
includes both collision with other vessels/sea
installationsandseaice.Thecategoryviolencemeans
incidents of violent behavior towards persons and
physical installations, from environmentalists
stopping activity to terror and piracy. The category
other may include failure on the vessel such as
constructionandenginefailure.
Table1Possiblevariationsofaccidents,dependingonship
andeventtypes
_______________________________________________
Tourist Cargo/tanker Fishing
_______________________________________________
Grounding T‐G C‐GF‐G
Collision T‐C C‐CF‐C
FireT‐F C‐FF‐F
Violentaction T‐V C‐VF‐V
OtherT‐O C‐OF‐O
_______________________________________________
Theriskmatrixapproachhasbeenwidelyusedfor
initial discussions on preparedness improvement,
because it provides a coarse‐grained picture of risk
levels as a basis for further assessments. They also
serveasaplatformforadiscussiononpriority needs
bothprecautionsandsafetyefforts,andallocationof
preparedness resources. An example of such an
assessment, The Polar code established by the
InternationalMaritime Organization(IMO)fortheicy
waters is a significant step towards reducing the
probabilityofaccidents throughmorerobust vessels
andimprovedtraining,andasteptowardsreducing
consequences of an accident for better
SAR
preparednessonboardthevessels.
The risk matrix approach, however, has its
limitations (Cox Jr 2008). In general, risk matrices
have limited ability to reproduce risk ratings
accurately because of the difficulties involved in
quantifying the two components of risk and their
possible correlation. In most existing and available
analyses,
the risk level is difficult to assess because
neither the probability nor the harm severity can be
estimatedwithaccuracyandprecision(CoxJr2008).
In particular, in Arctic waters, some accident types
suchasviolentactionandterrorhavenothappened,
so no statistics exist for calculation of such
a
probability.
Theriskassessmentthatisbasedonlowincident
occurrence historically, may, in fact, be misleading.
Such a traditional view suggests that one does not
prepare for a certain crisis until it has already
happened. Ian Mitroff (Mitroff 2004) claims that the
“blackswans”,thecrisisthatanorganization
doesnot
preparefor,maycauseasseriousharmastheoneswe
arepreparedfor.Hesuggeststhatforriskassessment
in strategic decision‐making, it is precisely those
crises that have not occurred that need to be
considered. As an example, the Polar code may be
focusingon
moreissuesandotherseaareasaswellif
usingthistypeofriskassessmentapproach.
Therefore,riskassessmentsinregionssuchasthe
Arctic should be based on a combination of
quantitative and qualitative information.
Categorizing severity may require inherently
subjective judgements about consequences and
decisionsonhowtoaggregate
multiplesmallevents
and fewer severe events. Therefore, risk matrixes
require a subjective interpretation (Cox Jr 2008).
Qualitativeriskmatrixesonemergencypreparedness
should be based on both the existing statistics and
estimatesfromexpertsfromprofessionalandresearch
emergencypreparednessinstitutions.
Basedonassessmentofaccidentsandexperiences
from
exercises,weclaimthatforbetterreliability,the
following factors should be taken into account in
additiontoincidentstatistics:
thedensityofmaritimetraffic
theincreasedcapacityoffishingvessels
theincreasedinterestincruiseshippinginremote
areas
the increased size of the cruise ships
entering
Arcticwaters
the increased number of Arctic expedition cruise
vesselscontracted
110
the number of oil and gas exploration licenses
givenintheHighNorth,especiallyinNorwayand
Russia
differences in government and industry
regulationsacrossborders
efforts from international organizations,
governments and industries to increase safety in
Arcticwaters
the availability of emergency capacities and their
responsetimeindifferentseaareas
Asforcategorizationofconsequencesincaseofa
lackofstatisticsintheArcticregion,thereisaneedto
learn from the largest SAR and oil spill response
operations. Mitroff (Mitroff 2004) points out those
suchlessons frompreviouscriseshave too
oftenbeen
ignored,notlearned.Forthispurpose, itisnecessary
toanalyzepastmishaps,on‐scenedrillsandengagein
realistic,full‐scaleexercisescoveringthedifferentsea
regions.Thereisalsoaneedtodistinguishbetween
the risk of severe consequences for the environment
and for humans. Consequences will
always depend
on different factors and preparedness, and resource
availabilityisoneofthemostimportantones.
5 METHODOLOGY
Inthisstudy,theriskmatricesshow1)thefrequency
level of different types of incidents with different
types of vessels and 2) the severity of consequences
for human health and
the environment. A certain
element of qualitative expert evaluations on specific
riskareasordefinedsituationsofhazardandaccident
(DSHA) serve as the basis for the matrix. The
estimationofconsequencesisbasedoncasestudiesof
the effects of real incidents in different parts of the
world illuminating accidents
with different types of
vessels. The analyses are also based on results from
exercises showing the capabilities of mitigating the
negativeeffectsofaccidentsinArcticwaters.Forour
assessment, we use the moderate scenario of the
accidentsasabaseforjudgementonconsequences.
Data for analyses include published
reports on
maritime activity in the Arctic, facts published by
emergency preparedness institutions on relevant
issues in Norway, Iceland, Russia and
Greenland/Denmark. In addition, risk assessments
have been discussed with industry specialists,
government officials, researchers, navigators, and
representatives from SAR‐related authorities,
organizations and academic institutions. The
qualitative data was collected
and discussed at the
MARPART advisory board and project group
meetings.
MARITIMERISKINTHEATLANTICARCTIC
Usingdevelopedalgorithm(Marchenko,Borchetal.
2015)wehavemadeariskassessmentandcreatedthe
riskmatricesfor all fiveregions.Wehave estimated
the risk for people and environment separately.
The
first risk matrices for Norway and Russia were
published in (Marchenko et al., 2015, Marchenko et
al.,2016),forGreenlandandIcelandin(Marchenko
etal.,2017).Hereweperformimprovedmatricesfor
humans for all five regions (Table 2‐6). The
probability of high‐risk event types increase with
growing activity level in the number of vessels, and
thenumberofpassengersandpresenceofdangerous
goodsoneachvessel.Anincreasednumberofvessels
may bring more sailors with limited experience in
running a ship in this region. The remoteness of
Arcticroutesandthecoldclimatemakes
humanlife
vulnerableifacrisis with a passenger vessel should
occur,evenwithadvancedrescueequipment(Solberg
etal.,2016).
Table2.RiskmatrixforpeopleinGreenlandicwaters.Risk
level:red‐high,yellow–moderategreen–low;Possibility
of accidents 1‐ Theoretically possible, 2 – Very rare,3 –
Occurs, 4 – Relatively frequently, 5 – Frequently;
Consequences:A‐Insignificant,B–Minor.C–Moderate,D
–Significant,E–
Serious
_______________________________________________
5
4
3T‐G,C‐G,
F‐G
2 T‐V,C‐V,T‐C,C‐C, T‐F,C‐F,
F‐V,T‐O,F‐CF‐F
C‐O,F‐O
1
_______________________________________________
ABCDE
_______________________________________________
Table3.RiskmatrixforpeopleinIcelandicwaters.Legend
andsymbolsseeTable2.
_______________________________________________
5
4
3F‐G,F‐C, T‐F
F‐F,C‐F,
T‐G,
2C‐G,C‐C,
T‐C,F‐O,
C‐O,T‐O
1F‐V,C‐V,
T‐V
_______________________________________________
A BCDE
_______________________________________________
Table4.RiskmatrixforpeopleinSvalbardwaters.Legend
andsymbolsseeTable2.
_______________________________________________
5
4F‐G
3F‐CT‐C,T‐G
2F‐O C‐O,C‐C, F‐FT‐F,
T‐O,C‐GC‐F
1F‐V,C‐V T‐V
_______________________________________________
A BCDE
_______________________________________________
Table5.RiskmatrixforpeopleinNorthernNorwaywaters.
LegendandsymbolsseeTable2.
_______________________________________________
5
4F‐O F‐G
3C‐G,C‐O C‐F,F‐F T‐C
F‐C,C‐C
2T‐G,T‐O T‐F
1F‐V,C‐VT‐V
_______________________________________________
A BCDE
_______________________________________________
111
Table6.RiskmatrixforpeopleintheRussianBarentsSea.
LegendandsymbolsseeTable2.
_______________________________________________
5
4F‐G,F‐O
3T‐G,C‐C F‐F,F‐C,
C‐G
2T‐O C‐O,T‐C T‐F,C‐F
1C‐V,F‐VT‐V
_______________________________________________
A BCDE
_______________________________________________
To assess the total risk and compare the regions,
we estimated the share of events with different risk
levels, taking 100% as the total amount of chosen
events. In our case, there are 15 different types of
events:threedefinedtypesofship(tourist,cargo,and
fishing) and five defined types
of accidents
(grounding, collision, fire, violence and others (f.ex.
technicalfailure)).Analyzingtheriskmatrixesforthe
different regions, we counted the amount of event
types on each risk level (Table 6). For example, for
Russia,weemphasizefourtypesofhigh‐risk events
for life and health – collision
of fishing vessels, and
fireoncargo,fishingandtouristvessels.ForSvalbard,
therearefourotherhigh‐risktypesforlifeandhealth
– all types of events with tourist ships (collision,
grounding,fire)aswellasfireoncargovessels.Large
cruise ships are the main concern of the
SAR
authoritiesonSvalbard.Therearenootherplacesin
the world where cruise liners with 3000 tourists on
boardrunupto80
O
N.Incaseofanaccident,thereare
limited resources to save people in distress. The
nearestshiptohelpmaybeseveralhoursaway.Two
Super Puma helicopters based in Longyearbyen are
not enough for mass evacuation. As a specific
Svalbard exercise (November 2015) showed, these
two helicopters can evacuate
80 persons in seven
hoursoperatingfromLongyearbyen50km(Svarstad
2015). One can compare this number with average
cruisevesselswithtwothousandpeopleonboardin
the Magdalena fjord (the main tourist attraction) on
180 km distance. Another case may be an exercise
with expedition ships with 150
persons on board in
the Hinlopen Strait on the same distance, but with
muchmorelowprobabilitytohaveothershipnearby.
Hypothermia is the main issue in case of large
disastersinaveryremoteplaceintheArctic. Dueto
long distances, assistance cannot arrive soon, and
mostlikely,
inanemergencycase,peoplewillneedto
waitforseveralhours.Inanexercisetestingsurvival
inlifeboats andliferaftsinice‐infestedwaters, even
theyoungestandbest‐trainedcoastguardvesselcrew
facedproblemsafter24hoursintheliferaft(Solberg,
Gudmestadetal.2016).
Amongthelarger accidentsinthe Arcticwefind
thecruiselinerMaximGorkiy(holedbyiceat60NM
west of Svalbard, 1989) (Kvamstad, Bekkadal et al.
2009, Hovden 2014) and the Hanseatic (grounded in
Murchinsonfjorden, 1997), (Lorentsen 1997). The last
accident occurred in the summer of 2016 – a
Cruise
shipOrteliuswith146people(105passengers)hadto
betowedfor2daysfromtheHinlopenstraitnorthof
Svalbard back to Longyearbyen after engine failure
(Sabbatini2016).
Table7. Type of events of different risk level (red‐high,
yellow – moderate, green – low) for regions under
consideration
_______________________________________________
GreenlandIceland SvalbardNorway Russia
_______________________________________________
RISKFORPEOPLE
_______________________________________________
6484
F‐G,F‐C T‐C,T‐G, F‐O,F‐G, F‐F,F‐C
F‐F,C‐F, T‐F,C‐F C‐F,F‐F T‐F,C‐F
T‐G,T‐FF‐C,C‐C,
T‐G,T‐F
6910511
T‐G,C‐G, C‐G,C‐C, F‐G,F‐C, C‐G,C‐O, F‐G,F‐O,
F‐G,T‐F, T‐C,F‐O, T‐O,C‐O, T‐G,T‐O, T‐G,C‐C,
C‐F,F‐F C‐O,T‐O, C‐C,C‐G, T‐V C‐G,T‐C,
F‐V,C‐V, F‐F,F‐V,T‐O,C‐O,
T‐V C‐V,T‐VC‐V,F‐V,
T‐V
912
T‐V,C‐V,F‐O F‐V,C‐V
F‐V,T‐O,
C‐O,F‐O,
T‐C,C‐C,
F‐C
_______________________________________________
RISKFORENVIRONMENT
_______________________________________________
62
C‐F,C‐O, C‐C,C‐G
C‐C,C‐G,
T‐C,T‐G
81210711
F‐G,T‐G, F‐F,F‐G, F‐G,F‐C, F‐G,F‐F, F‐G,F‐O,
C‐G,T‐C, F‐C,T‐G, T‐C,T‐G, F‐O,F‐C, F‐F,T‐G,
C‐C,T‐F, C‐F,T‐F, T‐O,C‐O, T‐F,T‐O, F‐C,T‐O,
C‐F,F‐F C‐C,T‐C, C‐C,T‐F, T‐V C‐V,C‐F,
C‐G,F‐O, C‐F,C‐G,T‐F,C‐O,
C‐O,T‐OT‐C
73522
T‐V,C‐V, F‐V,T‐V, F‐O, F‐F, F‐V,C‐V F‐V,T‐V
F‐V,T‐O, C‐V F‐V,C‐V,
C‐O,F‐O,T‐V
F‐C
_______________________________________________
In the more densely trafficked coastal region of
Norway,welisteighttypesofhigh‐risklevelforlife
and health – accidents with fishing ships due to a
large number of vessels and high activity in the
wintermonths;fireandgroundingofbothcargoand
tourist vessels, especially in
the autumn and winter
months.Thefishingvesselsrepresentthemajorityof
vessels along the Norwegian coastline and are the
dominatingfactorinthestatisticsofaccidentsatsea.
This included the number of wounded and dead
persons. For the first half of 2016, there were 123
personswoundedand
fourpersonsdeadatsea.Three
outoffourdeathswereatafishingvessel.
Passengervesselshaveexperiencedfewincidents.
However, the consequences may be significant. One
exampleisthegroundingofthefastpassengervessel
MVSleipnerin1999where19personsdied.Thelarger
passengervessels/cruiseships are
representedinthe
groundingstatistics.Oneexampleisthegroundingof
thecruiseshipMVMarcoPolointheLofotenIslands
in 2014 with 1096 persons onboard. There are,
however, few incidents in total and no subsequent
examplesofsevereaccidentsduetogroundingsand
collisions.Fireandotherproblems
likeenginefailure
is very critical along the Norwegian coastline and
mayleadtosignificantlosses.The fishingfleetfaces
challengesinthisrespectquitefrequently.
112
Engine and fire problems occur in the passenger
fleet also. The coastal steamer Hurtigruten traveling
the coast with many vessels all year round
occasionallyhasbeenchallengedwithsuchincidents.
. However, there are seldom severe accidents. One
seriousexceptionwasthefireonboardScandinavian
Star in 1990 where 159
persons died out of 500
personsonboard.Amorerecentaccidentistheengine
fireonboardtheHurtigrutencoastalsteamerNordlys
in2011,with262personsonboard.Twooftheengine
crewdiedand16personswereinjured.
ForIceland, touristvesselgroundingisestimated
asahighrisk
factorbecauseoftheconsequencesdue
to remoteness of the tourist routes from the nearest
SAR‐capacities. The ships that have grounded or
collided in the sea around Iceland have generally
been smaller fishing vessels and older cargo ships,
which have not been sailing according to a regular
schedule. Large cruise
vessels have not grounded
around Iceland, but there have been incidents with
smallerpassengerboats.Shouldanincidentinvolvea
larger vessel, it is obvious that the consequences
couldbeveryseverefortheenvironment.
Untilnow,wehavenotexperiencedsevereviolent
actsinthemaritimeArctic.Thatis
why all violence
events are estimated as low risk due to a limited
probability.
In general, regions with intensive traffic (coastal
Norway, Western Russia) may see a higher
probability. However, at least in the Norwegian
coastal waters there is more rescue resources and a
higherlevelofpreparedness,whichmakesit
easierto
find other vessels to help near‐by ships in distress.
Thecconsequencesfortheenvironmentare,however,
moresevereclosertoland,wherepollutionrecovery
isbothdifficultandtime‐consuming.
Theestimatesastopollutionmayincreasedueto
more traffic with dangerous goods from Russian oil
andgasfields.
Table8. Share of events with different risk level in the
regions.
6 IMPLICATIONSFORRESPONSECAPACITIES
There are few assessments done emphasizing the
future risk pattern and the subsequent need for
emergencycapacitiesinthe Arctic. Risk assessments
haveimplicationsforthedevelopmentofemergency
response capacities, including allocation of
preparedness resources, development of rescue
equipment,communicationandnavigationresources,
as
wellascoordinationcapacities,whichare,infact,
crucialinthecontextofscarceresources.
Priority needs should be discussed, primarily in
regards to high‐risk emergencies. Possible multiple
eventsorcrises that havenotoccurredmust also be
takenintoconsideration.
Tourist vessels fall into high‐risk cells in the
assessment matrixes, especially in case of fire
incidentsandgroundings.Thistypeofeventmaybe
verydynamicwithescalating consequences astimes
go without sufficient capacities mobilized and
broughton‐scene.
Collision is a high‐risk event for Svalbard and
CoastalNorway,andgroundingisabig concernfor
Icelandandcoastal Norway.Themainchallengefor
thepreparednesssystemcapacitiesfortouristvessels
is managing response to a large amount of people,
having enough rescue equipment and handling
accidents that can happen in other country than the
portofdeparture.Therequirementsforvessels,their
activity and management procedures
are important.
As the cruise vessels, increase their traffic to the
Arctic in autumn and winter months the challenges
increases.Weatherconditions,icing,drifticeandlong
distance from land can significantly hamper search
and rescue operations, therefore enhancing rescue
equipment suitable for cold climate and enforcing
capacityduringwinter
monthsareimportantforthe
Arcticregions.
Cargo vessels represent a risk as to fire in all
studied regions, and in case of collision and
grounding in coastal Norway. The region has also
perceived especially grounding with cargo ships as
high‐risk events for the environment after several
accidentsalongthe
coastsuchastheMVServer,Full
City andGodafossgroundings.Russiaconsidersthe
collisionandgroundingofcargovesselsasahigh‐risk
event for the environment as well. With increased
transportactivity,especiallyrelatedtothepetroleum
industryintheseregions,itisnecessarytoreexamine
the monitoring
system of coastal sea traffic, and
ensurecross‐borderpartnerships,especiallyinborder
zonesoffshoreandfarinthenorth.Itisimportantto
createcooperationandfrequenttrainingwithstandby
vessels from oil installations, helicopters and
equipment,whichcanhandlelongdistances,iceand
icing.Thereisalsoaneed
fordevelopingspecialized
oil spill recovery equipment for icy waters (ref.
NorwegianWhitePaper35(2015‐2016)“Ontheright
course”)
Thehighriskforfishingfleetisassessedincaseof
collision and fire in the regions with the increased
fishing maritime activity – Russia, coastal Norway
andIceland.
GroundingisaconcernforIcelandand
Norway. The high‐risk emergencies with fishing
vesselscallforensuringbothtowingandemergency
113
helicopter capacities. The challenges related to
fisheriesintheArcticwillincreaseifthefishingfleet
operate in a larger geographical area and farther
north.
Uncommon and multiple accidents may demand
anincreasedemergencyresourcecapacity.Machinery
damage may often cause fire; fire and collision of
vesselsmay causeoil
spill; grounding, fire, collision
orviolentactionmaycauseseriousinjuriestopeople,
etc.Theriddleeffectofthecompositethreatsliesin
their unexpected nature and highly complex
coincidencesduetotheArcticcontext.Therefore,the
mainchallengeforemergencycapacitiesremainswith
thecoordinationandthedynamiccapabilities
forfast
reorganizationoftheavailableandsuitableresources.
The capacity efforts should be directed towards
developmentofthejointemergencyresponsesystem,
improvement and sharing of emergency resources
and advancing competences in emergency
management in the Arctic seas. This calls for
increased frequency and complexity level on joint
exerciseslike
theExerciseBarents.Thereisaneedfor
full‐scaleexercisesinremoteareasand preferablyin
theautumnandwintertime,wherethechallengesare
significantlyhigherthaninthesummer.
7 CONCLUSION
Inthispaper,wehaveshownthattheincreasedtraffic
of oil and gas tankers, passenger ships
and fishing
vessels in the Atlantic Arctic may lead to negative
incidentswithsuchlargeconsequencethatmitigation
efforts from a broad range of resources are needed.
Effortstoreduceprobabilityareimminentinthenew
regulations for ice‐infested waters, especially the
Polar code. It is important that the operative
standardsfollowingthePolarcodesuchasnavigation
planningandpolarwateroperationmanualsareata
highenoughsafetyleveltoreducetheprobabilityof
incidents,especiallyrelatedtocruisevessels,Also,the
risk assessments point to the need for emergency
response plans, resource allocation and an
organization of
the preparedness system in an
optimal way. This may also include strengthened
cooperation across borders. In this study, we have,
however, highlighted a significant risk in areas not
covered by the Polar code. Thus, the Polar code
shouldbedevelopedfurtherandlinkedtothespecific
challengesofallArcticsea
regions.
Inthisstudy,wehaveshownthatthevalidationof
the risk assessment tools is important. Effective risk
managementdecisionscannotbebasedexclusivelyon
mappingorderedcategoricalratingsoffrequencyand
severity, as optimal resource allocation may depend
crucially on other quantitative and qualitative
information. Therefore, distinguishing between
the
most urgent and least urgent risks in a setting with
fast changing conditions and the lack of incident
statistics,liketheArcticsearegions,isachallenging
task. There is a need to reflect on the sudden
appearanceofthe“Black Swan”incidents.Toprepare
for the rare, but dramatic
events, qualitative
judgements and worst‐case scenario analyses are
needed. The non‐expected accidents may bring a
combinationofaccidents,suchasfire,woundedand
missing persons and oil pollution. Thus, a minor
accident in this region may fast escalate into a
disaster.
In the last decades, emergency preparedness
resources
in the Arctic have been significantly
strengthenedthroughtheadditionofavailablevessels
andhelicopters.However,stilltheresponsetimemay
be long and the capacity limited if major incidents
occur.Thiscallsforincreasedresearcheffortstolearn
more about how to reduce the probability of
unwantedincidents.Thisincludes
in‐depthstudiesof
modern vessel design and equipment, systems and
procedures,aswellas the education and training of
key personnel. We also need to look closer into the
preparednesscapacitiesbothfortheprivateactorsin
the region as well as on the government side as to
both
technologyandpersonnel.Weneedtolookinto
the competences of both the vessel crew and the
emergencyresponseresourcestodealwiththeArctic
water challenges. This includes research on training
and exercise schemes on less likely large‐scale
incidents demanding efforts from a broad range of
emergencyresponseactors,
andcross‐bordersupport
from other nations where institutional dimensions
mayrepresentanextrafactor.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to acknowledge the support from
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
NordlandCountyAdministrationfortheirsupportof
the MARPART project, and all MARPART partners
fortheircooperation.
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