101
1 INTRODUCTION
ShippingroutesalongtheRussianArcticcoastwere
recognized gradually during the movement of the
localpopulationinhabitingthecoastoftheArcticSea.
TheywerecompletedwhenS.I.Dezhnevdiscovered
possibilityofvoyagesfromEuropetotheFarEastin
the year 1648 (Starkov 2001). In the years 1691‐1692
wasdevelopedfirstma
poftheArcticOceancrossing
fromwesttoeast.Thefirstknowncaseofthepassage
oftheNorthernSeaRoute(NSR)concernsthevessel
ʺVegaʺ headed by Nils Nordenskjöld fromwest to
east (Northern Sea Route: history of development,
http://www.ikz.ru/si‐
berianway/engl/sevmorput.html, accessed 28.02.
2014). The vessel commenced it
s voyage in 1878,
winteredinthe Arcticand reacheditsdestinationin
1879.In1932,theSovieticebreakerʺSibiryakowʺwent
theNSR forthefirsttimeoverthecourseofasingle
navigation season (Starkov 2001). Most of vessel’
voyagesontheNSR,however,involvedlocalt
raffic,
between external ports and ports on the NSR
(Armstrong 1952). Under a special agreement
between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1940 an
auxiliarycruiserʺKometʺpassedtheNSRfromWest
to east with assistance of icebreakers. The transit
voyagewascompletedsuccessfullyinonenavigation
season. It was first commercia
l transit passage
through the NSR by a vessel other than the Soviet
flag. During the Second World War military
transportstookplacemostlyfromtheUnitedStatesto
theportofTiksiandtheGulfofProvidienya;theleast
Ice conditions affecting passage of Polish vessels
convoy though the NSR in 1956. Long-term ice
forecasts and passage strategies
T.Pastusiak
GdyniaMaritimeUniversity,Gdynia,Poland
ABSTRACT:Thegoalofthestudywastoexamineicecoverconditionsthataccompaniedthepassageo
f
convoy
ofsevenPolishvesselsfromEuropetotheFarEastinyear1956,whichinitiatedaninternationalcommercial
shippingtransit.SeveraldifferentsourcesofinformationonthestateoficecoverintheArcticwereusedinthis
study. Ice conditions (decisive for ability of a merchant vessel or icebreaker to cross the route) during the
followingnavigationalseasonsinmostoftheNSRareasshowedextremelydivergentresults‐
fromthemost
favorabletothemostdifficultandviceversa.
Existinginyears1940‐1957icecoverconditionsandshipbuildingtechnologiesdidnotguaranteeasuccessful
transitpassageinonenavigationseason.TheSovietUnionusedicebreakerstha
twerenotabletoleadvesselsin
heavy ice conditions that occurred in 1950s. The NSR Administration used passive strategy – waiting for
improvementoficeconditions‐insteadofforcingheavyice.PassivestrategyofnavigationthroughtheNSR
includedwinteringandcontinuationofpassagenextyearwhenicecondit
ionsimproved.Annualvariabilityof
iceconditionsapproximatedbythirddegreepolynomia llineshowedtrendswell.However,thehighannual
anomaliesoficeconditionsinrelationtotrendlinedidnotallowforeffectiveforecastsonparticularsectionsof
theNSRinnextnavigationseason.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 12
Number 1
March 2018
DOI:10.12716/1001.12.01.11
102
totheportofArkhangelsk.Anotherattempttouseof
the NSR as an international transit route was the
voyageofconvoyofsevenPolishvesselsfromPoland
toChinain1956.Thedestinationwasnotreachedthat
time. Due to unfavorable ice conditions, it was not
possibletocontinue
voyageinonenavigationseason.
ThedeputyministeroftheSovietmerchantfleettried
to persuade the convoy leadership to winter and
continuepassageinnextnavigationseason.However,
the convoy turned and successfully returned to
Poland.
2 PURPOSEOFTHEWORKANDRESEARCH
HYPOTHESES
Theaimofthestudy
istoexaminetheconditionsof
the ice cover that accompanied the passage of the
convoyofsevenPolishvesselsfromEuropetotheFar
East, which initiated an international commercial
shipping transit. Next is to determine whether the
knowledgeoftheconditionsoficedatingfrom1940‐
1956atthat
timecouldbeexpectedthatNSR would
become the route ofintensive transittrafficbetween
EuropeanportsandportsoftheFarEast.
The following partial research hypotheses are
intended:
It was it possible to reach the destination by a
convoyofL3iceclassmerchantvesselsunderthe
assistanceofSovieticebreakersin1956.
Wasit possible to predict (forecast)failureof the
implementedvoyage.
Could the purpose of the voyage be achieved at
theexistingthattimeknowledgeofshipbuilding?
Whetherinducingtheconvoyleadershiptowinter
and continue the voyage in the next navigation
seasonhadsubstantivelyjustifiedgrounds.
3 NARRATIVEDESCRIPTIONOFEVENTS
ACCOMPANYINGPOLISHVESSELS’VOYAGE
ONTHENSR
In1956,thePolishOceanLinesundertookaconvoyof
sevenPolishvesselsbuiltforChinabytheNSR(Falba
2011,Adamczyketal.2012,Gogol andHuras2014).
These were vessels named:
“Łódź”, “Radom”,
“Kalisz”, “Reda”, “Rumia”, “Sopot” and
“Wejherowo”.Thefirstthreeweresteamersthathad
a load capacity of about 5.500 DWT each and four
more were motorships of about 900 DWT. The
steamers were built in Gdanskʹs Shipyard and the
steamers in Gdynia Shipyard. In July 1956
vessels
wereloaded inGdańsk andGdynia.On19July,the
convoy reached Murmansk. On July 24, 1956, the
convoyleftMurmanskandonthehighseasjoinedthe
Soviet icebreakerʺSibiryakovʺ. The icebreaker sailed
in front ofthe convoy breaking ice. Behind it sailed
rest of the
vessels in the track. Without special
disturbances, the convoy reached the Yenisei River.
OnJuly30,theconvoyanchoredatsouthernshoreof
theRastorguyev(Kolchak)Island.Vesselswaitedone
month for suitable ice conditions to go through the
Vilkitsky Strait. Three steamers supplemented the
fuel supply within three days at
the nearby port of
Dikson. On 31 August, the convoy continued its
voyage. Without problems the convoy passed
through the Vilkitsky Strait. The following soviet
icebreakers paved the way amongthe ice” „Captain
Voronin”,„CaptainBelousov”and„Yermak”.Theice
was getting thicker. Near the island of Ayon and
polar
basePevekconvoywasstuckinice.Statements
of mariners showed that winds of hurricane force
encountered. Based on simulation of ice conditions
(ESIMO, http://www.aari.ru/‐resources/0011_12/
manual_op/infoice/szatie/vsb_ea‐st/info.html, aces‐
sed03.03.2014).Itcanbeassumedthatcompactingof
iceinthepassageareareachedvalueofmorethan1.5
degrees.Hydro
‐meteorologicalconditions,suchasice
concentration,icethickness,compactingandicedrift,
did not allow to continue voyage. With the help of
icebreakersʺCaptainBelousovʺandʺMolotovʺPolish
vessels reached anchorage at the road of Pevek.
Reconnaissance from the air and from the water
showninabilitytocontinuethevoyage
innearfuture.
Inplace ofthedeputy ministerarrivedin theSoviet
merchant fleet and tried to convince the Polish
command of the convoy to wintering and continue
voyageinnextyearnavigationalseason.Considering
wintering of vessels until the next navigational
season, the convoy commander decided to return
without
reaching a destination (China). The return
voyage was not difficult, despite fact that in the
VilkitskyStraitareavesselsoftengotstuckinice.The
convoy was assisted by icebreakerʺYermakʺ . Even
beforereachingtheMurmanskconvoywassolvedon
30September1956.PolishvesselsreturnedtoPoland
individually
in the first days of October. The
inspection of the vesselsʹ hulls showed only minor
damage. Subsequently, all seven vessels took over
SovietcrewsinKaliningrad.Thentheywerebrought
toChinaaroundCapeofGoodHope.
4 ANALYSISOFICECONDITIONSONTHE
CONVOYROUTEONTHENSR
In order
to investigate the relationship between ice
coverconditionandscheduleofconductedconvoyof
Polishvessels,therelativeareasoftheArcticseasand
their regions were analyzed for average of 10 days
(decades)between1935and2011(ESIMO,Iceextent
surface of the Arctic seas and their regions,
http://www.‐
aari.ru/odata/_d0005.php?mod=0,
accessed04.11.2014).Theresultsareshowningraphs
onFigure1.Timepointswithlinkinglines(inblack)
weredrawnongraphtoillustratechangeinrelative
icecoverage.Itisnoticeableinthenortheasternpart
of the Kara Sea and in the eastern part of the East
Siberian
Sea much higher ice coverage than inother
seas. From the graph, it can be concluded that the
NSRAdministrationplannedtocontinuevoyageafter
icecoverofthenortheasternpartoftheKaraSeawill
bereducedfrom about88% to about52%. Merchant
vessels without special adaptation of
propulsion
systemtoiceconditionswereunabletoovercomeice
conditions in eastern part of the East Siberian Sea
coveredwithiceat86%.Doubtsariseregardinghelp
oficebreakersinconnectionwiththequote,ʺFinally,
the convoy was stuck in ice near Ayon Island, near
the Pevek polar base. Help
for icebreakers was
neededʺand a quoteʺAfter a few hours came two
icebreakersʺsuggestingthattheconvoyhadnotbeen
103
assistedonaregularbasisbyicebreakers.Itshouldbe
inferred thatthe icebreakers came when the convoy
wasalreadystuck inice.Icebreakers“Molotov”and
“Captain Voronin” provided support for move
vesselsoutofice.Itcannotberuledoutthatthelack
ofcontinuoussupportoficebreakerscaused
decision
not to continue voyage and to return to Europe the
sameroute.AfterthereturnoftheconvoyofPolish
merchant vessels, ice conditions of the northeastern
part ofthe Kara Sea was covered at about 52%, the
eastern part of the East Siberian Sea at 37%, the
eastern
partoftheLaptevSeaat28%,thewesternpart
oftheLaptevSeaat45%andthenortheasternpartof
theKaraSeawas56%.Analysisindicatesthat60‐90%
iceconcentrationinthenortheasternpartoftheKara
Sea has prevented the passage of the convoy. The
convoycontinued
itsvoyage,whenwasopportunity
tobypassicefloesfieldsofconcentrationof50%and
higher. On the other hand, convoy of vessels was
using icebreakers to pass ice fields with ice
concentration of 20%. Ice conditions which prevent
continuationofvoyagewasconcentrationoficefloat
of90%occurring
intheeasternpart ofEastSiberian
Sea.
Figure1. Relative sea ice surface on the NSR during the
1956’ navigational season during voyage of Polish vessels
convoy; Black circles and lines – time points on the route
andlinkingline(madebytheauthorbasedandFalba2011
andESIMO,,IceextentsurfaceoftheArcticseas
andtheir
regions, http://www.aari.ru/odata/ _d0001.php?mod=1
&lang=1&sea=0,accessed03.03.2014)
In order to reconstruct the state of ice cover
accompanying passage of the convoy of Polish
vessels, the positions and route lines of the convoy
weremappedontoicemapsoftheArcticforperiods
of5‐15daysavailablefortheyears1950‐1998atgrid
resolution of 15ʹ longitude
and 15ʹ latitude (ESIMO,
Total ice concentration, http://www.aari.ru/
odata/_d0001.php? mod=1&lang=1&sea=0, accessed
04.11.2014).Thenextstagesofvoyagewerepresented
on subsequent ice maps at intervals of 10 days.
(Figure2).
Figure2. Ice conditions occurring on the Polish vessels
convoy route in 1956. Made by author based on ESIMO,
Total ice concentration, http://www.aari.ru/odata/
_d0001.php?mod=1&lang=1&sea=0 (accessed 03.03.2014)
andFalba(2011);pinkline–routeofconvoy.
104
5 LONG‐TERMFORECASTINGOFICE
CONDITIONSFORTRANSITPASSAGE
VOYAGES
Thetransi toftheGermanshipʺKometʺin1940ended
successfully. In order to clarify whether, based on
known ice conditions from 15 years preceding
planned trip, it was possible to predict failure of
transitofsevenPolishvessels
in1956thelightestice
conditions occurring in seas covering the NSR
between1940and1955wasmade.Tothisend,maps
of ice navigation conditions were reviewed for
averagedperiodsof30days.Theyareavailablefor
years1940–2005(ESIMO,Severityoficeconditions,
http://www.aari.ru/odata/_d0012.php?mod=1,
accessed 03.03.2014).
Annual changes in ice
conditions during the navigation season were very
high.Sometimestheychangedfromthelightesttothe
heaviest. The greatest annual volatility was
characterizedbywesternpartof the Laptev Sea,the
southwesternpartoftheKarasea,theeasternpartof
the Laptev Sea and eastern part
of the East Siberian
Sea.(Figures 1and2).Inorderto detectlong‐term
trends, annual changes were approximated by
polynomial line of the third degree. The
approximation results shown different trends in
westernpartoftheNSR(Figure3)andineasternpart
of the NSR (Figure 4).
The hardest conditions of ice
navigation in western part of the NSR occurred in
recentyearsprecedingthefailedvoyageintheLaptev
Sea in 1950 and shown a constant tendency to
improveiceconditions(Figure1).Inthenorthernpart
of theKara Sea, there were favorable conditions for
navigation
through the whole period of time. The
lightestconditionsoficenavigationintheeasternpart
of NSR occurred in the last years preceding the
unsuccessfulvoyageinthe Eastern Siberian Sea and
thesouthernpartoftheChukchiSeaattheWrangel
Islandbetween1950and1951,andthen
therewas a
tendency of rapid deterioration of severity of ice
conditionsupto3.0‐3.5onascalefrom1(good)to5
(bad) in the year preceding planned trip. From the
above graphs one should therefore expect a very
difficult and challenging conditions at the Wrangel
Island during navigation
season 1956’ in which
planned to pass a convoy of Polish vessels by the
NSR. It should be noted that successful transit of
German ship “Komet” in 1940 was generally
accompanied by extremely light ice navigation
conditions (CIA 1959). Only in western part of the
Laptev Sea and in eastern
part of East Siberian Sea
occurredanaverageiceconditionsthattime.
Cyclicalperiodicitywasobservedonallgraphsof
long‐term changes of ice conditions for third‐degree
polynomiallines(Figures3and4).Thewesternpart
ofalltheNSRseaswascharacterizedbyacyclicalof
7.5 years
and an eastern part of all the NSR seas of
10.7years.Thestudyincludedonlyonecyclechange.
Figure3.Thelightesticeconditionsonwesternseasofthe
NSR.Made byauthor based on Severity of iceconditions,
MadebyauthorbasedonESIMO,Severityoficeconditions
http://www.aari.ru/odata/_d0012.php?mod=1, accessed
03.03.2014.
Figure4. The lightest ice conditions on eastern seas of the
NSR. Made by author based on ESIMO, Severity of ice
conditions, http://www.aari.ru/odata/_d0012.php?mod=1,
accessed03.03.2014.
6 TECHNICALLIMITATIONSOFICEBREAKERS
NECESSARYTOCONDUCTCONVOY
THROUGHICE
Environmental conditions of each section of voyage
andtechnical parametersoficebreakers beinginuse
were presented in Table 1. It was assumed that
icebreakers met the needs of expected conditions on
the NSR. So the 6,200 horsepower icebreaker
ʺ
Sibiryakovʺ and the 10,000 horsepower icebreakers
ʺYermakʺ andʺMolotovʺ were able to pave theway
with an ice concentration of 20%. Icebreakers drive
power 12,000 HP not beat the ice cover with a
concentrationofover50%orovericewithathickness
of2.5mor icecompactness over
than1.5 degree.In
order to check whether the icebreakers assisting
convoy of Polish vessels were able to overcome the
2.5 meter ice cover and the 50% concentration,
technicalspeed oficebreakersbeinginuse thattime
was presented on Figure 5 (Arikaynen 1990).
Maximumthicknessoficeincludedinthe
graphdoes
not exceed 1.8 meters. This is much less than the
identified ice conditions (>2.5 meters). It should be
assumedthaticebreakersusedinthattimewerenot
abletoovercomesuchheavyiceconditions.
105
Figure5. Technical ice speed of icebreakers depending on
concentration and thickness of ice. Made by author
accordingtoArikaynen(1990).
Onlyfewdatasources wereinvicinityofvessel‘s
route.Mostofthemwere out of sight.Howeverthe
characteristicshapes of the edge of all sources were
analysed.Searchedcorrelations.
Table1.Parametersoficebreakerssupportingtheconvoyof
Polishvesselsagainsticeconditions(Falba2011;Icebreaker
Captain Belousov, http://www.polarpost.ru/forum/
viewtopic.php?f=4&t=795, acessed 03.03.2014; Icebreaker
Captain Voronin, http://www.polarpost.ru/forum/
viewtopic.php?f=4&t=3635,accessed03.03.2014;Icebreaker
Sibiryakov, http://www.polarpost.ru/forum/download/
file.php?id=3561&mode=view, accessed 03.03.2014;
Icebreaker Yermak, http://tsushima.su/RU/shipsru/
shipsrussiaru/shipsrussiabronru/shipsrussiabronsudaru/
ledokol‐ermak, accessed 03.03.2014; Icebreaker Molotov,
http://www.polarpost.ru/forum/view topic.php?f=4&t=628,
accessed
03.03.2017).
_______________________________________________
Icebreaker Segment PropulsionIce
ofroute power[KM], conditions
Displacement[T],
maximalspeed
[knots]
_______________________________________________
Sibiryakow Murmansk 6200,4850, Ice
‐Rastorguyev18.0/13.5concentration
Islandupto20%
_______________________________________________
Captain Rastorguyev12000/10500, Ice
Belousov, Island 5360,16.5 concentration
Captain ‐Ayon50%.
Voronin‐ IslandVerythickice
__________
Yermak10000/9000,(>2.5m).
10000,15/12 Compactness
_________________________________
Molotow AyonIsland 10000,11000, oficeover
15.51.5°–2.0°.
_______________________________________________
7 RATEGIESFORTRANSITVOYAGESOF
VESSELSONTHENSR
Analysisoficeconditionsoccurringinregionsofthe
Russian Arctic seas over time and time schedule of
vessel’s convoy movement shown that the NSR
Administration has adopted wait strategy for
improving ice conditions rather than forcing severe
iceconditions.
Itwould havetobe clarifiedwhether
inducing the convoy leadership to winter and
continuevoyageinthenextnavigationalseason1957’
was justified substantively. The ice conditions (their
lightest values) in the seas covering NSR between
1955and1957wereanalyzed.Forthispurposesused
mapsoficenavigation
conditionsforaverageperiods
of30daysavailablefortheyears1940‐2005(ESIMO,
Severity of ice conditions http://www.aari.ru/odata/
_d0012.php?mod=1, accessed 03.03.2014). Ice
conditions in eastern part of the East Siberian Sea
were very conducive to navigation in 1957. In
southwestern part of the Chukchi Sea ice sailing
conditionshaveimproved
veryfromdifficultin1956
tomoderatein1957.Thisindicatesthattheconvoyof
vesselswas likely toreachthe destination of transit.
Thissituationcouldalsobepredictedonthebasisof
extrapolationof multiannual changes for the eastern
part of the East Siberian Sea and the southwestern
partof theChukchiSea. However,were L3iceclass
vessels capable for wintering at Ayon Island‐is in
dispute.
Table2. Thelightest andthe lightest iceconditions on the
NSRin1955‐1957.Severityoficeconditions:1–verylight,
2‐light, 3‐average, 4‐heavy, 5 – very heavy. Made by
author based on ESIMO, Severity of ice conditions,
http://www.aari.ru/odata/_d0012.php?mod=1, accessed
03.03.2014.
_______________________________________________
NSRregion Iceconditionsseverityinnavigationseason
1955 19561957
_______________________________________________
KaraSea(SW)122
KaraSea(N)141
LaptevSea(W)135
LaptevSea(E)135
EastSiberianSea(W) 221
EastSiberianSea(E) 311
ChukchiSea(S)453
_______________________________________________
Averageseverity1,92,92,6
_______________________________________________
One may wonder whether successful strategy
wouldbetoreturnthisconvoy to wintering outside
oftheNSR(inEurope)andre‐crossingtheentireNSR
in 1957. Advantage of this strategy was that the
vessels wintered in ice safe place of refuge. Table 2
shownthatthisstrategywouldnot
work.Averageice
navigationconditionsin1957wereonlyalittlebetter
thanin1956.Bycontrast,intheeasternandwestern
parts of the Laptev Sea in 1957, very difficult
conditionsoficeconditionsoccurred.Suchconditions
could not have been predicted on basis of
extrapolation of multi‐annual
ice conditions on the
Laptev Sea. However, this should be taken into
accountduetoveryhighanomaliesoficenavigation
conditionsonthisseafromthelightesttotheheaviest
one, which were far away from the long‐term trend
line.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Severaldifferentsourcesofinformationonthe
stateof
icecoverintheArcticwereusedinthisstudy.These
weremapsoficeconditionsforanaverageof30days
106
between1940and2005,mapsoftheArcticicecover
forperiodsof5 ‐15daysbetween1950and1998at15
ʹlatitude and 15ʹ longitude grid resolution and the
mapsofseasoftheRussianArcticandtheirregions
foranaverageof10daysperiodsbetween 1935
and
2011. All used data and maps were from
http://www.aari.ru/projects/ECIMO. The information
waspresentedindifferentways,butallofthemgave
consistentresults.
It can be concluded that the Soviet Union had
icebreakers that did not have capacity for effective
assistance of vessels convoys in such unfavorable
shippingconditionsas
iceconcentrationabove50%
or ice thickness higher than 1.8 meters or when ice
compactness was higher than 1.5°‐2.0°. It was
observed that the NSR Administration coordinating
convoys had adopted tactics of waiting for an
improvementiceconditionsratherthanforcingunder
severeiceconditions.
Extrapolation of annual variation
in the second
degreepolynomialshowedtrendsofchange,butdue
tohighannualanomaliesoficeconditions,itwasnot
eligible for forecasting ice conditions on particular
sections of the NSR in the next navigation season.
Therefore,itdidnotrecognizepossibilityofcrossing
theNSRinonenavigationseason.
Inthissituation,in
particular due to the uncertainty of using the route
from Europe to the Far East by the Suez Canal, the
wintering tactic and continuation of vessels’ transit
voyageinthefollowingyearappearedtobejustified
bymerit.
Long‐term variability of ice conditions found on
thebasisofpolynomialcurvesofthethirddegreewas
characterizedbyaperiodof7.5yearsforthewestern
partsoftheindividualseasandaperiodof10.7years
fortheeasternpartsoftheindividualseas.However,
this cyclicality was determined on the basis of only
one cycle
of change. This did not allow for reliable
conclusions about extrapolation of changes in
subsequent years. So it was not useful for decision
makers planning a convoy of Polish vessels. The
usefulnessof futurenavigationalplanning would be
to examine many cycles of ice conditions in
navigationalseasonsinall
NSRsections.
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