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1 INTRODUCTION
The functioning of marine transportation, a large‐
scalesocio‐technicalsystem,affectshumans,societies
andnaturalenvironmentglobally.For suchcomplex
system, with a broad range of stakeholders located
worldwide, safety performance is extremely
important because exhibited failure modes can have
severe consequences, as demonstrated by series of
tra
gic events (Anderson 2003). Therefore, global
maritime community put substantial efforts into
preventinglossesoflife,ships/floatingstructuresand
damages to the environment.Historically, the
maritime international regulatory bodies had
attemptedtoimproveshippingsafetybyregulations
developedoramendedasaresponsetoaccidentsthat
haveoccurred.ByadoptionoftheInternationalSafety
Management Code (ISM Code) by the International
Maritime Organisation a shift from prescriptive and
reactive a
pproach towards proactive approach was
determined.OneoftherequirementsoftheISMCode
istoimprovesafetybyanalysingaccidents.
According to literature data, more than 80% of
marineaccidentsare a
ttributedtohuman failure.To
reducetheprobability of human failure it is vital to
understand the factors that influence safety
performance. Traditionally, accidents have been
viewed as a result of inadvertent (slips, lapses,
fumbles and mistakes) or deliberate (routine,
optimising and situational violations) unsafe acts
(Reason2001).Consideringhumanfailureasacause
instead of a symptom of a problem deeper inside a
system resulted with remedial act
ions focusing on
controlling human behaviour with introducing or
enforcing existing procedures and/or implementing
new technological solutions (Dekker 2014). On the
contrary,currentapproachtopreventionofaccidents
includes looking for organizational decisions or
policies, operational condit
ions and technological
features that created situations in which human
failurecouldoccur.
Organizational safety culture is one of the key‐
factorsthatcontributetosafety(Berg2013).Astrong
safety culture is a barrier against psychological or
behavioural factors that interacting in unanticipated
ways lead to accidents. Several leadership
charact
eristics and associated behaviours of masters
cancontributetocreatingandmaintainingapositive
The Role of the Master in Improving Safety Culture
Onboard Ships
T.Bielić,D.Predovan&J.Čulin
UniversityofZadar,Zadar,Croatia
ABSTRACT:Asacomplexsocio‐technicalsystemmarinetransportationisopentorisks.Duetotheeffortsof
internationalorganisations, flagand port administrations, classification societies and ship‐owners the safety
recordhassteadilyimproved.However,marineaccidentsresultingfrominadequatesafetyculturestilloccur.
Inthi
spaperexamplesofrecentaccidentsrelatedtodifferentdimensionsofsafetycultureareprovided.The
roleofthemasterinachievinganenhancedsafetyisemphasised.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 11
Number 1
March 2017
DOI:10.12716/1001.11.01.14
122
safety culture and thus impact the ship safety. This
paperreviewsanddiscussestheroleofthemasterin
improvingsafetycultureonboardships.Thepaperis
organised as follows. The second section briefly
reviewsthemaritimesafetyculture.Thethirdsection
describes connection between ma ster`s leadership
style and safety
culture onboard ship illustrated by
examplesofaccidents.Theconclusionsarepresented
inthefinalsection.
2 MARITIMESAFETYCULTURE
Although there is a plethora of research related to
safety culture there is no uniform definition of the
concept in the literature. One of the definitions is:
“Thesafetyculture
ofanorganisationistheproduct
of individual and group values, attitudes,
perceptions,competencies,andpatternsofbehaviour
thatdeterminethecommitmentto,andthestyleand
proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety
management”(HSC1993).Oneoftheissuesthathave
been debated among researchers is usage of terms
safety culture and safety climate. According to
Cooper(2000)safetyclimateisapsychological aspect
ofsafetyculture.Safety climate,i.e.values,attitudes
and norms regarding safety can be measured by
questionnaires or interview based methods. Two
other aspects, behavioural and situational, include
activities, actions and behaviour and policies,
procedures,
management system and practices
controlsrespectively.
Aneffectivesafetyculturerequiresleadershipand
commitment from management, effective two‐way
communication,employeeinvolvement,existenceofa
learningcultureandexistenceofajustculture(HSC
1993). Therefore, creating and sustaining a positive
safetycultureisacomplexprocessinallsafety‐critical
systems such as aviation, nuclear power plants and
medical system. Several characteristics of maritime
transportationadditionallyhampertheimprovement
of safety culture. The maritime transportation
involvesabroadrangeofstakeholders.Itisahighly
globalised industry, and they are usually located in
different countries, with different administrative
capacity and
willingness to enforce legal
requirements.Duetomulticulturalandmultinational
aspects of shipping it is difficult to achieve uniform
valuesregardingsafety culture. Costreductionsand
efficiency demands, seen as necessity of sustaining
competitiveness, also might compromise safety. A
comprehensiveunderstandingofworkingandliving
environmentonboardisvitaltodevelop
aneffective
safetymanagementsystem.Duetodiversityofroles,
tasksandconditionsonboarditisnecessarytoengage
all crew members. However, it is difficult to secure
the involvement of heterogeneous and continually
changingpersonnel.Inadditiontothehighturnover
of the labour force, relatively long distance between
the ship owner and the vessel perplexes the
development of safety management (Lappalainen
2010).Acommunicationbetweenstakeholderscanbe
ineffective due to cultural and language differences
(Berg2013).Moreover,ahierarchicalorganisation of
shipping, with steep authority gradient, may hinder
communication.Variouslevelsofcompetenceofcrew
members, different cultural
influences that affect
learningandshortageoftimecomplicateorganisation
and delivering of training courses. A proactive
approachtosafetyisaprerequisiteforlearninginan
organisation.Demandingaspectsofshippingsuchas
working and living onboard 24/7, periods of high
workload, harsh environment onboard can obstruct
collecting relevant
information and willingness to
introduce changes. Developing a just culture is a
challengingtask duetothefactthatblameculturehas
existed for a long time. All these issues hamper not
only achieving and sustaining a safety culture, but
alsodesign,execution,andinterpretationofresearch
studies that could contribute
to improvement
(Bergheimetal.2015).
3 MASTERSSHAPESAFETYCULTURE
It is widely acknowledged that leadership is a
primary antecedent of safety climate, important
aspect of a safety culture (Borgersen et al. 2013).
Unique aspects of shipping contribute to the
relationshipbetweenmasterasaleaderandcrewas
followers.Themasterhasultimateresponsibilityand
authority for navigation and the safety of the ship.
Additionally, a vessel represents both working and
living environment where workers interact which
othermoreoftenthaninotheroccupations.Therefore
it could be expected that master´s attitude towards
safetyandlevelofhisinvolvement
insafetyactivities
willshapethesafetybehaviourofthecrewmembers.
For example, a study performed among sailors
(n=244)workingonhigh‐speedcraftsoperatinginthe
Norwegian passenger ferry industry demonstrated
that there is a positive relationship between safety
climateandshipboardsafety(Fenstadetal.2016).An
analysisofthequestionnairesurvey,whichincluded
variables“Mycaptainappreciatesthattheemployees
takeupsafetyissues“,“Iamsuretogetsupportfrom
mycaptainifIprioritizesafetyinallsituations“and
“Mycaptainsetsagoodexampleregardingattention
to safety“ showed that master`s safety orientation
positively
influences safety performance. Similarly,
studyindicatesthatthebettertheperceivedqualityof
the regulatory activities (variables “The Norwegian
MaritimeAuthority’sinspectionofseafarers’working
andliving conditionsis good“ and“The Norwegian
MaritimeAuthoritydoesagoodjobofmotivatingthe
industrytotakeresponsibilityforsafetythemselves”),
the
shipboard safety is more positive. On the
contrary, ship‐owners efficiency demands (variables:
“Theship‐ownercompromisesonsafetytocutcosts”,
“The ship‐owner compromises on safety in order to
keep to the timetable”, “Owing to the ship‐owners’
demandforefficiency,wesometimeshavetoviolate
procedures”and“Following
thesafetyproceduresis
notrewardedintheshippingcompanywhereIwork”
wereamajorcontributortonegativesafetyclimate.
Theleadershipqualitiesalsoaffect safetyculture.
Research in safety‐critical organizations show that
followers´perceptions,attitudesandbeliefsrelatedto
safety are positively influenced by authentic
leadership, characterised
by relational transparency,
moral perspective, balanced processing and self‐
awareness.Astudyconductedinashippingcompany
that trades internationally examined relationship
123
between authentic leadership and safety climate
(Borgersen et al. 2013). The questionnaires were
administrated to 499 all‐male, Filipino crew and
officers working on the 23 general cargo vessels.
Respondentswereaskedtoratethecurrentcaptain`s
qualities regardingrelational transparency (five
items, e.g., “My captain admits mistakes when they
aremade”),moralperspective(fouritems, e.g.,“My
captaindemonstrates beliefs that are consistent with
action”), balanced processing (three items, e.g., “My
captain listens carefully to different points of view
before coming to conclusions”), and self‐awareness
(four items, e.g., “My captain shows that he or she
understandshowspecific
actionsimpactothers”).The
results indicated that authentic leadership was
positivelyrelated tocrew perceptions ofthelevelof
safety climate. However, according to Berg (2013)
some current masters do not possess some of the
several desirable characteristics: clear two‐way
communication, “tough empathy”, openness to
criticism,empathy towards differentcultures,
ability
to create motivation and a sense of community,
knowingthecrew’slimitations,beingateamplayer.
Thereforeitcouldbeexpectedthatsuchleaderswill
negatively affect safety culture and consequently
safety.
One example of the accident where poor safety
cultureplayedaroleisgroundingofaUK
registered
generalcargovessel,whichresultedinsea pollution
and a loss of ship (Marine Accident Investigation
Branch 2015). In February 2015, Lysblink Seaways
grounded when its sole watchkeeper, chief officer,
lostsituationalawarenessduetotheeffectsofalcohol
consumption.Theinvestigationrevealedanumberof
safety failures that could
be traced back to
organizational failures. The passage plan had not
beenpreparedandimplementedinaprofessionaland
precautionary manner and it had not been
appropriately entered into the Electronic Chart
System, used as principal means of navigation.
Namely,someavailablesafetyfeatureshadnotbeen
set up, alarm
for cross track error had been
inappropriatelysetupandtheaudioalarmhadbeen
silenced. Also, the bridge navigational watch alarm
system had not been switched on, contrary to the
requirements of the Safety Management System
(SMS). Intentional crew non‐compliance regarding
policiesandprocedureswasnormalpracticeonboard
Lysblink
Seaways. Despite the owner’s zero alcohol
policy, significant alcoholconsumption by thecrew,
obvious from the frequent replenishment of the
bondedstore,hadgoneunchallenged.
TheBahamasregisteredpassengervesselHamburg
groundedintheSoundofMull,ScotlandinMay2015
because the bridge team did not recognise that she
was approaching the buoy from an unsafe direction
(Marine Accident Investigation Branch 2016a).
Primarymeansofnavigationwere paper charts and
theshipwasequippedwithafullyfunctionalECDIS,
but both means of navigation were used
inappropriately for route planning and monitoring
and positioning. Namely, ECDIS safety features and
tools
werenotsetuporusedalthoughtheofficerof
thewatch (OOW)was relyingonit andthe passage
plan on the paper chart lacked detail. Furthermore,
fixingandchartwork,conductedbythecadet,were
substandard but remained unnoticed by OOW.
Engrossmentwiththetrafficsituationbymaster
and
OOW,insufficientnumberofpersonnelonthebridge
toproperlymonitorthevessel’snavigation,andpoor
communication between present bridge team
memberswithunclearspecificrolesresultedinpoor
situational awareness. Bridge resource management
onboardHamburgwasineffectiveduetoshortfallsin
additionalimportant elements:shared mentalmodel
and challenge
and response. For example, “Seven
minutesbeforethegrounding,boththeOOWandthe
cadet plotted the vessel’s position on the chart.
Despite both plotted positions being incorrect, the
cadet’s fix did at least indicate that the vessel was
running into danger. Unfortunately he did not feel
empowered to challenge
the OOW and chose to
silently erase his own position, leaving the OOW’s
incorrect position on the chart“(Marine Accident
Investigation Branch 2016a). Furthermore, a number
ofmaster´sdecisionsthatwerenotinaccordancewith
the company’s SMS remained unchallenged by
officers.
Acommonfactorappearinginthesetwoaccidents
was intentional
non‐compliance with the company’s
SMS.Inbothcasesmastersweredirectlyresponsible
for an inadequateness of voyage planning and
ignorance of bridge watchkeeping best practice.
Moreover,theydidnotapplytoolsofeffectivebridge
team management such as briefing with the bridge
team and encouraging open communication which
enable
team members to raise any concern anytime.
Therefore nobody challenged voyage planning or
reportedalcoholintoxication.Duetopoorleadership
and management by the masters, available
knowledge and resources were not used properly.
Becausethemasters lead by example, it is vital that
they don`t adoptʺDo as I say, not
as I doʺ attitude.
The importance of acting consistently and applying
safety standards should be underlined during
educationandtraining.
The company´s management could contribute to
the development of situations in which the master
makes wrong decisions or behave against his/her
knowledge, experience and feelings due to bad
communication between
them, disagreeable
environmentorpressure.
Capsize and sinking of the Cyprus registered
cementcarrierCemfjordthatresultedinlossof8lives
occurred in January 2015 in the Pentland Firth,
Scotland (Marine Accident Investigation Branch
2016b). Cemfjord capsized in extraordinarily violent
seaconditionscreatedbygaleforcewindsopposinga
strong
ebbtidalstream. Becausesuch conditionsare
commonly experienced within the Pentland Firth,
they were predictable and passage through the
Pentland Firth should not have been attempted.
However,themasterdecidedtoproceedthroughthe
Pentland Firth. The investigation concluded that
severalfactorscouldhavecontributedtohisdecision:
poor
passage planning, inaccurate calculations, an
underestimation of the environmental conditions,
over‐confidence in the vessel’s handling
characteristics and his recent experience of a
dangerous cargo shift while attempting to abort an
approach to the Firth in heavy seas. Fatigue or
tiredness were also identified as possible factors
influencing poor decision making
as the master and
the chief officer worked a 6 hours on /6 hours off
124
watchkeeping routine in the 72‐hour period prior to
the accident. Additionally, industry and commercial
pressures,evidentbychallengingcharterer’splanning
schedule, managing company´s inclination to
repeatedly request SOLAS exemptions and put
Cemfjord to sea with substantial safety deficiencies
and Flag State administration`s non‐informed
decisionstoissueSOLASexemptions,
incombination
withhispersonaldeterminationtosucceedprobably
affectedhisdecision‐makingprocess.Themasterhad
a reputation as a hard‐working, confident,
experienced and competent person. On the other
hand,apartfromthemaster, thecrewmembers had
no previous experience of cement carrying vessels
and six of
them were serving onboard Cemfjord on
their first contract, thus lacking experience and
competencetobefullyawareofthesituationand/or
challengehisdecision.Theinvestigationalsorevealed
that another dimension of safety culture, learning
culture, was deficient: advices on passage planning,
weather avoidance, cargo management and stability
arising from
analysis of previous incident onboard
CemfjordinOctober2014wereissuedonlyinJanuary
2015.
InJuly2014theroll‐onroll‐offpassengerferrySt
Helen suffered a mezzanine deck collapse when its
inboardsteelwirerampingropesuddenlyparteddue
to excessive mechanical wear, corrosion and fatigue
that
resulted from lack of service lubrication, long‐
standing maintenance failure (Marine Accident
InvestigationBranch2016c).The investigationfound
out that due to manager`s gradually policy changes
maintenancemanagementhaddeteriorated.Thelack
of proper maintenance of the mezzanine decks had
been subject of SMS non‐conformance report raised
by master 2
years earlier. However, proposed
corrective action was not implemented because it
wouldhaverequiredallocationofresources.Internal
SMSauditsand external ISM Codeauditsidentified
the maintenance shortcomings, but appropriate
actions by inspection body and regulator were not
taken, thus enabling ignoring the problem by the
management team. Furthermore,
an observable
deteriorated condition of mezzanine deck was not
identifiedduringdailyandmonthlycrewinspections
(on the day of the accident an operational status of
mezzaninedeckwascategorisedas‘Operational’)and
six‐monthly thorough examinations by appointed
surveyorwhoalsoshouldhavebringshortcomingsto
theattentionofthe
regulator.
Attitude towards safety could be gradually
changedduetopoorrelationshipsbetweenthemaster
and company`s management. If the masters feel
forcedtodisregardsafetyprocedurestocomplywith
company`s requests due to time and resource
constraints or to be perceived as efficient they can
make wrong decisions. Because
the master has to
assess and prioritize different and often competing
demands in order to organise work and complete
tasks it is necessary that he is able to communicate
with management effectively to present and clarify
problemsduetoefficiency‐thoroughnesstradeoff.
Poor communication could play a role in poor
safety culture. If the masters feel ignored and not
listenedtobythecompany´smanagementwhenthey
demonstrate concern regarding safety issues
gradually they can develop a negative attitude and
eventually they will not provide important
information or even use their knowledge.
Concurrently,theymightstopaskingforinformation
from
the crew members. Such situation, where
attentiontothesafetyissuesdiminishes,mayleadto
accidents. Managers` participating in a
communication skills training courses can help
improvingsafetyculture.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In the maritime transport seafarers are faced with
notablehazards.Thereforeitisimportanttoaddress
varies issues within maritime
safety, one of them
being safety culture. Studies show that despite
substantial effortsat all levels there are still barriers
andchallengestoapositivemaritimesafetyculture.
The leadership characteristics and associated
behaviours of the masters influence safety culture
onboard ships. Therefore these issues should be
addressed and emphasised
during Bridge Resource
Managementcoursestoenhancetheseimportantnon‐
technical skills that otherwise can contribute to
accidents.
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