151
1 FROMSOLIDARITYTOBANKRUPTCY
Thehistoryofshipbuildingintoday’sPolandcanbe
dated to 1850s when the first docks have been
constructedinthenPrussianterritory–inthecitiesof
Gdańsk and Szczecin (Danzig and Stettin in those
days). The purpose of the plants was to
equip an
emerging Prussian economy with fast and modern
steel ships. After the World War II, production
continued in those factories with new important
shipyardbeingdevelopedinGdynia.Backin1980s,
shipbuilding industry in Poland was one of the
biggestbranchesofitseconomyandthecountrywas
one
ofthelargestproducersofocean‐goingvesselsin
the world. Huge shipyards used to employ
thousandsofpeopleeach,providingColdWar‐time
militaryofWarsawTreatycountrieswithshipsand
merchantfleetwithcargovesselsinordertoimprove
international trade relations of Poland. They were
also major export
facilities and sources of foreign
currenciesforever‐shortageeconomy.
Centers of social and political life, one of them
became known as a place where a legendary
‘Solidarity’wasborn. The outsideworld first heard
more about the Polish shipyards in August 1980,
whenshipworkers’ unions in TheGdansk Shipyard
went on strike in defence of Ms. Anna
Walentynowiczbeingdismissedforpoliticalreasons.
Whathavefirstlookedlikesimpledemonstrationof
unrest have finally led to the first successful
negotiations on human rights between citizens and
socialist government. Production resumed and
continuedevenunderthemartiallaw,butanoverall
economic conditions of Poland tended to worsen
year by year. Eventually, socialist government has
been overthrown during legislative election of June
4th,1989.
As of September 1988, shipbuilding industry in
Poland consisted of 5 large shipyards: Gdańsk
‘VladimirLenin’Shipyard,Gdynia‘ParisCommune’
Shipyard, Gdynia Naval Shipyard, Szczecin ‘Adolf
Fall and Rise of Polish Shipbuilding Industr
y
K.Wróbel
GdyniaMaritimeUniversity,Gdynia,Poland
J
.Frankowski
UniversityofGdańsk,Gdańsk,Poland
ABSTRACT:TheherebypaperdescribesabriefhistoryoffallandriseofPolishshipbuildingindustryinthe
21stcenturyandconfrontsstereotypesaboutitusingdataavailablefromvarietyofstatisticalsourcesaswellas
impressions regarding its current and future condition presented
by different authors, including industry
representatives.Themaingoalofthearticleistheconfrontationofpoliticalstatementwiththestatisticaldata
and current sectoral trends within the shipbuilding industry in Poland. Firstly, we introduce a historical
background in a scope of economic transition in Poland. Then, socio‐political issues
are addressed together
with economic condition using statistical data. Lastly, the newest trends and perspectives are analyzed.
Eventually,wecometoconclusionthatdespiteencounteringgreatdifficultiesandargumentsaboutitscollapse
frompoliticalactors,shipbuildingsectordidmanagetoretainitsstrongpositioninPolisheconomy.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 10
Number 1
March 2016
DOI:10.12716/1001.10.01.17
152
Warski’ Shipyard and ‘Northern Shipyard’ in
Gdańsk, of which the first one was the biggest,
employing up to 15.000 people. Ship repairs were
being conducted in several smaller enterprises, of
which Gdańsk ‘Józef Piłsudski’ Shiprepair Yard,
‘Nauta’ in Gdynia and ‘Gryfia’ inŚwinoujście were
the most
notable. All those huge factories were
complementedbyagreatnumberofdifferentplants
aroundthecountry,including‘HipolitCegielski’– a
ship engines’ manufacturer, located in Poznań. As
much as 50.000 employees had been working in
shipbuilding and repair industry that time not to
mentionthesub‐contractors.
Itisdifficulttodescribe
its revenue or contribution to Polish GDP since
various issues spoof that image: emphasis on
providing foreign currencies for the central‐
controlled economy instead of being guided by
economic calculation, political relations with Soviet
Unionanditsshareinnumberoftenderedvesselsfor
instance(Doerffer
2008).
Despite having contracted many vessels to be
built in next couple of years, shipyards found it
difficult to operate in a period of transition from
centrally‐controlledeconomytofreemarket.Asearly
as on October 29th, 1988 it was announced by the
central government that Gdańsk ‘Vladimir
Lenin’
Shipyardshallbecloseddownduetoitsreportedly
poorfinancialcondition,eventhoughsuchcondition
was rather a result of external factors – absurds of
socialisteconomyinmostcases‐influencingitsday‐
to‐day operations as well as strategic planning
process (Doerffer 2008). At that point, there were
severalvesselsatvariousstagesofconstructioninthe
docks, scheduled to be delivered in next few years,
with ongoing negotiations on constructing a few
others. Polish state was the owner of the shipyard
andthathadmadeabigimpactandfinallyattributed
tothefactthatforthe
politiciansitseemedgenerally
easier to shut down the production rather than
implementing a recovery plan. Collapse of Soviet
Union and cancellation of its military orders,
overemployment,lowworkingefficiency(Dragicevic
2007) and poor management practices had a great
influence on the process (Forkiewicz 2010, Doerffer
2008).
Variety of actions have
been taken in order to
keepthebirthplaceofSolidarity‐andaworkplaceof
futurePolishPresident,Mr.Wałęsa–running.Those
included an offer from Mrs. Barbara Piasecka‐
Johnson‐wife of cosmetics magnate to buy and
recapitalizetheentireshipyard(noresults),merging
with Gdynia Shipyard (unsuccessful), seeking
a
reliable investor overseas (little interest) and
eventually–privatizationbysellingtheshipyardto
Ukrainianbusinessman.
2 COLLAPSE
Similar, very complicated processes took place in
othershipyardsalongPolishcoastwhichfinallyled
to the point where despite a huge public aid, great
shipyardsceasedtoexist(Musielak2001).It
mustbe
noted, however, that most of entities operating in
Polandhadundergoneasimilar‘shocktherapy’toa
certain degree, including heavy industry (shipping,
militaryindustry,automotive,coalmining)andother
minor companies across the country. Although the
objective data indicates significant improvement of
economicsituationinPolandin
last25 years, many
citizens miss the old times and claim the transition
process to have negative consequences (Grosfeld
2008).Oneofthemostpopularargumentsagainstthe
model of transition, frequently brought up by left‐
side academics is the increasing economic
stratification of Polish society (Kowalik 2012). For
high‐skilled
workforce,whosepositioninPolandon
thesocialladderwashigher thaninothercommunist
countries (Domanski 1997) it could be particularly
painfulloss.
That is why for many Poles, especially residents
ofGdyniaandSzczecinitwasextremelydifficultto
accept the decision made by EuropeanCommission
(EC)in
November2008,orderingshipyardsinthose
citiesto:
repaythepublicaidreceivedinthepast–which
waspracticallyequaltoinstantbankruptcy since
the aid was estimated at level of more than 2
billionEURinyears2004‐2008(UOKIK2008)OR
sellalloftheirassets
allocatingfundstorepaythe
creditors–buyerswouldthennotbeliabletopay
anydebtsoftheformerborrowers.
Thegovernmentchose second option by passing
the so‐called ‘Shipyard Special Act’. The vast
majorityofshipyards’propertyhasbeensoldtothe
private companies including their real
estate, dry
docks and berths. Some of those private companies
operated in shipbuilding, ship repairing or
metalworking before and used this opportunity to
expandtheiractivities.However,thepublicopinion
in Poland still hardly believes that former state‐
owned shipyards exist in some way, reduced to
handful of smaller and largely
private plants and
make profits of its basic activity. Many researchers
and press authors share that point of view
(Forkiewicz2010,Valioniene 2013). EC’s decisionto
claimpublicaidtoGdyniaandSzczecinshipyardsas
illegalandwithdrawanyfurthersupportleadingto
finalshutdownofthose,togetherwith
ratherblurry,
ineffective attempts to save the yards and unclear
business relationships between state‐managed
agencies and private stakeholders led the public
opinion to conclusion that the industry no longer
existsandthatunspecifiedpoliticiansaretoblame.
3 SHIPYARDSASPOLITICALISSUE
Formanyyears,largeshipyards wereperceivedas
a
workinghorsesofPolishcoastalregionswithalmost
every family having some member working for the
yard or company some‐how cooperating with it.
PolishMinistry of Economy’s estimatesof2007had
shown that shipbuilding created approximately
155.000‐165.000 jobs, with only 25.000 of which in
shipyards themselves. Perception
of shipyards in
Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin as a centers of
economic, political and social life together with a
long‐and in many cases difficult to understand
(Forkiewicz 2010)‐process of transition from
megafactories to smaller plants led the society to
impressionthattheshipbuilding industryinPoland
nolonger
existswithitspotentiallostforever.
153
Theshipyardanditssymbolicdimensionarestill
veryimportantforaccumulatingpoliticalcapital.The
bigworkplaceisformanypeoplethesignofwealth
andstability.Moreover,theideaof‘Solidarity’isstill
very attractive to evoke for the biggest Polish
politicalparties.Theethos ofsolidarityisespecially
crucialfortheLawandJustice‐right‐wing,socially‐
orientedparty,stronglycollaboratingwithpowerful
tradeunion‐NSZZSolidarnosc.MembersoftheLaw
and Justice as well as the union activists stood up
against the European Commission’s decision about
thestateaid.
But shipyards are not only seen in the
public
debateonthenationallevel,butalsoduringpolitical
campaigns for the local authorities. The argument
aboutthe downfall of shipyard industry was raised
bypresentmayorofGdansk,Mr.PawelAdamowicz
when he accused his political opponent, Andrzej
Jaworski(formerpresidentofTheGdanskShipyard)
of irrational management of
shipbuilding industry.
But on the other hand, Mr. Adamowicz reacted
against the investment demolitions of an old
shipyard heritage not earlier than after the internet
strikes, critique from opposition and some of the
experts’ voices. Social reaction can suggest that
heritage and the identity of Gdansk on the basis of
shipyardcanstillbeverycloseto city’sinhabitants.
There is also evidence which proved that the
shipbuildingcranesareessential part of thistown’s
landscape(BRG2012).
The shipyard as a political issue emerged also
during the president campaign at 2015. One of the
candidates, Andrzej Duda promised the stronger
public intervention inside industry sector and
reintroducingtheproductionofmodern ships (PAP
2015). But is this industry really in need of
reconstruction and stronger influence of the state?
The answer being confrontation of this political
statement with the statistical data and current
sectoraltrendsarethemainaimsof
thispublication.
4 POLISHSHIPBUILDINGINDUSTRYTODAY
Statistics clearly indicate the number of ships built
gradual regression since the fall of communism in
1989.Thenumberofvesselswasnotcorrelatedwith
the tonnage, which was the highest during first
decade of the twenty first century. This situation
dramaticallychangedin
2010‐asa consequence,at
the end of 2013 Polish shipyards launched only 12
vessels. If we compare those data with the sixty or
more ships annually during the end of 1970s, we
should probably talk about the downfall of the
industry(Figure1).
Butdataonthebasisof
thenumberofshipsand
thetonnagedonotcatchstructuralchangewhichhas
begun in Polish industry sector. Nowadays, ship
productionisthesecondgrossaddedvaluebranchas
wellasitholdsthefirstpositiontakingintoaccount
the number of employees within maritime sector
(Brodzicki,Zaucha2013).It
canbeexplainedthrough
the change of shipyards’ activities. Since 2009 they
haveconcentratedonrepairsandmaintenancerather
than the construction of new vessels (Figure 2.).
Paradoxically, the unfavorable decision of the
EuropeanCommissionmighthavearrivedinthebest
possible moment to do the transition, which forced
creation
of a much more flexible business model of
theindustry.
The economic shake‐out caused by the global
financialcrisisstruckPolandoneyearlaterthanthe
global economy as a whole. Industries, particularly
dependent on export and the condition of foreign
companies felt it the most. Shipbuilding industry is
typical
highly vulnerable sector on economic crisis
and its impact was visible in Pomorskie (Masik,
Rzyski2014).Theevidencecanbedecreasinglevelof
employment(2009)andavery lowgrowth rate of
average salaries compared to the national average
(Figure 3). However, shipbuilding industry quite
quicklystartedtomakeup
forfinanciallosses.
Paradoxically,thefinancial crisis could influence
smaller orders positively, that can be covered by
more flexible shipyards dedicated for repairs.
Shipowners rather minimize the risk of new
investments and focus on maintaining current
resources in good condition during precarious
economicsituation.EvidencefromUKsuggeststhat
the marketing,
innovation and customer qualityare
safer solution and the most popular strategy of the
companiesduringtimesofcrisis(Roberts2003).Since
2010 the shipbuilding sector noted stable gross
financial income as well as increase in employment
and working efficiency (Figure 4). While the
percentageofpeopleworkinginthe
shipyardsisnot
ashighasbeforethetransition,salaries(particularly
in2011and2012)havebeengrowingfasterthanthe
nationalaverage.
Figure1. Production of shipbuilding industry in Poland (1976‐2013). Own compilation based on (Maritime Economy‐
statisticreview)
154
Figure2. Employment in shipbuilding industry. Own
compilation based on (Maritime Economy‐statistic
review)
Figure3. Growth of salary in the shipbuilding industry
(2004 = 0%). Own compilation based on (Maritime
Economy‐statisticreview)
Figure4.Financialresults(PLN,millions)andemployment
in shipbuilding industry. Own compilation based on
(MaritimeEconomy‐statisticreview)
Structural changes also enforced stronger
specialization and extension of shipbuilding
industry’sserviceoffer.Since2009,therehasbeenan
increaseincomplexityofshipslaunched(PAP2014),
which may also be an indicator of growing
innovation potential of the industry (Compensated
GrossTonnageCGTtoGrossTonnageGTrelation,a
‘complexity
density factor’, Figure 5). It would be
risky to compare this indicator to the gross profit,
whichshowsthe higher competition from the other
countries.Thoseenterprisescutdowntheir margins
in order to protect their working places, economic
competitiveness and gain a share in the most
profitable sectors (FMI
2003). Further aggressive
price war could suddenly regress very well now
growingshipbuilding sectorinPolandaswell asin
othercountries. Butall those data clearly show that
onlyin2008thecollapseoftheindustrytookplace,
butsince2009theshipbuildingindustryhasstarted
recovery.
Figure5. Financial results (PLN, milions) and the
complexicityfactorofbuiltshipsinshipbuildingindustry.
Own compilation based on (Maritime Economy‐statistic
review)
5 FROM‘GOLIATHS’TO‘DAVIDS’
Theneoliberalmarketeconomyprefersmoreflexible
companies,freefromsentimentalissues.Inorderto
findtheirplaceinaglobalindustry,anewmodelof
shipbuilding activities had to be developed. After
yearsofstruggle,merging anddividing,newhopes
and falls, numerous attempts of
privatization, the
industry seems to have reached the point in which
situationissteadilyimproving.Thehugeplantshave
beenshutdownandnewemerged.
TheGdańskShipyardisnowonlyashadowofits
former power, jointly owned by state‐managed
IndustrialDevelopmentAgency(25%)andUkrainian
businessman
andpoliticianMr.SerhijTaruta(75%).
Inoppositetothepreviouscase,theneighbouring
RemontowaHoldingisnowthebiggestcompanyof
‘blueeconomy’inPoland.GdańskShipRepairYard
‘Remontowa’ has been privatized in 2001 by its
managers.In2003, itcame intopossesionof nearby
Northern Shipyard, which
has been renamed to
‘RemontowaShipbuilding’8yearslater.Theholding,
consisting of several additional companies, now
employs some 8000 men and performs some of the
most ambitious projects in Polish shipbuilding
history(Figure6).
Gdynia Shipyard was closed on May 30th, 2009.
Almost all of its properties were sold
and now
various companies operate within its former
premises, including but not limited to Crist and
Nauta shipyards (both owned by PGZ‐Polska
Grupa Zbrojeniowa and managed by closed‐end
investment fund ‘MARS’, having 35% share in the
first and 100% in the latter of the two). A special
economiczone
‘BalticPortofNewTechnologies’has
155
also been established in order to attract new
investors.
Figure6LNG/LEG/LPGcarrier‘CoralMethane’,launched
in 2009 in Northern Shipyard‐nominee to RINA’s
‘Significant Ship of 2009’ award. Source: Remontowa
Shipbuilding.
Farther north, Gdynia Naval Shipyard is now a
state‐ownedcompanyinbankruptcyliquidationwith
PGZ planning to take it over. Defense spending
reductions in 1990s had a great influence on its
present condition. The facility made attempts to
regain financial credibility by recapitalization from
Industrial Development Agency, carrying out ship
repairs for private shipowners and continuing
cooperationwiththenavyincludingnewbuildings.
In both Szczecin andŚwinoujście, there are
facilities of Marine Ship Repair Yard ‘Gryfia’,
company owned by ‘MARS’ fund, with history
datingbackto1950s.Itconductsvariousshiprepairs,
offshore and subsea structures construction with a
bigshareoffishingindustry.Moreover,metalworks
plant of ‘Bilfinger MARS Offshore’ in Szczecin is
under a final stage of construction and is about to
commenceoperationinJuly2015.
The above shipyards work for shipowners or
managers from all over the world. They cooperate
with numerous companies, mainly ba sed in
Poland
but also from different parts of Europe and other
continents. Such cooperation stretches from basic
weldingcontractsawardedtomicrocompaniesinthe
regiontomulti‐milliondollarsdeliveriesofscrubbers
– devices aiming in reducing ship’s environmental
impact. Such a system, where a big part of ship’s
production
cycle is outsourced, enables shipyard’s
managersto increaseflexibilityof thecompanyand
reduce the costs. It is a common solution for the
shipyardsaroundtheworld.
Thismodelandotherfactors(highelectricityand
laborcostsforinstance)ledtothesituationinwhich
constructionofrelativelysimplevesselssuch
asdry‐
bulkcarriers,wherealotofsteelisused,notsomuch
know‐howisneededtobedevelopedandrelatively
little number of high‐tech devices is required to be
installed, was found unprofitable. Particularly, the
competitionwithFar‐Eastshipbuildingcompaniesof
China,JapanorSouth
Koreawouldbedifficultasthe
lattermightbesubsidizedbystate inorder to keep
theworkingplacesasithappenedinSouthKoreain
1990s (Doerffer 2008). For simple cargo vessels
production, labor and material costs have a great
influence on unit’s final price since it is difficult to
introduce machines at some stages of production
process(i.e.finalassemblyandoutfitting)andagreat
number of employees conducting relatively simple
tasksisrequired.
6 CURRENTTRENDSINTHEINDUSTRY
European companies were unable to compete with
FarEastonessothatanewmarketnicherequiredto
be
explored and it now appears to be a highly
advancedunits:cruiseships,LNG‐propelledferries,
wind farm construction vessels and men‐of‐war
including submarines (FMI 2003). Polish private‐
ownedshipyardsalsocorrectlyidentifiedthis trend
and commenced a cooperation with shipowners
demanding the highest quality of the delivered
vessels,
andthoseinturnwereofthetypesinwhich
a great complexity of ground ‐breaking technical
solutionswasinvolved.Eventhoughoffshoresector
in Poland is highly underdeveloped in compare to
Western Europe, shipyards did manage to gain
know‐howandexperienceinsuchprojectsbytaking
advantage of
research facilities and former expats’
experience.
Thechanceheremightbe amodelofinnovation
support, with the main actor on the regional level.
European Union requires declaration from every
regionaboutsmartspecializationonthebasisofthe
diagnosedinnovative,endogenouspotential.Itisone
of the ways to use
Cohesion Policy for investment
support dedicated to the industry sector
(Gawlikowska‐Hueckel 2014) but now the region is
apparently more important player than in period
2007‐2013.
In 2015 Pomorskie Region chosefour smart
specializations,includingoff‐shore,portandlogistic
–technologies.Itshowsthattheregionalauthorities
still
findthemarineindustryastheimportantplayer.
Alsoshipyardrepresentativeswereactivelyinvolved
in preparing regional strategic programs and joint
statement as the Polish Maritime Cluster or Polish
Chamber of Maritime Commerce. Probably, funds
from European Regional Development Fund (either
national/European or regional) should be the most
popular source for
financing the increasing
innovative potential of shipyard industry and this
streamwouldratherbestableduringnextfewyears.
It must be underlined, however, that oil&gas
sector–oneofthemostimportantclients’economic
situationishighlydependentonoilprices,whichin
turn are liable to significant change.
Therefore,
shipowners and managers operating in this sector
tend to cut the orders or decide not to execute
optional parts of the contracts whenever oil prices
dropbelowcertainlevelorsituationchangesdueto
anyotherexternalfactors‐unstableconditionduring
financial crisis for instance (Steinerts 2012). From
shipyards’ point
of view, negative effects of such
phenomenon can be reduced by entering new
markets,whichareoffshorewindfarmsconstruction,
fishing/fishfarmingorferries.Vesselsbuiltforthese
sectors can be also technologically advanced,
especially the latter ones where considerable
progresscanbenoticedduetooperators’pursuitof
achieving
economic and ecological advantage in
conjunctionwiththeso‐called‘sulphurdirective’.
156
Another niche in which the shipbuilding‐related
plants seek their chance is construction of various
industrial objects for both onshore and offshore
clients,namely partly‐equipped vessel’s hulls, wind
towers, cranes etc. The expertise gained in
assembling technologically‐advanced ships can be
utilised in such projects and location inside or
near
the harbours facilitates the logistics of structures
weighinguptoseveralhundredmetrictonnes.
Nevertheless,theindustryfacessomedifficulties.
A great constraint in the development is associated
with lack of qualified manpower which may seem
strangeconsideringunemploymentrateinPolandof
more than 10%. With largest shipyards
shut down,
many welders and other very experienced
techniciansdecided the leave andseekemployment
overseas, in Norway or United Kingdom in many
cases.Withshipbuildingstillperceivedas‘collapsed’
and3D‐industry(Dirty,DangerousandDemeaning),
notmanyyoungwishtojoinevendespitetherisein
salaries and relatively
high unemployment rate
amongyoungPoles(Dajczak2008,Susmarski2009).
Factoriesareforcedtoemployforeignworkersfrom
Ukraine, India or North Korea, even at a price of
riskingaccusationsofsupportingcommunistregime
inPyongyang.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Despite significantly negative political and social
reception of privatization, shipbuilding industry is
now in very good condition. Economic crisis
enforced specialization in the shiprepairs and even
though employment and production (measured by
GT) declined sharply, they do not need public
support from the state. The offshore technologies
became an opportunity, with the crucial role of the
demand from energy and petrochemical sector.
Probably
thisisareainwhichshipyardsneed some
kindofindirectpublicsupport, becausesimilarlyto
thewholeeconomy,themodelofprizingcompetition
will dry up eventually. It seems that parallel to the
privatization, shipyards became stronger connected
with regional supply base. Moreover, smaller size
means more independence and
flexibility, so the
internationalcontactsareprobablythemostdynamic
ever.Regardingtothis,thepoliticalcommentsabout
the collapse of the shipyard industry seem
unjustified.
Buttheissueforthefurtherresearcharethesocial
consequences of shipbuilding industry’
transformationespeciallyconnectedwith itsspecific
identity. Even though the real
growth in the
economicfieldis observed,anyspecific information
about the social side of industrial sector’s opinions,
sentiments, significance and the quality of work
insidenewdynamicandprivatecompaniesiswidely
known. For some people ‘Stocznia’ (‘the Shipyard’)
evokesthememoriesabouttheunited,bigandstable
production
company.Now we still know very little
from the citizen’s and employee’s point of view to
the preferred model of the industry and it is
definitelytheareatofindproper,scientificevidence.
REFERENCES
Gdansk Development Office, (Biuro Rozwoju Gdańska,
BRG). 2012. Studium krajobrazu obiektów na terenie
Młodego Miasta ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem
dźwigów.Raportzbadańspołecznych.Gdańsk:BRG.
Brodzicki T. & Zaucha J. 2013. Study on Blue Growth,
Maritime Policy and EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea
Region.
WorkingPaperno.003/2014(011)ver.2,Sopot:
InstituteforDevelopment.
Dajczak, K. 2008. Przemysł stoczniowy w Polsce i na
świecie. Prace Komisji Geografii Przemysłu (10): 123‐129.
Warsaw.
Doerffer, J.W. 2008.Życie i pasje. Wspomnienia vol. IV.
Gdańsk: Fundacja Promocji Przemysłu Okrętowego i
GospodarkiMorskiej.
Domański H. 1997. Mobilność i hierarchie stratyfikacyjne.
Elementy nowegoładu. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IFiS
PAN.
Dragicevic,D.2007.Apoliticaleconomyofshipbuildingin
post‐socialist transition: comparative study of Croatia
andPoland.Budapest:CentralEuropeanUniversity.
FirstMaritimeInternationalLtd.(FMI).2003.Overviewof
the international commercial shipbuilding industry.
Newcastle:FMI.
Forkiewicz, M. & Tubielewicz, A. 2010. Social and
economic aspects of the transformation of Pomorskie
regionagainstthebackgroundofchangesinthePolish
economy in the years 1990‐2010. National and Regional
EconomicsVIII.Herl’any.
Gawlikowska‐Hueckel K. 2014. Polityka przemysłowa i
spójności wobec planów
reindustrializacji Unii
Europejskiej.WnioskidlaPolski,GospodarkaNarodowa5
(273)
Grosfeld, I. & Senik, C. 2008. The emerging aversion to
inequality: evidence from Poland 1992‐2005. Ann
Arbor,MI:UniversityofMichigan.
Kowalik, T. 2012. What went wrong with the
transformation? Social failures of the new system.
WarsawForumofEconomic
SociologyVol.3,No.2(6):9‐
26.Warsaw:WarsawSchoolofEconomics.
MaritimeInstituteMI.MaritimeEconomy‐statisticreview.
Gdańsk:MaritimeInstitute.
MasikG.&RzyskiS.2014.ResilienceofPomorskieregion
to economic crisis. Bulletin of Geography Socio‐economic
Series,Vol.25:129‐141.Toruń:NicolausCopernicusUniv
Musielak, J. 2001. Procesy restrukturyzacji w przemyśle
okrętowym(naprzykładzieStoczniSzczecińskiejS.A.).
PraceKomisjiGeografiiPrzemysłuPTG(3).Warsaw.
OfficeofCompetitionandConsumerProtection(UOKIK).
2008.Pomocpublicznadlastoczni.Warsaw:UOKIK.
Roberts, K. 2003, What strategic investments should you
makeduringa
recessiontogaincompetitiveadvantage
intherecovery?Strategy&Leadership,Vol.31Iss:4:31‐39
Steinerts,G.2012.EffectivenessoftheEuropeanMaritime
Policy Instruments. TransNav: International Journal on
Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation 6(2):
271‐276.Gdynia:GdyniaMaritimeUniversity.
Susmarski,P.2009.Pracującywprzemy
ślestoczniowym–
diagnoza stanu obecnego i analiza trendów. Pomo rski
PrzeglądGospodarczy2.
Valioniene, E. & Druktenis, A. 2013. Analysis of
shipbuildingindustrymarketinLithuaniaandPoland.
JournalofMaritimeTransportandEngineering2(1):74‐81.
Riga:LatvianMaritimeAcademy.
Polish Press Agency PAP. 2014. Ekspert: polski sektor
stoczniowy osiągnął światowy poziom technologii.
http://www.bankier.pl/Retrieved10‐07‐2015.
PolishPressAgencyPAP. 2015.Duda:musimyodbudować
nowoczesny przemysł stoczniowy.
http://hutnictwo.wnp.pl/ duda‐musimy‐odbudowac‐
nowoczesny‐przemysl‐stoczniowy, 250434_1_0_0.html.
Retrieved09‐07‐2015.
