339
distancetotheorginaltrajectoryd(c
k,R
0
)isusedalso.
Thisleadstothecost‐to‐comefunction
0
1
,,,
kk k k
cu
cdcudcR
(15)
with δ and τ as scaling factors. For the distance
function d(c
k,u) to the previous cell the Euclidian
distance between the cells c
k‐1 and ck is used. To
calculate the distance between c
k and R
0
an
approximation of the area between c
k‐1 and ck‐1 and
theclosestpointstotheoriginaltrajectoryisusedas
trajectory distance function d(c
k,R
0
). For the
approximationtheaveragedistancebetween c
k‐1and
c
k‐1 to R
0
multiplied by the Euclidian distance
betweenthetwopointsonR
0
isused.Anillustration
ofthisapproximationisshowninFigure2.
Figure2. Distance between avoidance trajectory and
originaltrajectory.
Tousetheareainsteadofthedistancebetweenck
andR
0
hastheadvantagethatthedistanceD(R*,R
0
)
between the resulting trajectory R* and the original
trajectory R
0
is the sum up of the distances d(ck,R
0
)
fromthecellsequenceestimatedbytheA*algorithm:
*0 0
0
,,
j
k
k
RR dcR
(17)
withtrajectoryR*containingaswaypointsallcellsof
theA*solution.
Thecompletecostofatrajectoryisdefinedasthe
cost‐to‐comeg(c
g,u)forthegoalcell.
AsheuristicfunctiontheEuclidiandistancefrom
cellc
ktothegoalcellcgisused.
The trajectory R* estimated by the A*‐algorithm
contains as waypoints W*, a list of connected cells
fromthestartingcellc
0tothegoalcellcg.Toachieve
a trajectory Rʹ as a sparse representation of R*, a
Dougles‐Peuker algorithm is used to eliminate
needless waypoints using a certain threshold. This
sparsetrajectoryRʹmakesitpossibletoexchangethe
complete trajectories between all agents during
negotiationprocess.
5 TRAJECTORYNEGOTIATION
Aftertheinitial
solutionisfoundbythepath‐finding
component, the locally planned avoidance
trajectories are negotiated between all involved
vessels. The initial, single trajectory for the own
Vessel isplanned,ignoring informationabout other
vesselandusedasaninitialofferinthenegotiation.
This first trajectory is considered the desired
trajectory
of each vessel, if no other vessel would
interfere. The value of other trajectories will be
calculated in between this best solution and a
hypothetical worst solution, which is usually
unfeasible.Inanumberofnegotiationroundsvessels
broadcasttheirproposalfortheirtrajectoryintheset
of all trajectories.
At the end of the first round,
intentionsofallvesselsare known,though theyare
verylikelytoconflict.Insubsequentrounds,vessels
discard sets with low value and re‐plan their
trajectoryinsetswithahighvalue.Thenewsetsare
exchanged as an offer while the global
measure is
designed to let the negotiation converge to an
optimal, common solution. This procedure helps to
compensate for incomplete information without the
need to exchange state space information explicitly
andbalancethecostsandbenefitsequallyamongall
participants through the design of the trajectory‐set
selectionprocess.
The
following steps are our adoption of an
algorithmofStevenP.Waslander(2007)who,inhis
thesis, designed distributed algorithms for agents
which reach optimal solutions using concepts of
game theory without the need to maintain all
information locally at one central point. The
cooperative decentralised penalty method is modified to
workonthepaths,already locallyoptimised bythe
path‐finding component, to perform a global
optimisation.
In our adopted algorithm, a number of agents
aA
follow a number of trajectories Ra(W,v),
consisting of waypoints w
0..wj‐1 where w0 is the
starting position of the vessel which moves along
thattrajectoryandw
j‐1asitsdestination.
The original algorithm does not have a path‐
finding component which already minimises the
distance from a desired optimal trajectory and the
originaltrajectoriesarefullydefinedondiscretetime
steps. The path‐finding component works on a
smaller,minimalnumberofwaypoints,asdescribed
inparagraph
4.1.Theagentcostfunctionistherefore
modifiedfromtheoriginalapproachto:
d
aa a a
CR R R
(19)
where
d
a
isthedesiredtrajectoryofagentawhich
is in our case a straight line from its position to its
destination. Our decentralised augmented cost
function contains no penalty function because the
interconnectedconstraints,imposedbytrajectoriesin
theneighbourhoodoftheagents,arealreadyfulfilled
bythepath‐finding
algorithmandtrajectorieswhich
violateconstraintscannotbegenerated.Thisleadsto
adecentralisedaugmentedcostfunction:
|log
Aug
aai a aaa
a
CRR dCR
(20)
The function is defined on all neighbouring
vessels
iA
where ia which in our first
approach includes all other vessel. The notation
i
j
referstothefixedknowledgeoftheagentof
the trajectories of other agents. The disagreement
point d
a, a point which represents the costs of the
worst case solution, if the agents do not reach an