101
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper assumes that everyone concerned with
riskandsafetyatseasharethesameoverarchinggoal:
To reduce the risk of accidents and harm, and to
increase the safety of every person involved in, or
affected by, shipping. Systematic efforts to increase
safetyatseabeganonehundredyearsago,andfora
long ti
me the greater majority of researchers and
safety‐professionals agreed on how to achieve it:
Through scientific identification of risk factors that
couldbetranslatedintoformalprocedurestomitigate
them. Recently, however, this consensus has broken
and a fundamental tension has developed between
those who st
ill see proceduralisation as the only or
optimalwaytomanageandminimiserisk,andthose
who believe some aspects of proceduralisation may
generateother,andpossiblymore,problemsandrisks
thanitsolves.Operativepersonnelhavegivenvoice
to this view for many years (see e.g. Almklov,
Rossnes and Størksen, 2014; Knudsen 2009; Lamvik,
ByeandTorvatn,2008)andmembersoftheresearch
community are increasingly hearing their voices.
WiththeontologyʺTra
ppingsafetyintorulesʺ(Bieder
and Bourrier Eds 2013) the combined voices from
below and the sideline can no longer be kept at the
periphery.
Thecrit
iqueofproceduresshould,however,notbe
understoodasadeviationfromthecommongoal:To
reducerisksandenhancesafety.Onthecontrary,this
critique is an opportunity to open up for inquiries
intohoweventhe bestintentions, andthetools that
initially carried such great promises, ma
y have
unintendedconsequences.Neithershouldthecritique
beunderstoodasanattackonproceduresandpartof
astrategytogetrid ofthem.There canbenodoubt
that procedures are effective tools that have been
successfullyappliedtoreducetheriskofaccidentsin
many fields. As an example the number of work
The Legitimac
y
of Safety Management Systems in the
Minds of Norwegian Seafarers
B.Vandeskog
Stord/HaugesundUniversityCollege,Haugesund,Norway
ABSTRACT:AllseafarersIhavemetareconcernedwiththeirownsafetyandallseriousshippingcompanies,
nationalregulatoryauthorities,unions andlargershippingclientsworktoimprovesafetyatsea.Formalised
riskmanagementsystemsareattheheartoftheseefforts,andthereisgoodreasontobelievetha
ttheyhave
beenverysuccessful.Onewouldthereforeexpectthatseafarershadapositiveattitudeandwerecommittedto
theirimplementation.Empiricaldatasuggeststheopposite.Duringobservationalfieldworksoverthelasttwo
andahalfyears,oneightdifferentshipsinNorway,AustraliaandMalaysia,notoneoftheobservedseafarers
expressedmainlypositiveopinionsab
outthesafetymanagementsystemsimposedonthem.Thegreatmajority
ofseafarerswhoseopinionshavebeenrecordedexpressedmassivenegativesentiments.AssumingaWeberian
perspectivethispaperexploreshowthebureaucraticimplementationofsuchriskmanagementsystemsmay
contributetothi
spicture.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 9
Number 1
March 2015
DOI:10.12716/1001.09.01.12
102
relatedpersonalinjuriesinNorwegianwatersandon
Norwegian ships fell from almost 1300 per year in
2000 to just over 200 in 2010 (Sjøfartsdirektoratet
2011). The Norwegian Maritime Directorate who
wrotethereportarguesthatthisreductionisadirect
result of rational risk and safety management
systems.
Just
as there can be no doubt that seafaring is a
dangerousprofession(Oldenburg,BauerandSchlaich
2010) there should be no doubt that seafarers in
general take safety seriously. Considering the
successes of formal safety management systems
(SMS)inmakinglifeatseasaferonemighttherefore
expectthatseafarers
ingeneralhadapositiveattitude
to them, and were committed to their
implementation.Thisdoesnotappeartobethecase,
however. During observational fieldworks over the
lasttwo andahalfyears, on eightdifferentshipsin
Norway, Australia and Malaysia, not one of the
observed seafarers expressed mainly
positive
opinions about the safety management systems
imposedonthem.Onthecontrary,thegreatmajority
of seafarers whose opinions have been recorded
expressed massive negative sentiments about them.
Seafarersʹstrong dislike of thetools that purports to
make their lives at sea safer appears at odds with
whatmight
beexpectedandisalsoatoddswiththe
intendedoutcomesofthesemanagementsystems.
This article begins with a description of the
fieldworkbywhichthedatawascollected,aswellas
a presentation of the data supporting the claim that
the observed seafarers dislike the formal safety
managementsystems.
Itthenarguesthatthisdislike
representsacrisisofthelegitimacyoftheSMSinthe
mindsofseafarers.BuildingonWebers theoryabout
the legitimacy ofʹordersʹ, it argues that a formal
safetySMSisatypeofʹorderʹthatisatoddswiththe
types ofʹ
ordersʹ that traditionally have existed on
ships and therefore cannot draw on the sources of
legitimacythattraditionally have justifiedʹordersʹat
sea. In addition the process of introducing formal
safety management systems have failed to draw on
emotional and rational sources of legitimacy that
possiblycouldhavejustifiedthem.
2
FIELDWORK
The data upon which this article is based was
collectedduring eight anthropological fieldworks on
eight different ships, with eight different crews
between June 2012 and July 2014. Two coastal
container vessels, three PSVʹs, two AHV and one
AHV that did a supply run and IMR (Inspection,
maintenance
and repair) when I was on board. The
fieldworks lasted three to eight days; six took place
offshore Norway, one in Australia and one in
Malaysian Borneo. In addition I have talked with a
large number of seafarers when I have met them in
various on‐shore settings like conferences, visits
at
shippingcompanies,meetingseafarersatairportsetc.
IhavemainlyspokenwithandobservedNorwegians,
but also one Australian crew, a Ukrainian/Russian
crew, officers of Swedish, Polish, Hungarian and
Dutch origins, ABʹs from the Faeroe Islands,
Philippines,Malaysia and Finland. This is obviously
not a representative selection of
all seafarers, and it
may be that other seafarers from other places have
different opinions about the formal SMS they have
experienced. Wide generalisations from my material
to all seafarerscan thus notbe made. However, my
observationsso farhave leftavery solidimpression
with no exceptions; all my
informants were, to a
greaterorlesserdegree,negativeaboutformalsafety
management systems as they perceive and
understand them. This observation is valuable in its
own right, and here I presenthow this negativity is
expressed.ThereafterIwilldiscussthelimitationsof
myfindings.
Twoandahalf
yearsagoIwasnewtothefieldof
nauticalstudiesandmerelywishedtolearnaboutlife
at sea. When entering into a new field social
anthropologists commonly adopt an exploratory
methodinordertoletthephenomenaathandinform
the research question rather than beginning with a
fixed
problemtosolve.Theinitialresearchquestions
werethereforenotlinkedspecificallytosafetyorrisk
management and did not aim at discovering or
uncovering anything in particular about safety
discourses and practices, safety managements
systems, non‐compliance etc. The safety topic soon
became salient, however. Signs, posters, safety
policies,
safety meetings, risk‐assessment meetings,
toolbox meetings and talk of such meetings were
ubiquitous.InitiallyIdidnotpromptquestionsabout
risk and safety, but listened to what seafarers said
aboutitandobservedhowtheybehavedwhendoing
potentiallydangerousjobs.GraduallyIbecameaware
that the discourse about the
safety management
systems among operative seafarers is generally very
negative. This negativity is very different from, and
strongly opposed to, the discourse communicated
through procedures, posters and signs. Gradually I
begantoaskexplicitquestionsaboutthistopic.
Averycommoncomplaintwasthattheamountof
safetyand risk
managementrulesand procedures is
unmanageable. Only a few days ago I accidentally
meteightseafarersatthe local airport who wereon
theirwaytotheirvariousships.Iknewoneofthem
fromapreviousfieldtripandheaskedmewhatIwas
working on. When I saidʺSeafarers
opinions about
the safety management systemsʺ, all of them
instantaneously said that it has become horrendous
andthattheamountofproceduresandpaperworkis
thegreaterproblem.
Seafarers frustrations over the large volume of
safety rules and procedures frequently also
highlighted the self‐contradictory nature of the
documentation
involved, e.g. claims that it actually
reducessafetyratherthan increaseit.Acaptaintold
me that when he enters and leaves a specific port
wherethesailingisparticularlydifficultheismadeto
fill in a number of papers. In addition to safety
managementpaperworkhe hastodeal
with various
officialsandclients;anddootherkindsofpaperwork
too.Itisnotpossibleforhimtokeeptheschedulesset
bythecompanyandalsogettheamountofrestthat
thesafetymanagementsystemrequires.Andstill,as
theyleavetheporthehastodo
yetmorepaperwork,
fillinmorechecklistswherethelastofthechecksasks
ifhehashadenoughsleep.Hestatedthateverybody
whoknowsthatport,andthetasksthatamastermust
do, knows that the answer isʺNOʺ and that all
103
masterstickʺYESʺ.ʺEverybodyknowstheexerciseis
asham,anditwouldbebetterifthemasterhadgone
to bed rather than fill in that form at that timeʺ, he
said.
Another officer told me about a checklist for
navigating at night. In order to complete
it he must
putonthelight,thusruininghisnightvision.Oneof
thequestionsonthechecklistisifhehashadample
timetoadjusthiseyestothedark.Obviouslyhehas
notbecausehehad to turn on thelight and destroy
hisnightvision
inordertodohisdutyandfillinthe
form.HemusttickʺYESʺhowever,orelseriskbeing
heldupfornon‐compliance.
I have also observed that specific SMS
requirementsmay lead to unsafe behaviour. Onone
trip we left the harbour in thick fog. The officer on
duty suddenly remembered that the client required
thatthey perform a risk assessment/toolbox meeting
under such conditions and quickly assembled the
bridgecrewatthebackofthewheelhouse.Theyhad
to record andtick off that such a meeting had been
held. The meeting only took 10minutes, but
during
thistimenoonekeptwatchandnooneoperatedthe
horn, in direct violation of standard rules and good
seamanship.
On another ship the cook had a minor accident
and received a minor burn on her hand. Both the
masterandthecookwereindoubtaboutreportingit,
fearing that huge amounts of extra work would
follow. The Master told me about a recent accident
where an AB had cut his finger. It was small and
insignificant,buttheyhadreportedit.Followingthe
initial report the Master had to write a number of
otherreports,hehad
beencalledintothemainoffice
forseveral meetings during his off‐dutyperiod,and
received no compensations for it. The Master felt
penalisedforhavingreportedit,butknewhewould
alsohavebeenpenalisedifhehadnotreportitandit
had been found out.ʺHours and
hours of
paperwork,andabsolutelynothingcameoutofit,or
couldhavecomeoutofit.Sometimespeoplecuttheir
fingersandthereisnothingtodobutletitgrowʺ,he
said.
A common opinion is that there are ulterior
motives behind the safety management systems,
or
thattheyhavelosttheiroriginalpurposeandarenow
used mainly for ulterior reasons. Seafarers speculate
whether the clients use accident reports to put
pressure on the shipping company, claiming safety
information is used to get the shipping company to
reduce the price of their services, and ultimately to
cancel contracts if there are disputes. Another
possibleulteriormotivethatconcernsthemishowthe
safetymanagementsystemisusedtocontrolthemas
employees. One master always made sure to do all
thepaperworkcorrectly,thenpronouncedloudly, for
everyonetohear,thatthiswashisʺtoiletpaper‐
it
coversmy(….)ifanythingshouldgowrongʺ. Athird
set of claims is that the HSE‐Q administrators and
professionals are buttering their own toast.ʺMaking
evermorecomplicatedsafetymanagementsystemsis
a great way to make a career in any oil company,
stately directorate or classification
society
bureaucracyʺ,oneofficertoldme.
Many,ifnotall,oftheseafarersIhavespokento
about this matter are worried that the
bureaucratisation of safety, and the safety
managementsystemsareunderminingseafarers real
abilitytodealwithdanger;underminingthetechnical
andrelationalcompetenceneededto
arealjobsafely.
RecentlyIhavestartedaskingseafarersiftheycan
tell me about where specific safety practices come
from; who has made a specific rule; the process
whereby it was decided; the reasoning behind a
specific way to do something. I never receive clear
answers. They refer to
IMO, IMS and SOLAS, to
clients, classification societies and the directorate.
TheirexplanationsarealwaysrathervagueandIhave
never managed to pin a specific behavioural rule
downtoaspecificentity.Seafarershaveinformedme
thateveryshippingcompanyhasitsownspecificway
of meeting the general
safety requirements set by
classification societies, flag state authorities and
clients.ButIhaveyettomeetaseafarerwhoknows
andcanexplainthebackgroundofthespecificsofthe
rules and procedures that make up the safety
management tasks they are required to do. As an
example,tothis
dayIhavenotfoundouttheprocess
thatleadtotheinfamousrulethatonemustalways
holdontotherailwhenclimbingstairs.
Itmay,ofcourse,bethatIhaveonlyobservedand
talkedwithanon‐representativeandselectgroup of
outliers, i.e. seafarers whose
opinions on the matter
differ greatly from the majority. This is unlikely,
however,foranumberofreasons.Inadditiontomy
observations I have also spoken with a very large
numberofpeopleinvolvedinshippinginonewayor
another:SeafarersIhavemetatconferences,meetings
and by
chance; formers seafarers now working as
teachers and administrators; shipping company
employees; and fellow researchers. All of them
confirmmyimpression.Intotal I must have spoken
with close to one hundred people about it and only
one of them had ever met a seafarer who mainly
spokeinpositive
termsaboutthesafetymanagement
system. That comment, however, was quickly
followedupwiththeremarkʺbutheusedtoworkat
the HSE‐Q departmentʺ. There is thus strong
anecdotal evidence that most seafarers have mainly
negative opinions about the safety management
systems. In addition there is a growing
body of
qualitativeresearchthatconfirmsorindicatesthatmy
impression is correct (see e.g. Kongsvik og Størksen
2014;ByeogLamvik2007;Lamviketal2008).
The only method to potentially falsify the claim
that the greater majority of Norwegian seafarerʹs
predominately hold negative opinions about the
formal
safety managements system is to conduct a
quantitative study mapping the prevalence and
distributionoftheiropinionsaboutit.Itisnotcertain
that this method would produce valid results,
however, as the dominant discourse requires
seafarerstoexpressthattheycomplywiththeSMS.It
is widely recognised that people
tend to present
themselves in accordance with what is socially
expected and acceptable (Goffman 1959) even when
answering anonymous questionnaires (see e.g.
Edwards1959,Furnham1990).
104
3 ACRISISOFLEGITIMACY
My overall impression is thus that Norwegian
seafarers in general are not only irritated by and
negative towards the safety management systems,
theyaresuspiciousaboutwhethertheyhaveanyreal
safetyeffect, andquestionwhattheyarereallyused
for. In addition they fear
that they may actually
underminetheirtruesafety.InthearticleʺManaging
legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approachesʺ
Suchman(1995)claimsthatalegitimacycrisiscanbe
recognised whenʺaudiences begin to suspect that
putatively desirable outputs are hazards, that putatively
efficaciousproceduresaretricksorthatputativelygenuine
structures are
facadesʺ. All of these signs are present
among seafarers I have observed and talked with.
Consequently it is reasonable to conclude that the
legitimacy of these systems is so low that it is best
describedasacrisis.
Note, however, that seafarers do use the word
ʺlegitimacyʺ when talking
about the safety
management system and itʹs many manifestations.
They talk about specific rules and procedures, and
express agreement or disagreement, likes and
dislikes, irritation or satisfaction with these; but do
not say that they find the system or any of its
componentsʺillegitimateʺ. Legitimacy is what
anthropologists call
anʺeticalʺ concept (see e.g. Lett
1990);i.e.ananalyticalconceptappliedtothedatato
identify patterns in the data that the informants
themselves have not named, and perhaps not
identified.ItisthusfromanoutsideperspectivethatI
perceive that seafarers predominantly express
negative opinions about the
SMS andpropose that
thisnegativitycanfruitfullybeunderstoodasamater
oflegitimacy.
The literature on legitimacy is large and the
concept has been given many different definitions.
This article builds on Suchmanʹs: ʺLegitimacy is a
generalizedperceptionorassumptionthattheactionsofan
entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions.” (1995, p. 574). A problem with this
definition is that it primarily aims to say something
about organisational legitimacy and not how specific
decisionscometobeconsideredlegitimatebythoseit
affects. This is easily
rectified, however, by
emphasising the wordʺactionsʺ in Suchmans
definition rather thanʺentityʺ. Behind every action
there is, analytically, a decision, and if the action is
consideredlegitimate,by implication the decision to
doitmustalsobelegitimate.Otherresearchershave
providedotherdefinitionsthanSuchman,butnone
of
thosefitmypurposeanybetter.Itisneitherpossible
nor necessary to give an overview of all the other
definitions here. For those interested in such
overviews see Colvyas and Powell (2006) and
Suchmann(1995).
Legitimacy is a relational concept useful for
describingandunderstandingsomeofthequalities
of
sometypesofrelationshipsbetweenpeople.Inamore
straightforward language: It concerns relationships
betweenpeoplewhomakedecisionsand the people
whoaresupposedtodowhathasbeendecided.The
decision‐making aspectobviouslydoes not make up
the totality of these relationships, but in order to
avoidacumbersomelanguageIwillheretalkaboutit
astherelationshipbetweendecisionmakersandtheir
audience.ThisterminologyisinlinewithSuchmanʹs
as seen in the quote above, and highlights that the
audiencemaychoosetoagreeordisagreewithwhat
has been decided. In the
context of this article
legitimacy is therefore concerned with how people
judge decisions made by others. It is only decisions
that have a certain quality, i.e. a high degree of
motivational strength, that are judged to be
legitimate. ʺThe essence of leg itimacy …. is the sense of
duty,obligation, or
ʺoughtnessʺ towards rules, principles
or commandsʺ (Spencer 1970, p.126). If the audience
judge the decisions, and the ways they are
implemented,assoʺdesirable,proper,orappropriateʺ
(Suchman1995)thattheyareobligedtofollowthem,
thedecisionsarelabelledlegitimate.
Arrivingatacomprehensiveunderstandingofthe
reasons why
the (decisions which together make up
the)formalisedriskand safetymanagementsystems
havelowlegitimacyamongseafarerswouldrequirea
combination of several theoretical and
methodological approaches. This article can only
present one of these and assumes a perspective
inspired by Weberʹs work onʹorderʹ. ʺThe subjective
meaning of a social relationship will be called anʹorderʹ
onlyifactionisapproximatelyoronanaverageorientedto
certain determinateʹmaximsʹ or rules. Furthermore, such
anorderwillonlybecalledvalidiftheorientationtosuch
maxims includes, no matter to what actual extent, the
recognition
that they are binding on the actor or the
correspondingactionconstitutesadesirablemodelforhim
to imitate.ʺ (Weber 1964. p 124).Weber claims that
there are four different bases for the legitimacy of
suchʹordersʹ: 1. Tradition – theʹorderʹ is legitimate
(rightandbinding)becauseit
hasʹalwaysʹexistedor
isinlinewithwhathasʹalwaysʹexisted;2.Affectual
attitudes–theʹorderʹisbindingbeca use itfeelsright;
3. Rational belief in absolute value – theʹorderʹ is
rightbecauseitistheappropriatemeans toupholds
anabsolutevaluelikethesacrednessofhuman
life;4.
Legal process – theʹorderʹ is right and binding
becauseithasbeenestablishedinalegalmanner.
The safety managements system, as it is talked
aboutbyseafarersIhavebeenincontactwith,carry
allthecharacteristicsofwhatWebercallsanʹorderʹ.It
is
aset, albeitvaguelyperceivedand understood,of
maxims and rules (and procedures) towards which
their actions are oriented. The organisations that
introducedthisʹorderʹhavegoneto greatlengths to
convince seafarers to agree with and feel obliged to
follow it and to consider the rules and maxims
binding. The
effort has, so far, not been successful.
Using Webers four bases for the legitimacy of such
ʹordersʹwecantheninvestigatetowhatextent,andin
what ways, the failure is related to a failure in
engagingwithtradition;failurestoarouseandappeal
to the right affects; failure to
identify the right
absolute values and/or the means to achieve these
values; or a failure with regard to the legal process
wherebytherulesandmaximshavebeendecided.
105
4 THELEGITIMACYOFSMSRULESAND
PROCEDURES
Inempirical situationsthesourcesoflegitimacy will
always be mixed, but they can still be investigated
separately. Webers first source of legitimacy is
tradition and even a superficial comparison of
ʺtraditionalʺ seafaring and seamanship with the
formalSMSrevealsthat
thereishardlyanythingfrom
the tradition that can be used to legitimize the new
system. Several studies argue that fundamental
aspects of traditional seamanship are at odds with,
and maybe even directly opposed to the types of
behavioursspecifiedby the new safety management
systems.Almklov,Rosnes,Størksen(2014)argues
that
SMSmaymarginalisenecessarypracticalknowledge.
ByeogLamvik(2007)arguesthatthetraditionalway
ofcopingwithrisksamongNorwegianfishermenand
supplyshipcrewistoignorethedangers;astrategy
in stark conflict with the new safety management
strategy.Knudsen(2009)describeshowseafarersfind
the
paperwork aspect of the safety management
systemstobeathreattoʺgoodseamanshipʺ.Insum,
thereseemstobenotraditionsofseafaringthatcanbe
used to legitimise the new safety management
systems. There are, on the other hand, many
traditionalsourcesthatcanbeusedtodisagree
with
it.
Webers second source of legitimacy is affectual
attitudes, by which he means the feelings of the
audience that somehow influence their judgement
that a rule or maxim is so desirable, proper or
appropriatethatitbindsthem.Suchfeelingsmay,of
course, be both positive and negative. Positive
feelingsmaydrawtheaudiencetowardstherulesand
maxims.Negativefeelingsaboutsomethingthatisin
conflict with or opposition to the rules and maxims
may repel the audience form that and towards the
rules.Consideringthattheformalsafetymanagement
system consists of rules, paragraphs and checklists,
written procedures
with a prose like technical
manuals, usually in an objective and imperative
language,itisdifficulttoseethatspecificelementsof
thesystemcouldevokepleasantfeelings.Thestyleof
theSMSisintendedtoevokeneutralaffectionsand
asenseofʹobjectivityʹ.Totheextentthatthis
typeof
text does generate feelings it is tiredness, boredom,
andvarious degreesoffrustrationandthereforealso
aggression. It is difficult to imagine any positive
emotions that the rules and procedures of the SMS
mightevokeandthatcouldgiveitlegitimacy.Atthe
sametimeitiseasyto
imaginetheopposite.
Attemptsto appealtofeelings are stillfrequently
made, however. It is acommon practice at shipping
companies to employ former captains as HSE‐Q
administrators.Oneofthereasonsforthispracticeis
todrawonfeelingsofidentification.Theideaisthat
seafarers will be
more willing to listen to, and
therefore agree with, the safety management system
because one of their own, rather than some
landlubber, implements it. Attempts to use
communicativetechniquesthatarousefeelingsoflove
andattachment;fearandguilt;andhumourarealso
used.Storiesaboutpeoplewhowereinjuredor
killed,
andreferencestothefamilyathomewhoareworried
about the seafarer, are presented in newsletters and
on posters. Happy and funny posters with safety
messagesaretapedonwallsandputonnoticeboards.
Drawingonemotionstolegitimiseaformalʹorderʹ
likethesafetymanagementsystemis,
however,both
a difficult and risky strategy. Emotions are fleeting,
open to manipulation, a matter of interpretation of
sensations and impossible to control. The intended
emotionalmessagemayeasilybeturnedaroundand
usedagainstthesender.AnHSE‐Qmanager/captain
may quickly be reclassified as a turncoat who has
joined
the landlubbers, and the positive emotions of
identification be turned to contempt. Happy and
colourfulposterscanbeinterpretedaschildishanda
signofdisrespect,etc.
The third and fourth sources of legitimacy are
rationalinthesensethattheyappealtotheabilityof
theaudiencetoreason
logicallyaboutvalues,means
andprocesses.Safetymanagementrulesandmaxims
are also (supposed to be) products of logical
reasoning and expressed in a language of logical
reason. Consequently these sources of legitimacy
oughttobefarmoreaccessibleandeasytodrawon
than the two non‐rational sources. Webers
third
source of legitimacy is rational belief in an absolute
value. The absolute value at the heart of SMS is
human life and good health. Appealing to these
values ought to be easy and I have never heard or
seenanythingtosuggests thatseafarersdonotvalue
good health
and human life. At the same time
commentsbyseafarerssuggestthattheydonotmake
directandclearconnectionsbetweenthesevaluesand
the specific rules and procedures imposed on them.
Thereisnothusnoreasontodoubtthelegitimacyof
these values. It seems, however, that these absolute
values fail to be a source of legitimacy of the SMS
becausetheaudienceisnotconvincedthattheSMSis
theappropriatemeanstoachievethem.Exploringthe
manyreasonswhytheSMSisperceivedtoconsistof
incomprehensible, irrelevant, wrong and contra‐
productivemeanswouldrequirefarmore
spacethan
available in this article, but some reasons are quite
obvious. The sheer volume of rules and procedures
makesitvirtuallyimpossibletoachieveanoverview
of all the means. It is difficult to have faith in a
ʹtoolboxʹ so full that you do not know what tools it
containsandcannotfindthetoolyouneedwhenyou
need it. In addition to the volume the SMS is an
amorphous conglomeration of tools (rules,
procedures and instructions) at all levels of
abstractionsandatalllevelsofachievability.Someof
thesemeansareperceivedtobeOK,butcumbersome.
Others,likeHSEpolicieswithʺzeropersonalinjuriesʺ
objectives are seen as absurd, and yet others are
irrelevantbecausetheyarenotaimedattheseafarers,
butatactorsatadifferentorganisationallevel.Which
leads to the question of education. SMS is a
comprehensive system relying on input, processing
and compliance at many different organisational
levels.Mostcommentsbyseafarersindicatethatthey
havenotbeenprovidedwith,orhavenotbeenableto
retain,adetailedunderstandingofthisgreaterpicture
andthusdonotseewheretheyfitin.
The point about education and seafarers
knowledge leads to
Weberʹs fourth source of
legitimacy,i.e.thelegalprocess.In a democracy the
majority of voters have received massive education,
both formally through school and informally via
106
publicdiscourses, aboutthe legal processleading to
the rules governing and regulating society. This
knowledgeisvitalforhowdemocracieswork.People
maydisagreewithaspecificdecision,butiftheyare
convincedthatthelegalprocesswascorrecttheywill
stillfeelobligedtofollowit.AsmentionedIhavenot
metoneseafarerwhocouldexplainthelegalprocess
leadingtoanyoftherules,ʹma
ximsʹandprocedures
of the SMS. I have even asked HSE‐Q managers to
explaintheseprocesses,andhaveyettoreceiveanda
clearanswer.
5 CONCLUSION
Thereisgoodreasontobelievetha
tthelegitimacy
oftheformalSMSiscriticallylowinthemindsofthe
Norwegian seafarer. This crisis is probably a
consequence of a failure to take advantage of the
sources of legitimacy available to those who
implement and maintain this safety management
system. The new safety management systems are
fundament
ally at odds with the traditional
knowledge and behaviour that constitutesʺgood
seamanshipʺandcannotdrawitslegitimacyfromthis
source. The SMS is not supposed to evoke strong
feelings,anditisthereforebothdifficultandriskyto
appeal to emotions in order to legitimise it. The
absolute va
lues at the heart of the formal safety
management systems are life an health; values that
oughtto be great sources oflegitimacy. However, it
seemsthatduringtheimplementationoftheSMSthe
relationship between these values and the SMS as a
set of means for achieving it has been lost to the
generic Norwegian seafarer. Seafearers are not
convincedtha
tthesearetherightmeans,andsuspect
thattheymayattimesbecontraproductive.Last,but
not least, seafarers lack knowledge both about the
larger safety management system and the legal
processeswherebythespecific rules and procedures
tha
tmakeupthesystemhavebeendecided.
Drawingconclusionsabouthowtodealwiththis
legitimacycrisisisafargreatertaskthanwhatcanbe
achieved here. It would require a separate research
projectandSuchmann (1995) and Blake, Ashforand
Gibbs(1990)providevaluableinsightsabouthowto
doitandwheretogo.
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