229
1 INTRODUCTION
TokyoMOUPSCNewInspection Regime (NIR) has
come into effect in Asia‐Pacific area on January 1st
2014[1].ForthesakeofpassingthePSCinspectionand
reducing the frequency of being inspected in the
future, putting out fire on board timely and
successfully,and enhancingthe emergencyresponse
capabilit
ies of ship’s master and crews, every ship
mustcomplywithfiredrillstomeettherequirements
of the SOLAS Convention. As an important part of
ship management, effectiveness evaluation on fire
drills should be carried out on board. The
effectiveness evaluation should be implemented
undertheleadershipofthema
sterandrelatedofficers
to learn a lesson from the former fire drills and
furtherimproveoperationsasmuchaspossibleinthe
nextdrill,inordertoputoutfireinanemergency.
Something undesirable could be found in the
effectiveness evaluation based on the author’s
experienceonboard:ma
nyofficersdon’tunderstand
whoshouldbeincharge of effectivenessevaluation,
whatshouldbeevaluatedandhowtoevaluate.NIR
of Tokyo MOU and Paris MOU PSC impose more
requirements on fire safety, which put greater
pressure on ships to respond to the PSC inspection
[1], especially fire drills in some Port States.
Therefore,itismoreadv
antageoustowininthePSC
inspection if ships carry out effectiveness evaluation
efficientlyinadvance.
Effectiveness Evaluation on Fire Drills
for Emergency
and PSC Inspections on Board
J
.Wu&Y.Jin
ShanghaiMaritimeUniversity,Shanghai,China
J
.Fu
NingboMaritimeSafetyAdministration,Ningbo,China
ABSTRACT:Thepaperevaluateseffectiveness offiredrillsforemergencyandrespondingtoPSCinspections
onboard.AbriefbackgroundaboutthePSCinspectiononfiredrillsonboardisintroducedinthebeginning.
Thenthesignificanceofeffectivenessevaluationonfiredrillsispresented.Next,legalgroundisdiscussedon
International Conventions, including regulation of related regional group, national ma
ritime laws and rules
andConcentratedInspectionCampaign(CIC).Furthermore,PSCNewInspectionRegime(NIR)forParisMOU
andTokyoMOUarealsodiscussed,andmanydeficienciesrelatedtofiresafetymeasuresfoundinthePSC
inspect
ion are statistically analyzed. More importantly, the paper introduces System Engineering Theory,
presents the principle and method of effectiveness evaluation, focuses on the preparation, performance and
rehabilitationoffiredrillanddevelopstheCriterionofEffectivenessEvaluation.Finally,somesuggestionsare
raisedtocarryouteffectivenessevaluationforemergencyandrespondingtothePSCinspection.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 8
Number 2
June 2014
DOI:10.12716/1001.08.02.08
230
2 THELEGALGROUNDFORPSCINSPECTION
OFFIREDRILLS
2.1 TherelatedregulationsoftheSOLASconvention[2]
Specific regulations concerning fire drills have been
developed in the International Convention for The
Safety of Life at Sea (the SOLAS convention).
According to the provisions of Regulation II‐2/15
“Instructions,
on‐boardtraininganddrills”,firedrills
shallbe conducted andrecordedin accordance with
the provisions of regulations III/19.3 and III/19.5 as
general requirement 2.2.5 provided. For passenger
ships, “in addition to the requirement of paragraph
2.2.3,firedrillsshallbeconductedinaccordancewith
theprovisionsofregulation
III/30,havingdueregard
to notification of passengers and movement of
passengers to assembly stations and embarkation
decks”asadditionalrequirements3.1provided.
Furthermore, the SOLAS convention has also
developed special requirements for helicopter
facilitiesonsomerelatedships,suchasRegulationII‐
2/18.8 “Operation manual and fire‐fighting
arrangements”, which
provides “fire‐fighting
personnel consisting of at least two persons trained
for rescue and fire‐fighting duties, and fire‐fighting
equipmentsshallbeimmediatelyavailableatalltimes
whenhelicopteroperationsareexpected”ontheba sis
of provision II‐2/18.8.3; it also provides that “on‐
board refresher training shall be
carried out and
additional supplies of fire‐fighting media shall be
provided for training and testing of the equipment
”asregulationII‐2/18.8.5provided.IntheRegulation
II‐2/30 “drills” for all passenger ships, “an abandon
shipdrillandfiredrillsshalltakeplaceweekly.The
entire crew need not be
involved in every drill, but
each crew member must participate in an abandon
shipdrillandafiredrillseachmonthasrequiredin
regulation II‐2/19.3.2”, and “all passengers shall be
stronglyencouragedtoattendthesedrills”.
2.2 TherelatedregulationoftheSTCWcode[3]
ChapterIIof
theSTCWcodehasdevelopedstandards
regardingthemasteranddeckdepartmentassection
A‐II/1 and section A‐II/3 provided. Chapter III has
developedstandardsregardingenginedepartmentas
section A‐III/1 provided. These provisions focus on
the “Prevent, control and fight fires on board” and
providecriteriaforevaluating
competenceintableA‐
II/1,A‐II/3 and A‐III/1. Firstly, the type and scale of
theproblemispromptlyidentifiedandinitialactions
conformtotheemergencyprocedureandcontingency
plansfortheship.Secondly,“evacuation,emergency
shut‐down and isolation procedures are appropriate
tothenatureofthe
emergencyandareimplemented
promptly”. Thirdly, “the order of priority, and the
levels and timescales of making reports and
informing personnel on board, are relevant to the
natureoftheemergencyandreflecttheurgencyofthe
problem”.
In chapter V, we can find standards regarding
specialtrainingrequirementsforpersonnel
oncertain
types of ships, such as mandatory minimum
requirements for the training and qualifications of
masters, officers and ratings on oil and chemical
tanker and liquefied gas tankers in section A‐V/1‐1
and A‐V/1‐2 respectively. Minimum standard of
competence in basic training for oil and chemical
tanker cargo operations and that for liquefied gas
tanker cargo operations are listed in table A‐V/1‐1‐1
and table A‐V/1‐1‐2. Criteria for evaluating
competence on carrying out fire‐fighting operations,
includingthatinitialactionsandfollow‐upactionson
becomingawareofanemergency,mustconform
with
establishedpracticesandprocedures,actionstakenon
identifyingmustersignalsmustbeappropriatetothe
indicated emergency and comply with established
procedures, clothing and equipments must also be
appropriate to the nature of the fire‐fighting
operations, similarly, the timing and sequence of
individual actions must be appropriate to
the
prevailing circumstances and conditions, and
extinguishment of fire should be achieved using
appropriate procedures, techniques and fire‐fighting
agents.
Additionally, chapter VI, table A‐VI/1‐2
“Specificationofminimumstandardofcompetencein
firepreventionandfire‐fighting”developscriteriafor
evaluatingcompetenceon“minimizingtheriskoffire
and
maintaining a state of readiness to respond to
emergency situations involving fire”, that is “initial
actionsonbecomingawareofanemergencyconform
withacceptedpractices andprocedures”and“actions
takenonidentifyingmustersignalsareappropriateto
theindicatedemergencyandcomplywithestablished
procedures”;andthistablealso
listsdetailsofcriteria
for evaluating competence on fighting and
extinguishing fires, which focus on clothing and
equipments, timing and sequence of individual
actions, extinguishment of fire, breathing apparatus
procedures and techniques. Table A‐VI/1‐4
“specificationofminimumstandardofcompetencein
personal safety and social responsibilities” provides
the criteria
for evaluating competence with
emergency procedures of “the master and deck
department in charge of a navigational watch on
ships of 500 Gross Tonnage or more”. The criteria
include “initial actions on becoming aware of an
emergency conform to established emergency
response procedures” and “information given on
raising alarm is
prompt, accurate, complete and
clear”. Table A‐VI/3 shows minimum standard of
competence in advanced fire‐fighting, in the table,
criteriaforevaluatingcompetenceoncontrollingfire‐
fightingoperationsaboardshipsarerelatedtoactions
takentocontrolfires,theorderofpriority,timingand
sequenceofactions,transmissionofinformation
and
personal safety during fire control activities. In the
aspect of organizing and training fire parties,
composition and organization of fire control parties
must ensure a prompt and effective implementation
of emergency plans and procedures. Operational
effectivenessofallfiresystemsandequipmentsmust
be checked out during inspection and
maintenance.
Causes of fire are identified and the effectiveness of
countermeasures must be evaluated when
investigatingandcompilingreportsonfire.
2.3 TherelatedregulationinsomeregionalPSC
agreements
Port State Control involves enforcement activities
controlled over the vessels and carried out by the
231
government of the foreign port in which the vessels
operate to ensure compliance with applicable
domestic and international requirements to ensure
safetyoftheport,environmentandpersonnel[4].The
PortState,uponidentifyingasubstandardvessel,was
authorized to detain the vessel until corrections to
eliminate hazards to the
port and return to a
seaworthy condition were achieved, and ultimately,
to eliminate substandard ships from the waters of
participatingcountries. The regulations of Port State
Control were adopted in the amendment to the
SOLASin1994,whichconfirmedthelegalpositionof
PSCinspectiononinternationalvessels.
Besides, the
International Maritime Organization
has also encouraged some regional PSC meetings to
conduct PSC inspections by the same standard. In
January1982,14EuropeanStatesagreedtoestablisha
systemofcontrol,whichresultedinthesigningofthe
ParisMOU.Intheearly1990stheAsia‐Pacific(Tokyo
MOU)cameinto
beingintheFarEast,whichlargely
includeswesternAsia‐PacificrimStates.
2.4 Somenationalmaritimelawsand rulesonfiredrills
Unlike other major maritime countries, the United
States has not participated in any regional MOUs
grouping. Under the US Coast Guard’s Port State
Control (PSC) Program, it
undertakes control
measuresonaunilateralbasis.AccordingtoUSCoast
Guard, Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
(NVIC) was adopted to provide guidance on the
enforcement of the 1995 Amendments to the STCW
ConventionandCode.CoastGuardPortStateControl
Officers (PSCOs) used the provided guidance and
procedures to conduct
PSC inspection in ensuring
compliance with the requirements of the STCW
ConventionandCode.[5]
Relatedtothefiredrillsinspection,thePSCOswill
examinethespecificnewcrewmemberfamiliarization
procedures in the first stage, which is the general
examination. During the general examination, if the
PSCOs find a situation
which indicates that the fire
drills cannot meet the requirements due to the
inabilityofcrewmember(s)toperformtheirassigned
dutiesduring firedrills,orthedrillposesadangerto
persons, property or the environment, the
examination will be transformed into an expanded
examinationwhichfocusesoncorrectingtheapparent
deficiencies.ThePSCOswillprovideanopportunity
and permit the master to correct the deficiencies at
thattime;forinstance,theyallowthecrewtoreceive
instructionsandrepeatafiredrillafterfailingthefirst
timeortoreplaceonecrewmemberbyanotherwho
isqualifiedtohold
thatposition.Ifthesituationcan
not be corrected, ships may be detained under the
STCWConventionandCode.
2.5 ConcentratedInspectionCampaign(CIC)
In2012,theParisMOUandTokyoMOU onPortState
Control have launched a joint Concentrated
Inspection Campaign (CIC), which started on
September1st2012and
lastedforthreemonths[6,7].
The CIC verified fire safety systems to ensure
compliancewithSOLASChapterII‐2/Construction‐
fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction
arrangements on board ships. The Indian Ocean,
BlackSeaandViñadelMarMOUsonPSChadalso
conductedaCICcoveringcompliance
withthesame
regulatory requirements during the same period. In
addition to the physical inspection and testing, the
crewmayberequiredtodemonstratetheirfamiliarity
with the fire‐fighting systems and appliances, and
mayalsobecalledupontoconductafiredrillsforthe
benefitofthePSCOs[5],
accordingtothe12itemsin
the provided checklist, which is “where a fire drills
waswitnessed;wasitfoundtobesatisfactory?”[8]
3 THENEWINSPECTIONREGIMEAND
STATISTICALANALYSISOFDEFICIENCIES
3.1 NIRforParisMOUandTokyoMOU[1]
TheParisMOUintroducedanewinspection
regime
(NIR)inJanuary2011.BothNIRforParisMOUand
Tokyo MOU are risk‐based and have been
implementedsinceJanuary1
st
2014.
UnderthebackgroundofNIR,ShipRiskProperty
(SRP) is one of the most important parameters to
determine the rating of ship. Once a ship has more
than 5 deficiencies one time in the previous 36
months, then the number of inspections which
recorded over 5deficiencies is the
weighting points,
which account for at least a quarter of the 4 points
corresponding to High Risk Ship. These deficiencies
fall into the category of ISM related deficiency and
other deficiencies. When calculating the Deficiency
Index,ISMdeficiencyisassigned5 pointsandother
deficiencies only one point. The emergency
management
suchasfiredrillsarerelatedtoISM,so
the deficiencies of fire drills are important to the
rankingofShipRiskProfile.
If the number of detention within previous 36
monthsis3ormoreinTokyoMOU,theshipwillbe
given one point, which is a quarter
of the 4 points
corresponding to High Risk Ship. The Deficiency
Index and Detention Index form company
performancematrixthatdeterminestheperformance
level.Ifoneship‐ownedcompanyperformanceisona
loworverylowlevel,theweightingpointsare2,half
of 4 points corresponding to High Risk
Ship. High
Risk Ship will be periodically inspected by Tokyo
MOUPSCaccordingtotimewindow,whichis2to4
monthssincepreviousinspection,triggerinspections
on HRS might be carried out between periodic
inspections.
3.2 Thestatisticalanalysisofdetentiondeficienciesoffire
drills
Statistical data from Tokyo
MOU PSC inspection on
shipfrom2010to2013isshowedinfig1.Duringthe
5yearstherateofdeficienciesoffiresafety measures
isthehighestaccordingtothetable.Particularly,the
rateofdeficienciesreached20%in2012.
232
Figure1.ComparisonofdeficienciespercategoryofTokyo
MOUPSCfrom2010to2013[9‐11].
Figure 2 reveals the details of deficiencies from
Paris MOU Inspection. Based on the seven‐year
statisticdata,firesafetymeasuresisamongthetop5.
Especially, the rate of deficiencies of fire safety
measureshasanobviousgrowthin2012.Thereason
ofthisgrowthisthejointCIConfire‐fight
ingsystem
in2012.Accordingtothefinal report from CIC‐FFS,
74ships were inspected on fire drills,34 shipswere
detained[6,7],andtherateofdetentionistopto46%,
itissoregrettablytoknowthatresultoffiredrills.
Figure2. Comparison of deficiencies per category of Paris
MOUPSCfrom2006to2012[12‐17].
It can be seen from figure 2 statistical data of
deficiencies from the Paris MOU PSC inspection in
2012,therateoffirefightingsystemdeficienciesisat
the second position, as is high to 17% of total
deficiencies.
Figure3. Comparison of deficiencies per category from
USCGPSCinspectionin2012[18].
There were 46354 deficiencies were found in by
PSCofficesofChinain2012,ofwhichthenumberof
Fire Safety related deficiencies was 9386 (20.2% of
totaldeficiencies),Safety ofNavigation7810(16.8%of
total deficiencies),Lifesaving appliances 5654 (12.2%
of total deficiencies). The deficiencies of other years
werelistedinFig.4.Inthefouryear,therateoffire
safetydeficienciesisalwaysnumberone.
Figure4.Top7deficienciecategoriesinchinapscinspection
from2009to2012[19‐22].
A report on detention deficiencies per category
group found on DNV ships from 2006 to 2011
illustratesclearlythattheitemoffiresafetymeasures
playsaleadingroleinthedeficiencies,asdetailedin
figure5[23,24].
Figure5. Detention deficiencies per category
group found on DNV ships from 2006 to 2011. The
first number in square bra
ckets stands for total
deficiencies per category, while the last number
standsforquantityofdetainabledeficiencies.
In the six years, DNV ships were found to have
1547 deficiencies on fire safety measures, am
ong
which 512 cases, accounting for one third, were
detainable deficiencies, which reached 18 percent of
alldetentiondeficiencies.[25]
According to a report of detainable and ISM
RelatedDeficienciesnoted in PSCinspection reports
of Class NK & NK‐SMC ships during Jan‐Aug 2012
[26],115shipsintota
lweredetainedbecauseoftheir
seriousdeficiencies.7detainedshipsinportinJapan,
USA and Spain were related to fire drills. The most
frequent cause was that crews were unable to
demonstrateproficiencyinfiredrills.
AnotherreportondetentionofHongKongShips
due to fire drills in 2007 shows tha
t two cases of
detention were because of fire drills, which were
inspected by USCG in USA, while 46 of them were
owing to their serious deficiencies [27]. Two other
ships inspected in Italy and Spain under the Paris
233
MOU were instructed to rectify deficiencies before
departurebecausefiredrillswerehardlysufficientor
crewmemberslackknowledgeoffiredrills.Through
thesecases, some points can be gained that the PSC
inspectiononfiredrillsunderUSCGisverystrict.If
thefiredrilldoesnotsatisfythe
PSCOsoftheUSCG,
they will give deficiencies action code 30 indicating
grounds for detention, which is the most serious
resultinthePSCinspection.
4 THEPROCEDUREOFPSCINSPECTIONOF
FIREDRILLS
4.1 TheprocedureofPSCinspectionundertheTokyo
MoU
During the Asia‐Pacific PSC inspection
within the
TokyoMOU[28],thePSCOsmaywitnessafiredrills
carriedoutbythecrewassignedtothesedutiesonthe
musterlist.
Inthefirststage,thePSCOswillconsultwiththe
masterandthenselectoneormorespecificlocations
of the ship for a simulated fire
and assign a
crewmembertothelocation(s)toactivateafirealarm
systemoruseothermeanstosoundalarm.
Inthenextstage,atthesimulatedfirelocationthe
PSCOsdescribethefireindicationtothecrewmember
andobservehowthereportoffireistransferredtothe
bridge,
whichisgenerallythecontrolcenter.
In the following stage, ship will sound the fire
alarm to summon the fire‐fighting team to their
stations. The PSCOs will observe the fire‐fighting
team arriving on the scene, properly donning their
protective equipments and using fire‐fighting
equipments to fight the simulated
fire. The team
leaders should be giving orders appropriate to their
membersandpassingthewordsbacktothebridgeat
thesametime.
Moreover, crews should response to personnel
injuriesbycommunicationandusingofstretcherand
medical teams. The PSCOs will monitor them
handling the stretcher and wounded
properly
through narrow passageways, doors and stairways,
whicharedifficultandtakespractice.
Furthermore, those crewmembers assigned to
close manually operated fire doors and dampers
shouldpaymoreattentiontothedutiesintheareasof
the simulated fire(s) during the drill. Those crews
assigned to other duties related to emergency
equipmentswillbeaskedtoexplaintheirdutiesand
demonstratetheirfamiliaritypossiblyinthedrill.
4.2 TheprocedureofPSCinspectionundertheIndian
OceanMOU
UnderthePortStateControlofIndianOcean[29],the
PSCOswilldeterminewhetherthecrewmembersare
familiar with the duties assigned
to them and
locationswheredutiesareperformedinfiredrillson
themusterlist.Generally,afterconsultationwiththe
Master,thePSCOsrequireafiredrilltoascertainthe
awarenessandpromptnessofthecrewmembersinan
emergency.Duringthisdrill,thePSCOswillaskthe
crew members to explain
their duties including the
procedure. For instance, if a crew is assigned to
operate the fixed fire‐fighting equipments, which
cannot be operated during the simulated drill, the
PSCOswill evaluate whetherthe person requiredto
operate the system can explain the complete
procedure.
4.3 TheprocedureofPSCCIC
Inresponsetotherequirementsandpracticeofajoint
Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) launched
byParisMOUandTokyoMOUonPortStateControl,
every vessel should confirm the following items
beforesurveys.
The fire fighters’ outfits including personal
equipments should comply with the SOLAS Ch II‐2
/R10.10 &
R14.2.2. The Emergency Escape Breathing
Devices(EEBD)mustcomplywiththeSOLASChII‐
2/R13.3.4 & 13.4.3. The portable extinguishers ready
foruseinlocationsasperfireplanmustmeetSOLAS
ChII‐2/R10.3.2.4.Thetestofautomaticaudiblealarm
shouldsoundpriortothereleaseofa fixed
gasfire‐
extinguishingmediumintospacesinwhichpersonnel
normally work according to SOLAS Ch II‐2/R10.5.
Thefire protectionsystemsandfire‐fightingsystems
andappliancesmustbemaintainedreadyforuse to
meet the SOLAS Ch II‐2/R14.2.1. The crew must be
familiar with the location and operation of
fire‐
fightingsystemsandappliancessothattheymaybe
called upon to use them in accordance with the
SOLASChII‐2/R15.2.2’.
Thetestofthesprinklersystemshouldtriggeran
automaticvisualandaudiblealarmforthesectionon
thebasisoftheSOLASChII‐2/Reg10.6.The
activation
of any detector or manually operated call point can
initiateavisualandaudiblefiresignalatthecontrol
panel on the bridge or control station to meet the
SOLAS Ch II‐2/R7.4.2.The Emergency Fire pump
must be capable of producing at least two jets of
waterinthedrill
andemergencytocomplywiththe
SOLASChII‐2/R10.2.2.3.1&R2.2.4,andtheisolating
valves of the fire main must bemarked, maintained
andeasilyoperableinaccordancewiththeSOLASCh
II‐2/R10.2.1.4.
Alltheabove‐mentionedshouldbedemonstrated
in the fire drills, which should satisfy the
PSCOs
when witnessing in the PSC inspection. Once the
satisfaction has been achieved, the detention of ship
wouldneverhappenasaresultoftheCIC.
5 THEEFFECTIVENESSEVALUATIONOFFIRE
DRILLSONBOARD
5.1 Definition
Withinthesystemengineeringtheory,evaluationisto
determine the property of research objects
in
accordancewithsomespecificpurposes,andturnthe
property into denominated objective quantity or
subjective utility. Effectiveness evaluation on fire
drills is defined as a series of activities via which
shipsevaluatetheir ownfiredrills,i.e. evaluation of
crew performance in fire drills [30]. It is the
234
continuousprocessofevaluatingallitemsinvolvedin
the preparation, performance, and rehabilitation of
thedrill.
5.2 Principle
In accordance with SOLAS 74/CII‐2/R15.2.2.3, crew
performance of fire‐fighting duties should be
evaluatedperiodicallybyconductingon‐boarddrills
and identifying areas in need of improvement. The
effectivenessevaluationof
firedrillsistoensurethe
operationalreadinessofthefire‐fightingorganization
and that competency in fire‐fighting skills is
maintained.Effectivenessevaluationshouldmeetthe
mostimportantprinciplethatis“drillmustensurethe
safetyofinvolvedcrews”, which isthekeyfactorin
thesuccessofthe
firedrills.
In recent years, some shipping companies have
experiencedanumberofseriousaccidentsduringfire
drills. Many guiding documents from the shipping
industry provide advices and instructions to help
prevent accidents during fire drills. Fire drills are
coveredbytheprovisionsonoccupationalsafetyand
healthonboard,which
shouldbeplanned,organized
andperformedsothattheyaresafeineveryrespect.
Beforethedrill,possiblehazardstocrewmembersin
the execution of the drill should be identified and
respectiveriskshouldbemitigated[31].Additionally,
firedrillsprescribedbynationallawsandregulations
and by international instruments
should be
conductedinamannerthatensuresthedisturbanceof
the rest period is minimized and does not induce
fatigue.[32]
5.3 Keysofeffectivenessevaluation
5.3.1 Preparationstage
Firstly, crew participation should be maximized.
Personnel arrangements should include every crew
member except on‐duty crews. In particular, those
crew
membersassignedtootherdutiesrelatedtofire
drills, such as the manning of the emergency
generators, the CO2 room, the sprinkler and
emergencyfirepumps,shouldalsobeinvolvedinthe
drill.Inthesecond,allrelatedequipmentsmustbein
good order and readily available in an emergency.
The persons in charge, such as third officer and
engineer, should maintain the fire‐fighting
equipmentsanddevicesregularly.Anotherkeypoint
is that the type and position of the fire scenario
shouldbevariedinawellconceivedsequence,which
covers most parts of the ship and all types of
fire‐
fighting. For the purpose of a fire drill, the alarm
shouldbeactivatedandtherequisiteactionsbetaken
inaccordancewiththeshipʹssafetyandhealthpolicy.
5.3.2 Performancestage
Thefirststep:timeandplaceoffire drillsshould
bekeptasasecretuntilthe
noticedcrewactivatesthe
fire alarm that delivers the signal of fire location,
which is helpful to improve the awareness and
promptness of the crew members during an
emergency. The best time and location should be
determined through coordinating with the Master
and/or shipʹs safety officer. The master should hold
drills considering locations where the ship is most
likely to experience a fire, where most recent drills
havebeenheld,andwhileminimizingdisruptionsto
cargooperations[33].
Point2isplanningarealisticemergency[34].The
drillshould,asfaras practicable, be conducted asif
there were an
actual emergency. All involved crews
must participate in the fire drills with a positive
attitude and be fully confident of a realistic fire‐
fightingotherthanasimulation. Availableresources
(such as smoke‐generating machine) should be
utilizedtomakedrillasrealisticaspossible[33].For
example, in order to
prevent unnecessary risk and
gain realistic effectiveness, the recovery of a hoist
stretchershouldbecarriedoutwithoutpersonsonthe
stretcher, where a similar load can be used instead
[35].Andfiredrillsshouldbeplannedinsuchaway
thatregularpracticedependsonthetypeofships
and
cargoinvariousemergencies.
The third point is to keep a timeline of events.
Certainemergencysituationsrequiretimelyresponse,
without any delay during the whole drill. As an
example of that, when hearing the warning of fire
doors remote released, which is announced on the
public address system, crew
should run away from
the fire area as far as possible because the remote
controlledreleaseoffiredoorscanalsoinvolvearisk
ofpersonalinjury[36].
Moreover, checking the necessary arrangements
for subsequent abandoning of the ship must be
implemented according to muster list. Many ships
generallyneglect
abandonshipdrills orconductfire
drills several minutes after abandon ship drill. This
situationshouldbeavoided.
5.3.3 Rehabilitationstage
In the rehabilitation stage, equipments used
duringdrillsshouldbeimmediatelybroughtbackto
its fully operational condition and any faults or
defects discovered during the drills be remedied as
soonaspossible.Theeffectivenessofthedrillwillbe
evaluated. The master should hold a meeting or
discussion to get feedback together and conduct a
thoroughdebriefingofthelessonslearned.Thisisthe
most important element of the drill or exercise as it
allowscrewmemberstoidentifythose
areasinwhich
theycanimprovetheirrespectiveresponseefforts
[37]
.
Forinstance,themastercangivesomecommentson
incapacitation of crewmember and malfunctions of
simulated equipments including radios, fire‐fighting
equipments,andlighting.
5.4 Thecriterionofeffectivenessevaluation
Thecriterionofeffectivenessevaluationonfiredrills
onboardwouldbefoundinthefollowingtable1.The
master
canapplythisreferencetable toeffectiveness
evaluation,andobtainascoreofthewholedrillafter
having graded every item in the checklist. The
checklist designs 25 kinds of items belonging to 7
stages.Thehighestscorewillrunupto125pointsif
25pointshavebeenperformed
perfectly.Ifthescore
islowerthan100,thisdrillwouldbenotsatisfactory,
andthewholedrillmustberedone.Thecrewsrequire
235
supplementaltrainingandcorrectiveactionshouldbe
takenintheshortestpossibletime to respondtothe
seriously defective drill. If the drill gains a higher
score with only several items not at good level, the
correspondingknowledgeandskillmustbechecked
carefully and the related roles must be
well
disciplined.
Table1.Thecriterionofeffectivenessevaluationonfiredrillsonboard
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
No. ItemsElements ofEvaluationCriteriaofEvaluation Score
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Reporting Contentofreport:thelocation,size,kindandtimeofthefireNoMiss=5,Other=0
2 Bridgeoffire Theinitialcallershouldbemostlikelyconnectedtothedesignated Good=5,Average=3,Poor=0
firesourceinhisjobrole
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
3 Initialactions Fire‐SignaliscorrectwiththeMusterlistNoMiss=5,Other=0
4Shipʹsalarmannouncementcontainsthelocation,size, kindand NoMiss=5,Other=0
timeofthefire
5ProperextinguisherhasbeenusedandLocalventilationhasbeenshutNoMiss=5,Other=0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
6 Mustering Assemblingconditionaftersoundemergencyalarm:Good=5,Average=3,Poor=0
7 andEachcrewwearingcondition:thecrewsshouldhavetakenoutGood=5,Average=3,Poor=0
preparation theirpersonaleffects
8WearingtimeoffiremanʹsoutfitLess3min=5,Less5min=3,
Over5min=0
9Wearing
conditionoffiremanʹsoutfitNoMiss=5,Other=0
10StartingtimeofEmergencyFirePumpLess5min=5,Less10min=3,
Over10min=0
11ConditionofEmergencyPumpPresserwithtwohosesOver12min=5,Less12min=0
12StartingtimeofElectricalsuppliesandlightingLess5min=5,
Less10min=3,
Over10min=0
13TimeoflisteddampercloseLess5min=5,Less10min=3,
Over10min=0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
14 Entryinto EachteamreportinglevelduringdrillGood=5,Average=3,Poor=0
15 thefirezone Theconditionofcheckandreportaboutthefireteamtothebridge NoMiss=5,Other=0
andfire‐fighting(BApressure/Timeofentry/Name/MasksecureandSafetyLanterns
areinallgoodorder)
16
Theconditionofthefirehose(properlength,boundarycooling) NoMiss=5,Other=0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
17 RescueThereportoftheinjured(Name/location/status)NoMiss=5,Other=0
18 operation Theconditionoftransferenceoftheinjuredpersontoasafelocation Good=5,Average=3,Poor=0
19Theconditionofmonitorandfirstaidtheinjuredperson(s)Good=5,Average=3,Poor=0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
20 UseofaFixedAllventilationandopeningbeenclosedNoMiss=5,Other=0
21 FireExtinguish‐ TheRollcallhasbeenreportedtotheBridgeNoMiss=5,Other=0
22 ‐ingSystemAnycrewcanexplainthemanualoperationmethodGood=5,Average=3,Poor=0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
23 Master’sConditionofeachteamactiontobetaken:Good=5,Average=3,Poor=0
24 Comments EachcrewattitudefordrillGood=5,Average=3,Poor=0
25WholeperformanceGood=5,Average=3,Poor=0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Suggestion CrewsrequiredsupplementaltrainingYes/No
2CorrectiveActionYes /No
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
6 CONCLUSION
Somesuggestionsareraisedtocarryouteffectiveness
evaluationonfiredrillsinordertorespondtothePSC
newinspectionsregime.Firstly,sufficientknowledge
andunderstandingofthelegalbackgroundaboutthe
PSC inspection on fire drills on board are needed.
Moreresearchshouldbeconducted
byshipowners,
ship operators, ship class association and some
relatedmaritimeresearchinstitutions,focusingonthe
SOLAS convention and code, the STCW convention
and code, regulation of related regional PSC
agreements, some national maritime laws and rules
on fire drills. The master and crews should be
proficientinthe procedure
of the PSCinspectionon
fire drills, whatever PSC agreements are, including
main maritime administration, the Paris MOU, the
Tokyo MOU, the Indian‐Ocean MOU and USCG.
Most importantly, each ship had better do research
andanalyzethedetentiondeficienciesinrecentyears
whateverregionalPSCagreementsare,anddiscipline
masterandcrewsregularlyandefficiently.Certainly
therelatedpre‐posttrainingshouldbecarriedouton
landtomeetrequirementsofthePSCinspections.In
orderto pass thePSC inspection onfire drills, what
havebeenmentionedaboveshouldnotbeneglected
oromitted.
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