International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 1

Number 3

September 2007

333

The Semirara Oil Spill: Its Implications to

Maritime Legislations

M. Magramo

John B. Lacson Foundation Maritime University, Iloilo City, Philippines

ABSTRACT: In the stormy morning of December 18, 2005, Power Barge 106 operated by the National Power

Corporation (NAPOCOR) ran aground some 200 meters off Barangay Semirara. Approximately 364,120

liters, equivalent to 1,734 barrels or 364 tons of bunker oil was spilled in the area. The study unraveled the

circumstances which led to the grounding of the tugboat and the barge off Semirara Island: the captain going

near a coral reef and taking the very big risk of grounding; responsible person handling the wheel of the

tugboat at the time of the grounding; the supervisor’s competence and qualifications as deck officer; the

position of the vessel prior to grounding; the navigational equipment of the tugboat; and the absence of

clearance from the Coast Guard. Findings revealed that the captain of the tugboat towing the power barge did

not inform the Coast Guard about the incident.

1 INTRODUCTION

On December 18, 2005, at 11:48, Power Barge 106

operated by the National Power Corporation ran

aground off Barangay Semirara.

The grounding ruptured tanks 3 and 4 of the

power barge which caused a massive oil spill along

the seashores of the island. This was aggravated by

the huge waves pounding on the reef.

The National Power Corporation blamed the

inclement weather for the incident. The oil spill had

contaminated 236 hectares of mangrove forests and

40 square kilometers of marine life including the fish

sanctuary off the coast of Semirara.

It was the worst oil spill in the Philippines

according to the Coast Guard. The vessel was

estimated to be carrying 800, 000 liters of bunker oil.

Clean-up was projected to last for six months, was

estimated to cost Ps 90 million (Philippine Daily

Inquirer, Feb. 3, 2006).

Aware of this development related to the incident,

the JBLCF was moved to do its share by determining

the implications of the oil spill to maritime legislation.

2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study aimed to determine and present the

following:

1 The underlying factors and circumstances which

resulted in the oil spill,

2 The implications of the oil spill to maritime

legislations, particularly those concerning the

Philippine Coast Guard; and

3 The implications of the oil spill to safe navigation

and passage planning.

3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study maybe beneficial in terms of the

following:

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The data presented in this study maybe of

significance to the maritime-related government

agencies for they will be made aware of how

seriously and religiously are the maritime laws,

policies and regulations implemented and observed

in the country. The Semirara incident could be a

springboard for them to review and evaluate existing

maritime legislations and make decisions as to their

appropriateness and adequacy at present. They may

likewise be moved to conduct rigid regular

monitoring and inspection of sea vessels to prevent

tragic and harmful incidents like the Semirara oil

spill.

This study may also be found important by sea

vessel managements for the Semirara incident can

serve as reminder for them to take all possible

measures to prevent the occurrence of accidents such

as oil spill, which pose great danger to people and

the environment.

The Semirara oil spill, as presented in this

research, can serve as a model topic for discussion

and analyses among maritime faculty and students in

related subjects. Said discussion and analyses can

delve into the causes and triggering factors,

preventions, and effects of sea vessel accidents.

The ultimate beneficiary of this study are the

public in general and the marine environment for-

when precautionary measures are appropriately and

adequately made and taken by the authorities

concerned- seafaring vessels shall have been made

and become environment-friendly for the benefit of

human beings in the vicinity.

4 METHODOLOGY

This descriptive-qualitative study looked into the

causes and extent of damage of the oil spill in

Semirara. It further looked into the implications of

the oil spill to the Coast Guard Regulations, safe

navigation and passage planning. Interviews and

documentary analysis were employed as techniques

in data-gathering.

5 FINDINGS

5.1 Unanswered Questions

What were the circumstances which led to the

grounding of the tugboat and the barge on December

18, 2005 off Semirara Island? A seasoned captain or

master of a vessel would never go near a coral reef

because, by doing so, he would be taking a very big

risk of grounding. Who was handling the wheel of

the tugboat at the time of the grounding? Was he

under the supervision of a competent and licensed

deck officer? What was the position of the vessel

prior to its grounding? What electronic navigational

equipment did the tugboat have? Did the tugboat and

the barge being towed have clearance from the Coast

Guard?

5.2 Bad Weather

How valid was the National Power Corporation’s

claim that bad weather caused the grounding of their

tugboat and barge? Or was there misjudgment on the

captain and management’s part to order the tugboat

and barge to proceed to Mindoro despite the low-

pressure warning in the Visayas area? Did they have

clearance from the Coast Guard station in Masbate?

Is it true that the NAPOCOR tugboat and barge,

being government vessels are exempted from

securing Coast Guard clearance?

Had the captain of the officers at tempted to

secure clearance from the Coast Guard as any

commercial vessel would usually do, they would not

have been allowed to sail in the bad weather. Had

they not sailed, they would not have run aground.

Had they not run aground, there would have been no

oil spill.

5.3 Negligence

In the event of an oil spill, the primary obligation of

the spiller is to inform the Philippine Coast Guard,

the agency responsible for preventing and

controlling pollution in the country’s territorial

waters.

Findings revealed that the master or captain of the

tugboat towing the power barge did not inform the

Coast Guard about the incident. They learned about

the spill only because Malayan towage informed

them that they were conducting a salvage operation

in Semirara.

5.4 Extent of Damage

The oil spill spread over 236 hectares of mangrove

forest. The area included 100 hectares of fully

grown mangrove, 56 hectares was reforested by

Semirara Mining Corporation and 80 hectares

reforested by the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR). A 40 sq. km. marine

area was also heavily affected, including declared

fish sanctuary. Bunker oil had likewise seeped in as

deep as three feet from the surface of a 5 km. stretch

of shoreline, resulting in heavy concentrations of

dead sea-grass in the area.

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5.5 Actions to Contain the Oil Spill

A few days after the incident, an oil spill boom was

deployed in the area. A 120- meter solid boom was

positioned as barrier at Phase 1 of the area.

Meanwhile, a 60- meter fence-type boom was placed

as barrier at Kaybilo Cove. Unfortunately, the oil

spill boom was rendered useless during strong winds

and heavy seas.

5.6 Clean-up Operations

Clean-up operations were done both manually and

with the use of high-pressure compressors in the

application of oil dispersant.

Aside from the deployment of the oil spill boom

and the application of oil spill dispersant, manual

clean-up was also undertaken by 255 local work

force hired by the National Power Corporation in

coordination with the CENRO personnel and the

Barangay Captain Reynante J. Lim. Over-all clean-

up operation was done by the Philippine Coast

Guard with 23 personnel assigned to work at site of

the oil spill. The Coast Guard advised an improvised

oil-spill strainer made of bamboos and cogon grass

to contain the oil from spreading further into the

open sea.

A canal was also dug to facilitate the flow of

bunker oil from different areas under the mangroves

to a pit which served as reception facility. Using

drums, the local workers manually collected the oil

from the pit for transport to a safe place provided by

the barangay officials. The contaminated soil and

sand was collected in sacks and also transferred to,

and secured, in a permanent dumping site designated

by the CENRO Officer and the barangay officials.

5.7 Area Covered by the Clean-up Operations

As of January 30, 2006, only 6% of the area had

been cleaned manually and applied with oil spill

dispersant. A total of 9,640 liters (46 drums) of

dispersant had been applied, covering 40, 000 sq. m.

of the affected area.

6 GENERALIZATIONS

Following are certain generalizations concerning the

Semirara oil spill incident:

1 Had correct maritime protocol been observed,

the Coast Guard would not have cleared the

NAPOCOR tugboat to sail and tow the power

barge from Masbate to Mindoro due to the bad

weather.

2 The route taken by the master of the tugboat

defied practical navigation principles. The chosen

route was, in the first place, not the safest and

shortest route from Masbate to Mindoro. The

tugboat could have opted for a safer alternative

route in accordance with established and accepted

principles in the practice of navigation.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the above generalizations, the

following are recommended:

To avoid other catastrophic incidents similar to

Semirara oil spill, the NAPOCOR management

should consider an evaluation of competencies

among its captains and officers in-charge of tugboats

towing power barges. A needs assessment training

will help in the enhancement of said competencies

among the personnel concerned.

The Philippine Coast Guard should strictly

require all vessels to secure a clearance from their

office prior to their departure. It is suggested that the

Coast Guard establish a vessel traffic service to

facilitate the passing vessels reporting in their

position, cargo and port of destination for close

monitoring of their movements.

The NAPOCOR management should require its

captains to prepare and submit a passage plan for

every intended voyage or trip. The NAPOCOR

should closely monitor that the passage plan is

strictly followed by the captains and officers in

command of the tugboats of the company.

The government through the Maritime Industry

Authority (MARINA) should implement the 2003

Amendment of the Marpol 73/78-the phasing out of

single hull tankers.

REFERENCES

Baldomero E. (2006, January 14). Antique Provincial

Government to Sue Napocor Over Oil Spill. Panay News.

Burgos N.P. (2006, February 6). Boracay resort owners say Oil

spill no threat. Philippine Daily Inquirer. (A- 18).

Salaverria L.B. (2006, January 30). Semirara clean-up Urgent,

says PCG. Philippine Daily Inquirer. (A-15).

Tubeza P.C. (2006, February 3). Massive oil spill Threatens

white Boracay beaches.Philippine Daily Inquirer. (A1).