363
1 INTRODUCTION
Alargenumberof maritime accidents andincidents
involve some form of human error (Harati et al.,
2006).AsreportedbyPortandMaritimeOrganization
(PMO)ofIran,marineaccidentswereidentifiedtobe
the cause of death of more than 5000 people in this
decade.Studiesshow
thatforeachseriousaccidentin
the maritime domain, or in any other domain, there
arealargernumberofincidents,alargernumberof
nearmisses,andmanymoresafety‐criticaleventsand
unsafe acts (Kristiansen, 2005). Pomeroy and
Tomlinson(2000)statedthatmanyofthefailuresare
actually
the result of errors (i.e. latent failures) that
have been designed and constructed into highly
complex systems especially system integration and
interfacing.
Thefulltextof44marineincidentswasanalyzed
byPillips(2000),includingcollisionsandgroundings
reports. Indeed his study focused on evaluating the
effects of sleep in marine
incidents. Tzannatos and
Kokotos (2009) examined human reliability with
reference to all accidents involving Greek‐flagged
shipsduring1993‐2006,atime‐scalespannedoverthe
pre‐ and post‐ISM period. Celik et al. (2010)
developed a risk‐based modeling approach to
enhance the execution process of shipping accident
investigation
(SAI). Their paper addressed a fuzzy
extended fault tree analysis which combined the
effects of organizational faults and shipboard
technical system failures under a risk assessment
analysis. Mullai and Paulsson (2011) designed a
conceptualmodelforanalysisofmarineaccidents.
An Empirical Survey on the Role of Human Error in
Marine Incidents
A.H.Mokhtari&H.R.KhodadadiDidani
ChabaharMaritimeUniversity,Chabahar,Iran
ABSTRACT:Errorisapartofhuman.Despitethatorganizationsaretryingtoreduceerrortothezerolevel,this
goal is unachievable. As far as human operation is taking place in a complicated environment, error will
occurred,anditspossibilitywouldbeincreasedunder
theconditionsofstress,extraloadingwork,andfatigue.
Oneofthemostimportanttransportationmodesismarinetransportations.Thesea isanunsafeplacethatkills
manybyasimpleevent.Everyyeartherearethousandsofmarineaccidentsthatresultininjuries,casualties,
marinepollutionsandalsomassivefinancial
loss.Toreducetheaccidents,thereshouldbemoreattentiontothe
factorssuchassuitabletrainingofhumanresource,properimplementationofnationalandinternationallaws
and regulations, vessels and the equipment on board them, port facilities, and also the utilities for marine
searchandrescue.
In this research
1816 marine accidents have been studied in five Iranian shipping companies. 17 factors are
knowntobeeffectiveinoccurrenceofhumanerrorintheseaccidents.Fourfactorsofthemostinfluenceare
negligence,poortraining,inadequatetools,andlackofskillandexperience.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 7
Number 3
September 2013
DOI:10.12716/1001.07.03.06
364
Asintheaviationandothertransportationmodes,
human error is at the root of most preventable
casualties in the maritime field and around 70 to 90
percent of transportation crashes are, directly or
indirectly, the result of human error (Dhillon, 2007).
Human errors depend upon the internal factors
related
to the operatorsʹ characteristics and
differencessuch as skill, experience, task familiarity,
etc.andtheexternal factorstotheoperators such as
equipment design and installation, task complexity,
work environment, organizational factors and
operatingprocedures.A properbalancebetweenthe
capabilityofthehumanoperatorandthedifficultyof
the
taskwoulddecreasethelikelihoodofhumanerror
(Whittingham, 2004). Figure 1 represents the most
commonhumanerrorsoccurintransportation.
Figure1. Human error categorization in transportation
(Dillihon,2007)
Celik and Cebi (2009) proposed an analytical
humanfactorsanalysisinordertoidentifytheroleof
human errors in shipping accidents based on the
fuzzy analytical hierarchy process. Sanders and
McCormick (1993) defined human error as an
inappropriate or undesirable human decision or
behavior that reduces or has potential for
reducing
systemeffectiveness,safetyorperformance.
Whenweusethetermsafety,itwillencompass:
Safetyandhealthofpersons,
Safetyofvessel,and
Environmentalaspects
Hetherington et al. (2006) reviewed the literature
on safety in three key areas; common themes of
accidents, the influence of human
error, and
interventionstomakeshippingsafer.
Thecontrolofsafetyinshippingiscomplexfora
numberofreasons(Kristiansen,2005):
International, regional and national laws and
regulations
Controlisexercisedbyanumberofagencies
Controlaffectsthevariouslife‐cyclesofthevessel
Lackof
enoughinformationontheroleofhuman
in marine disaster coupled with the importance of
maritimesafety motivatethisstudy.Theaimsofthis
researchcanbesummarisedasseekingtoanswerthe
followingquestionsincontextoftheIranianshipping
lines:
Q
1.Whatarethemainrootcausesofhumanerror
inIranianshippinglines?
Q
2. How these errors can be reduced in Iranian
shippinglines?
Firstly, this paper starts with research method.
Afterthat,themainrootcausesofmarineincidentsin
Iranianshippinglinesarestudied.Thepaperfollows
with a questioner based analysis on the ways of
reducinghumanerrorinmarineincidents.
2 METHOD
Questionnaires are one of the most frequently used
methods for gathering data from individuals in
research studies (Bourque & Fielder, 1995). In other
words, the questionnaire is a technique of data
collectioninwhicheachpersonisaskedtorespondto
the same set of questions in a predetermined
order
(Saundersetal.,2003).Whenthesurveyisconfinedto
oneorganization, andtheorganizationiswillingand
ableto assemble groups of employees to respond to
the questionnaires at the work place, personally
administeringquestionnairesingroupsisagoodway
to collect data (Sekaran, 2000). Therefore, group
administrationwasfoundtobeveryappropriatefor
thisresearchstudy.
In this study, different items associated with
humanerrorinmaritimetransportwereself‐assessed
by respondents using a 5‐point Likert scale from
‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. All results,
analyses and tables using these variables were
constructed
fromanswerstoquestionsinthesurvey
instrument.
Itemsinthesurveyinstrumentrelatedtoquestion
and hypothesis were statistically examined in three
ways. Firstly, Cronbach’s alpha and principal
componentfactoranalysiswerediscussedtotestthe
reliability and validity of collected data. Secondly,
descriptive statistics were used to get
a feel for the
data.Thirdly,appropriatestatistical techniqueswere
conductedtotestthehypotheses.
With respect to statistical analysis, first each
item/variablewasindividuallytestedusingstatistical
techniques suitable for single samples, such as one‐
sample Chi‐square and Kolmogorov‐Smirnov one‐
sample tests, to ensure the existence or
lack of
significant differences between the frequencies of
response categories of each item. Second, each
variable was assessed by organization location,
managerial position titles, and managerial education
levels variables using a series of nonparametric
statistical tests, such as Chi‐square test of
relatedness/independence, Kruskal‐Wallis several
independent samples test, and Mann
‐Whitney and
Kolmogorov‐Smirnovtwo‐independent‐samplestests.
These tests were carried out to reveal whether the
significant differences, which were found in
frequencies of responses to each item (first sets of
statisticaltests),wererelatedtoanyparticularbranch,
position title, or education level (hypothesis of
independence tests). Third,
finally the first variable
(human error) was used as a pivot variable and
checked with the other variables for possible
correlationusingSpearman’srhobivariatecorrelation
(Spearman’srankordercorrelation—anonparametric
alternativetoPearson’sr)(Healey,1999).
3 HUMANERRORINMARINEINCIDENTS
Humanisthemainrootofmarineincidents
whichis
studiedintwocategories,includinghumanerrorand
humanelement.Personal,group, and organizational
factors are the main categories of human element,
whilehumanerrorconsistsofoperational,legal,and
knowledge‐basederrors.
365
3.1 TheRoleofHumaninMarineIncidents
Humanerrorisaninseparablepartofmarineincident
all around the world. Indeed, majority of marine
incidentsaredirectlyrelatedtohumanerror.Likeits
globalscale,humanerrorisoneofthemaincausesof
marineincidentinIranianterritories.
Collectingthe necessary dataforanalysis, face to
face interview coupled with the published reports
(2008todate)ofSearchandRescue(SAR)committee
ofPortandMaritimeOrganizationofIran(PMO)are
used as data collection method. Figures 2 to 6
represent the main causes of marine incident in
the
mainIranianshippingline.
Figure2.CausesofdefectsinNITC
Asshowninfigure2,crewnegligenceisthemain
rootofincidentinNationalIranianTankerCompany
(NITC).Poortrainingandinadequatetoolsareatthe
secondlevelofimportance.
Figure3.CausesofdefectsinIRISL
Figure4.CausesofdefectsinIran‐o‐Hend
As same as the NITC, crew negligence and poor
training are the main causes of accident in Islamic
RepublicofIranShippingLine(IRISL).
As illustrated in figure 4, crew negligence is the
main cause of defects in Iran‐o‐Hend shipping line.
The second main root causes are belong to
over
confidence and poor judgment leading to wrong
action.
Figure5.CausesofdefectsinValfajr
For Valfajr shipping line, crew negligence, poor
training, and working improper condition are the
main causes of marine incident, respectively, as
showninfigure5.
Figure6.CausesofdefectsinBOSCO
Asillustratedfrom figure6,crew negligenceand
poor training are the main causes of incident in
BonyadShippingLine(BOSCO),respectively.
Figure7NatureofdeficienciesreportedbyIranianshipping
lines
366
In terms of shipping, as shown in figure 7, the
main deficiency reported is the problem of
negligence. Poor training, fatigue, inadequate tools,
and lack of skill and experience are other factors in
thecategoryofhumanerrors.
3.2 MethodsofHumanErrorReduction
As mentioned in section 2, more
than 1800 Iranian
deck‐ and engine officers (figure 8) are asked to
answer the questioner, which was prepared to find
thewaysforreducinghumanerror.
Figure8.Respondentsranking
Based on the obtained results, followings are
selectedasthesolutionsfornegligence:
Increasingtheautomationlevel,
Morecontrolandsurvey,
Moreusageofalertsigns,
Moreaccurateworkingstandards,and
MoreaccurateProgrammingMaintenanceServices
(PMS)
Achieving the problem of poor training,
followingsareproposed
byrespondents:
ImprovingtheSTCW‐basedtrainingsforseafarers,
Implementing ISM Code on non‐conventional
vessels,
Increasing the safety culture by the use of on‐
boardtrainings,and
Improving the knowledge of officers on marine
perils
Regarding the seafarers ideas, followings are the
waystoovercome
inadequatetools:
Moreinstallationofalerttools,and
On‐boardhierarchicalriskassessmentsystem
Increasing the skill and experience of seafarers,
followingareproposed:
Increasingthesimulator‐basedtraining
4 RESULTSANDCONCLUSIONS
This research studied the role of human error in
marine incidents in the ma in Iranian
shipping
companiesbytheuseofself‐datacollection,coupled
with questioner among more than 1800 Iranian
seafarers.Basedontheobtainedresults,poortraining,
fatigue, inadequate tools, and lack of skill and
experiencearethemainrootcauses ofhumanerrorin
marineincidents.
Unfortunately, there is no accurate
data base for
reportsofmanyincidents.Indeed,thereisnoaccurate
andupdatedataonmarineaccidentsofunclassified,
nonconventional, and fishery vessels. Based on the
reportsofSAR committee ofPMO,thesevesselsare
usually engaged with problems such as machinery
failure, fire, flooding, hull rupture which can be
the
resultofpoorcontrolandinadequateregulationson
them.Inaddition,accordingtolotsofmedicalhelps,
crewinjuries,andmanoverboarddisastersreported
annuallyallaroundtheworldonthesevessels,their
crew should act under adequate regulations
categorizedinthementionedoperatorerrorlevel.
Improving the
level of safety in maritime trade
anddecreasingmaritimedisasters,followingsshould
beconsidered:
Since there are usually many reports on marine
disasters on nonconventional vessels, Port State
Controls and Classification Societies should
control them more careful than ocean‐going
vessels.
There should be annual training programs for
seafarers
under safety conventions, in particular
the new amendments of the STCW, SOLAS, and
CORLEG.
Oilandfuel leakagein engine rooms isthemain
root of fire, especially in small vessels. Thus
firefightingappliances shouldcontrolregularlyby
both of the port state control and classification
societies.
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