353
1 INTRODUCTION
Safety at sea is aimed to be enhanced by extensive
safety regulation. The range of maritime safety
regulationiswide;itrangesfromlegalandregulatory
instrumentstoeconomicinstrumentsandinformation
sharing based instruments. Additionally, regulatory
and other maritime safety actors are numerous. Of
themthe International
Maritime Organisation (IMO)
is the most prominent, but also other international,
regionalandnationalactorsplaytheirrole.
Therehasbeenaremarkableincreaseinmaritime
transportation, and the transportation of oil in
particular,intheBalticSeainthe2000´s.Overthelast
ten years, the volume of oil
and oil products
transportedhastripledinthisarea.Themainreason
for the increase in maritime oil transportation
volumesintheBalticSeaisRussia`snewoilterminals
intheeasternpartoftheGulfofFinland.ThePortof
Primorsk started operating in 2002, and other ports
haveincreased
theircapacityaswell.Oilterminalsin
theportofUst‐LugastartedoperatinginMarch2012.
In 2010, almost 290 million tonnes of oil and oil
productsweretransportedintheBalticSea,ofwhich
morethan55%viatheGulfofFinland(Holmaetal.
2012).Everyday,
morethan2,000shipsaresailingin
the Baltic Sea, and 25% of these are tankers.
(HELCOM 2009) The shallow and rocky waters,
narrowchannelsandsevereiceconditionsaddtothe
risks of navigation in the Baltic Sea and, more
particularly, in the Gulf of Finland. The relatively
smallsea
areas,crossingtrafficbetweenHelsinkiand
Tallinn and oil tankers going to the west from the
easternpartoftheGulf ofFinlandareacombination
which can cause a disaster both for humans and
environment.
The focus in this paper is to establish how to
prevent an oil accident
in the Gulf of Finland. The
The effectiveness of maritime safety policy
instruments from the Finnish maritime experts’
point of view – case Gulf of Finland and prevention
of an oil accident
J
.Lappalainen,J.Storgård&U.Tapaninen
UniversityofTurku,CentreforMaritimeStudiesMaritimeUniversity,Finland
ABSTRACT:Seaaccidentsareaimedtobepreventedwithanextensiveamountofmaritimesafetyregulation.
The purpose of this paper is to present the findings of a questionnaire study that was targeted at Finnish
maritimeexpertsandaddressedthe
question:howtopreventanoilaccidentintheGulfofFinland.Thisstudy
alsoincludesaliteraturestudyabouttheproblemsofthecurrentmaritimesafetyregime. Thefindingsofthe
questionnairestudyarecomparedtothefindingsoftheliteraturestudy.Thequestionnairestudyshowedthat
many kindsof
policieshaveimprovedmaritimesafety,andtheyareneededtoensuremaritime safety. For
instance,shipconstruction,fairwaymaintenance,nauticalchartsandrulesoftheroadatsea canbeconsidered
thecornerstonesofmaritimesafety.However,theresultsrankedvoluntaryactivitiesofcompaniesasthemost
effectivewayto
improvemaritimesafetyinthefuture.Self‐regulativeapproachescouldsolvesomeproblems
connectedtomoretraditionalpolicy‐making.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 7
Number 3
September 2013
DOI:10.12716/1001.07.03.05
354
paperpresentsthefindingsofaquestionnaire study
that was targeted at Finnish maritime experts. The
questionnaire study was done as a part of a project
focusingontherisksofmaritimetrafficintheGulfof
Finlandin the Baltic Sea. In the questionnaire study
widerangeofdifferent
policy instruments and their
effectiveness in the past and in the future were
compared.
Previously accident risks and accident probabili‐
tiesandtheirenvironmentalconsequencesintheGulf
ofFinlandhavebeenstudiedbyusingBayesianbelief
networks(BBNs)e.g.inHänninen2011;Mazaheriet
al.2013;Hänninen et al.
2012;Hänninen and Kujala
2012.Environmentalimpactsofshippingand oil ac‐
cidentsontheenvironmentinGoFhavebeenstudied
bye.g.Lecklinetal.2011;Ihaksietal.2011;Helleet
al. 2011; Lehikoinen et al. 2013. This paper comple‐
mentsthepreviousresearchbyfocusingonthesocie
‐
talview:howtopreventanaccidentfromhappening.
Thestructureofthepaperisasfollows.Inchapter
two,maritimesafetypolicyinstrumentsandsomeex‐
amples of evaluation methods and studies are pre‐
sented.Alsothegeneralcritiqueofthemaritimesafe‐
ty policy system is reviewed. In
chapter three, the
method of the questionnaire study is presented.
Chapterfourpresentstheresultsofthequestionnaire
study.Chapterfiveprovidestheconclusionsanddis‐
cussionoftheresults.Intheconclusions,theresultsof
thequestionnairestudyare mirrored to the findings
presentedinchaptertwo.
2 MARITIMESAFETY
POLICYINSTRUMENTS
ANDTHEIREVALUATION
Policyinstrumentsareoftendividedintoregulatory,
economic and information guidance based
instruments (e.g. Klemmensen et al. 2007; Vedung
2003;Vieiraetal.2007;KuronenandTapaninen2010).
Other classifications of policy instruments exist as
well, based on for example the degree of
governmentalpower
orthecarrot/stickcategorization
(Vedung 2003). Regulatory instruments include for
example jurisdiction and law based decrees,
restrictionsandlicences;economicinstrumentstaxes,
subsidies, fees etc.; and information‐based guidance
information, voluntary education, certification,
awardsetc.
Policy instruments can be viewed from the
perspective of the interests that they aim to protect:
privategoods(e.g.thecompetitivenessofcompanies)
or public goods, which the market would otherwise
neglect(e.g.themaintenanceofsafetyandsecurityin
the shipping industry and protection of the
environment from the harmful effects of shipping).
Policyinstrumentscanbeeitherpreventivemeasures
(e.g.regulationontheconstruction
ofshipsorvessel
traffic services), or sanctions (e.g. criminal
responsibility) and consequences (e.g. financial
liability).Bothpreventivemeasuresandconsequences
canbeeitherprivate(e.g.insurance)oradministrative
measures (e.g. prohibitions). All the instruments are
not necessarily based on jurisdiction. Private actors
can also act in co‐operation and promote
maritime
safety related goals, for example in P&I Clubs
(Protection & Indemnity Clubs). (Kuronen and
Tapaninen2010)
In addition to traditional governance, new forms
ofself‐regulativegovernancehaveemergedespecially
inenvironmentalgovernance,including,forexample,
self‐governance, network governance, interactive
governance or co‐governance (Kern 2011; van
Leeuwen
and van Tatenhove 2010; Wuisan et al.
2010). This shift has introduced new actors into
elements of policymaking and has resulted in new
practiceswhichchallenge,transformandcomplement
the traditional ways of policymaking. Globalization
andindividualizationareseenascatalystsinthisshift
(vanLeeuwenandvanTatenhove2010).
Effective
policy instruments should be coherent
with overall policy orientations. A certain set of
policiescantogetherbemoreeffectivethananysingle
policy would be. In their study on transport policy
instruments,Vieiraetal.(2007)foundthatmostofthe
policy instruments studied had positive synergy
effects, i.e. the
effectiveness of instruments
implemented together is potentiallygreater than the
effectivenessofeachinstrumentseparately. Itisalso
important to look at which current policies might
provide conflicting incentives and which should be
removed.Policyinstrumentsshouldalsobereviewed
inthe context of maritime shipping systemchanges.
(Greineretal.
2000;Vieiraetal.2007;Walker2000)
2.1 FormalSafetyAssessmentandotherevaluationsof
maritimesafetypolicyinstruments
IMO has developed the Formal Safety Assessment
(FSA)methodwhichcanbeusedasatooltoevaluate
regulations for maritime safety and to make
comparisons between existing and new regulations.
FSAisbasedonfivestepswhichare:identificationof
hazards; assessment of risks, identification of risk
controloptions(RCOs),cost‐benefitanalysisofRCOs
and recommendations to decision‐making after the
analysis(IMO2007).
During the years FSA has been in use in IMO,
many FSA analyses have been submitted
to IMO
addressing specific cases (e.g. MSC/83/21/1 2007;
MSC/83/21/2 2007; MSC/83/INF.8 2007; MSC/85/17/1
2008;MSC/85/17/22008).Therearemanyexampleson
howtheFSAmethodhasbeenusedintheanalysisof
maritime safety, e.g. in the evaluation of
containership safety (Wang & Foinikis 2001), in the
evaluation of cruise
ship safety (Lois et al. 2004), in
thedevelopmentofrisk‐basedrulesforoffshorecrane
systems(RuudandMikkelsen2008),orintheanalysis
of the risk of LNG carrier operations (Vanem et al.
2008).However,manyofthesestudiesfocusmoreon
riskassessmentissuesthanonrankingof
RCO’s.
AcollectionofFSAstudiesdoneintheBalticSea
area has been published in 2010 (Westerlund 2010).
Westerlund (2010) concludes that FSA studies have
mainlybeen concerned with risks of oil spills in the
BalticSeaasaconsequencetogroundingorcollision
accident.Someofthecited
studiesdevelopedRCO’s
during the FSA process and some evaluated the
proposedRCO’s.ThemostcommonRCO’sanalysed
were traffic separation schemes and VTMIS (Vessel
355
Traffic Management and Information System).
(Westerlund2010)
Some studies focus on evaluating the FSA
methodology and also criticize it (Rosqvist &
Tuominen2004; Kontovas&Psaraftis 2009;Psaraftis
2012; Puisa & Vassalos 2012). For example, FSA
studieshavebeencriticizedfor lackingtransparency
of used data or utilizing constricted or
unreliable
data; also the methods used (e.g. of cost‐benefit
analysis or ranking of RCO’s) have been criticized
(Psaraftis 2012; Puisa & Vassalos 2012). Despite of
deficiencies in its practical applications, the FSA
methodisusedwidelyintheevaluationofmaritime
safety risks and policies. The FSA system has
provided a common framework for maritime safety
policy evaluation, but inside the FSA framework
different methods for risk assessment and policy
evaluationcanbeused.
BesidesFSAstudies,therearealsootherexamples
of evaluation of maritime safety policy instruments.
Walker(2000)hasanalysedinhisstudythecostsand
benefits
ofarangepolicyoptionsformaintainingor
improvingsafetyintheNorthSea.Walker(2000)has
usedinthepolicyevaluationanapproachwhichwas
developed by a research institute called RAND
Europe.Inthestudy, 9 different“tactics”to prevent
anaccidentintheNorthSeawereidentified.
Tactics
were connected for example to traffic routing, VTS,
piloting,waterwaymarkingorcontingencyplanning
andSARservices.(Walker2000)
Hawkins(2001)hasstudiedeffectivemeasuresto
improve the quality of shipping in the Asia Pacific
Region. According to the survey results, the most
effective mechanisms in improving the safety of
shipping in the Asia Pacific Region were port state
control, ship vetting, ISM Code implementation,
industry self‐regulation, government‐industry
partnerships,aregionalapproachandastrongerAsia
Pacific voice and media coverage and information
exchange(Hawkins2001).
Intheirstudy,Marlow&Gardner(2006)perform
cost‐benefit analysis for
the development of marine
electronic highway (MEH) in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore. The MEH is a type of information
superhighway that integrates maritime safety
technologies and environmental management
systems,andwhichisbasedonelectronicnavigation
charts (ENC). Their analysis is based on economic
cost‐benefitanalysis(Marlow&
Gardner2006).
2.2 Thegeneralcritiqueofmaritimesafetypolicy
Severalauthorshavecriticisedtheprevalentmaritime
safety regime which mainly consists of command‐
and‐control type policies (Goss, 2008; Goulielmos,
2001; Knapp and Franses, 2009; Knudsen, 2009;
Mitroussi,2004;Psaraftis,2002;Roe,2008,2009).
Extensive maritime safety regulation is
in pla ce,
ranging from the international level (International
Maritime Organization, IMO) to the supranational
(e.g. European Union), the regional (e.g. HELCOM)
and the national levels. Several measures have been
adopted, and new mea sures are continuously being
developed and proposed to prevent sea accidents.
Although the goals are good, there is a
risk of the
shipping industry being encumbered with excessive
rulesandextracosts,whichintheendwilldolittleto
decrease accident risks (Kuronen and Tapaninen,
2010).
The current governance system of the maritime
industry has been criticised for being reactive. In
many cases, major accidents have activated the
renewalofinternationalmaritime safety regulations,
for instance SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions and
OPA 90 regulations. This kind of ‘post‐accident’
policy is often not very comprehensive, and one
particular risk gets too much attention (Goulielmos,
2001;KnappandFranses,2009).
Maritime safety regulation focuses very much on
technical aspects, while
it is a commonly repeated
statementthatthehumanfactoristhemostimportant
cause of maritime accidents (Kujala et al., 2009;
Trucco et al. 2008). IMO has recognised the
importance of safety culture and human factor in
maritime safety (IMO 2012), but it seems that it is
difficult to
find or implement effective measures to
reduce the role of the human factor in accident
causation(KuronenandTapaninen2010).
Theimplementationofinternationaljurisdictionis
based on flag states, and flag states have very
different standards for implementing regulations.
According to Knudsen and Hassler (2011), there are
inconsistencies and ‘conflicts’
concerning the
inspection practices, interpretation of rules and
implementation strategies between flag states. This
enables unfair competition in the shipping business
(Goss,2008).
Knudsen (2009) has concluded that the
continuously increasing amount of safety regulation
and the administrative workload of maritime
personnel have induced aversion against new rules
and regulations
among seafarers. The seafarers
believe that the increasing volume of regulations,
controls, and administrative work has negatively
affected the safety onboard. Moreover, the seafarers
feelthatthistrendbelittlestheirseamanship,whichis
a blend of professional knowledge, professional
pride, and experience‐based common sense
(Knudsen,2009).
Finally, one major problem
of maritime safety
regulation results from the fact that national
representatives make up IMO, which leads to
constructing maritime policies for the globalised
industryfrom a national perspective. Problems arise
whennationalinterestsconflictwithmaritimesafety
goals.Manytimesthisismanifestedintheslowpace
oftheIMO
legislationprocess.Inaddition,maritime
safety jurisdiction does not match the geographical
extension of the corresponding economic activities.
The administrative units that implement the safety
rules and regulations can only act at the national
level, while the shipping industry acts at the global
level(Furger,1997;Roe,2008,2009).
356
3 METHOD
3.1 Thequestionnairestudy
The aim of the questionnaire study was to find out
how to improve maritime safety in the Gulf of
Finland. In particular, the purpose was to find out
how maritime experts viewed the effectiveness of
different preventive maritime safety policy
instruments, and how they
thought maritime safety,
with focus on the Gulf of Finland, could most
effectivelybeimproved.Thequestionnairewasbased
on the previous literature review (Kuronen and
Tapaninen, 2010) on the effectiveness of maritime
safetypolicy.Theaimofthequestionnairestudywas
to test the conclusions of the literature study
empirically. How do Finnish maritime experts view
the regulatory, economic and information guidance
based policy instruments in comparison with each
other, and how do they think an oil accident in the
GulfofFinlandcouldbeprevented?
Thequestionnairestudywas carriedoutinFinnish
using the web‐based system ‘Webropol’
(http://w3.webropol.com/) between February and
March 2010. Two different ways to fill in the
questionnaire were used: an open questionnaire on
theInternetorane‐mailquestionnairethatwassent
toselectedrespondents.Thetwoquestionnaireswere
the same, except that the open questionnaire
contained a few more questions concerning
the
backgroundoftherespondents.
The questionnaire study was targeted at Finnish
maritimeexpertsincludingseafarers,pilots,maritime
authorities, representatives of maritime education,
classification societies, marine insurers, the Coast
Guard,searescue andotherrelated organisations in
Finland.
An e‐mail invitation was sent to 175 persons
whose contact details were
obtained from the
Internet,fromthecustomerregisteroftheCentrefor
MaritimeStudiesorthroughtheresearchers’personal
contactsandinformation.Intheselectionofpotential
respondents attention was paid to an even
distributionbetweendifferentrespondent groups.In
addition, information concerning the open
questionnaire was sent to four
Finnish trade unions
involving ship officers, seamen, engine officers and
pilots. Information about the questionnaire was also
disseminated in meetings, seminars and conferences
relatedtoshippingduringthetimethequestionnaire
wasavailableontheInternet.
Atotalof96personsfilledinthequestionnaire.63
oftheserespondedtothe
e‐mailquestionnaireand33
tothe Internet questionnaire. The distribution of the
respondentswasasfollows:
Seafarers24%
Maritimeauthorities13.5%
Maritimeeducation12.5%
Shore‐based employees of shipping companies
11%
Pilots19%
Others24%
Seafarerswerethelargestgroupwith24%of
the
respondents. The second largest was the group
‘Others’ (20%). The group ‘Others’ contained many
respondents from several sectors that could not be
treatedasseparategroupsduetothesmallnumberof
respondents in each sector, e.g. sea rescue or
classification societies. The third largest group was
pilotswith19%.
Ofthosewhoreceivedaninvitationtothee‐mail
questionnaire,seafarerswerethemostactivegroupto
respond(54%filledinthequestionnaire). Inaddition,
over50%ofpilotsandmaritimeeducationpersonnel
filled in the questionnaire. The least active group
(compared to the number of e‐
mail invitations) was
“otherpersonnel”withacompletionrateof24%,but
on the other hand, the number of selected
respondentsbelongingtothisgroupwasthehighest
(67persons).Itshouldalsobenotedthatpilotswere
active in answering the open questionnaire on the
Internet.Outof33
respondents,15werepilots.Pilots
can be considered to be over‐represented in the
results, which was reflected in the questions about
pilotage and in the number of free‐text comments
dealingwithpilotageissues.
Regardless of their current position, most of the
respondentshadlongexperienceinseafaring.Almost
one half of the respondents, or 48%, had seafaring
experienceof over15years,and16had 10‐15 years.
Only 13 respondents (14%) had no seafaring
experience, but 7 of these had over 15 years of
experienceinworkinginthemaritimesector.Therest
(6respondents) had lessthan
10 years of experience
in working in the maritime sector. It emerged that
some of the respondents with relatively little
seafaring experience, for example 1‐5 years, had a
longexperienceinotherjobsrelatedtothemaritime
industry.Overall,therespondentscanbeestimatedto
haveagoodknowledge
ofseafaringandthemaritime
industrybasedonlongexperienceinthesector.
The Finnish shipping industry (Trafi, 2012;
Sundberg, 2011) consists of approximately 25–30
shippingcompanies.Thenumber ofshipsregistered
toFinlandandoperatinginforeigntraffichas,inre‐
centyears,beenapprox.110‐120ships,thetotal
gross
tonnage at the end 2011 being approximately
1,400,000t.SomeoftheshipsownedbyFinnishship‐
pingcompaniesareregisteredunderforeignflags,or
the shipping companies use chartered ships. All the
majorsectorsoftheshippingbusinessarerepresented
intheFinnishshipping industry.Drycargoships
and
ro‐rocargoshipsformabouthalfoftheFinnishships
thatoperateinforeigntraffic.Themaritimetrafficin
theGulfofFinlandandintheBalticSeais,toalarge
extent,feedertrafficfromandtoEuropeanportsand
onlyfewFinnishshippingcompaniesoperateworld‐
wide.
3.2 Analysis
A structured questionnaire was chosen as the main
method of this study. However, the results were
analysedinaqualitativemannerduetotherelatively
low number of respondents (96). The respondents
were asked to evaluate whether they thought the
existing regulations/practices had been effective in
improving maritime
safety, and secondly they were
asked to evaluate whether they thought that further
development of regulations and practices could
improve safety in the future with the focus on the
357
Gulf of Finland. The respondents could choose
between five options in their answers: ‘I disagree
strongly’,‘Idisagreepartly’,‘I agreepartly’,‘Iagree
strongly’, and ‘no opinion’ (Likert Scale). The
respondents were directed to choose the option ‘no
opinion’whentheyconsiderthattheyarenotfamiliar
withthe
issueofthequestion. Therespondentswere
obligedtoanswerallquestionsasitwasnotpossible
to move forward in the web questionnaire without
answering. In all issues, the respondents were also
given the opportunity to write freely worded
comments. The freely worded comments were
utilisedintheinterpretation
oftheresults.
The policies and practices involved in the study
arelistedinthefollowingTable1.Thepurposewasto
compare different regulatory, economic and
information guidance based policy instruments, of
which the regulatory instruments are the most
prominentonesfortheregulationofmaritimesafety.
Inotherwords,
allthepoliciesandpracticesthatwere
includedinthequestionnairearenotbasedonpublic
jurisdiction, but also instruments that are used
between private partners, such as P&I Clubs, were
partofthestudy.
Table1Thepoliciesandpractices
Analysisoftheresults ofthequestionnaire study
was carried out in three phases. Firstly, the
distributionsoftheresponsesforeachquestionwere
calculated.Secondly,thepolicies were ranked based
onthecalculatedmeansoftheresponses.Inorderto
calculate the mean values, the numeric values were
set
from1–4fortheoptionof‘Idisagreestrongly’,‘I
disagreepartly’,‘Iagreepartly’and‘Iagreestrongly’.
Theoptionof‘noopinion’wasnottakenintoaccount.
The reference value was set to three, which means
thatover50%oftherespondentsagreedeitherpartly
orstrongly
thatapolicyorpracticeiseffective.
Allof theresults wereanalyzed togetherand the
different respondent groups have been merged. The
distributions of responses by different respondent
groups were calculated, but it turned out that the
distributions between different respondent groups
were rather similar, and the difference in
response
distributions between different respondent groups
was in many cases only either one or two
respondents.
4 RESULTS
A summary of the responses is presented in the
followingtable(Table2).Thedistributionsofanswers
of‘Iagreepartly’and‘Iagreestrongly’aswellas‘I
disagreestrongly’and‘I
disagreepartly’answersare
added together. The calculated means of the
responsesforpoliciesarealsopresentedinthetable.
Table2.Summaryoftheresponses
In almost all of the questions about the past
effectivenessof existing regulation or practices, over
50%oftherespondentschoseeither‘Iagreepartly’or
‘Iagreestrongly’.Onlyinthequestionsaboutfairway
andportdues,marineinsuranceandP&IClubswas
the share of ‘I agree partly’
or ‘I agree strongly’
answers less than 50%. The question about the
fairway and port dues stands out from the other
questionswiththelargestnumberofboth‘Idisagree
strongly’ and ‘I disagree partly’ answers, and the
lowest number of both ‘I agree partly’ and ‘I agree
strongly’answers.
Ship construction and equipment, fairway
maintenance, nautical charts, traffic separation
schemes and routings, and voluntary activities of
companies are the questions to which nobody
answered‘Idisagreestrongly’andveryfewanswered
‘I disagree partly’. Nautical charts produced the
highest number of ‘I agree strongly’ answers.
Information about safe shipping elicited
the highest
number of ‘I agree partly’ answers. The widest
distribution of answers is found in the ‘fairway and
port dues’ question. The lowest numbers of ‘no
opinion’ answers were given in the questions
concerning ‘ship construction and equipment’ and
‘voluntary activity of companies’, and the highest
number of ‘no
opinion’ answers was given in ‘P&I
Clubs’. The distributions of responses for past
effectiveness are presented in the following figure
(Figure1)
358
Figure1.Pasteffectivenessofthepolicies
In the questions about the potential of different
kinds of policy instruments to improve maritime
safety in the future, the majority of the respondents
alsochose either‘Iagreepartly’or‘Iagreestrongly’.
Additionally, in this case, fairway and port dues,
marineinsuranceandP&IClubselicitedthesmallest
share
of‘Iagreepartly‘or‘Iagreestrongly’responses,
andtherespondentsthusdidnotseemtohavemuch
faithintheirpotentialtoimprovesafetyatall.
The question about the voluntary activity of
companiesstandsout,because ofallthe questionsit
elicitedthelowestnumberof‘I
disagreestrongly’,‘I
disagreepartly’and‘Iagreepartly’answersandthe
highest number of ‘I agree strongly’ answers. The
highest number of ‘I agree partly’ answers was
produced by the question concerning ‘ship
construction and equipment’, reflecting the fact that
regulationof shipstructure and equipmentwill also
be a
cornerstone of maritime safety policy in the
future. Ship construction and equipment also
produced the lowest number of ‘I disagree partly’
answers,whichalsounderlinestheimportanceofthis
issueinmaritimesafetypolicy.
‘Competence of seafarers and manning of ships’,
‘working and employment conditions of seafarers’,
‘traffic separation schemes
and routing’, ‘fairway
maintenance’, ‘nautical charts’ and ‘information
sharingaboutnavigationconditions’arequestionsin
whichnobodydisagreedstronglyandfewdisagreed
partly, and thus these issues will be very important
formaritimesafetyinthefuture.
The lowest number of ‘no opinion’ answers was
producedbythequestionsabout‘voluntary
activities
ofcompanies’andthehighestnumberby‘P&Iclubs’.
Inall,thehighestnumberof‘noopinion’answerswas
elicitedbythequestionsthatdealtwithissuesthatare
notpresentineverydayshipping,suchasP&IClubs.
Thewidestdistributionofanswerswasfoundinthe
question about
‘fairway and port dues’. The
distributions of responses are presented in the
followingfigure(Figure2).
Figure2.Futurepotentialofthepolicies
The respondents gave 338 freely worded
comments in total. In general, the freely worded
comments in many questions tended to be quite
criticaltowardsexistingregulations,whichoftenwas
incontrast toresponsesgiven inthemultiple choice
questiononthematter;e.g.arespondenthadselected
‘I agree partly’ with
the fact that regulation has
improved safety, yet included a very critical freely
wordedcommentabouttheregulationinquestion.It
shouldalsobenotedthatpeoplewhohadsomething
tocriticisewere probably morelikely to writefreely
wordedcommentsthanothers.
The question concerning the VTS inspired the
highestnumberoffreelywordedcomments(28)(see
Table 3). The respondents suggested that the VTS
centresshouldoperatemorelikeanairtrafficcontrol
service.Inaddition,cooperationbetweenVTScentres
and other actors (pilots, administration and ship
officers) should be developed. Pilotage inspired a
relativelylargenumberofcomments
(23),andmostly
thecommentsdealtwiththerecentdevelopmentsof
thepilotageorganisationinFinland.
Competence requirements of seafarers and
manningofships(basedonSTCWregulation)got26
freely worded comments. According to these
comments, young seafarers should have more
practicalexperiencebeforetheyarepromotedasdeck
officers. In addition, the minimum requirements for
manning were considered too small, which has lead
toasituationwhere,forexample,restingperiodsare
violated.Fatigueofseafarerswasconsideredamajor
riskformaritimesafety.Thefreelywordedcomments
concerning employment and working conditions of
seafarers(19comments)werealso
similartothosein
thequestionofcompetencerequirementsofseafarers
and manning of ships. Shifts were considered too
long, and resting hours are violated in many cases.
Competence requirements are too diverse between
flagstates.
Publiccontrolsofshipcondition(24freelyworded
comments)raisedstrongcriticismdueto
overlapping
inspections and incompatibilities of the inspecting
officers.Accordingtotherespondents,theinspections
should be based on a similar interpretation of the
standardsandotherrequirements.Similarcomments
weregivenonvettinginspections,whichgot16freely
worded comments. Both positive and critical
comments were given about the vetting inspections.
359
On one hand, it was stated that vetting inspections
have created the real requirement level of safety for
thetankersectorandimprovedsafetybyfocusingon
important issues. On the other hand, vetting
inspectionswerecriticisedforoverlappingwithother
inspections and that companies want to get ‘results’
from
vetting inspections and deficiencies are looked
atwithamagnifyingclass.
Comments about the ISM Code (20 comments)
brought out similar criticism as in the above‐
mentioned comments about inspections. The ISM
auditsshouldbedevelopedbecausetherehavebeen
problems with the uniform interpretation of the
requirements.Thesafety
managementsystemsbased
on the ISM Code were considered too detailed, and
the documentation does not correspond with the
actions. Some commented that the ISM Code has
addedpaperworkbutdonelittletoimprovesafety.
Voluntary activity of companies got 11 freely
worded comments. According to the respondents,
voluntary improvement is
the most effective way to
improve safety, but it often requires economic re‐
sources.Ifacompanyanditspersonnelaremotivated
andcommittedtosafety,detailedregulationsarenot
necessarilyneeded.
Many of the comments dealt with safety policies
onagenerallevel.Accordingtothesecomments,the
content
and the implementation of the current
regulationsshouldbedevelopedinsteadofpreparing
newregulations.Therespondentsconsideredthat,for
themostpart,thecurrentregulationsalreadyinclude
and regulate all necessary issues. Maritime safety
cannot be ensured by increasing the amount of
regulation, by increasing control and inspections or
by
creating specific certificates for every purpose.
Instead, the respondents considered that the most
important issues from the viewpoint of safety are
competence,attitudesandmotivationofthemaritime
personnelandallotheractorsofthemaritimesector.
The importance of practical experience and best
practicesshouldbeemphasised.Themanagement
of
the shipping companies and other actors of the
shipping industry and supply chain (e.g. shippers)
shouldtakemoreresponsibility for safety instead of
delegating the responsibility to the maritime
personnel.
4.1 Comparisonoftheeffectivenessofmaritimesafety
policiesandpractices
Mostoftheresultsofthisstudyindicatethat
almost
all of the current policies and practices have been
effective and they have relatively high future
potential. The majority of policies and practices got
highscoresof meanvaluesof pasteffectiveness and
futurepotential(over3orverynearto3).Inaddition,
the distributions of the answers
showed that a
majority of the respondents strongly support the
current variety of the policies. All other policies
besidesfairwayandportdues,marineinsuranceand
P&I Clubs were agreed on by over 50% of the
respondents. Many policies got near or over 80%
support from the respondents. Moreover, future
potential
was considered higher than past
effectivenessinalmostallpolicies.Amajority ofthe
respondents agreed strongly or partly with the fact
that the policies and practices have the potential to
improve safety in the future. The percentages in
agreeing answers were over 50% on all except the
questions concerning
fairwayand port dues, marine
insuranceandP&IClubs.
Voluntary activity of companies had the highest
mean(3.6)inthequestionaboutfuturepotentialand
also a high mean (3.5) in past effectiveness. In
addition,voluntaryimprovement gotstrong support
infreelywordedcomments,anditwasconsideredthe
most effective
way to improve safety. If a company
and its personnel are motivated and committed to
safety, detailed regulations are not necessarily
needed. In other words, self‐regulation seems to be
themosteffectivewaytoimprovemaritimesafetyin
thefuture.
Nauticalcharts,fairwaymaintenance,information
about navigation conditions, ship
construction and
traffic separation schemes all had very high past
effectiveness,andtheyalsohadhighfuturepotential,
althoughfuturepotentialwasslightlylowerthanpast
effectiveness. These issues can be considered the
cornerstones of maritime safety – without proper
ships, maps, waterways and without proper
information on what kind of
circumstances can be
expected during the voyage, safe navigation is not
possible.Thepublicmaritimesafetyregimemusttake
carethattheseissuesarealsohandledproperlyinthe
future, although it cannot be expected that the
developmentoftheseissues wouldcontributegreatly
to the improvement of maritime safety
from the
currentlevel.
Pilotage, manning, competence requirements and
employment and working conditions of seafarers
have a mean of under 3 in the question about past
effectiveness, but in the question about future
potentialmeansareclearlyabove3.Theseareissues
that seem to have major development potential
compared to
the current situation. Manning,
competencies and working conditions are all very
closely connected to human factor issues, which
underlines the fact that the current maritime safety
policyhasnotbeenabletodealeffectivelywiththese
questions.
Althoughpoliciessuchascompetenceofseafarers
andmanningofshipsandworking
andemployment
conditions of seafarers are based on public
jurisdiction(notablySTCW),these policies alsohave
self‐regulatorydimensions.Thehighscoresoffuture
potential and the freely worded comments indicate
thattheshippingcompaniesshouldcomplywiththe
rulesmorecarefullyandthattheshippingcompanies
havemanypossibilitiesto
enhancesafetybymaking
longer contracts and paying more attention to
working conditions. Ships with competent and
committed seafarers onboard are likely to be safer
ships.
Besides economic incentives, all economic
instruments (marine insurance, P&I Clubs, fairway
and port dues) had a mean of under 3 in both
questions.There
canbevarious reasonsforthis.The
respondents can sincerely be of the opinion that
maritime safety cannot be improved with economic
instruments.However,itcanalsobeduetothereason
thateconomicinstrumentshavenotbeenwidelyused
to promote maritime safety, and that many
360
respondents might not have much personal
experienceforinstanceofP&Iclubs.Thisconclusion
is supported by the high number of ‘no opinion’
answers, especially in the questions about economic
instruments.Thenumberoffreelywordedcomments
wasalsolowinthesequestions.
5 CONCLUSIONS
There has been a remarkable
increase in maritime
transportation and the transportation of oil in
particular,intheBalticSeainthe2000´s.Overthelast
ten years, the volume of oil and oil products
transportedhastripledinthisarea.Theshallowand
rocky waters, narrow channels and severe ice
conditionsaddtothe
risksofnavigationintheBaltic
Seaand,moreparticularly,intheGulfofFinland.The
relatively small sea areas, crossing traffic between
HelsinkiandTallinnandoiltankersgoingtothewest
from the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland are a
combination which can cause a disaster both
for
humansandenvironment.Thefocusinthispaperhas
beenonhowtopreventanoilaccidentintheGulfof
Finland. The paper presents the findings of a
questionnaire study that was targeted at Finnish
maritimeexperts.
Several authors have raised strong criticism
against the prevalent maritime safety
regime due to
variousreasons.Duetotheprevalentcommand‐and‐
control policy, the following problems weaken the
effectivenessofmaritimesafetypolicy:
1 Problem of regulatory overload – the shipping
industry is bothered with excessive rules and
inspections.
2 Maritime safety regulation can mostly be
considered reactive – the ‘post
‐accident’ policy
means that new rules and regulations have been
established after major sea accidents, and
preventiveactionsarestilluncommon.
3 Maritime safety regulation concentrates on
technicalsafetyandhasnotbeenabletoeffectively
addresstheproblemsofsafetycultureandhuman
factor.
4 Theimplementationofmaritime
safetyregulation
variestoomuchbetweentheflagstates.
5 IMO is not able to offer quick solutions to
maritimesafetyrisksdue to the characteristics of
theIMOworkings.
A questionnaire study among Finnish maritime
experts was carried out to find out how maritime
experts viewed the effectiveness of different
preventative maritime safety policy instruments and
howtheythoughtmaritimesafety,withthefocuson
the Gul f of Finland, could most effectively be
improved. The questionnaire results confirmed the
findingsoftheliteraturereview; howeversupportfor
self‐regulatory activities was surprisingly strong
among Finnish maritime experts, both in the
comparison of different policies and in the free‐text
comments.
The results indicate that the focus of future
development in the studied area should be on self‐
regulativeapproachesandhumanfactorsissues.The
proper competence, employment and working
conditions of maritime personnel are vital for safe
navigation. The implementation of
these policies
should be strengthened in order to ensure that
seafarers are motivated and committed and that the
working hour regulations are followed and
developedinordertodecreasefatigue.
In the future the focus should be placed on the
developmentofexistingregulationsandpractices,not
on augmenting the
amount of maritime safety
regulation.It has to be taken care of that the
cornerstonesofmaritimesafetyarehandledproperly
‐withoutproperships,maps,waterwaysandwithout
proper information on what kind of circumstances
canbeexpectedduring thevoyage,safenavigationis
notpossible.
However, it seems that
new approaches are
needed to tackle the problems in the governance of
maritimesafety, e.g. consideringtheimplementation
problemsorhumanfactorissues.Thisstudyindicates
that self‐regulatory approaches are needed in
developing maritime safety in the Baltic Sea. In
environmentalgovernanceofmaritimeactivities(van
Leeuwen and van Tatenhove,
2010) the shift from
commandandcontrolpoliciestomoreself‐regulatory
approaches has been more obvious than in safety
issues,buttheconclusionisthatthedevelopmentof
maritime safety governance could benefit from
similar approaches. This is supported by the
respondents’ strong agreement with the importance
of volunta ry
activities of companies. Effective self‐
regulation has many advantages compared to
governmental regulation. For instance, it has more
situationalsensitiveness,itcanadapttochangesmore
quickly and it decreases public expenditures.
However,self‐regulativeapproachesinthepromotion
of maritime safety are a subject that needs further
analysis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This
articlehasbeenwrittenasapartoftheSAFGOF
andCAFEresearchprojects.Weexpressourgratitude
tothe financersof theprojects: theEuropeanUnion,
the Regional Council of Kymenlaakso, the Regional
CouncilforPäijät‐Häme,theCityofKotka,theKotka‐
HaminaRegionalDevelopmentCompanyCursor,the
Kotka Maritime Research Centre and the member
companies of the Kotka Maritime Research Centre
corporategroup.
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