International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 6

Number 4

December 2012

1 INTRODUCTION

With global primary energy demand forecasted to

grow at about 1.7%/year from 2002–2030 [1], the

world LNG demand is expected to grow at

approximately 7%/Year [2].

By 2020 LNG trading via sea set to look much

more global [3]. Hence even in current global

economic downturn all activities connected with

LNG shipping industry are at its Unprecedented

Growth Phase [4-7] and is slowly inching into its

globalization era [8].

2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

In the past LNG shipping industry has leveraged

upon its properly trained and experienced LNG Sea

Officers to sustain its business success backed by

strong HSSE Assurance. Today the utmost concern

in LNG shipping industry is the acute shortage of

experienced LNG Sea Officers [9] to man the

multimillion dollar F1s at sea (LNG Tankers)

without jeopardizing its Safety Assurance [10-12].

3 LNG MANPOWER DEMAND

As of 1st April 2009, the global LNG Fleet is

forecasted to hit a total of 396 LNG Tankers by year

2012 [13,14]. Hence by 2012, there shall be (at

least) a total of about 8700 active/serving LNG Sea

Officers to man all the LNG Tankers afloat.

4 LNG MANPOWER ISSUES & ITS POSSIBLE

IMPACT ONTO AN LNG TANKER’S SAFETY

ASSURANCE.

The above highlighted matters has brought about

increased competition and many new challenges to

LNG Tankers owners /operators. Following are

some Safety Assurance related “concerns” that arise

in their attempt to maintain current competitive LNG

market position, ventures and commitments:

− Experienced LNG Sea Officers from existing

LNG elite group are “poached” using “economic

enticements” [15,16]

− “Wrong kind of” unchecked Sea Officers are

brought into the industry at higher rank [17].

A Safety Assurance Assessment Model for an

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Tanker Fleet

S. Manivannan

Malaysian Maritime Academy, Malacca, Malaysia

A.K. Ab Saman

Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Johor, Malaysia

ABSTRACT: With the world’s attention on future energy needs focused on LNG; the unprecedented growth

phase and globalization era of LNG Shipping activities are inevitable.Along with that the acute shortage of

qualified /experienced LNG Sea Officers to manage, operate and maintain the existing and upcoming LNG

Tankers is a crucial issue to LNG Shipping Industry as they are the onsite guardian that safeguard and set the

standards for the onboard HSSE Assurance. Hence the write-up is an attempt to recommend a recently

developed (tailor-made), tested/proven, practical and cost effective solution i.e a Survey Questionnaire based

rapid Safety Assurance Assessment Model to safeguard, sustain and further improve any LNG Tanker’s

Safety Assurance. The Assessment Model was crafted out after an in depth and width study/research into

existing and potential future Safety Regimes applicable to an LNG Tanker (including its current Management

Approach (Internal Control) – challenges ahead, needs to reform, etc.).The Assessment Model has also taken

into consideration the foreseen challenges from the “humans on-site” with reference to already seen and

proven historical perspective and impact of human behaviors onto an LNG Tanker’s Safety Assurance.

579

− LNG Sea Officers might be frequently rotated

among various types/class of LNG Tankers [18],

leading to LNG Sea Officers/crews (strangers)

cobbled together with little time to develop mutu-

al trust [19].

− Crewing instability can lead to serious deteriora-

tion of the relationship between LNG Sea Offic-

ers onboard and management ashore within any

LNG Tankers operators [20].

− Globally younger generation of Sea Officers (“Y

Generation”) are withdrawing from the industry

prematurely [21].

In conclusion worldwide shortage of LNG

experienced Sea Officers can lead to poor decline in

Safety Assurance [17,18].

5 CURRENT STATUS AND PROPOSAL

Many LNG Fleet owning /operating companies

already feeling the pinch of “concerns” highlighted

above. Moving forward, to safeguard, sustain and

further improve LNG shipping industry’s trademark

i.e excellent Safety Assurance track record [22];

customized, rapid, practical and cost effective

solutions are desired.

However before describing one of such

(proposed) solution, let’s revisit the typical /existing

Safety Assurance regimes of a globally trading LNG

Tanker.

6 LNG TANKERS – EXISTING/TYPICAL HSSE

REGIMES

6.1 During Building And At The Point Of Delivery

Today during construction stage, each LNG Tanker

is closely supervised by owner’s representatives and

appointed Classification Society’s surveyors.

These people are entrusted to ensure that a New

Building strictly complies (at least) with 17 latest

Maritime Rules and Regulations required by Flag

State, International Maritime Organization (IMO –

Load Line, Tonnage, SOLAS , STCW, ISPS Code,

IGC Code, ISM Code, International Convention for

Prevention of COLREGs, MARPOL, GMDSS), US

Code of Federal Regulations (33 CFR, 46 CFR), US

Port and Tanker Safety Act, Suez Canal Authority

(SCA), ILO Codes and other Rules & Regulations

as decided by owner.

6.2 In Service

Upon delivery, during in service for globally trading

LNG Shipping Company (hence its LNG Tankers)

are expected to complied with Safety Regimes i.e

Inspection and Vetting related to or required by ISM,

Terminal, SIRE, CDI , Class, Port State Control

(PSC) Inspection, Change Of Status, Structural

Review, Investigation, Performances and

Benchmarking.

7 AN LNG TANKER’S EXISTING HSSE

ASSURANCE REGIMES MANAGEMENT

7.1 Internal Control (IC) ManagementConcept

Today onboard LNG Tankers almost all the above

listed Safety Assurance regimes are managed by its

LNG Sea Officers using “Internal Control” (IC)

Management Concept which concentrates on the

Obligations, Systems, Interfaces and Procedures

[23,24]. Generally IC Management Concept has a

“richness” which is difficult to communicate.

7.2 IC Management Concept – Challenges Ahead

The implementation of Safety regimes using IC

Management Concept within any industry tends to

be “mechanical”, with focus on meeting minimal

requirements. The approach hence leads to initial

improvements in Safety performance that tends to

“plateau” after some time [25].

With reference to previously discussed

“concerns”, LNG Tanker owners/operators need to

do more then just “mechanical implementation” of

onboard Safety regime.

The implementation shall be elevated to a level

where everyone understand, internalize, adapt,

adopt, practice, agree and promote on the values of

positive Safety behaviors.

7.3 IC Management Concept – How to Reform?

To harness “hard to communicate” IC Management

Concept richness, its implementation method

(model) needs to be fine tuned. The model shall

encourage “scientific objectivity” i.e exposing risk

evaluations and decisions to intelligent debate,

critics and amendment by people affected by the risk

[26-29].

8 AN LNG TANKER HSSE ASSURANCE

8.1 Historical Perspective & Future

Since the beginning of LNG shipping business (in

early 1960’s), there has been efforts and progress in

reducing and keeping the industry’s Safety risks to

As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). First

generation of LNG ships (about 1960’s – 1980’s)

benefited from its “design” by sustaining its intrinsic

“engineering safety”. Second generation of LNG

ships (about 1980’s – 2000’s) benefited further

580

through improvement in Safety Management

Systems. Today taking note the matters discussed in

previous sections; current and future generation

(post 2000’s) LNG ships’ Safety Assurance can only

be safeguarded by the integration of and changes to

existing organizational culture, personal behavior

management and management attitudes [30].

8.2 Impact Of Onsite Human Behavior

Ultimately onboard any LNG Tanker its Sea

Officers’ “behaviors” that ensures onsite Safety

Assurance and status [22]. Research findings by UK

P & I Club and SHELL on “human behaviour” [31-

33] further elaborate the above statement.

1 The plan that people make in their mind centers

around “questions” related to the expected ac-

tion’s –

− outcome,

− perceived gap (present Vs ideal) and

− own ability

2 Individuals’ reaction to above questions depend

on their beliefs, perceptions, management meth-

ods and working environment.

3 Making known the Safety Management Systems’

key elements/requirements is crucial for its effec-

tive implementation.

4 Verifying whether the person “responsible” un-

derstands the above key elements/ requirements is

important.

5 Personal proactive intervention through the appli-

cation of “Hearts and Mind” is crucial

The research concluded that continuous

improvement in Safety Assurance requires a deeper

education/ embedding of the Health, Safety, Security

& Environment Management Systems (HSSE MS).

People shall be motivated to operate the elements of

the HSSE MS, because they believe in it (“want to”),

rather than that they are being forced (“have to”).

8.3 Driving Force

From the above it is a fact that an LNG ship /fleet

can improve and sustain its Safety Assurance when

its LNG Sea Officers’ (i.e its driving force) “hearts

and minds” are tactfully addressed. With onboard

“educated /reminded” LNG Sea Officers and

“checked” /known Safety Assurance status, future

“hearts and minds” related initiatives (e.g Behavior

Based Safety (BBS), etc) can be easily rolled-out

and implemented.

9 PROPOSAL – A RAPID CUSTOMIZED HSSE

ASSURANCE ASSESSMENT MODEL FOR

AN LNG TANKER

Taking note all the above discussed matters, ideally

for educating/assessing Safety Assurance onboard an

LNG Tanker, the focus and scope (of key Safety

elements) shall expand /cover beyond the typical

existing HSSE Regimes.

The above can be practically approached via an

“one (1) comprehensive” customized Survey

Questionnaires i.e a Rapid Safety Assurance

Assessment Model.

The following write up further describe the

model.

10 DEVELOPMENT OF CUSTOMIZED RAPID

HSSE ASSURANCE ASSESSMENT MODEL

FOR LNG TANKER

A “one (1) comprehensive” customized Survey

Questionnaires (Rapid Assessment Model) was

developed adopting “process approach”. The

following activities were carried :

1 An in depth study of:

− Latest study/research (e.g reports, papers, arti-

cles, statistics, etc) on or related to Safety As-

surance management in maritime and various

high risk industries.

− Latest 17 mandatory Regulatory Requirements

applicable to globally trading LNG ships.

− Typical 19 Safety Assurance related Inspec-

tions, Vetting and Other Initiatives imposed

upon/adopted by globally trading LNG ships.

− Existing/in use (active) MISC Berhad LNG

Fleet’s (one of the largest owner /operator of

LNG Tankers in the world) Safety Manage-

ment Systems.

− MISC Berhad LNG Fleet’s Safety Performanc-

es and Standards for last two (2) Financial

Years (FYs)

− Nine (9) future (potential) Human Elements

and Organizational Factors related to Safety

Assurance improvement initiatives that can be

adopted by any LNG Fleet.

− Reflect back 21 years of personal LNG ship-

ping (onboard/on field) and academic experi-

ence and exposure.

2 In the process of studying the above (item 1), the

elements crucial to ensure effective Safety Assur-

ance Regimes and Systems Implementation were

critically analyzed and summarized.

3 Resulting from the above (item 2), seven (7) El-

ements (variables) were identified as “crucial” for

effective implementation of Safety Sys-

tems/Assurance onboard any LNG Tanker. The

seven (7) Elements are:

581

− Leadership

− Policies

− Resources Management

− Hazards Management

− Planning

− Execution

− Assurance

The below diagram illustrate the interlink

between the above seven (7) elements. (See Figure 1

below)

Figure 1. Seven (7) HSSE Assurance Main Elements

To ensure a clear existing status /situational

awareness of the research area; a comparative study

was carried out between the existing typical 36

Safety Regimes for a LNG Tanker against the above

seven (7) identified Safety Elements (variables). The

comparative study revealed that the existing 36

Safety Regimes address (on average) only 68.6% of

the above identified seven (7) Safety Assurance

Element.

11 SYNTHESIS OF SURVEY

QUESTIONNAIRES

In order to get a fair distribution of data on various

Safety Assurance related matters /activities onboard

an LNG Tanker all the above detailed seven (7)

Element (variables). were treated equally.

The characteristic features of LNG Shipping

Safety related matters, challenges, etc. and

practicality of conducting an effective Safety

Assurance survey (onboard in service/active LNG

Tanker) were also well noted during the synthesis of

the research Survey Questionnaires:

12 CUSTOMIZED RAPID HSSE ASSURANCE

Assessment Model Package Taking note all the

above detailed/discussed matters a structured and

customized Survey Questionnaires (Rapid

Assessment Model) and its “Supportive Documents”

were then detailed out under:

− Seven (7) “Main Elements/Topics”,

− 37 “Sub Elements/Topics” and

− 252 “Survey Questionnaires”.

The below table list down the 37 “Sub

Elements/Topics” under the Seven (7) “Main

Elements/Topics”. (see Table 1 below)

Table 1. Seven (7) Main Elements/Topics and 37 Sub Elements

/Topics

___________________________________________________

1.0 Leadership

___________________________________________________

1.1 Management Visibility

1.2 Proactive Targets Setting

1.3 Informed Involvement

___________________________________________________

2.0 Policies

___________________________________________________

2.1 Policies Contents & Dissemination

2.2 Strategic Objectives

___________________________________________________

3.0 Resources Management

___________________________________________________

3.1 Roles, Responsibilities & Accountabilities

3.2 Advisors or Management Representatives

3.3 Resources

3.4 Competency Assurance

3.5 Training

3.6 Contractors / Third Parties

3.7 Communication

3.8 HSSE Committee & Meetings

3.9 Documentation Control

3.10 Checklists & Critical Operation

___________________________________________________

4.0 Hazards Management

___________________________________________________

.1 Hazards & Effects Management – General

4.2 Hazards & Effects Identification

4.3 Hazards and Effects Evaluation

4.4 Records of HSSE Hazards and Effects

4.5 Performance Criteria

4.6 Risks Reduction Measures

___________________________________________________

5.0 Planning

___________________________________________________

5.1 Plans & Initiatives – General

5.2 Critical Facilities & Equipment Integrity

5.3 Procedures & Checklists

5.4 Work/Standing Instructions

5.5 Management Of Change (MOC)

5.6 Emergency Response & Planning

___________________________________________________

6.0 Execution

___________________________________________________

6.1 Critical Activities & Tasks

6.2 Performance Monitoring

6.3 Records

4 Non-Compliance (NCs) & Corrective Actions

6.5 Undesired Events (UDEs) Reporting & Investigation

7.0 Assurance

___________________________________________________

7.1 Assurance Activities

7.2 Assurance Or Audit Plan & Follow-Up

7.3 Internal & External Auditors’ Competency

7.4 Contractors/Third Party Auditing

7.5 Management Review

___________________________________________________

582

13 RATING SURVEYED ITEMS

(PERCENTAGE (%) OF COMPLIANCE)

(OR RATING METHOD)

To enable a Survey Respondent to rate i.e to give

“opinion on” (points) for a Surveyed Item (Survey

Question/Statement); by design for each of the

surveyed item either one or both of the following

were made available:

1 Compare the “current status” against “minimum

requirement”

2 Verify a surveyed item against onboard /onsite

“objective evidences”.

RATING OPTIONS (FIVE (5) POINTS

LIKERT MEASUREMENT SCALE)

A dopting the Likert Rating Scale [34]

for each

surveyed item (Survey

technique;

Question/Statement) five (5) options were made

available for a Survey Respondent. (see Table 2

below)

Table 2. The Surveyed Items - Rating Scale

___________________________________________________

Point(s) Survey Respondent’s “Opinion”

___________________________________________________

5 Excellent (E)

4 Good (G)

3 Satisfactory (S)

2 Poor (P)

1 Very Poor (VP)

___________________________________________________

Hence a Survey Respondent is required to award

only one (record his/her feedback or opinion) of the

“points”.

Using the above tailor-made “measuring

instrument”, the status of each surveyed items is

recorded in a quantitative manner.

15 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

Adopting the above mentioned “Likert Scale”; the

tailor-made rapid Safety Assurance Assessment

Model was ensured to be compatible with the

“Statistical Package For Social Scientist” (SPSS

Statistics 17.0) software, leading to various

meaningful results on surveyed items can be

obtained.

Some of the examples are:

Post Study One (1) (Pre-Treatment/Intervention)

1 Survey Respondents Demographics

2 Standard/Descriptive Statistics (Mean, Standard

Deviation and Variance)

3 Distribution Of Feedback (Very Poor, Poor, Satis-

factory, Good and Excellent)

4 Normality Of Data Distribution (Skewness and

Kurtosis)

5 Reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha)

6 Safety Assurance Status Summary (Overall Opin-

ion & Conclusion)

7 Statistical Data Distribution Tests (Kolmogorov-

Smirnov (K-S D) & Shapiro- Wilk (S-W) Tests

Of Normality)

8 One-Sample T Test (Trial Survey or Pilot Study

Vs Actual Study)

9 HSSE Concerns (Written and Interview feedback)

10 HSSE Recommendations (Written and Interview

feedback)

11 Survey Findings Reliability (Pearson’s Correla-

tion) and Validity (including a Post Survey – Re-

spondents Feedback.

Figure 2. Statistical Analyses/Test

583

Post Study Two (2), Post-Treatment/Intervention

12 Paired-Sample T Test (Pre-Treatment / Interven-

tion Vs Post-Treatment/Intervention)

13 One-Way Analysis of Variance (One-way ANO-

VA)

(See Figure 2)

Using the “mean” of Survey Respondents’

“opinions” (feedback) for each surveyed Safety

Assurance Sub Elements/Topics; its “status” can be

determined. Next by calculating out the “average

mean” for a group of Safety Assurance Sub

Elements /Topics under a Main Element/Topic; the

status of a particular Main Element/Topic can be

determined. Subsequently with all the 36 Sub

Elements/Topics hence the seven (7) Main

Elements/Topics “average mean”, an entire LNG

Fleet’s HSSE Assurance status at the point of survey

was quantified.

All the above “means” and “average means” can

then be directly related to the custmized Safety

Assurance Element Assurance – Status Summary

and Overall Opinion & Conclusion matrix. This

enable better appreciation of the research finding’s

in term of its “overall opinion” and “conclusion”.

(see Table 3, below).

Table 3. Safety Element Assurance – Status Summary

(Overall Opinion & Conclusion)

___________________________________________________

Score (%) Surveyed HSSE Sub Or Main Element –

Status Summary

___________________________________________________

4.0 – 5.0 EXCELLENT (E)

Sustain and still scope for continual improvement

3.0 – 3.9 GOOD (G)

Sustain and still scope for further (“specific”)

improvement

2.0 – 2.9 SATISFACTORY (S)

Cause for serious concern and scope for “overall”

improvement

1.0 – 1.9 POOR (P)

Cause for serious concern and immediate

enforcement.

0.0 – 0.9 VERY POOR (VP)

Cause for serious concern and immediate adoption.

___________________________________________________

16 IDENTIFYING SHORTCOMINGS (OFIS)

Using the above detailed matrix (Table 3) if a

particular Sub or Main Element’s/Topic’s “means”

or “average means” was < 3.000 the particular Sub

or Main Element/Topic can be recorded as

“Satisfactory”.

Hence adopting the above described customized

method of analyses, shortcomings (OFIs) within any

surveyed LNG Tankers’/Fleet’s 36 Sub Elements/

Topics hence the seven (7) Main Elements/Topics,

crucial for its Safety Assurance can be easily

identified/quantified With statistically identified

“shortcomings” (OFIs) a structured post survey

Improvements/Intervention Plans can be detailed

out.

17 COMPREHENSIVE, WELL DISTRIBUTED

AND COMPARABLE DATA COLLECTION

To ensure a comprehensive, well distributed and

comparable data collection (hence results) from all

level of management onboard any surveyed LNG

Tanker, the selected portions of the Survey

Questionnaires were carefully distributed to relevant

pre-identified LNG Sea Officers (by Rank). The

approach also ensured that Survey Questionnaires

were answered by the rightful Survey Respondents

(focal persons).

CASE STUDY – MISC BERHAD LNG TANKER

FLEET

18 PILOT STUDY (PRE-TESTING/FINE-

TUNING RAPID ASSESSMENT MODEL)

To test out, fine-tune and further improve the

Assessment Model prior actual full scale

field/onboard survey, a “Pilot Study” was carried

onboard three (3) MISC Berhad’s LNG Tankers.

The Pilot Study statistical results were analyzed

using the Statistical Analyses package – SPSS

Statistics 17.0. Upon completion of the Pilot Study

the Rapid Assessment Model was further fine-tuned,

improved and finalized.

19 FULL SCALE FIELD/ONBOARD SURVEY

FIRST STUDY OR ACTUAL STUDY ONE

(1) (PRE-TREATMENT/INTERVENTION)

The finalized Survey Questionnaires (rapid

Assessment Model pack) were then sent to ALL 28

MISC Berhad’s active/in-service LNG Tankers

worldwide.

20 TESTED ASSESSMENT MODEL

A total of 252 active/serving LNG Sea Officers from

28 MISC Berhad’s LNG Tankers responded to full

scale study.

The Survey Results were analyzed using the latest

Statistical Analyses package – SPSS Statistics 17.0

(as detailed in section 15.0)

The results were then presented to MISC Berhad

Top Management. The survey findings were

584

accepted as valid. Relevant “Corrective Actions”

were commenced.

After a substantial time lapse (1 year) same

survey (Study Two (2) – (Post-Treatment

/Intervention)) were carried out on the same

population.

21 CONCLUSION

With reference to LNG shipping industry’s foreseen

challenges; the way, the existing Safety Regimes

onboard LNG Tankers being managed shall be

reviewed and tactfully addressed.

It is also important to acknowledge the fact that

any proposed recommendations to manage the

foreseen “challenges” shall take note of the already

seen/proven historical perspective and impact of

human behaviors onto an LNG Tanker’s Safety

Assurance.

Taking note all the above a rapid, practical and

cost effective solution to safeguard, sustain and

further improve an LNG Tanker’s Safety Assurance

was crafted adopting a research based “process

approach”.

The model has been tested by one of the largest

owner/operator of LNG Fleet in the world (MISC

Berhad) and proven reliable.

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