International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 5

Number 4

December 2011

549

1 INTRODUCTION

Maritime piracy has been on the rise for years, ac-

cording to the International Maritime Bureau's

(IMB) Piracy Reporting Center. But until 2008,

when pirates operating off the coast of Somalia hi-

jacked a ship full of Russian war-tanks and an oil

supertanker, the crime drew limited international at-

tention. By early 2009, more than a dozen countries

had deployed their navies to the Gulf of Aden to

counter piracy, and the United Nations passed four

resolutions in 2008 on the issue. In April 2009,

stakes grew higher after the U.S. Navy killed three

Somali pirates, and took one captive in the rescue

operation of a U.S. cargo ship captain taken hostage.

There are a range of measures available to combat

piracy--from onboard defense systems to naval de-

ployments to preemptive strikes. Pirate attacks are

largely confined to four major areas:

− The Gulf of Aden, near Somalia and the southern

entrance to the Red Sea;

− The Gulf of Guinea, near Nigeria and the Niger

River delta;

− The Malacca Strait between Indonesia and Ma-

laysia;

− The Indian subcontinent, particularly between In-

dia and Sri Lanka.

In 2008, maritime piracy reached its highest level

since the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Re-

porting Center began tracking piracy incidents in

1992. Global piracy increased 11 percent, with pira-

cy in East Africa up a stunning 200 percent. Of the

forty-nine successful hijackings, forty-two occurred

off the coast of Somalia, including the capture of an

oil supertanker, the Sirius Star. Five hijackings were

off the Nigerian coast, though the IMB suggests at-

tacks in that area are underreported. In other areas of

the world, including Indonesia, piracy dropped.

The shipping industry has urged greater action on

the part of the world's navies. But many ships are not

even using basic deterrents.

There is no quantitative research available on the

total cost of global piracy. Estimates vary widely be-

cause of disagreement over whether insurance pre-

miums, freight rates, and the cost of re-routings

should be included with, for instance, the cost of

ransoms. Some analysts suggest the cost is close to

$1 billion a year, while others claim losses could

range as high as $16 billion. Some experts such as

Martin N. Murphy, author of a 2007 study on piracy

and terrorism, warn against exaggerating the threat

posed by maritime pirates. He notes that even $16

billion in losses is a small sum in comparison to an-

nual global maritime commerce, which is in the tril-

lions of dollars.

2 MECHANISMS FOR COMBATING PIRACY

A range of options exists for combating maritime pi-

racy, but experts stress that most of the current tac-

tics are defensive in nature, and do not address the

state instability that allows piracy to flourish. The

mechanisms used or under consideration in the most

Ships Monitoring System

L. V. Popa

Navigation and Maritime Transport, Constanta Maritime University, Romania

ABSTRACT: Due to the increasing of the piracy attacks all over the world, the maritime transport is now fac-

ing increased risk and security problems. To prevent and minimize the impact of the piracy, the owners and

the maritime administrations must take preventive actions/measures. One of these actions is the implementa-

tion at a global level of the Long Range Identification and Tracking system (LRIT). The system, mandatory

under SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 19-1, is now operational since one year and proved to be a useful secu-

rity tool against piracy.

550

prevalent piracy area, the Gulf of Aden, can be clas-

sified as follows:

2.1 Onboard deterrents

Individual ships have adopted different onboard de-

terrents. Some use rudimentary measures such as

fire hoses, deck patrols, or even carpet tacks to repel

pirates. Others use a nonlethal electric screen with a

loudspeaker system that emits a pitch so painful it

keeps pirates away. Most do not arm their crews,

both because ship workers tend to be unskilled and

because many do not want to carry weapons, fearing

that pirates will target them if they are armed. The

shipping industry has urged greater action on the

part of the world's navies. But many ships are not

even using basic deterrents, writes retired U.S. Navy

Commander John Patch in Proceedings maga-

zine. [6]

2.2 Naval deployments

By January 2009, an estimated thirty ships were pa-

trolling an area of about 2.5 million square miles.

More than a dozen countries--including Russia,

France, the United Kingdom, India, China, and the

United States--had sent warships to the Gulf of Aden

to deter pirates. There were also two multinational

anti-piracy patrols in the area: the European Union's

military operation, called EU NAVFOR, which be-

gan in December 2008; and a multinational contin-

gent, known as Combined Task Force 150, which

was originally tasked with counterterrorism efforts

off the Horn of Africa. The United States announced

a new task force, CTF-151, in January 2009. Some

analysts, including a blogger for the U.S. Naval In-

stitute, suggest that the new task force will allow the

United States to seek a non-Western approach to

counter piracy by partnering with Eastern navies. [6]

2.3 Long Range Identification and Tracking

Experts unanimously stress that the only effective

long-term piracy deterrent is a stable state. When

Somalia was briefly under the control of the Islamic

Courts Union in 2006, the piracy acts stopped com-

pletely. Until recently, sovereignty has prevented

outside states from targeting inland pirate infrastruc-

ture. A UN resolution passed on December 2, 2008,

allows states to enter Somalia's territorial waters in

pursuit of pirates, and another resolution passed on

December 16, 2008, implicitly authorizes land pur-

suit.

On 19 May 2006, the International Maritime Or-

ganization (IMO) adopted Resolutions of the Marine

Safety Committee MSC 202 (81) and MSC 211 (81)

which states amendments to the International Con-

vention of Safety of Life At Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) and

introduces the timely establishment of the Long-

Range Identification and Tracking system

(LRIT). [4]

A robust international scheme for long-range

identification and tracking of ships is an important

and integral element of maritime security. An active

and accurate long-range identification and tracking

system also has potential safety benefits, most nota-

bly for maritime search and rescue. Accurate infor-

mation on the location of the ship in distress as well

as ships in the vicinity that could lend assistance will

save valuable response time to affect a timely res-

cue.

At the 83rd Maritime Safety Committee the pur-

pose and scope of LRIT was extended ultimately to

include safety and environmental protection applica-

tions.

The requirements concerning LRIT have been in-

troduced into SOLAS, Chapter V (“Safety of Navi-

gation”), Regulation 19-1. In accordance with Para-

graph 8.1 of Regulation 19-1, “Contracting

Governments shall be able to receive long-range

identification and tracking information about ships

for security and other purposes as agreed by the Or-

ganization”. Such “other purposes” would for in-

stance include Search and Rescue (SAR), as explic-

itly mentioned in the new SOLAS provisions, as

well as maritime safety in general and marine envi-

ronment protection purposes as agreed by Resolu-

tion MSC 242(83) adopted on 12 October 2007. The

IMO LRIT requires that all passenger ships includ-

ing high speed craft, cargo ships of 300 gross ton-

nage and above, mobile offshore drilling

units should automatically transmit every 6 hours the

identity of the ship, the position report and time of

the position. [4]

Furthermore, IMO also adopted on 19 May 2006,

Resolution MSC 210 (81) amended and modified by

MSC 254 (83) which establishes performance stand-

ards and functional requirements for the LRIT of

ships. This states that all LRIT Data Centers and the

International LRIT Data Exchange should conform

to functional requirements not inferior to those spec-

ified in the Annex to the Resolution. [4]

The performance standards were then revised

through Resolution MSC 263(84) adopted on May

2008 - Revised performance Standards and func-

tional requirements for the LRIT of ships (this re-

vokes MSC 210(81), MSC 254(83)). The system

specifies that 4 position messages per day are stored

and available for those actors entitled to access the

LRIT information. The international LRIT sys-

tem receives, stores and disseminates LRIT infor-

mation on behalf of all Contracting SOLAS Gov-

ernments.

551

The LRIT system consists of the ship borne LRIT

information transmitting equipment, the Communi-

cation Service Provider(s), the Application Service

Provider(s), the LRIT Data Centre(s), including any

related Vessel Monitoring System(s), the LRIT Data

Distribution Plan and the International LRIT Data

Exchange. [1]

Fig.1. LRIT System Architecture

Certain aspects of the performance of the LRIT

system are reviewed or audited by the International

Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO) appointed as

LRIT Coordinator in December 2008 [MSC

275(85)].

Each Administration should provide to the LRIT

Data Centre it has selected, a list of the ships entitled

to fly its flag, which are required to transmit LRIT

information, together with other salient details and

should update, without undue delay, such lists as and

when changes occur.

The obligations of ships to transmit LRIT infor-

mation and the rights and obligations of Contracting

Governments and of Search and rescue services to

receive LRIT information are established in regula-

tion V/19-1 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention.

It should be noted that regulation V/19-1.1 pro-

vides that:

Nothing in this regulation or the provisions per-

formance standards and functional requirements

adopted by the Organization in relation to the long-

range identification and tracking of ships shall prej-

udice the rights, jurisdiction or obligations of States

under international law, in particular, the legal re-

gimes of the high seas, the exclusive economic zone,

the contiguous zone, the territorial seas or the straits

used for international navigation and archipelagic

sea lanes.

3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

3.1 LRIT components

The international LRIT system consists of:

− ship borne LRIT information transmitting equip-

ment;

− Application System Provider(s) – ASP;

− Communication Service Provider(s) – CSP;

− National, Regional, Co-operative and Internation-

al Data Centre(s) including related Ship Monitor-

ing System(s) – SMS(s) and Vessel Traffic Ser-

vice(s) – VTS(s); [1]

− International Data Exchange – IDE;

− the Data Distribution Plan - DDP; and

− LRIT Co-ordinator.

3.2 Ship borne equipment

Ship borne LRIT equipment should be capable to

automatically transmit LRIT data to the selected

LRIT Data Centre at 6-hour intervals and to be con-

figured remotely to transmit data at variable inter-

vals ranging from 15 minutes to 6 hours, following

receipt of polling commands.

3.3 Application and Communication Service

Providers

Application Service Providers (ASPs) provide

services to the selected LRIT Data Centres and

should:

− be recognized by the contracting governments of

the associated Data Centre;

− provide a communication protocol interface be-

tween Communication Service Providers (CSPs)

and Data Centres to enable remote integration of

ship equipment into selected LRIT Data Centre

and automatic management, configuration, modi-

fication, suspension and recovery of LRIT data

transmissions;

− add defined set of data to each transmission of the

LRIT information;

− provide an integrated transaction management

system for the monitoring of LRIT data through-

put and routine; and

− ensure that LRIT data is collected, stored and

routed in a reliable and secured manner.

Communication Service Providers (CSPs) con-

nect the ship-borne equipment with the ASP in order

to ensure the end-to-end reliable, timely and secure

transfer of LRIT data. Communication between

ships and Data Centers may be secured by different

Satellite and Terrestrial CSPs.

552

Fig.3. Global Ships Monitoring System

3.4 International Data Exchange (IDE)

The International LRIT Data Exchange is a message

handling service that connects all LRIT Data Centres

and route LRIT data between particular Data Centres

using a standard agreed protocol, secure access and

routing table to establish the correct distribution of

the reports. Additionally it should:

− use a store and foreword-buffer to ensure LRIT

data is received;

− automatically maintain journal containing headers

of all routed messages;

− archive journal for at least one year for invoicing

and audit purposes; and

− not store or archive LRIT data.

3.5 Data Distribution Plan (DDP)

The DDP is the set of rules governing the distribu-

tion of the LRIT reports between the users of the

system. The rules are established by each Contract-

ing Government and uploaded accordingly on the

DDP server hosted and maintained by the IMO.

3.6 LRIT Data Centre (DC)

Each SOLAS Contracting Government (CG) is re-

quired to establish or participate in a Nation-

al/Regional/Cooperative Data Centre. Once the DC

was established, all SOLAS ships under the flag of

the relevant CG will report to the nominated DC.

The appointed DC / ASP will undertake in general

the following tasks: integration of ship equipment

into the designated DC, initial terminal compliance

testing and certification in conjunction with the Ship

Operator (or nominated regulatory representatives),

management of the DC activities, connection of the

DC to the wider international LRIT network via the

International Data Exchange (IDE), and coordina-

tion of Data Centre-to-Data Centre billing arrange-

ments.

4 THE EU LRIT DATA CENTRE

In line with IMO requirements, the European Mem-

ber States have decided to establish an European

Union Cooperative Data Centre (EU LRIT

CDC).The objective of the EU LRIT CDC is the

identification and tracking of EU Flagged ships and

the integration in the wider International LRIT sys-

tem. The main advantage is that all Member States

can share a LRIT information repository, a common

interface to the International Data Exchange (IDE)

for requesting LRIT information on ships flying

non-EU flags, and a common interface to LRIT in-

formation eventually via the Safe Sea Net system.

According to paragraph 1 of the Council Resolu-

tion, the Commission is in charge of managing the

EU LRIT CDC, in cooperation with Member States,

through the European Maritime Safety Agency

(EMSA). The Agency is more particularly in charge

of the technical development, operation and mainte-

nance of the EU LRIT CDC. It also “stresses that

the objective of the EU LRIT CDC should include

maritime security, Search and Rescue (SAR), mari-

time safety and protection of the marine environ-

ment, taking into consideration respective develop-

ments within the IMO context.”

The EU LRIT CDC is operational since June

2009 in accordance with all IMO performance

standards and requirements.

The general architecture of the EU LRIT system

and the links between the EU LRIT Data Centre and

other components of the system such as the links

with the IDE, DDP, and EU LRIT Ship database are

shown in the figure below. The components are

similar to the International LRIT system and the EU

Data Centre links with the IDE to obtain information

from non-EU flagged ships.

Fig.2. EU LRIT Data Centre

4.1 EU LRIT CDC and piracy

In order to assist the EU NAVFOR efforts in

fighting the piracy acts off Somalia coastal area, the

EU LRIT CDC has developed a specific anti-piracy

553

tool based on the Flag State LRIT reports. The tool

consists of a defined polygon off Somalia coastline

where all EU ships entering the polygon automati-

cally send an alert to EU NAVFOR and changed

their reporting rate from the default 6 hrs to 1 hr (see

Fig. 3). The EU NAVFOR has direct access to this

tool and they can visualise and closely track each

EU ships navigating in the area. The close monitor-

ing rate provides a better coordination for the EU

NAVFOR escorting ships in the area.

Fig. 3 – EU CDC anti-piracy tool

Based on the EU LRIT CDC and as requested by EU

NAVFOR, the IMO has decided to extend the LRIT anti-

piracy tool at international level in order to provide the

navy forces in the area with a complete LRIT pic-

ture. Therefore the MSC .87 (May 2010) has agreed

on the setting-up of a dedicated IMO LRIT anti-

piracy facility which will provide LRIT reports of all

ships transiting the area. This facility has become

operational since July 2010 and all SOLAS CG can

join the tool on a voluntary basis and provide the

ship position of their ships to the navy forces patrol-

ling the area.

This is one of the best positive examples on how

the international cooperation can assist better im-

plementation of the maritime security rules in high

risk areas.

5 CONCLUSIONS

Worldwide sea traffic is increasing and security,

safety and environmental risks are increasing too.

Establishment of the LRIT system shall increase

level of ships, coastal states and port states security

and improve environmental protection, safety of

navigation and efficiency of the search and rescue

operations at high seas. It will increase the range of

reporting requirements already imposed on ships en-

gaged on international voyages by regulations either

international (conventional) or regional and national

introduced in a variety of places. International ser-

vice providers should work on the basis of contracts

(Public Service Agreements) signed between each

one of them and IMSO or IMO. It is possible that

particular flag states will reserve the right to approve

service providers acceptable for their vessels.

It shall be stressed that LRIT system as described

in this paper is technically operational at this stage.

Technologies are available to provide cost effec-

tive solution. Additionally according to the infor-

mation presented by IMSO there is now about 45

000 ships which should participate in the LRIT sys-

tem.

If all of them will send daily four reports for 20

cents, the total global cost will be around 13140000

USD per year. That is the reason that IMO and IM-

SO do not suspect any problems with finding the

service providers. There are a number of parties with

a legitimate interest in receiving LRIT data from

ships:

− search and rescue, immigration, customs, quaran-

tine and navigational services,

− security, environmental protection and Port State

Control agencies,

− port authorities and ships’ agents,

− commercial bodies (ships owners, cargo forward-

ers, charterers, etc); and

− fisheries management authorities.

Many different commercial and government

owned and operated systems have been developed

and introduced to cater for these interests. They vary

in the type of technology used and costs of reporting

a ship’s position and related information. All exist-

ing conventional vessels engaged on voyages out-

side A1 sea areas are fitted and will be fitted with

the terminals of the global satellite radio communi-

cation system Inmarsat-C for reception of Maritime

Safety Information (MSI) and to meet other re-

quirements of the Global Maritime Distress and

Safety System (GMDSS). Those terminals can be

used to transmit reports required by LRIT service

without extra cost to the ship. Other ships may have

to be fitted with additional equipment, but will be

able to choose from a range of Communication Sys-

tem Providers.

Since 1st December 2004 the mandatory ship re-

porting system in the Great Barrier Reef and Torres

Strait Vessel Traffic Service (REEFVTS) has been

upgraded by introducing obligatory so called Pre-

Entry Report and 15 minutes position updates

transmitted via Inmarsat. It means REEFVTS creates

already first in the world obligatory LRIT system for

conventional vessels.

Experts unanimously stress that the only effective

long-term piracy deterrent is a stable state. When

Somalia was briefly under the control of the Islamic

554

Courts Union in 2006, the piracy acts stopped com-

pletely.

Until recently, sovereignty has prevented outside

states from targeting inland pirate infrastructure. A

UN resolution passed on December 2, 2008, allows

states to enter Somalia's territorial waters in pursuit

of pirates, and another resolution passed on Decem-

ber 16, 2008, implicitly authorizes land pursuit.

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[1] Wawruch R.: Conception of the Polish national ships moni-

toring system based on AIS technique. Zeszyty Naukowe

Politechniki Śląskiej, seria Transport, z. 51, Gliwice, 2003,

s. 543-549.

[2] Wawruch R.: Global ships monitoring system. Zeszyty Na-

ukowe Politechniki Śląskiej, seria Transport, z. 59, 2005,

s. 487-493. 66 R. Wawruch

[3] Wawruch R.: Global ships monitoring system – structure

and principle of work. Monograph „Advances in Transport

Systems Telematics”, Section III „Systems in Maritime

Transport”, Chapter 4 “Global ships’ monitoring system –

structure and principle of work”, Katowie, 2006, s. 307-

312.

[4] MSC 81/25/Add.1, IMO, London, 2005.

[5] VTS 22/4/6, IALA, Saint Germain en Laye, 2005.

[6] Combating Maritime Piracy, Stephanie Hanson 2009