International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 5
Number 1
March 2011
125
The performance of Flag Vessels Fleet (FVF), com-
posed by almost 350 teachers and students from
Shanghai Maritime University (SMU), impressed
the viewers deeply at the opening ceremony of 2010
Shanghai Expo. Safety of the trainees is the most
important factor being considered by the organizer
and also by our university. In order to guarantee the
success of the program, the average risk of the Flag
Vessels fleet need to be controlled. Therefore, For-
mal Safety Assessment (FSA) method was applied
to identify, control and reduce the risk during the
trainings, rehearsals and performance. FSA is a
structured and systematic methodology, aimed at
enhancing maritime safety, including protection of
life, health, the marine environment and property, by
using risk analysis and cost benefit assessment [1].
In the middle of 1990s, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) adopted FSA, initially put for-
ward by Maritime and Coast Guard Agency (MCA)
at the 62nd meeting of Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC), introduced FSA to the marine industry and
put it into use, and asked its members to be actively
involved in the research on ship safety [2]. After
that, FSA methodology was applied in different as-
pects of shipping industry, such as safety assessment
of containerships [3], cruise ships [4] and fishing
vessels [5]. Besides, the theory and methodology of
FSA was further studied, covering its theoretical ba-
sis and origin [6], details in every step [7-8].
This paper mainly focuses on the application of FSA
in quantitative risk assessment of man overboard.
Based on the analysis and conclusion of FSA ap-
proach, some useful suggestions are provided to
promote and improve safety of the FVF perfor-
mance.
1 INTRODUCTION
The FVF, composed by 220 ships, formed a com-
plex chevron shape, and the complex chevron
Research on the Risk Assessment of Man
Overboard in the Performance of Flag Vessel
Fleet (FVF)
T. R. Qin, Q.Y. Hu & J.Y. Mo
Merchant Marine College, Shanghai Maritime University, PR China
ABSTRACT: The performance of Flag Vessels impressed the viewers deeply at the opening ceremony of
2010 Shanghai Expo. Safety of the trainees is the key factor being considered by the organizer in the course
of trainings, rehearsals and final performance. Complex chevron shape of fleet increased the risk, such as col-
lision, grounding, waves damaging etc., which made it necessary to assess the risk of performers, especially
the risk of man overboard. In this paper, Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) method recommended by Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO) was adopted to guarantee/assess the safety of the performers, especially
decrease the risk of man overboard. FSA includes five steps in general, which are Hazard Identification
(HAZID), Risk Assessment (RA), Risk Control Options (RCOs), Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA) and Rec-
ommendations for Decision-Making (RDM) respectively. In this paper, Brainstorming and Fault Tree Analy-
sis (FTA) methods were both used in HAZID step. Then the combination of the two indexes was employed to
calculate the risk distribution of the fleet in RA step. One is the possibility of man overboard and the other is
the consequence once the incident happens. Moreover, several RCOs were provided based on the risk distri-
bution mentioned above. Finally, based on the results of FSA assessment, some suggestions were carried out
to decrease the risk of performers according to CBA, like personnel arrangement according to risk degree of
different areas in fleet. It has been proved that applying FSA method to the fleet of flag vessels can reduce the
overall degree of risk and ensure the success of performance.
126
shaped fleet includes two v-shaped groups showed
as figure 1. Each group includes eleven teams and
each team includes one motor rubber boat (MRB)
and ten non-power driven vessels (NPDV) which
were towed by the MRB.
The distance of each team should be kept as ten
meters and two vessels were towed by a ten-meter
line. The distance of two groups is fifty meters ac-
cording to original plan. Each team has one captain
who drives the motor rub and gives orders to this
team. Two VHF calls is given to the first MRB and
the last NPDV. As shown in figure 1, from the top to
the bottom, the MRBs are numbered as A1, A2,∙∙∙,
A11 in group A and the same in group B. From the
left side to the right side, the NPDVs are numbered
as Ai-1, Ai-1, ∙∙∙, Ai-10 i
∈
[1,11].
The performance was hold at the Expo Culture
Center (ECC), which is located in Pudong New Area
between Nanpu Bridge and Lupu Bridge beside the
Huangpu River as shown in figure 2. FVF should
keep the chevron shape when the fleet marches
across Huangpu River from the Nanpu Bridge to-
ward the ECC. The segment of the Huangpu River
adjacent to the ECC is a curved channel, so the cap-
tains of all eleven MRBs in each group should make
a turn at the same time and the MRBs located in out-
er circle needs to be accelerated respectively in order
to keep the shape. Besides, the distance between two
teams should be kept as ten meters which need be
judged by the eyes of the captains. The current speed
in the channel is irregular and the current direction
near the bank is onshore. Therefore, it is difficult to
keep the shape of the fleet.
The control of performance time is another prob-
lem. The distance between two bridges is approxi-
mately 1.5 nautical miles (NM) and the distance
passing by ECC which should be gone through with-
in 5 minutes is about 0.6 NM. According to the Tide
Table, the FVF will run against the tide and the cur-
rent speed is about 3 knots, so the marching speed of
the FVF will be 9 knots to meet the time according
to the program. The performance trace across the
Huangpu River was showed in figure 2.
ECC
Lupu Bridge
Nanpu Bridge
Huangpu River
Figure 2: The map of performance trace across the Huangpu
River
2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The hazard factors of FVF performance can be gen-
erally classified as three aspects: damage or loss of
the flag vessels, damage of navigational aids in the
channel, death or injury of the performers. Where
the importance of Shanghai Expo is concerned, to
the utmost guaranteeing no casualty is the organiz-
er’s primary task. The boats and Flag Vessels is
small tonnage and not made of steels, so the possible
casualties are not directly caused by collision,
grounding and wave damage etc., but mainly by the
man overboard. Therefore, all possible factors lead-
ing to the man overboard are identified and assessed,
and the emergency plan of the research and rescue
should be provided to ensure the safety of every per-
formers.
Group A
Group B
1
A
2
A
11
A
10
A
11
A
12
A
110
A
Figure 1: The top view of Flag Vessels Fleet (FVF) with complex chevron shape
127
In order to get the factors resulting in the man
overboard, Delphi method was adopted. Inquiry
sheets were sent to 15 experts including captains, in-
structors, and trainers as well. In addition, Accident
Records including all kinds of accidents happened
during the training were analyzed. According to the
investigation results, the prime hazard factors were
summed up as follows:
− The MRBs need to be accelerated or decelerated
frequently to keep the chevron shape, which may
lead to the man overboard due to doddering.
− The movement of MRBs will make huge wave,
which may lead to the man overboard due to
swaying.
− The Flag Vessel (UPDVs) may be trimmed by the
head because of rolling and pitching, which may
lead to the man overboard due to flooding.
− The Flag Vessel (UPDVs) will be damaged or
capsized by the collision with the aids to naviga-
tion or by grounding, which may lead to the man
overboard.
− The Flag Vessel (UPDVs) between two teams
may collide or fouled with each other because of
the irregular of the current speed and direction,
which may lead to the man overboard.
Hazard identification helps to quantify the fre-
quency and severity of every performer overboard.
3 RISK ASSESSMENT
Frequency, the common statistics for computing
possibility elements, is introduced to describe the
possible occurrences of hazardous accidents or ab-
normal events. Generally, the frequency is described
using such phases as ‘‘frequent’’, “reasonably prob-
able’’, ‘‘remote’’ and ‘‘extremely remote’’. As for
man overboard, this paper suggests five grades to
describe the possibility of performers falling into
water, so that the frequency of the man overboard
can be quantified accurately. Details of the criteria
are showed in table 1:
Table 1 Frequency/probability criteria table for the man over-
board
___________________________________________________
Nature Index Value Description
___________________________________________________
Always F5 5 Always happened during an activity
happened
Frequent F4 4 Frequently happened during an activity
Reasonably F3 3 Possibly happened during an activity
Probable
Remote F2 2 Occasionally happened, but not often
Extremely F1 1 Almost would not have happened
During an activity,
but should not exclude the existence
___________________________________________________
The MRBs are equipped with two engines and
60HP each, some of them 90HP. The maximum
speed can reach more than 40 knots. While they tow
10 UPDVs, the maximum speed is less than 10
knots, and the inflammable rubber bands around
MRBs are railed for protecting men from falling into
water.
The UPDVs next to the MRBs (that is Ai-1 or Bi-
1, i
∈
[1,11]) is relatively easy to be impacted by
green water, which was caused by two high speed
engines. Man overboard frequently happened. Be-
sides, the more close to the center of the UPDVs
fleet the crew is, more rough the wave is, and he is
easier to fall into the water. According to the analy-
sis mentioned above and consulting to the coach
team, the matrix of possibility of man overboard at
different position of the FVF was obtained as fol-
lows (figure 3):
1
1
3
1
1
3
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
1
1
3
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
3
1
3
2
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
2
3
1
2
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
3
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
2
2
3
3
3
2
2
3
3
4
3
3
2
2
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
2
3
1
2
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
3
3
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
Figure 3 matrix of possibility of man overboard at different po-
sition
Severity is utilized to describe the consequences
of casualties. Quantifying the severity is complicated
issue in safety assessment. Generally, the severity is
described using such words as ‘‘Catastrophic’’,
“Major’’, ‘‘Minor’’, and ‘‘Insignificant’’. As for
man overboard, this paper provides their definitions
in table 2 as follows:
128
Table 2 Severity criteria table for the man overboard
___________________________________________________
Nature Index Value Description
___________________________________________________
Fatal C5 5 The injury probably was fatal
injury if the incident happened
Major C4 4 The injury probably was not fatal but
injury serious if the incident happened
Moderate C3 3 The injury probably was less serious if
injury the incident happened
Miner C2 2 The injury is slight during an incident
injury
Insignifi- C1 1 Almost no injury or the injury can be
cant injury neglected
___________________________________________________
During the FVF, the fatality comes from high-
speed MRBs. The man overboard can be hurt by
propellers or drawn into the whirlpool, and hit by the
UPDVs. Besides, that the UPDVs probably press
upon the man overboard is another consequence of
injury. So the man overboard in group A is more in
danger than those in group B. And in each group,
closer to the front the UPDVs locate in, more serious
the severity of them is.
Based on the results, the matrix of severity of man
overboard at different position of the FVF was ob-
tained as follows (figure 4):
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
Figure 4 matrix of severity of man overboard at different posi-
tion
Risk is defined as a combination of possibility (F)
and severity (C), characterized by Risk = (F, C). The
following formula is provided to describe the degree
of the risk:
r fc= ×
r
is the value of risk
f
is the frequency of man overboard
c
is the severity or consequence of the man
overboard
×
is the multiplication operation
According to the formula, the risk value of each
person can be calculated and the risk matrix can be
obtained, which will not be given here due to the
limited space. After consulting to the coach team
and the experts composed by the experienced cap-
tains from SMU, the risk matrix is divided into three
risk regions which are given as follows:
1
I
＝{negligible risks } and if
r
∈
1
I
, then 0<
r
≤5.
2
I
＝{risks as low as reasonably practical
(ALARM)} and if
r
∈
2
I
, then 5<
r
≤15.
3
I
＝{high level risks } and if
r
∈
3
I
, then 15<
r
≤25.
Based on the divisions, the persons on the black
shades and vessels need to be carefully paid atten-
tion to as shown in figure 5, because they are in the
high-level risks.
Risk Control Options (RCOs) will be reflected in
the step of Recommendations for Decision-Making
(RDM). Compared with the vast budgets of Shang-
hai Expo and with the safety of performers, Cost
Benefit Assessment (CBA) cannot be a primary is-
sue, so the steps RCOs and CBA will not be dis-
cussed in detail here.
4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECISION-
MAKING
According to the results of assessment, some rec-
ommendations and suggestions are drawn as fol-
lows:
Firstly, all performers should be able to swim and
female performers should be evacuated from the
high risk region. According to the assessment re-
sults, risk of persons on the MRBs and the last UP-
DVs is very low, so all female persons were ar-
ranged on those positions and accompanied by a
male person to decrease the whole risk.
5
129
5 15 5
5 15 15 15 5
5 15 15
20 15 15 5
5 15 15
20 20 20 15 15 5
5 15 15 15
20 20 20 15 15 15 5
15 10 15 15
20 16 20 15 15 10 15
5 10 15 15
16 16 16 15 15 10 5
5 10 15 12
16 16 16 12 15 10 5
5 10 12
16 16 16 16 16 12 10 5
5 8 12
16 16 16 16 16 12 8 5
4 8 12
16 16 16 16 12 8 4
4 8 12
16 16 12 8 4
4 8 12 12 8 4
4 8 8 4
4 4
6
6 9 6
6 9 9 9 6
6 9 9 12 9 9 6
6 9 9 12 12 12 9 9 6
6 9 9 9 12 12 12 9 9 9 6
9 6 9 9 12 8 12 9 9 6 9
3 6 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 6 3
3 6 9 6 8 8 8 6 9 6 3
3 6 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 3
3 4 6 8 8 4 8 8 6 4 3
2 4 6 8 4 4 8 6 4 2
2 4 6 4 4 6 4 2
2 4 3 3 4 2
2 2 2 2
1 1
Figure 5 risk matrix
Secondly, each sailor on the MRBs was responsi-
ble for an extra duty for reminding and supervising.
According to the original plan, each MRB was
manned one captain, one second captain, one coor-
dinator and one sailor. The captain drove the MRB
and gave orders. The second captain was substitute
for the captain. The coordinator issued the order
from the captain by VHF and the sailor did some-
thing of berthing and unberthing. While the person
on the fist UPDV of each team was in the region of
the high-level risk. Therefore, the sailor should re-
mind and oversee his/her misoperation, unsafe ac-
tion and carelessness.
Thirdly, everyone’s position in the ship should be
fixed. In order to decrease the possibility of green
wave due to rolling and pitching, the person on the
UPDV was required to be seated at the stern as far as
possible, to prevent the vessel from being trimmed
by the head. The coordinator in the MRB should
stand at the bow, the captain and second captain in
the middle, and the sailor at the stern respectively.
Fourthly, the distance of group A and group B
need adjusting at any time. The distance of two
groups was kept as 50 meters for the wholeness, art-
istry and compactness, so the distance was un-
changeable generally. From the assessing result,
high-level risk region lies around the column
6
A
, so
the column
6
B
was more dangerous. If the distance
of two groups kept unchangeable, it is better to re-
cede
6
B
about 10 meters to keep the column
5
B
,
6
B
and
7
B
in parallel. So
6
B
was away from the high-
level risk region about 60 meters and the captain of
team
6
B
had more time to find the potential risk and
take immediate actions to avoid it. Besides, the
wholeness, artistry and compactness of the perfor-
mance were kept as plan.
Fifthly, four big horse-power MRBs were selected
as convey for search and rescue. Four 90 horse-
power MRBs was used to protect the FVF, among
which, one MRB was operated by Eastsea Rescue,
two by the coach team and one by the trainers from
Yangchenghu Club respectively.
Sixthly, the handling method of vessels and the
self rescue method of the man overboard were
worked out. If someone happened to fall into water,
teams near the man overboard should alter course
immediately regardless of the distance of two teams
and other teams should alter their courses corre-
spondingly. At the same time, the coordinator would
report the position of the man overboard vie the pub-
lic channel of VHF. Persons should keep eyes on
him and wave their hands to be noticed promptly.
The man fell into water should take out his light
stick from his lifejacket so that the salvagers could
find him.
The FVF performance of Shanghai Expo took a
high success and was recognized greatly by the
leaders of the country and Shanghai City and was
elected as one of the most ten advantageous perfor-
mances. Performers of FVF were awarded for their
special contributions. Here, I will thanks all the stu-
dents and teachers attending for their painstaking
work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper is partially supported by Science &
Technology Program of Shanghai Maritime Univer-
sity, No.20100132, and Shanghai Special Scientific
Research Fund for Selection and Training of Out-
standing Young College Teachers.
130
REFERENCE
[1] IMO, MSC Circ.1023 / MEPC Circ.392. Guidelines for
Formal Safety Assessment(FSA) for Use in the IMO Rule-
Making Process, London, 2002
[2] Shenping Hu, Quangen Fang, Haibo Xia and Yongtao Xi.
Formal safety assessment based on relative risks model in
ship navigation. Reliability Engineering and System Safety.
2007,92(3):369-377
[3] Wang J., Foinikis P. Formal Safety Assessment Of
Containerships. Marine Policy, 2001,25 :143-157
[4] Lois P., Wang J., Wall A., Ruxton T.. Formal Safety
Assessment of Cruise Ships. Tourism Management,
2004(25): 93–109.
[5] Pillay A., Wang J., Wall A, Ruxton T. Formal Safety
Assessment of Fishing Vessels: Risk and Maintenance
Modelling. Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology.
2002（1）81-115
[6] QIN Ting-rong, CHEN Wei-jiong; ZENG Xiang-kun. Risk
management modeling and its application in maritime
safety. Journal of Marine Science and Application,
2008,7:286-291
[7] Chen Weijiong, HAO Yuguo. Research on Maritime
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Methodology. In: WANG
Yajun, ed. Progress in Safety Science and Technology:
Vol.IV. Beijing: Science Press, 2004:2373-2378
[8] Tingrong Qin, Weijiong Chen, Yuguo Hao, Jianhua Jiang
and Chuang Li. Formal Safety Assessment Methodology.
China Safety Safety Science Journel. 2005, 15(4):88-92
