International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 3

Number 2

June 2009

153

1 INTRODUCTION

Emergency operations are always critical, regardless

of the position on earth. The need for high quality

data at the right time is essential, and the need is

crucial in all phases of an emergency operation. In

some places on earth it is, however, more difficult to

manage emergency operations due to harsh envi-

ronments and long distances, lack of suitable com-

munication means and poorly developed search and

rescue (SAR) facilities and services, which is most

definitely the case for Arctic areas.

It is foreseen that within this century the North-

east and Northwest passages may well become alter-

native transport corridors between the Eastern and

Western parts of the world, and that the maritime

traffic will increase significantly in these areas

(Orheim, 2008). A consequence of this will most

certainly be an increased number of accidents that

could have fatal impact on people and the vulnerable

Arctic environments. Also, new requirements to

meet the navigational challenges will appear, such as

e.g. requirements for real-time meteorological data

updates and prognoses to be used in the planning of

a voyage.

To illustrate some of the challenges pertaining to

emergency operations in the Arctic waters, a case

from an earlier accident is described. The focus is on

the availability of information, data and communica-

tion means, and it includes all elements in an emer-

gency operation (emergency team, SAR vessel, ship

in distress, passengers, operation centre ashore etc.).

Figure 1. The Northeast and Northwest passages

A Case Study from an Emergency Operation in

the Arctic Seas

B. Kvamstad, K. E. Fjørtoft & F. Bekkadal

MARINTEK e-Maritime, Trondheim, Norway

A. V. Marchenko

The University Centre in Svalbard, Norway

J. L. Ervik

The Norwegian Coastal Administration, Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT: The objective of this paper is to highlight the needs for improved access to high quality mari-

time data and information in the Arctic, and the need to develop maritime communication infrastructure with

at least the same quality, in terms of availability and integrity, as in other more centralized areas. The foreseen

Arctic ice meltdown is expected to provide new maritime transport corridors within relatively short time, and

there is an urgent need to prepare for this, to ensure safe operations at sea and to protect the vulnerable Arctic

environment.

This paper points out some of these needs by presenting a case from a former accident in the Arctic sea. The

case shows how the lack of proper information and data complicates the emergency operation. Some possible

solutions to the challenges are proposed, and finally the paper briefly discusses the IMO e-Navigation concept

in light of the Arctic challenges.

154

1.1 MS Maxim Gorkij

At 00.40 on the 17

of September 1989, the Captain

on board the Norwegian Coast Guard vessel KV

Senja received a message from Svalbard radio that a

vessel positioned 60 nm West of Isfjorden required

assistance. The ship in distress was a Russian vessel

chartered by a German tour operator; having 953

people on board, whereof 575 passengers and 378

crew members. It was on its way to the Magdalena

fjord at Svalbard when the crew discovered ice and

took the vessel closer to it to show the passengers.

The weather conditions were good, a bit hazy, but no

wind and only 2-3 m swell. At 23.05 Maxim Gorkij

collided with the ice. A crucial maneuver resulted in

a 10 m long rip in the hull in addition to some small-

er rips in the bow. At 00.05 Maxim Gorkij’s Captain

sent an emergency message on the distress frequen-

cy 500 kHz requesting assistance.

When KV Senja received the message from Sval-

bard radio the vessel finished it’s inspections in the

area around Isfjord radio and went by 22 knots to the

position of Maxim Gorkij. Estimated time of arrival

was 04.00, 5 hours after the time of the accident. KV

Senja did not have any information on what had

happened, what type vessel or the extent of the

emergency. The only available information was that

a vessel was in distress and the position of this ves-

sel.

At 01.00 KV Senja received a message via a poor

VHF link from Maxim Gorkij that the vessel took in

water, but remained stable. At 01.30 KV Senja re-

ceived a message that passengers and crew went into

the lifeboats. On basis of this information the crew

on KV Senja started to plan the rescue operation.

The resources they had on board were 53 people, a

medical treatment capacity of 110 persons, medical

personnel, divers and various equipments such as

cranes and smaller boats. However, when they ar-

rived at the scene of the accident, almost nothing

was possible to perform as planned, since:

Figure 3. MS Maxim Gorkij passengers in lifeboat.

Photo: Odd Mydland

− A 1.5 nautical mile (nm) deep ice-belt of about

1m thickness was separating KV Senja from

Maxim Gorkij.

− The cultural and language differences between

Russian and Norwegian crew made communica-

tion difficult, including the communication with

the Master on board the Maxim Gorkij.

− The passengers were mostly elderly people that

needed rapid and extra assistance to get out of the

lifeboats and on board KV Senja.

Another complicating issue was that the request-

ed rescue helicopters had to refuel in the air, and

they had to land on KV Senja with passengers, even

though the helicopters were too large to be using the

ship as landing place.

At the bridge of KV Senja some of the main chal-

lenges were to accommodate requests from the press

and worried relatives, coping with poor support from

decision makers on the mainland and few available

resources.

Figure 2. MS Maxim Gorkij passengers.

Photo: Odd Mydland.

After some critical moments and huge efforts

from the emergency team, KV Senja could finally

leave for Longyearbyen (at Svalbard) with the crew

and passengers from Maxim Gorkij. The Russians

were able to save their ship with assistance from KV

Senja’s divers. Luckily no one died or was seriously

injured. There were only a few minor injuries among

the emergency team.

The Maxim Gorkij incident is not the only of its

kind. A more recent accident happened to the MS

Explorer, which was tragically lost in 2007. Alt-

hough taking place in Antarctica, the scenario was

generally the same: The vessel collided with ice,

rescue assistance was far away, the vessel MS Nord

Norge just by coincidence happened to be in the area

and were able to assist MS Explorer.

Also, in 2008 there were 4 ship incidents in the

waters near Svalbard, and in January 2009 there

were two accidents with fishing vessels in this area,

155

where the Captain on board one of them tragically

lost his life. (Svalbardposten, 2009a) (Svalbard-

posten, 2009b).

2 CHALLENGES

The case study of Maxim Gorkij reveals several de-

ficiencies in information availability, both for the

planning- and the execution phases of the rescue op-

eration. In the following sections the main challeng-

es are identified and categorized to information and

data, and communications.

2.1 Information and data

In the planning phase, which started at the moment

KV Senja received a message from Svalbard radio

that a vessel needed assistance at 60 nm West of

Isfjorden, the lack of information and data is strik-

ing. The only information available was: A vessel

was in distress at this position, making it virtually

impossible to plan the rescue operation. Information

that should have been available at KV Senja was:

− What type of vessel was in distress? Was it a

smaller fishing vessel with but a few persons on

board, was it a tanker that could leak oil or was it

a cruise ship with lots of crew and passengers?

− How was the weather and ice conditions? Was

the vessel trapped in ice? Was it windy? Difficult

waves?

− Were other vessels in the area that could possibly

assist?

On the way to the emergency scene, two messag-

es were received from Maxim Gorkij, via a poor

VHF channel. One of the messages contained infor-

mation that the vessel was stable, and the next in-

formed that passengers were transferred to the life-

boats. A question to be raised is whether Maxim

Gorkij had tried to contact other vessels at an earlier

time, but was not able to reach anyone due to the

poor communication link?

The initial operation phase started when KV Sen-

ja finally arrived at the emergency scene. The rescu-

ers recognised that almost nothing of the initial

planning could be used; they were not prepared at all

on the real situation. The first surprise was the ice

belt, the second was the condition of the passengers

having left the lifeboats and stood on ice floes, wait-

ing to be rescued. They were mostly elderly people,

in their nightwear and coats. The new goal of the

rescuers on KV Senja was therefore immediately

changed to: ‘Rescue as many people as possible’. It

is easy to imagine what benefit better access to in-

formation could have added to the emergency opera-

tion:

− An overview of the emergency scene in terms of

ice and weather conditions would assist them in

planning an alternative route to the emergency

scene.

− By getting information on the type of vessel,

number of passengers and the condition of the

passengers they could have prepared for a recep-

tion adjusted to this information.

In the next stage of the operation phase, one of

the challenges was the lack of information and sup-

port from operation centres and decision makers

ashore. One example is the use of helicopters. The

helicopters were, according to laws and regulations,

too large to land on KV Senja. However, if they did

not land the helicopters, they would use more time

to rescue the passengers. Having in mind that they

were out there in relatively thin clothing in harsh en-

vironments, the rescuers had to make fast decisions.

The decision and responsibility on overruling the

laws and regulations was put on the shoulders of the

Captain on board KV Senja and the helicopter pilot.

If they had had online contact with an operation cen-

tre ashore, which again had continuously contact

with necessary decision makers, they could have re-

ceived a temporary allowance to perform the opera-

tion. In such way they would not have had to waste

time worrying about the personal consequences of

breaking the rules. Luckily the Captain and the heli-

copter pilot were willing to take personal risks to

save the lives of the Maxim Gorkij passengers. What

if they had not?

Another issue, which probably had to do with

cultural differences in addition to lack of infor-

mation, was the Russian helicopters that suddenly

appeared at the emergency scene, dropping packages

on the deck of Maxim Gorkij. The people on board

the KV Senja had no information on how many Rus-

sian helicopters to expect or what they were doing.

An operation centre ashore could most probably

have assisted in finding out what they were doing by

making contact with Russian colleagues, and then

providing KV Senja with this information.

2.2 Communications

The relation between getting access to high quality

data and information and the availability of commu-

nication channels is obvious. Without a proper

communication link it is impossible to distribute the

information. Different potential communication

technology solutions are discussed in the next sec-

tion. The communication challenges pertaining to

the Maxim Gorkij accident were:

− Limited or almost no possibilities to communi-

cate with the vessel in distress.

156

− No on-line communication link between an oper-

ation centre and the emergency operation team

(KV Senja and the helicopters).

− No communication link for weather and ice up-

dates, and other information to enhance situation-

al awareness.

− The communication link (Isfjord radio) was also

occupied by worried relatives and the press

Even if the Maxim Gorkij accident happened 20

years ago, the above challenges regarding communi-

cation infrastructure and access to high quality data

and information has remained almost unchanged in

the Arctic areas. This accident ended without loss of

lives and hazardous consequences for the environ-

ment thanks to dedicated rescuers and nice weather

conditions. The question to be raised is: What will

happen when the traffic increases and hence the

emergency rate increases? Are we willing to take a

chance on the weather conditions and rescuers that

are in the area by coincidence? There is an immedi-

ate need to address the issues of communications, in-

formation and data, and in the following sections

possible solutions are proposed and assessed.

3 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

3.1 Information and data

On basis of the challenges described in the above

sections the following information and data is con-

sidered useful and necessary during an emergency

operation:

− Meteorological- and hydrological ocean data

(weather-, wave- and ice data)

− Information to increase situational awareness

(type of ship, number of passengers, condition of

passengers, condition of ship, surrounding traffic)

− Improved Electronic Navigation Charts (ENC’s)

− Improved emergency preparedness tools

− Status on and from fairway objects (lighthouses,

buoys, sensors to monitor stream, temperature,

wind, etc.)

Some of this information and data sources are

further described in the following sub-sections.

3.1.1 Meteorological- and hydrological ocean data

Today several maritime services are broadcasting

information on weather and sea conditions via radio

channels and on the Internet. To offer such services

in the Arctic areas, sufficient observation and meas-

urement sites are required, along with an adequate

communication link for data distribution. This chal-

lenge is due to the long distances over open sea and

harsh weather conditions. Another challenge is the

information on ice conditions. The solutions availa-

ble for such information are presently satellite imag-

es from Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR) and near

ship ice monitoring by the use of cameras on the

bow of ice breakers. Investigations have been and

are being conducted to test out how the satellite im-

ages can be used by vessels sailing through icecov-

ered waters. One of the challenges is to understand

and read the images without having enough

knowledge or experience of reading ice surfaces

from satellite pictures.

This type of information can be particularly use-

ful for voyage planning. By using this type of data

the planners are able to set up routes outside ice-

covered waters, or possibly through openings in the

ice. However, these satellite images can not be used

for real-time monitoring of ice conditions near the

ship. It can not provide any information on rapid

changes in ice conditions and thickness.

A study performed at the University Centre in

Svalbard (Marchenko, 2009) shows that it is possi-

ble, by advanced techniques, to calculate velocities

on ice, ice compactness and the effect on ships sail-

ing in this ice - compactness meaning the concentra-

tion of ice on the sea surface. For example, if half of

sea surface is covered by ice and another half is ice-

free, the compactness is equal to 0.5. These calculat-

ed parameters can be used to show ice compactness

on maps, and it is one of parameters characterizing

ice structure in numerous numerical models of sea

ice coverage dynamics. The conclusions from the

study are:

1 Spatial evolution velocities of compacted ice re-

gions depend on the compactness of surrounding

rare ice, with typical values reaching a few meters

per second when rare ice compactness is larger

than 0.6.

2 The ship resistance caused by rare ice can be in

the order of the water resistance when rare ice

compactness is larger than 0.5 and floe diameters

are about the ship width.

3 When ice compactness is close to the critical val-

ue of 0.78, the performance of small ships with

maximum speed of about 10 knots in open wa-

ters, is very poor. Practically they will be cap-

tured by the ice in this case.

By combining and using these parameters it could

be possible to develop an advanced and accurate re-

al-time decision tool for voyages in ice-covered wa-

ters infested. This could also be used in an emergen-

cy operation as a decision support tool. In the

Maxim Gorkij case, such tools could have been used

to assist the Captain onboard KV Senja to decide

whether or not to move trough the ice belt.

3.1.2 Situational awareness

Information that would increase the situational

awareness both in the planning- and execution phase

of an emergency operation, is information pertaining

to the ship in distress. Examples of such information

157

are vessel type, size, condition of vessel, number of

passengers, condition of passengers, information on

surrounding traffic and available resources.

Figure 5. Combination of satellite images and AIS data.

Photo: Kongsberg Satellite Services (KSAT).

One possible solution to this is to combine data

from several sources, e.g. images from surveillance

satellites and ship information from AIS or LRIT, as

exemplified by the picture in Figure 3. The Norwe-

gian Coastal Administration has utilized satellite im-

ages from surveillance satellites to detect oil spills in

Norwegian waters. From these satellite images it is

impossible to see which ship is responsible for this.

However, if a layer of AIS data is put on top of the

images, the ship can be identified. In areas beyond

coverage from land-based AIS base stations, future

space-based AIS or other sources can be used to

identify the ship, e.g. the evolving LRIT system.

This way of combining data could also be used

for surveillance of emergency operations. Today the

time delay of data from satellite is to large, but fu-

ture developments of the communication infrastruc-

ture might solve that problem.

3.1.3 ENC’s and preparedness tools

The existing Electronic Navigation Charts

(ENC’s) for the Arctic seas are far from mature,

since it has been difficult to develop these charts due

to the ice covering sea and land. This work needs to

be started as soon as the landscape is visible. Satis-

factory charts represent a crucial factor to increase

the safety of navigation.

Preparedness tools are also something that need

to be developed. In Norway work is ongoing to de-

velop such tools and also work is started to investi-

gate possible areas to be used as port of refuge.

3.2 Maritime communication technologies

The previous sections clearly illustrate the need for

high quality maritime communication technology in

Arctic areas. High quality means primarily sufficient

bandwidth and adequate reliability. Shut-downs of

the communication link from time to time can not be

accepted. To be able to implement the possible solu-

tions depicted in section 3 of this paper, stable

communication channels are needed between land

and sea, and also ad hoc networks at the emergency

site. The pertinent maritime communication tech-

nologies can roughly be divided into three domains:

− Satellite communications (SatCom), comprising

so called Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites, Geo-

stationary (GEO) satellites and High Elliptical

Orbit (HEO) satellites

− Terrestrial wireless communications

− Ad hoc communication networks

As can be seen from the Figure 6 the present situ-

ation for satellite communication in Arctic areas is

far from satisfactory. Only the LEO-based Iridium

system has allegedly ‘true’ global coverage. The

newly launched Iridium service OpenPort can offer

up to 128 kbps capacity, which might be sufficient

for transmitting operational messages during and

emergency operation. However, if video and images

shall be conveyed to land stations for real-time mon-

itoring of the operation, this service is also rendered

useless.

Another problem with Iridium is its dubious la-

tency (the time delay due to data relay), and hence

being doubtful for time-critical applications.

The limitations of GEO satellites in Arctic areas are:

− They are invisible at latitudes beyond 80°N (graz-

ing incidence), and it is challenging to achieve a

stable communication link beyond about 76°N

(5° elevation).

Figure 6. Maritime communication systems coverage areas

− Complex (and expensive) antenna platforms are

required at these latitudes, so in practice the GEO

satellites are usable only up to about 70°N for

moving vessels.

A preliminary study performed in the MarCom

project states that ‘the only adequate SatCom alter-

native for the High North is apparently to be based

158

on HEO satellites’ (Bekkadal, 2009). This is due to

the convenient satellite orbits of the HEO’s, cover-

ing the northern hemisphere for a large time of the

day, and a 3-satellite constellation would be suffi-

cient to provide this area with a 24/7 service. How-

ever, this needs to be further analysed both in terms

of technology and cost/performance. Such a devel-

opment would require cooperation with other coun-

tries bordering the Arctic areas, such as Russia,

Canada, Finland, Iceland, Denmark (Greenland),

Sweden and the USA, which could very well be or-

ganised under the auspices of the Arctic Council.

The coastal areas (including the Northeast and

Northwest passages) are judged to be adequately

covered by deploying terrestrial systems along the

coast - WiMAX and enhanced Digital VHF being

considered the most promising future alternatives.

However, the cost and complexity of such systems

would require a detailed study of a.o. the area’s to-

pography (Bekkadal, unpublished).

Ad hoc networks are in use today by both SAR

teams and in military operations. Ad hoc networks

do not really depend on the position on earth be-

cause the network comprises only the nodes within a

limited area. However, it would be very convenient

if the ad hoc network could be monitored from oper-

ational centres ashore, which would require a satel-

lite or terrestrial link with sufficient bandwidth and

high integrity - integrity meaning the link being

trustworthy.

3.3 Application software (SW) tools

The Wikipedia definition of an application SW is:

“Application software is any tool that functions and

is operated by means of a computer”. Some applica-

tions could be developed to meet the challenges

posed by emergency operations in Arctic areas. The-

se applications could be used both in planning and

execution phases of the operation. An example of a

planning tool is the contingency plan, including fea-

tures such as optimum selection of rescue resources.

Examples of such resources are tugs and oil recov-

ery equipment specially designed for operations in

Arctic areas.

The need for enhanced equipment and applica-

tions on board vessels should also be considered in

facilitating improvements to the process of emer-

gency operations. Often it is a “normal” vessel that

reaches the emergency scene first, obviously not

having the same on-board equipment and applica-

tions as a SAR vessel. New requirements for a min-

imum set of Arctic SAR applications and equipment

on board vessels should be considered, which needs

of course to be combined with classification of ves-

sels. By introducing such requirements all vessels

could amply assist other vessels in distress until the

SAR team arrives.

Another issue that should be investigated is prior-

itising mechanisms on communication channels us-

age. This is especially important in the time to come

before the communication infrastructure is fully de-

veloped in the Arctic areas, which may take some

years. The prioritising mechanisms should automati-

cally provide exclusive access to sufficient commu-

nication capacity to ensure high availability and in-

tegrity of channels used by all partners involved in

the emergency operation.

Ice related applications are of course also very

important in the Arctic areas. This is the case both

during normal sailing in the Arctic areas, and during

emergency operations. Possible applications are:

− Calculations and visualisation of ship perfor-

mance in different ice conditions, which could be

used both to avoid dangerous situations during

normal seafaring, and for analysis during emer-

gency operations.

− Recognition of sea ice characteristics (compact-

ness, thickness, icebergs) by satellite images. This

is already to a certain extent used by navigators

on vessels sailing in ice-covered waters.

− Features of rare ice drift around e.g. Svalbard and

in fjords. This could also be used to enhance the

safety of a voyages in ice-covered waters, and for

analysis during emergency operations.

4 E-NAVIGATION IN THE HIGH NORTH

Some of the solutions on applications and communi-

cations proposed in the above sections should also

be considered during the development of the IMO e-

Navigation concept. The IMO has adopted the IALA

definition of e-Navigation, and it says (NAV sub-

committee, 53rd session, 2007):

“e-Navigation is the harmonised collection, integra-

tion, exchange, presentation and analysis of mari-

time information on board and ashore by electronic

means to enhance berth to berth navigation and re-

lated services, for safety and security at sea and pro-

tection of the marine environment”.

In remote areas, and especially in Arctic waters,

this concept faces extraordinary challenges. It is e.g.

difficult to collect, integrate and exchange maritime

information if there are no available communication

channels. Also, the need for special purpose e-

Navigation services in Arctic areas should be con-

sidered. The extreme navigational challenges due to

low temperatures, ice and harsh weather conditions

require more specialised services than in other more

centralized areas. E-navigation can become an im-

portant part in a future safety and security concept

for Arctic areas if these requirements are fulfilled.

159

5 CONCLUSIONS

It is important not to forget the experiences from the

Maxim Gorkij and other similar accidents having

occurred in the Arctic and Antarctic areas. They can

help in providing a clear view on what type of in-

formation, data, communication infrastructure and

SAR resources required to be developed. The main

lessons to be learned from the Maxim Gorkij acci-

dent is that in order to be able to conduct efficient

and safe emergency operations, more crucial infor-

mation needs to be available to all parties involved.

This could be in terms of supporting decision tools

and information from operation centres ashore.

However, nothing of this is possible without a mari-

time communication infrastructure with sufficient

bandwidth and adequate integrity. This important

task should consequently be immediately addressed

within the maritime community.

REFERENCES

NAV sub-committee, 53rd session, 2007. Agenda item 13, De-

velopment of an e-Navigation strategy.

Orheim, O. 2008. Risks by sailing in Polar areas. Safety at Sea

Conference. Norway: Haugesund.

Svalbardposten,2009a.

http://www.svalbardposten.no/nyheter/kaptein-omkom-i-

tr%C3%A5lerforlis

Svalbardposten,2009b.

http://www.svalbardposten.no/nyheter/hjulpet-ut-av-

metertykk

Bekkadal, F. 2009: “Maritime Communication Technologies”,

MarCom D4.1, MARINTEK report, Project no. 280131,

V1.0, 05.01.2009