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1 INTRODUCTION
While climate change continuously manifests itself for
the world's inhabitants, societies are increasingly
focusing on solutions that will prevent Earth’s
hospitality level from deteriorating further. The
ability to reduce fossil fuel consumption is
investigated intensively. Shipping has, compared to
other logistics and transportation industries, not been
change-effective due to the complex challenges that
international shipping actors point out themselves
(Poulsen and Sampson 2020).
Shipping has become essential to today’s
standards of living as it connects the world. So much
so that up to 80% of the world's goods are transported
through shipping (OECD 2019). These living
standards have a heavy price as shipping mainly
relies on fossil fuels for propulsion (Martin Cames
and Cook 2015). Shipping is heavily judged for
contributing to human-generated Greenhouse gasses
(GHG) and is held accountable for 2.7% of GHG
emissions. Without averting actions, the number is
projected to reach 17% by 2050 (Martin Cames and
Cook 2015; Adland, Cariou, and Wolff 2019). The
cases for radical change are overwhelming and
something must change (Mazzucato 2021, 23). The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has
vowed for GHG to reach net zero by or around 2050
(IMO 2023). Yet, it is unclear what that means or how
to get there (Møhl, Krause-Jensen, and Skårup 2022,
5)!
Research shows simple low-cost energy efficiency
(EE) measures in shipping can cut up to 75% of GHG,
while also reducing the cost of operation (Johnson and
Andersson 2016, 79–80; Viktorelius, Varvne, and von
Knorring 2022, 2). However, this proves difficult to
enact (Poulsen and Johnson 2016). A myriad of
research has investigated the many barriers in
shipping to implement energy-efficient measures.
Barriers such as changing practices, governance,
Barriers for Inclusion of User Practices in Technology
Development in Blue Denmark
R
.G. Kristensen & T. Børsen
Aalborg University
, Aalborg, Denmark
ABSTRACT: As the world collectively looks to technology to salvage what is left of our world to sustain a
habitat that can accommodate our way of life, users are increasingly exposed to technological solutions, rarely
developed with an offset in their practice. This also holds for the maritime sector in Denmark, where the way of
developing technology is limited to the applicability of technological artifacts and can reduce the potential
efficiency gains that technologies can introduce. This paper applies qualitative research to show that there is a
disconnect between, on the one hand, funders, technology developers, and decision-makers and, on the other
hand, technology users and practitioners in the Danish maritime sector. It argued that if technology is to replace
or assist any human practice and solve for example the climate crises, then knowledge of users’ practices must
be key to developing the technological solutions.
http://www.transnav.eu
the
International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 18
Number 3
September 2024
DOI: 10.12716/1001.18.03.1
7
632
company and vessel policies, and adoption of
technology (Adland, Cariou, and Wolff 2019; Poulsen
and Sampson 2020; Poulsen and Sornn-Friese 2015;
Johnson and Andersson 2016; Johnson, Johansson,
and Andersson 2014; Trianni and Cagno 2012).
In 2022 Denmark ranked as the world's 6th largest
commercial fleet (Steffensen and Torstensen 2021;
DMA 2022). The Danish government released a report
on ensuring Blue Denmark gains status as a global
hub for maritime digital expertise. Blue Denmark
refers to maritime businesses and industries, maritime
researchers and educators, legislators, etc., nearly
occupying a hundred thousand people.
A major point of the report is that a digitalization
strategy can change our current trajectory. By
claiming quality assurance from being made in
Denmark, political backing, and quantum leaps in
technological development, the future looks brighter
(Braat 2022). Digitalization has long been a part of the
agenda of Blue Denmark (Gyldensten 2017). Danish
Shipping, an important voice in Blue Denmark,
affirms the coming changes:
“Shipping companies face new challenges led by
ambitious climate goals, environmental regulation,
increased digitalization, and new business models,
with large parts of possible solutions for the future
being unknown. Innovation is, therefore, higher on
the shipping companies' agenda than ever before.
Development, new research, and innovation projects
are, among other things, crucial for Danish shipping
companies to achieve the climate goals and remain
competitive in an increasingly digital world”
(Vesterlykke 2019)
Developing newer technology, such as
autonomous vessels, has arguably been established as
a superpower in society as the only solution to the
climate crisis; and steals focus from the low-hanging
fruits of current technology, governance, policy-
making, and changing human practice. It parallels the
plot dramatized in the Hollywood movie “Don’t Look
Up”, where known methods to avert certain
destruction are waived to make way for untested
futuristic technology that eventually fails, without
ample time to revert to old methods (McKay 2021).
The belief that liberation through technology is
succumbing to a total technocracy where solutions are
based on technical expertise alone, is worrying. It
appears forgotten to consider alternatives to new
technology and its dependencies. Technological
advancement must also deal with the social context of
the user's practice (Johnson and Andersson 2016;
Viktorelius, Varvne, and von Knorring 2022). While
eyes are set on the development of technology, not
much attention is devoted to the user and the
changing technology landscape their practice is going
through and technology is thought to effectivize
(Man, Lundh, and MacKinnon 2019).
We need to broaden the perception of what
constitutes technology to a nexus of the artifacts and
the human practices, in which it is embedded. Critical
authors in Technology Studies, e.g., Andrew Feenberg
(Feenberg 2017) and Langdon Winner (Winner 2001),
suggest that if we neglect the fact that technology is
supposed to help and emancipate people it adds the
opposite, inevitably generating animosity towards
technology. A more inclusive definition of technology
could offer us the chance to consider how technology
is utilized in the real world and to discover how to
design more democratic and adaptable technology
that can be applied in practical contexts, ultimately
increasing the chances of our future generations'
survival.
2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This paper investigates the barriers to an equilibrium,
in developing technology between technical artifacts
and human practices and to understand its socio-
technical configurations. In doing so we call for a
democratic intervention in Blue Denmark’s
technology. In other words: What are the barriers to
democratizing the system of technological
development in Blue Denmark?
Figure 1 is to illustrate the research question. On
the left, we see the current technocratic view on
technological development in Blue Denmark, focusing
primarily on developing technical artifacts, while
scrutinizing the practice. On the right, we see the
desired situation where the development is balanced
with an equal focus. The line in the middle illustrates
the barriers to the requested transition that this paper
will display.
Figure 1 illustrates the research question structuring this
study: What are the barriers to democratizing the system of
technological development in Blue Denmark?
3 ETHNOGRAPHY
Ethnography strives to understand the meaning
humans ascribe to their lives. Not by quantifying
numerical global metadata, something the shipping
industry has long suffered from (Viktorelius, Varvne,
and von Knorring 2022), but by spending time with
the people practicing that which technology aims to
enhance. As stated by Sunderland and Denny; “if we
accept the notion that technology refers to the use of
artifacts in practice then it becomes clear that
understanding human practice is an integral part to
developing technology” (Sunderland and Denny 2007,
5).
Actors of Blue Denmark constitute a diverse group
with multiple interests and expertise: fund and project
managers, customers, shipping companies (who have
the actual end-users as employees), etc.,. They vary in
location, purpose, organization, as well as influence.
Observing them, visually and audibly, in their socio-
technical configuration is a valuable way to attain
perceptions of contexts and constructions (T. H.
Eriksen 2010). Thus, ethnographic work at their
different sites is the method used to understand Blue
Denmark as a system of developing technology.
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Traditional ethnography is characterized by
focusing on a single location or setting to immerse
oneself into a socio-cultural installment intensively.
To observe and make sense of a specific or unique
group of people’s lives. As the world became an
interconnected system, multi-sited ethnography
appeared, as a local, single-site, could no longer be
understood as isolated from its place in the global
system. (Marcus 1995, 96). Multi-sited ethnography
moves away from focusing on internal scenarios,
objects, and meanings. Instead, zooming out to
understand a local setting's place in its larger
network, such as a user’s practice’s place in
developing a technology. By including a macro
perspective, this method is suitable for understanding
the system of the multi-situated processes of
developing technology.
The mobility guides the researcher to follow
initially unknown sources to their origin. Thus,
investigating the original site in question through the
different perceptions of the system (Marcus 1995, 96).
When researching the context in a socio-technical
setting (such as the system) it is possible to both
follow the people and follow the thing, the thing
referring to non-human actors, concepts, or in this
case, a trend of grand technologification without the
user (Marcus 1995, 106–7). The contents of the people
or the thing may be completely or partially unknown
as research begins. As people or a thing is mobile and
found in various settings so must the researcher then
move to understand the entirety of the system.
To understand the system and how technology is
perceived and developed we conducted semi-
structured interviews, and formal and informal talks,
together with participation in various events,
discussions, and projects. The empirical material was
collected in the following sites: development of fund
strategies, project facilitation and management,
product testing, and project implementation. The
named sites represent different stations of
technology’s development. The sites’ embedded
barriers to user involvement will be brought forth in
the analysis. The list of interviewees from the sites can
be found in Appendix 1. The list of workshops and
other events where observations and informal talks
were conducted is in Appendix 2.
Figure 2 is a model of the technology development
processes in Blue Denmark. The model will scaffold
our empirical investigation of actors in different
stages of an artifact’s development. To comprehend
the processes that constitute development in Blue
Denmark (and why it excludes the users’ human
practices) actors in Blue Denmark were followed to
map them and place them in a development chain,
labeled the system. Processes of the system were
observed as follows: Directional change in society is
fostered by the climate crisis. This change influences
Blue Denmark to invest in greenifying shipping
operations. It is thus decided that funds will be
allocated to develop green technology. Funds are
requested by and provided to those who claim green
solutions. I.e., entrepreneurs, GTS, project- facilitators
and managers, etc. Once funds are secured project
execution can commence. The system ends in a
potential implementation with the following nursing
phase pursued.
Figure 2. The figure illustrates the synthesis of the
technological development system in Blue Denmark.
4 BARRIERS TO USER INVOLVEMENT IN THE
SYSTEM
The analysis will identify barriers to involving users
of technology in its development. Therefore, it was
imperative to understand what constitutes the system,
and its representatives' perception of what constitutes
technology. Following technology and people in the
system from the perspective of the user through the
sites of the system showed that it fails to involve them
enough and at the right time and place. This fact is
acknowledged by a project facilitator; “[...] it is a hole
in the process [of development] that is being dug with
open eyes, which is paradoxical since one assumes
that one has the interest [to implement technology] at
heart” (I1). The terminology barrier might be
perceived as physical and concrete, but a barrier can
also be on a social-technical conceptual level.
Researching the system indicated that attention to
user involvement appears late, after initial
implementation attempts. As the complexity of the
real world unfolds it becomes clear that human
practices are not confined to a restricted set of
scenarios. Thereby indicating that user-technology
collaboration is dealt with reactively instead of
proactively i.e. recognizing problems that could have
been identified at much earlier stages. Indeed, value is
not necessarily only created if the technology
prospers. However, suppose failure purely occurs
because of deficiency to appreciate the actual
problem, failure with no gain seems accurate. I.e., if
nothing was learned from failure it is arguably a
complete waste of time, money, and resources.
4.1 Barrier One - Users
When developing technology it is difficult for the
creator to understand the various ways in which it can
be used. The focus of technology’s development needs
to be readjusted from the artifact to the practice.
Allegedly technology cannot succeed without both;
“If you think all you need to develop technology is
technical insight, or to just get it to work according to
some criteria of functionality, then you have not
understood what technology is” (I4). Research
underlines the importance of user involvement.
Research such as human-computer interaction,
different methods of user involvement, participatory
design, and user ethnography (Hyysalo, Jensen, and
Oudshoorn 2016; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003;
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Woolgar 1990; Sunderland and Denny 2007; Børsen
and Botin 2013; Büscher et al. 2009).
Informants have acknowledged the uneven
distribution of focus on artifact and practice; “there
has been an exaggerated focus on the technology
[artifact]” (I9). We see this in the maritime sphere with
investments in autonomous vessels and navigational
aids. Such systems, among others, are not understood
nor functioning optimally because the user was
excluded from the development of the system (Grech
and Lemon 2015, 2).
All sites recognize the importance of user input for
a successful implementation. An informant concedes;
“if it [technology] is not adopted, the other half of the
calculus is missing, and that is the end-user” (I9). The
system appears to want to involve users but is often
obstructed by the shipping structures (Møhl, Krause-
Jensen, and Skårup 2022, 25). Overall, there is
consensus that user involvement is important but it is
debatable as to what extent it is practiced; “I am not
sure, but I think it has always been the intention to
incorporate end-users” (I9).
4.2 Who Constitutes Users
User involvement is not just involving people. There
seems to be ambiguity as to what and who the user is,
like what a user is and when/what they should be
involved in. Looking at technology deployability, this
is exactly the knowledge that developers need that
users can help with. By listening to inputs seafarers
feel included and they can illuminate problems that
developers alone could never foresee. Seafarers are
often exposed to complex technology in a top-down
implementation (Man, Lundh, and MacKinnon 2019,
4).
An important defining parameter is that while
preferable to the exploitative and applicable
technology, user involvement might be less relevant
on a conceptual level; “regarding exploitative
technology, I think it is extremely important to
incorporate them, otherwise it will not work. With
explorative technology, I do not think it is that
important at the first stage that is about
understanding the potential but to apply the
technology to solve a problem, involvement is vital”
(I9).
While exploring the system different conceptions
appeared of who the users are elaborated in 5
misconceptions;
The first misconception is that the customer is the
user. Reaching out to a private maritime fund they
were assured that their project facilitator has user
contact through applied sciences. When interviewing
said project facilitator they replied; “[...] that [applied
science] is together with the companies [...]” (I3). I.e.,
not the user but the company. When discussing user
involvement it sometimes appears misunderstood and
instead referred to as customer involvement; “you
could say that our end-users are the manufacturers
and the shipping companies” (I1). Customers do not
understand the practice as a user. As agreed by an
informant; “I would say it should be the end-users, as
the customers are constructed by a financial relation”
(I9).
The second misconception is, that when users are
involved, it is often only specific ones; “[...] there were
the darling captains who always were brought in on
the projects [...]” (I5). This leaves few candidates and
limits the available practitioner knowledge to one or a
few positions. Various positions and individuals can
have greatly different tasks on a vessel.
The third misconception is that users could also
refer to former users. This introduces the risk of
patenting knowledge from when leaving life at sea; “I
have observed, there are many [ex-seafarers] know-it-
alls with the solution for all the world’s problems”
(I2). This is problematic because there is a risk that
extracted knowledge is not grounded in
contemporary seafaring practices; “[...] the end-users
are often represented by former seafarers [...]” (I9).
This has caused; “[...] many half-hearted solutions
from a former navigator or marine engineer with old
knowledge” (I2). The industry keeps on evolving, so it
can be a big problem if former seafarers are used to
reflect current life at sea.
The fourth misconception. The maritime
academies have also been pointed to as a source of
contemporary knowledge; “we depend on the
maritime academies, SIMAC e.g., and their facilities
[...]” (I1). While training facilities, teachers, etc., can
provide valuable knowledge, they cannot replace real-
life scenarios, experience, and expertise.
The fifth misconception. The industry and the
agenda of the funds were identified as an outcome-
altering factor; “we are driven by the industry’s
interest as they are our core stakeholders [...]” (I1). If
project facilitators cannot secure their interest and
funds, there will be no project.
It must be understood who the users are. It is the
active seafarers. The above illustrates the first barrier
to real end-user involvement as important actors can
be under the illusion that end-user involvement takes
place. A user’s input is needed in Blue Denmark, as an
informant states “Some of the projects we have are
very technical and very engineer savvy, but there are
no marine engineers connected [...]” (I1). It is
indisputable that domain-specific knowledge can help
verify potential in development. But it must stay
diverse and current; “it is important to be observant of
the diversity of knowledge [...] also within maritime
knowledge, that you are aware that there is a seafarer
from China and India who also are end-users of the
product” (I2).
4.3 Barrier Two - Technology
The second barrier is the false idea of what technology
should be developed for and why. Arguably there is
more than one truth, but for the sake of the green
transition we can look to a dictionary definition of the
word technology, “the use of tools and machines to
help people conduct tasks more efficiently and with
less effort” (Cambridge University Press 2021). I.e.,
technology can reduce emissions from shipping, as a
project facilitator mentions; “moving people and
goods creates a lot of value for the world. However,
there is also a dark side, in this case, a negative impact
on the environment, we work to bring that down”
(I9). We have to remember that technology should be
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developed, invested in, and committed to, so we can
ensure our future on this planet. The disconnect
between land and sea along with the construction of
the world of shipping often results in sub-optimal
conditions for change when deploying new
technology. Therefore it is important to see how the
perceived purpose of developing new technology
changes throughout the system. The system has
shown two main categories of false beliefs: removing
humans and technological glorification.
4.4 Removing Humans
The first false belief is that technology should replace
humans. Aside from the expense, that crew needs to
be paid and therefore will result in fewer expenses, it
will allegedly also result in fewer errors, i.e., it equals
fewer disasters, higher efficiency, and more revenue
(Man, Lundh, and MacKinnon 2019, 3). However,
removing human operators from ships is implausible
for three reasons.
First, technology is not capable e.g., the unmanned
autonomous vessel is not able to deal with the
dynamics of the seas or to possess the level of
adaptability of humans while being built on the
COLREG that is dependent on human intervention.
And, if technology was able it would have happened
already as the business case would be too lucrative for
any shipping company to pass, as an informant
argues; “if the technology were a product you could
just go and buy off the shelf, then it would already be
implemented” (I14).
Secondly, the false belief that seafarers solely exist
on the vessel to steer the vessel. The auto-pilot
technology has existed for years, the ship is steering
itself. Most of the work that happens on a ship is
maintenance (S. Eriksen, Utne, and Lützen 2021, 9).
Along with other workloads, maintenance is not
something an autonomous vessel is exempt from,
even though Danish Shipping anticipates robots will
be able to overtake this task (RINA 2018). The
workload from digital systems is still increasing
(Ljung and Lützhöft 2014, 3). An informant said;
“companies, at the moment, have more crew than
legislation requires, because there is too much
maintenance work” (I10).
Thirdly, the argument that computers are safer,
and the concept of human error. The main argument
is that roughly 85% of accidents can be attributed to
human error (AGCS 2017). The problem is that human
error does not classify as an error isolated to a human
making a mistake, but rather because of multiple
factors failing. As noted by Rothblum; “human errors
are generally caused by technologies, environments,
and organizations which are incompatible in some
way with optimal human performance” (Rothblum
2011, 5). It is also explained as a human error if the
operator is incapable of comprehending the
complexity of a system (Grech and Lemon 2015, 3). As
no apparent data exists on how many times a human
prevented a system from making a critical error, it is a
very one-sided argument. When asked, an informant
answered; “[...] show the other perspective, if that
statement is to have any validity, I want to know how
many accidents did not happen because a human told
a computer it was wrong” (I14). A study on the near-
miss system showed that 87% of such occurrences had
been discovered by humans (S. Eriksen 2020, 99).
Furthermore, an informant says; “it is important to
say that safety cannot be understood by some
numerical value as it is bound by the context in which
it emerges” (I11). Ultimately, an informant assesses
that we should; “let humans do what humans do best
and let machines do what they do best, then assist
each other” (I14). The crew is present to act on
sudden, unforeseen, dangerous situations and handle
such situations all the time without drawing on
external parties (S. Eriksen 2020, 89).
4.5 Technological Glorification
The second false belief is that of potential gains from
doing technology simply because it is technologically
possible and cool (I14). There appears to be a
discrepancy between the land-based actors’ idea of a
modern vessel and what is currently possible with the
infrastructure of the sea. Such misalignments and
unreal expectations lead users to abandon technology
as critical issues and constant problems inhibit
adoption (Krause-Jensen, Hansen, and Skårup 2020, 7,
20). The reliability of systems at sea carries important
significance. The technician is not just around the
corner and consequences can be devastating at
unfathomable levels. Where an entrepreneur might be
willing to take risks of losing their investment, the risk
measures greater for a Captain and their crew. Risks
include human lives, man-made natural disasters, and
innumerable amounts of monetary loss. Toying with
new and fancy technology just because one can,
should not be an argument for the pursuit. Such a
discrepancy can be harmful to the much more useful
technological development that we so desperately
need (Hancock et al. 2013, 10; Krause-Jensen, Hansen,
and Skårup 2020, 41; Kristensen 2022, 25). As an
informant describes the technical characteristics of a
ship are spot on and need to be understood by all;
“We need to remember when characterizing a ship, it
is extremely low-tech [...] nothing like a plane or a
train [...] a ship is multiple different systems
connected from multiple different brands and
manufacturers using different methods and having
different rules, so nothing is standardized. A ship
works, yes, but at the same time, it never really works
[...] so you place 20 crew members on board, running
around 12 hours a day to try to keep the vessel afloat
and get from A to B
. This is the context we should
think about when thinking about automating ships”
(I11). Noting that this quote only deals with the
complexity of one ship and does not recognize that
similar ships in a fleet further differentiate in
equipment and systems. It is sort of a microcosmos
composed of elements from all over the world. It is
quite normal for systems to be supplied by more than
15 different manufacturers (Krause-Jensen, Hansen,
and Skårup 2020, 8).
The need for streamlining systems is problematic
for progress. Manufacturers often worry about
production costs, not integration capacities resulting
in a low ability for the system to work together with
the operator. This causes technology, even though
introduced to reduce error, to in some cases directly
contribute to accidents (Grech and Lemon 2015, 2–4).
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As technology increasingly becomes a vital
support function for humans, the role of the navigator
is changing from being a controller to a supervisor of
systems. Technology is becoming increasingly
complex and systems’ full capabilities can be
overwhelming, while the human operator has
remained stationary and does not follow the
exponential path (Grech and Lemon 2015, 2; Lundh
and Rydstedt 2016, 2–3; Man, Lundh, and MacKinnon
2019, 2). It is a known challenge within shipping
companies to provide attention to crew competency
development (Froholdt 2010). It is a major democratic
problem as responsibilities are not subjected to
change. As the final decision maker, the seafarers
should be included to ensure the operator has the
required skill and knowledge to sufficiently operate
and supervise the system (Man, Lundh, and
MacKinnon 2019, 2–3). Seafarers still have the final
call, they will decide what action to take and be held
responsible. The importance of the system’s ability to
facilitate the navigator in the unique settings where
the pot is boiling and an overview of the situation is
vital e.g., in the unavoidable case of system or
machinery breakdown. Those are the situations where
the systems are needed most (Grech and Lemon 2015,
11). These are the situations that can only be prepared
for by involving those who have the experience. And
the deliberate absence of the same means that the
scope of technological glorification is undemocratic.
4.6 Barrier Three - Funding
The last selected barrier requires a short prelude.
As an example of the technology criticized in the
previous chapter, autonomy in navigational systems
has been described as a pinnacle for bringing down
emissions from the shipping industry (by Danish
Shipping). Looking at ShippingLab, half of the budget
for ShippingLab is earmarked for autonomy research
and development (ShippingLab 2022). When opening
the discussion on the topic of technologification,
whether or not one believes in total digitalization and
autonomy, it does seem peculiar to address self-
sailing crewless vessels as a solution when global
connectivity infrastructure is unable to sustain usable
connections for daily operation. Sunbae Hong from
the Korean Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, in a
presentation at Digtal@Sea 2021, calls for addressing
the challenges in global maritime digitalization. He
calls for collaboration between stakeholders to reach a
state within shipping that can support the very basic
level of digitalization on a global scale (Hong 2021).
Going back to Blue Denmark, it leaves one wondering
about the actions taken when autonomous shipping
becomes a top priority when, simultaneously, the
world’s maritime stage is trying to figure out how to
ensure basic connectivity to the world’s oceans.
The third barrier is funding strategies. Is the
technology to be developed chosen in accord with
trending hot and sexy topics while leaving more
boring yet necessary-for-us-as-all projects for others?
It poses a problem if funding focuses on individual
success and not the progress of the world, as declared
by Hong; “focus on progress, not perfection, one step
made together is more powerful than 10 steps made
by one country” (Hong 2021).
An informant mentions that; “we see the same
logic in many other places in society” (I4). This can
mean that research and projects can be influenced by
trending topics. There are similarities to global social
trends, something that an informant concurs with; “if
we take society as a whole I think we can establish
that there is an overexcitement towards technology
[...] that technology will come and fix all the problems
of the world” (I9). Arguably this trend has gotten a
foothold within Blue Denmark, as the informant
continues; “like the rest of society, there is overweight
of focus on the technology, but I do not think it is with
bad intentions, it is just following society where fancy
exponential technologies are mentioned everywhere,
so naturally, that is what attracts funding” (I9).
Hard science and quantitative data have mainly
been in focus in shipping when presenting the state of
business (Viktorelius, Varvne, and von Knorring
2022). Similarly, it appears that trends decide what
research gets prioritized and that appears to be
reflected by funding structures. Funding strategies
rarely specify expectations for user involvement but
focus on hard science statements, as an informant
shares; “it is my opinion that it is easier to get funding
for technical research in place of social sciences, I do
not carry in statistics, but it is my opinion, the
technical stuff is the big trend right now” (I7). Which
is peculiar as it is common to; “assume that having a
more humanistic instead of purely technical approach
would enable a higher applicability” (I7).
The funding system appears to influence how Blue
Denmark seemingly chooses to focus on technical
experts and their artifacts more than the users and
their practices. When discussing what impacts the
operation of project facilitators it seems plausible that
they are influenced by more powerful actors, an
informant states; “it is about creating jobs, and
promoting the Danish maritime industry, if you
cannot do that, then it is not a Fund’s project
[depending on the Fund]” (I9).
Furthermore, technical experts try and keep their
current societal validation, as an informant talks about
the power of technical experts; “[...] they hold on to
the idea that pure technology is fantastic, so when
they tell the story they make it seem like it was
technology in itself that did it” (I4). AI, e.g., is
extremely resource-demanding and dependent on
human work such as setting the framework, sorting
the data, and maintaining it. Granted, quantification is
next to impossible for a human to do but as an
informant explains; “[...] at the end of all that work,
indeed, you can say, AI did it. It is like saying it was
the nuclear physicists that won World War 2” (I4).
After which they address; “[...] the same as every
other sector, not because the tech industry is worse
than others, they are simply extremely privileged at
the moment. A sort of unjustified power that lets them
dominate the narrative” (I4).
Unfortunately, this upholds the assumption that
technological greatness is a technical expert thing. As
the board member argues, campaigning and lobbying
are not free services; “researching technology is big
business so there is an ongoing quest of justifying
continued research” (I4). Arguably, when such
systems are driven by what is trending, it adds a layer
of ineffectiveness to positive change.
637
The structures of funding sometimes remove the
true context from innovation as it becomes a goal to
secure funds. A project facilitator mentions; “[...]
sometimes it is very easy to see in the application that
they are trying to appease us with what they think we
want” (I1). It can be traced to trends like the use of
certain terminologies that are used simply because of
their power in society, as the project facilitator
continues; “sometimes it is more the fact that there is
an argument, than the quality of that argument, that
means something [...] like it does not matter what you
answer as long as you answer” (I1). Such projects are
doomed at once, as he states; “in those cases, for sure
it will not get implemented, because it does not matter
to them” (I1). Possibly we as a society do not have
unlimited time therefore it is a harmful way of
looking at progress, as an informant observes; “there
are seemingly no consequences from exaggerating
what a project is capable of achieving, they just get
another try” (I4).
If the mentioned barriers to not involving seafarers
in the development of technology, replacing humans,
and technologification, are combined, we can look at a
defining trait of the system funding strategies and
trace barriers back to here. Involving the user and
assuring application must be considered already at
the funding stages.
5 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
User involvement usually first emerges when
technology is implemented and operational
malfunctions manifest themselves. There are no
formal standardized methods for ensuring user
involvement. Often, solutions are top-down
implemented and alien to their users, thus assessing
the system as rather undemocratic. There is a risk that
solutions will oppress seafarers, reducing the chance
of adoption. Which means the needed
technologification is postponed. The system is very
complex which makes it difficult to determine who
should be responsible for keeping in touch with the
seafarers.
The green transition is a topic everyone knows,
and this is a subject to agree and collaborate on.
However, a disconnect to real-life practices enters. It is
the impression that the system is mainly concerned
with the artifact of technology, influenced by trends
and funding practices. User involvement is not alien
to any of the actors, but it is not a normal,
standardized practice either.
It is a challenge as Blue Denmark is too massive an
entity for anyone one individual to be held
responsible. The system is a mesh of so many
different actors with varying agendas. It is genuinely
a microcosmos. An informant mentions that project
facilitators are connected and collaborate only
competing on funding and stakeholders’ time (I9).
They ensure that other companies have a
collaborative space, this is something that is
constantly under development; “we have creators
who focus on action-based research and bring more
disciplines in [...] and through that evolve some
methodologies that can help in future development”
(I1). This appears to have a positive effect on the
system. However, it is only a place for ideas to grow
and nothing will change without the businesses'
support.
If a project facilitator does not interact with the
end-user but leaves it up to the shipping company to
take care of that part, it leaves the shipping company
in charge of something they perhaps will not keep to,
as told by an informant at a shipping company; “no,
we do not have that much focus on the end-users on
the ship, but we ensure to collect as many
perspectives as possible when discussing these
technologies” (I9). Shipping companies can appear to
act as gatekeepers and designated user facilitators by
other actors. Actors seem aware of the value user
involvement has, as they continue; “gaining mutual
understanding can help avoid many of the traps of
inducing change with unwanted consequences that
affect others negatively, because you just did not see it
from that perspective” (I9).
Shipping companies might increasingly face this
responsibility if user involvement activities were
funded from the beginning when the technologies
were conceptualized and also later on when they are
developed and implemented. This will force and
award the different actors in Blue Denmark to reflect
and act on user involvement.
However, understanding users' practices has been
revealed to be more problematic as ex-seafarers and
academies often represent actual users. In some cases,
actual seafarers are consulted but typically only
Captains. The system must ensure that the people
who get to represent the seafarers' practices represent
actual practices, not the academy’s, not the captain’s,
and not former seafarers’, but the real deal. The actual
end-users must be involved.
While there is consensus on the importance of user
involvement in the system, there are uncertainties as
to how it can be achieved, a challenge noticed by an
informant; “the end-user cannot be a technology
expert, of course, it is not their job, they have a ship to
navigate. So naturally, there is a difficult task
incorporating them in a workshop, etc.” (I9).
Furthermore, it can be a practical challenge to test the
technology on a vessel, as an informant assesses; “I
think it will be difficult to establish procedures for
testing the technology on vessels due to their trade
and the complexity of ship operations [...]” (I7).
While this might be speculative, something that is
not is that shelved technology caused by seafarers and
land-based actors not understanding each other,
resulting in technology holding no ground in reality,
does not solve anything. It does not make the operator
or their ship any safer, more environmentally
friendly, or better in any way. It is a waste of time,
money, and resources. Therefore, what can be done in
the early stages of developing technology, should be
done. The true purpose of technology should be
known and appreciated by all actors. It is damaging to
technological advancement and the green transition if
seafarers understand technology as an enemy and not
as a digital colleague.
Based on multi-sited fieldwork at different sites of
technology development in Blue Denmark (what we
call the system) we have in this contribution selected
638
three central barriers for the involvement of end-
users. The first barrier is an ambivalent understanding
of who constitutes the user to be involved. The second
barrier regards the purpose of developing new
technologies in Blue Denmark that are centered on
efficiency, automation of human work tasks, and
technological glorification rather than on addressing
socio-ecological challenges. The two mentioned
barriers are both underpinned by the third one that is
existing funding structures. Thus, if funding
structures would increasingly award user
involvement, it could generate clarification of who the
users are and reorient the goals of technological
innovation.
Ultimately user involvement in the system fails
because it generally focuses on the artifact and the
claims of technical experts while the constellation is
hostile to changing structures. It appears that there is
a need for a democratic intervention in Blue Denmark
to support further technological advancement in the
service of green transition. This democratic
reorientation we suggest is initiated in the funding
structures of technological innovation in the maritime
sector. Actors of the system mean well and strive for
a better world. However, becoming lost in the
complexity of the shipping world. The funding of
transdisciplinary work could be a positive way to
structure and facilitate further technologification of
Blue Denmark. By bridging the many different sites of
the system, a holistic view of how technology should
be developed can be acquired. The system’s
understanding of technology must become more
inclusive referring not only to the technical artifact but
also to the practices of people.
APPENDIX 1: SITES & INFORMANTS
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Main Affiliated Site Organization Description ID
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Development of Fund Strategies A fund in Blue Denmark A private fund with a focus on wild ideas I5
Product Testing, Implementation Accident Investigation An organ conducting research and investigating the I11
& Nursing root causes of accidents in Blue Denmark
Product Testing, Implementation A Captain and active An active captain who engages a lot with his shipping I13
& Nursing practitioner company to address issues with technology
Product Testing, Implementation Maritime Academy A Maritime Academy in Blue Denmark testing many I14
& Nursing modern technologies such as autonomy
Product Testing, Implementation Maritime Academy A Maritime Academy in Blue Denmark who also I10
& Nursing conducts research
Project Execution Maritime Startup A newly formed company developing a platform for I2
mutual learning at sea
Project Execution University and Project An organ that organizes research and functions I3
Facilitator
Project Execution Shipping Company A shipping company implementing new solutions I8
Project Execution Maritime Startup A start-up that has developed an innovative location I15
beacon for maritime personnel
Project Execution Maritime Startup A start-up that developed an intelligent searchlight I6
for vessels
Project Facilitation Project Facilitator An independent collaborative platform for other I9
companies in Blue Denmark
Project Facilitation Maritime Knowledge and An initiative to facilitate and broadcast research across I7
Project Facilitator Blue Denmark
Project Facilitation Project Facilitator ShippingLab is a public-funded initiative to address the I1
climate crisis through technical innovation directly
Societal Change of Direction University An anthropologist, Senior Researcher, and Author I12
Creating Trends
Societal Change of Direction University A Professor in Techno-Anthropology and Science and I4
Creating Trends Technology Studies
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX 2: OVERVIEW OF WORKSHOPS AND OTHER EVENTS
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Events An Update on Maritime Autonomous Navigation (07-03-22)
Autonomous Ships from the Perspective of Operation and Maintenance (06-10-21)
Autonomy ships and new paradigm (25-10-21)
DanaDynamics Presentation 2021 (31-08-21)
Digital Harbor (01-03-22)
Digital Tech Summit 2021 (30-11, 01-12-21)
Human + Tech = Problems? (28-10-21)
InnoFounder and InnoBooster (04-03-22)
Marine Sustainability by Digitalization (2021-2022)
ShippingLab Conference (24-11-21)
Summer Business Networking 2021 (25-08-21)
TechBBQ 2021 (16,17-09-21)
The New AI Regulation (09-03-22)
Values and Norms of the Green Transition in Blue Denmark (28-01-22)
World Maritime Technology Conference 2022 (26-04-22)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Workshops Maritime Competencies of the Future (01-10-21)
Predicting future trends based on past predictions (26-04-22)
User Involvement (16-11-21)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Projects The Connected Ship (2021)
VHF Data Exchange System (VDES) (2021)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
639
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