221
1 INTRODUCTION
“Evacuation”describesanemergencyresponseaction
that is implemented during a situation associated
with immediate peril for the lives of all people
onboardavessel(crewandpassengers).Duringthese
crucial moments, the main goal is to muster
everybodyswiftly and efficiently;unfortunately,any
inabilitytotake
effectiveactions/decisionscanleadto
seriousdelaysinabandoningthevessel. Afailure in
timely evacuation of crew and passengers can be
provenfatal,sincetheavailabletime(aftertheorder
ofabandonment)isofutmostimportance.Duringthis
short time frame, which as per the guidelines of
SOLAS shall not
exceed 30 minutes, the passengers
and crew shall be gathered to the Muster Stations,
boardedtotheevacuationmeans(lifeboats,life‐rafts)
anddepartfromthevesselindistress.Although,this
three‐step ship evacuation process seems relatively
simple, over the years, a significant number of life‐
losses have occurred.
The reasons behind the
casualtiesvarywidelybetweenincidents,butinmost
cases,they canbeattributedtohumanerrors,design
and layout failures and of course the variable
circumstances under which the abandonment was
conducted,sincethecauseofabandonmentisdecisive
fortheoverallevacuationoutcome.
IMO,bytaking
intoconsiderationtheneedofthe
markettoproduceshipsofconsiderablesize/carrying
capacityandrecognizingthecomplexityofthedesign
for Cruise or Passenger vessels, over the years has
issued circulars which prescribe certain calculating
formulas that shall be adopted by naval architects
during the ship design phase.
These formulas are
used to measure theefficiency of the ship designin
case of an emergency evacuation by recreating an
evacuation scenario and measuring if the desired
Investigating Abandonment Errors in Cruise/Passenger
Ships: Researching the Reasons Leading to Life-Losses
During an Evacuation
A.Andreadakis
1
,D.Dalaklis
1
&N.Nikitakos
2
1
WorldMaritimeUniversity,Malmoe,Sweden
2
UniversityoftheAegean,Chios,Greece
ABSTRACT:OverthecourseoftimeandundertheauspicesoftheInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO),
safetyatseahassignificantlyincreased.Numerousregulationshavebeenadoptedinanefforttoincreasesafety
standardsonboardshipsandreducetheprobabilityofaccidents.Unfortunately,abandonment
proceduresstill
remainatlargeinefficient.AveryindicativeexampleisprovidedbytheevacuationofCostaConcordia,which
lastedmorethan6hours,althoughtheInternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea(SOLAS)dictates
thistypeofoperationshouldnotexceed30minutes.Thisresearcheffortaimsto
provideaclearunderstanding
tothecausesbehindtheinefficienciesandflawsexistinginthecurrentevacuationprocedures.Bydeployinga
qualitative method, causes behind the accidents and how thesecan affect the abandonment process will be
explored;contributionsofthehumanelementandhowthepsychological/behavioralattributesofpeople
can
affect the outcome of an evacuation will be included. Finally, the design of passenger/cruise ships will be
discussedinanattempttoidentifypossibleareasofimprovement.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 18
Number 1
March 2024
DOI:10.12716/1001.18.01.23
222
evacuation times are fulfilled. The objective behind
thisisnotonlyfindingthebest,butalsotheshortest,
evacuation routes and identifying the approximate
required time of evacuating all people onboard.
Furthermore, apart from the structural and design
featuresofavessel,alargepart oftheoutcomeof
a
ship’s abandonment is directly linked to the human
element. From crew to passengers, the impact of
people is of significant importance in any social
environment, especially when they are found under
threat and their reactions in the face of danger
diversifies greatly. Therefore, the International
Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification
andWatchkeepingforSeafarers(STCW)andSOLAS
have established safety and training procedures that
shall be followed (both by crew and passengers)
beforeandaftertheirembarkationonpassengerships.
These safety procedures aim to familiarize the
passengerswiththeprocessesandstepsthatshallbe
followed during an
emergency situation onboard a
ship,withtheultimategoalbeingtoavoiddelaysthat
canleadtofatalresults.
Thispaperattemptstoapproachthetopicofship
evacuation holistically by initially presenting the
causes and accidents that can lead to the need of
abandonmentduringaship’sjourney.Furthermore,it
presents the ship design methods that have been
developed in order to ease the evacuation and
identifies the shortcomings that still exist in these
methods and can inhibit the effectiveness of
abandonment procedures. Finally, the following
research discusses the complexity of human nature
when it is faced with anunprecedented
danger and
how human behaviors can detrimentally influence a
passengership’sevacuationprocedure.
2 METHODOLOGY
This study was conducted by utilizing a semi‐
systematic literature review and particular attention
was paid to the current training standards and
procedures (as required by the STCW), which are
followed during the certification process for
every
crewmember and Officer. Moreover, this literature
review process included various peer‐reviewed
articlesintheopenliterature,attemptingtoprovidea
clearinsighttothementalandpsychologicalstatethat
thecrew/passengersexperienceduringanevacuation.
Asithasbeenobservedduringaship’sabandonment,
peoplecanexhibitvarious
irrationalbehaviors,afact
thatcannegativelyimpacttheproceduresbycausing
further confusion and delays. Additionally, the
research covered the situational constraints that can
furtherly hinder the evacuation as they are
unpredictable and inconsistent, e.g., the weather
conditions, speed of escalation of the damages the
vessel is enduring, etc. Relevant
grey literature
documents (special reports and/or International
Codes/Regulations) were used, often in conjunction
withpeer‐reviewliterature,aimingtogetsupporting
materialandobjectiveopinionsaroundaccidentsthat
influencedlargelythecourseofthemodernshipping
industry and to showcase the changes and
amendmentsinInternationalRegulations.
3 DISCUSSION
3.1
ShipDesign
The advancement of the modern naval architecture
during the last thirty years has led to a trend of
building larger passenger vessels (cruise
ships/ferries), capable of accommodating thousands
of passengers [1], with the largest cruise ship today
being capable of transporting approximately seven
thousand passengers. As the world is
progressively
recoveringfromthedevastatingeffectsoftheCOVID‐
19pandemic,theInstituteofShippingEconomicsand
Logistics, reports that the Cruise Lines International
Association(CLIA)[2]expectsthatbytheendof2023
the passenger numbers will surpass the pre‐COVID‐
19 levels, reaching an increase of 12% in
2024,
compared to 2019. Moreover, it shall be mentioned
that the passenger ship industry contributes
significantly to the global economy, generating a
revenue surpassing 154 billion USD in 2019, as
reported by CLIA. Therefore, in an ever‐growing
passenger ship market, the design/durability of the
shipisofultimateimportancein
ordertoachievethe
ultimatelevel ofsafetyforpassengersandto ensure
the profitability of the cruise and ferry market.
Nevertheless, it can be understood that a voyage at
sea increases the safety risk for each individual
onboard.AsperthereportsubmittedbyAllianz[3]in
2022,between
theyears2011‐2021,72passengerships
were lost. In addition, according to Table 1,
approximately2600peoplelosttheirlivesinvarious
disastersbetween2011‐2016[4].
Table1.PassengerShipAccidentsandfatalitiesfrom2011–
2016
________________________________________________
ShipNameTypeFatalities Year
________________________________________________
MVSpiceIslander PassengerFerry 1,529 2011
CostaConcordiaCruiseShip322012
MVSTThomasAquinas PassengerFerry 120 2013
MVSewolPassengerFerry 304 2014
DongfangZhiXing CruiseShip442 2015
AungSoeMoeKyaw2 PassengerFerry 992016
Total2,526
________________________________________________
Source:Createdbytheauthors,basedondataavailablein
thepaper:Determinants,methods,andsolutionsof
evacuationmodelsforpassengerships:systematicliterature
reviewbyArshadetal,2022.
Especially after the incident of M/V Estonia, that
resultedinthelossoflifefor851people,theIMOhas
taken decisive measures in order to reinforce the
onboard safety of vessels [5], starting from
establishing effective measures and standard quality
assurance procedures from the design phase of a
vessel.Part
oftheseproceduresrefertothecapability
of a vessel in maintaining stability after excessive
water intake or constructional fire protection,
adequacy of essential ship systems and ultimately
evacuationarrangementsasthefinalsafetymeasure,
if everything fails [6]. Over the years, regulations
concerningtheoptimizationofshipdesignhave
been
developedandadopted by SOLAS and a number of
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) Circulars have
beenalsointroduced,aimingtosetclearerdirections
towards the design of the “evacuation ability” of a
passengership.Moreprecisely,SOLASinChapterII‐
1/2 [7], dictates the structure and stability
requirementsthata
vesselshallbeequippedwith,in
223
order to accommodate high‐safety levels under any
unanticipated incident. Furthermore, the MSC/ Circ.
1033 that came into effect in 2002 describes the
methods of evacuation analysis that shall be
performedduringthedesignphaseofavesselorthe
modificationofanexistingshipinservice,inorder
to
bedeterminediftheabandonmentcanbeperformed
in the established time frame (30 minutes as per
SOLASCh.III/Reg.21.1.4)[7].
AspertheGuidelinesofferedbyMSC/Circ.1033,
therearetwodistinctmethodsthatcanbeutilized:
1. Asimplifiedevacuationanalysis;and/or
2. Anadvanced
evacuationanalysis
The simplified method analysis is based on the
“fluid‐dynamic principle”, where the corridors and
stairs of the vessel’s interior are considered as the
tubes,whilethepassengersarethefluid“whichflows
inside them”. For the accurate analysis execution, a
specialized procedure is followed, based on
algorithms
and calculations that are defined in the
Circular.Ontheotherhand,theadvancedevacuation
analysis, views the passengers individually with
distinct features; aiming to take into consideration
people of all ages and physical well‐being, that
consequentlyaffectslargelytheirwalkingspeedand
their ability to move rapidly through adverse
conditions.Thecalculationoftheevacuationtimesis
based on virtual‐reality software, that utilize
algorithmsandmethodsprescribedintheCircular[8].
Based on these guidelines, the desired evacuation
time(30minutesasperSOLASCh.III/Reg.21.1.4)[7]
is set as the objective function, consequently the
available
evacuation time is a natural constraint.
During the calculations, if the computed evacuation
time exceeds theavailable time, then the evacuation
plan shall be revised. In case that even after the
revisions, a solution satisfying the given limitations
cannot be found, then modifications should be
introducedtothecurrentlayoutof
theescaperoutes.
Whenfinally,thedesignoftheevacuationroutesand
the evacuation plan are corresponding to the
prescribedrequirements,thedesignprocesscanmove
tothenextstep[9,1].
Inbothcases,theadoptedalgorithmsallowforthe
calculation on whether or not the laid design is
corresponding
to the SOLAS requirements for the
evacuationofpassengerships.Furthermore,themain
objective of the methods is to avoid possible jams
towards the emergency exits and to reduce the
evacuationtimeasmuchaspossible,aimingtoavoid
possiblecasualtiesortheconditionoftheabandoning
vessel to go out
of control [1]. On 2016 the
MSC.1/Circ.1533[10]wasissuedbytheIMO,inorder
to renew and revise the existingguidelinesas setin
Circular1033andmademandatorythedetermination
of the evacuation time during the design phase of
every new passenger ship (the analysis was also
recommendedforexistingpassengershipsinservice),
usingtheaforementionedmethods.
Nevertheless, based on the opinion of various
scholars, the evacuation analysis methods that have
been adopted by the IMO, although they address
issuesconcerningthelayoutofthemainescaperoutes
and passenger demographics, fail to take into
consideration the
problems evoking during real life‐
threateningconditions[11].Since,thenatureofeach
incident is unique, every detail can impact the
evacuation process widely. For example, the heel
and/ortrimoftheship(duetowaterintake),canlead
to halting the movement of the evacuees due to
inclined escape
routes, and additionally large
inclinations(morethan20degrees)canseverelyaffect
the deploying ability of the evacuation systems, an
eventthatobservedduringtheM/VEstoniaincident
in 1994 [12,13]. Moreover, the behavioral patterns
displayedbythepassengerscanwidelyvarybetween
totalimmobility to excessive overreactions[13], thus
affecting
theprogressoftheabandonmentprocedure.
Anotherimportantunweightedfactoristhereactions
of the crew thataredirectly linked totheir personal
familiarity with theevacuationprocedures and their
abilitytocopewithstressfulsituations.
Taking into consideration those issues,
considerable effort has been made into developing
refined software
models capable of simulating
analogousenvironmentsduringthedesignphaseofa
ship. In that way the designer would be able to
retrieve a full spectrum of possible scenarios, hence
enabling the construction of a safer vessel. Over the
years an extensive amount of digital modeling tools
hasbeencreatedwith
differentandlargecapabilities,
indicativelybutnotlimitedtothesearethefollowing:
1. Maritime Exodus: Incorporates the prescribed
evacuationanalysismethodswithtrialdataofthe
behavior of passengers under conditions of trim
andlist.
2. VRVelos:Providesasimulationtoolthatisbased
on the recreation of
abandonment conditions by
utilizingvirtualreality.
3. AENEAS: A fast performing simulation tool that
can be utilized in handling large numbers of
passengers.
4. IMEX:Anevacuationmodelthatintegrateshuman
behaviormodelingwithdynamics.
5. BYPASS:Asimplecellular‐automationmodel.
These simulation platforms (without the
aforementioned list being exhaustive)
enclose vastly
developedtechnologicalsolutions, aiming toachieve
close proximity to real‐life emergency conditions. A
number of them can even construct and employ the
use of “avatars”, capable of having roles as
passengers, crew‐members, family‐groups (as the
dynamic of people related with each other differs,
compared to
individuals). Furthermore, among
others,theycanrecreateinterchangeableweatherand
stability conditions that are experienced during
emergencyevents happeninginopenseaconditions.
Themajorityoftheavailableprogramsarecapableof
creating evacuation analyses by using both of the
proposed evacuation analysis methods (simplified
and advanced) as indicated by the
Circulars, and
ultimately to provide a comparison between them
[11].
However, literature shows that even though a
significantprogresshasbeenmadetowardsrecreating
evacuation simulation that corresponds to reality
conditions, there are still serious shortcomings that
might impede an abandonment procedure. By
dividing the evacuation factors into configuration,
environment,
procedure and human behavior and
consideringthatinordertotakearealisticevacuation
overview,allofthemshouldbeequallyclassified;it is
224
observedthatduetocomputationalabilitylimitations,
technical difficulties, and application characteristics,
the systems do not take all the factors in equal
consideration [14]. Moreover, there are no digital
platforms capable of recreating “actual” human
behavior. Most digital programs used during ship
design are able to represent only basic
human
behavioral norms, suchas evacuationpath selection,
groupbehavior,walkingspeed,etc.However,dueto
the complexity of human nature, especially during
mental and psychological challenges, the effects of
panic, fatigue, and other unexpected behaviors,
cannotbequantified.
3.2 HumanElement
Thetopicofshipevacuationincorporatesaquitewide
research spectrum, which encompasses various
different aspects; among them are the impact of the
event(s) leading to the need of evacuation, the
condition and structure of the impaired vessel, the
design of the vessel, the evacuation means.
Unfortunately, human psychology and behavior
regarding the topic of ship abandonment occupies
only
asmallpartoftheexistingresearch[15].Human
behavior can greatly affect the outcome of an
evacuation, as individuals are prone to displaying a
multitudeofattitudesinfluencedbydifferentfactors,
such as age, physical condition, familiarity with the
space, nature of the disaster, whether they are
travellingaloneor
withfriends/family,etc.Itcanbe
understood that a delay in passenger mustering can
leadto delays that ultimatelycan lead to major life‐
losses. As per [16] the abandonment process can be
dividedinthreemainstages:
Pre‐movementphase:Itinitiatesafteranalarmhas
been
activated.Duringthisperiod,thepeopleare
attempting to collect information about the
unveiling situation from passengers and crew
around them, but they are also observing the
behaviors and actions of the people surrounding
them. In several cases this period can be quite
long‐lasting, as humans tend to ignore the
first
emergency and alarm signs and continue their
routine. This behavior can be directly associated
withdenial.Ithasbeenobservedthatpeoplefailto
acceptthattheirlifeandsafetyisindangerandon
the contrary they try to connect the ongoing
warningstopastfalsealarms.These
canbelinked
tothefactthatpeoplegenerallyreactandperform
pre‐plannedbehaviorsandnormsthattheyusein
their daily life activities. Consequently, when a
novelsituationappearsthereisanimmediateneed
of generating a new behavioral pattern that will
helpthem correspondeffectively.Thispressuring
needs
in the majority of cases might lead to
freezingandinabilitytoact.Itshallbealsotaken
intoconsiderationthatpeoplearesocialcreatures
and are directly influenced and affected by the
behaviorofthepeopleintheirclosevicinity.Itcan
be understood therefore, that the individual
reaction
to an emergency is directly linked to
“massreaction”.
Motion Process: This phase commences after the
passengers(and crew) onboardhave come tothe
realizationthatthereisanimminentthreattotheir
lifeandtheyhavetotakeaction.Itischaracterized
by wayfinding decisions and activities that the
passengers shall follow during the limited given
time.Duringthisphasethepeopleshallselectthe
most efficient path, from their initial unsafe
position to a safer one (e.g., life‐boat, life‐raft,
musterstation).Furthermore,peopleareaskedto
follow the crew’s instructions and guidance, in
order to avoid
congestion and formation of
crowds. This can be considered the most
demanding, important and crucial stage of the
wholeevacuationprocedure,asthesuccessofthe
procedure is dependent on various factors that
shall be takenequally intoconsideration, such as
the familiarity of the passengers with the
evacuation procedures and
with the vessel, the
guidanceofthecrewtowardsthepassengersthat
is directly linked to their leadership and
management abilities and also on the quality of
trainingthathasbeenreceivedbythem.Sinceitis
inhuman naturetofollowand trust figures with
authority, it can be
understood that wrongful
instructionsandguidancecanbeprovenfatal.
Achievementofthesafeplace: Thisis considered
the last phase during a ship’s emergency
evacuation and it involves the embarkation
process of the passengers and crew to the
evacuation vessel and in continuation to that the
launchofthe
safetymeans.
Havingexplainedthemainstagesofanevacuation
procedure,aimingtoshowcasetheprocessesthatan
individualisfacingduringanemergencycondition,a
more deep and thorough examination of the human
behaviorsisrequiredinordertoexaminewhathides
behind the delays that can ultimately lead
to
casualties. It shall be mentioned that no simulation
canproviderobustresultsaroundthebehavioraland
psychological patterns that individuals experience
duringreal‐lifeemergencies [17]. Thiscan be clearly
attributedtothefactthatduringevacuationtrialsthe
peopleareawareofthefactthattheirlivesarenot
in
dangerandtheyarejustapartofastatisticalresearch,
thus they act rationally. In contrast, during real‐life
emergencies that decisions tend to be seriously
influencedbytheirsurroundings(behaviorsofothers,
unveilingconditions,etc.),thepeopletendtodisplay
various behavioral patterns and emotions that can
delaytheoutcomeoftheevacuation.Thesebehaviors
areoftencharacterizedas“panic”.
Image1. Impulsive reactions of people during a cruise
ship’s evacuation, Source: The Royal Institution of Naval
Architects
225
Many debates between scholars can be found on
whetherornotpanicoccursbetweentheindividuals
aftertheorderofevacuationhasbeengiven.Keating
[18] supports that in order for an attitude to be
classified as “panic behavior” it shall include four
essentialelements:firstly,thereisa
willingness‐hope
to escape through routes (or either means) that are
either inaccessible or insufficient for granting to the
individual a safe passage. Secondly, the behavior
exhibitedis contagiousbetween the concentrationof
people and is usually initiated and transmittable to
thecrowd byanindividualwhohasaleadershiprole.
Thirdly,eachpersondisplaysaggressivenesstowards
other people in the close vicinity and is concerned
solely for his personal safety, while being totally
indifferentforthewell‐beingoftheothers.Finally,the
mass is unable to exhibit rational and logical
responses to the surrounding circumstances. Often,
peoplearenot
awareofthesurroundingdangersand
conditionsandresorttoactionsthataredangerousto
themselves, such as attempting using the elevator
instead of stairs during the abandonment. Ockerby
[19], seemingly agrees to the aforementioned by
supportingthat“Panicisassociatedwithnon‐coping
behavior”, and he adds that regularly during
emergencies panic is confused with emotional and
mentalstress,butneverthelessthevictimsareableto
maintain their sanity and respond effectively to the
occurring perils, while maintaining their concern
abouttheothers.That was observed alsoduringthe
sinking of M/S Estonia, that people in many cases
even though
they were facing extremely dangerous
conditions, were showing solidarity to others and
theyweretryingtoassisttotheextenttheycould.It
canbeunderstoodthereforethatpanicisnotinevery
case the cause behind the evacuation delays that
ultimatelyleadstofatalities.
HarbstandMadsen[20]believethat
delaysmight
occurduetothefactthatpassengersdo not paythe
requiredattentionduringthedrillsperformedatthe
initial stages of a voyage. People tend to
subconsciously accept the risk of each action they
take, and unfortunately, they are unprepared to act
when emergency calls. This is
mirrored usually in
every new environment individuals encounter. How
many people really study the emergency plan and
exits of a hotelor shiptheyembark on? Howmany
people really pay attentionto the safety instructions
before a plane’s takeoff [20]? It is understandable
thereforethatsinceamistakensafety perception
has
been formed inside them, the time needed to act
effectivelyinanemergencyscenariowillbeincreased
and also incorrect behaviors and actions might be
anticipated [15]. This phenomenon in combination
with the pre‐movement phase of the evacuation
process, where peopleare experiencing denial about
the ongoing reality
and thus, they are unable to
respond effectively to the new situation as initially
they refuse to believe that their life is under threat,
can increase even further the response time and
consequently affect furtherly the progress of the
evacuation.
Another common evacuation mistake is the
“delayed alarm”. It has been
observed in numerous
cases, that the Master and crew in charge might
postpone raising the alarm until it is absolutely
necessary. This attitude is based on the assumption
thatapossiblealarmwillcreate“panic”fromareally
earlystage,whereitisnotcertainiftheconditionof
the
shipwilldemandthenecessityofevacuation[19].
The concept of alarm delay was also used at M/S
Estoniawithdisastrousresultsforthepassengers,asa
lot of crucial time was lost. The US National
TransportationSafetyBoardsupportsthatadelayin
sounding the general alarm and directing to
the
muster stations the passengers and crew, can be
criticaltotheirsurvivalandwell‐beingandsupports
that“passengersshallbeawareoftherealconditions
from an early stage”. Moreover, since the speed of
escalationofthedamagethattheshiphasenduredis
unknown,alatealarm
mightbeprovenfatal[21].In
otherwords, leavingpassengers inignorancecanbe
classified as a gamble that can have catastrophic
consequences.
Anadditionalhighlyinfluentialfactortowardsthe
outcome of an evacuation, is the crew and their
capacity to act in emergencies. As dictated by the
STCWConvention[22]
everycrewmembereligibleto
work onboard a vessel, is obliged to undergo Basic
Training and familiarization (STCW Reg. VI/1). In
combination to that, SOLAS Chapter 3,Reg. 19.3 [7]
mandatesthatatleastoneabandon‐shipdrillshallbe
performed every month for merchant vessels and at
leastonce‐
a‐weekforpassengervessels,toensurethe
crew’s preparedness for emergency situations.
Furthermore, a drill within 24 hours since the
departureofthevesselfromaportshalltakeplacein
casethatanumberexceedingthe25%ofthecrewhas
notparticipatedinadrillduringthepast
month,oris
new.Despitetheexistenceofaregulatoryframework,
research suggests that in large cruise/ passenger
vessels which employ a considerable number of
people, it is common for inconsistencies to exist
between the training that the crew receives; as the
higher ranks tend to receive more training days
comparedtothelowerpositions[23].
Additionally,Szcześniak[24]claimsthatinseveral
cases the crew does not put adequate effort and
attentiontowards the correct and effectiveexecution
of onboard drills. Drills are treated by many crew
membersasaboringobligationthathastobefulfilled
duringtheir
sparetime,inordertocomplywiththe
International & Company requirements. As these
individualsareoverconfidentwiththeirabilities(this
is most commonly observed between older crew‐
members), they tend to limit their responses to the
minimum. Consequently, when a real‐life threat
appearsitisdoubtfulifthey
willbeabletorespond
effectively on time. Other scholars support that the
maritimecommunitylacksaneffectiveandinclusive
safetycultureonboardships,capableofallowingthe
creationofasafeplacethatwillbetteraccommodate
the exchange of ideas and perceptions equally
between all crew members [25]. It is
a common
phenomenon for lower crew ranks hesitating to
express their questions or opinions during drills or
safetymeetings,astheyareafraidofbeingmockedor
disregarded[26];thiscanleadtosevereconsequences
for the general human survival during a shipboard
emergency.Overall,itcanbesaidthat
crew’straining
playsa keyroleinthe outcomeof anabandonment.
Peoplehavethetendencytoobeyandfollowpeople
with authority or expect guidance from them [16];
therefore,itcanbeunderstoodthataninsufficientand
226
incapablecrewcanhavealethalimpactonthelivesof
passengers.
3.3 CausesbehindAccidents:
Manyfactorsandeventshappeningduringadisaster
can influence directly the survivability of crew and
passengersonboardavessel.Theextentoftheship’s
damage,seaconditions,waterdepth,proximitytothe
land,prevailingseason,weather,timeduringtheday,
are only few of the factors that can have a decisive
imprint in the outcome of a ship’s abandonment. A
fairlygoodexampletothisisthecomparisonbetween
TitanicandCostaConcordia,twostateoftheart(for
their time) cruise/passenger vessels
that both
sustainedstructuraldamagesandexcessiveflooding.
The main difference here is that Titanic sank in the
deep‐freezing waters of the North Atlantic Ocean,
around400milesfromtheclosestshore;whileCosta
Concordia ran aground inthe coast of Giglio Island
during the early days of 2012.
Even though the
accidentofCostaConcordiahappenedatadistanceof
approximately 300 meters from the land, the
evacuation lasted more than 6 hours and 32 people
lost their lives. It can be assumed that if the
circumstancesduringtheaccidentweredifferent,the
casualties would have been much higher
[24].
Although the conditions under which a disaster
occursplayanimportantroletowardstheoutcomeof
the evacuation, the success and effectiveness of an
evacuation procedure in most cases iscloselylinked
totheaccidentthathaspreceded.Whenitcomestoan
accident there are several possible occurrences
onboard a vessel that can lead to the need of
abandoning a ship. Based on a study published by
Cardiff University in2016 [28],which examined 693
accident cases based on accidents investigation
reportsrangingfrom2002to2016(Table2),thereare
5 main categories that maritime accidents can be
distributed: collision (including close quarters and
contact), grounding, fire (and explosion), lifeboat,
other (poor judgment, technicalfailure,poor design,
etc.).
Table2.MarineAccidentCasesfrom2002–2016
________________________________________________
TypesofAccidentsFrequency Percentage
________________________________________________
Collision,CloseQuarters&Contact 248 35.8
Other238 34.2
Grounding118 17.0
FireandExplosion669.8
Lifeboat233.3
Total693 100
________________________________________________
Source:Createdbytheauthors,basedondataavailablein
thepaper:Thecausesofmaritimeaccidentsintheperiod
2002‐2016byCardiffUniversity
As it can be understood, the most common
accidenttypeiscollision.Inadditiontothat(basedon
thegivenstudy)it shall be mentionedthatthemost
commoncauseofcollisionorclosequartersituationis
inadequatelookout.Thiscanbecloselylinkedtothe
misuseoftheavailabletechnology
ortheoverreliance
on it. It is supported as well that the inadequate
communication between crew members is another
contributing cause that can lead to a collision.
Furthermore, grounding is another major accident
category. It has been supported that inadequate
communication between personnel, wrong chart use
andinsufficientmanninglevels
aretheprimalcauses
behind grounding. It is also highlighted that a
groundingcanincreasemortalitiesconsiderably.Fire
and explosion accidents can be mainly attributed to
inadequate risk management and poor emergency
response after the occurrence of the event. It was
additionally found that insufficient maintenance of
equipmentonboardcancontribute
significantlyinthe
commencementofafireorexplosion.Itisimportant
tomentionthatasperareportpublishedbytheU.S.
NationalResearchCouncilin1991,thecasualties and
deaths following a fire accident can be on average
132% higher than from incidents where no fire or
explosions
haveoccurred.Thisisassociatedwiththe
factthatthesedevastatingeventsduetotheirnature
and the rapid progression of fires inthe majority of
cases,leavesmalltimewindowsfortheevacuationof
passengers and crew. As “Other Accidents” are
classified a wide variety of incidents that can have
catastrophic consequences on the vessel and its
occupants. The causes behind this category of
accidentscanbeanthropogenicorexternalfactors:
Anthropogenic Factors: Rule Violation, Alcohol,
Unsafe Speed, Overloading, Distraction, Fatigue,
etc.
External Factors: Weather, Technical failure,
Visibility,Traffic,SeaConditions.
Asitcanbeunderstoodthesefactors
varywidely
fromcasetocaseandareresponsibleforaroundone
thirdoftheoccurringaccidents.Furthermore,itshall
behighlightedthatthesurroundingcircumstancesan
accidentoccurs canhave a decisiveroletowardsthe
survivability of people. It has been observed that
mortalities during night‐time accidents are elevated
byapproximately17%[20].Thiscanbeaffiliatedwith
the fact that the evacuation time during darkness
periods lasts longer, mainly because the majority of
crewandpassengersareasleeporresting,compared
todaytimewherethemajorityofpeopleareawakeor
working. All in all, it can be
understood that the
accident leading to the need of evacuation, together
with the surrounding circumstances can greatly
influencethechancesofthesurvivabilityofcrewand
passengers before and during the abandonment
process. Based on the explanation of the
aforementioned accident types, that even though
thosedisastrous incidents can differ widely
between
themandcanoccurunderdifferentcircumstancesand
environments; the common denominator between
theminthemajorityofcasesisoncemorethehuman
element.
4 CONCLUSION
Thispaperanalyzedthevariousfactorsthatcanhave
a detrimental effect on the lives of crew and
passengersduringanevent
ofemergencyevacuation.
Asevacuationisamultidimensionaltopicandprocess
that encompasses a variety of elements, there was a
needofconductingdiverseresearchthatwouldtake
intoconsiderationdifferentinfluentialfactors during
an abandonment scenario, starting from the ship’s
designphaseandthemethodsthatareimplemented
to achieve
maximum safety and survival chances
during an emergency scenario. In continuation to
227
above, the nature of the accident and the influence
that can have in relation to the efficacy of the
evacuationprocessandthesurvivabilityofthepeople
onboardwasdiscussed.Finally,humanattributesand
theirrelatedeffectsduringtheeventofanevacuation
werediscussed.
More precisely, the paper
initially presented the
progress that has occurred in the cruise/passenger
industryduringthelastdecadesandtheneedofthe
industry of producing bigger vessels, able to
accommodatelargenumbersofpassengersandcrew.
Furthermore,thepaperdiscussedtheintroductionof
requirements and design analysis methods from the
IMO,whichshall
beadoptedbythenaval architects
during the ship design phase in order to examine
whether or not thedesign of the ship is determined
efficiently for the passenger and crew movement
during an evacuation. Additionally, the paper
analyzed the different evacuation analysis methods
proposedbytheIMOandshowcased
differentdigital
simulation programs that have been developed over
theyears,whilealsodisplayingtheshortcomingsand
limitations of the existing technology in the design
processes that can have adverse effects during an
evacuation.
Secondly, the paper discussed the connection
betweenamaritimeaccidentandtheoutcomeofthe
evacuation. More
specifically, a number of
approximately 700 maritime accidents was analyzed
andthecausesbehindtheaccidentsweredistributed
in5 different categories. Subsequently each category
wasanalyzedincombinationwithadditionalresearch
papers, in order to extract a safe conclusion around
the effects of each accident in the abandonment
aftermath.
Moreover, the paper elaborated furtherly
onthesignificanceofthesurroundingcircumstances
at the time of the accident and on their catalytic
influenceinlife‐threateningconditions.
Finally,theinfluenceofthehumanelementduring
an abandonment scenario was analyzed. Because of
thecomplexityofhumanpsychologyandreactionsin
the
face of danger, there are many different and
opposing opinions around human behavior during
moments of peril that can have harmful effects on
humans and especially during an evacuation event.
Furthermore, several human behaviors that are
displayedduringmomentsofdangerwerediscussed,
inanefforttoshedlightbehind
theevacuationdelays
and fatalities. At last, common practices and
perceptions of the crew during emergency
circumstanceswereexplainedandcommonincorrect
attitudes of crew and passengers towards drills and
trainingwerehighlighted.
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