95
1 INTRODUCTION
Seafaring has always depended on marshalling the
laws of buoyancy to attain floatability and stability.
The law of buoyancy deal with the upward
counterforces of a bodyʹs downward gravitational
forcewhenimmersedinfluid[1].Buoyancyisequal
to a bodyʹs fluid displacement, which enables
the
explanation why bodies (ships) can float in water.
More specific, if the density of the fluid a body
displacesishigherthanthedensityofthebodyitself,
thenthebodywillfloatinthefluid.TheancientGreek
mathematician and physicist Archimedes (287 – 212
BC),isconsideredas
theoriginatoroftheconceptof
the law of buoyancy, floatability and stability of
floatingbodies[2].Thedensityofe.g.,ashipcanbe
explainedasacombinationoftheweightoftheship
hullandtheairinthecavityofthepartofthehullthat
is
immersedinthewater.Therefore,itispossiblefora
ship made of e.g., steel to float. Whatis challenging
relatedtothisconceptisiftheairinsidetheshiphull
is displaced with water e.g., when the ship hull is
breachedallowingfloodtoenterthehull.Withinship
terminology,waterintrusionisrelatedtotheconcept
ofshipdamagestability.
According to The United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) [3], the world
fleet have continued to grow from the late 20th
century to resent time. Despite that fleet grow, the
total ship loss figures at sea
have largely halved
duringthelastdecade.
Revisiting Unsinkable Ships: From Titanic to Helge
Ingstad, the Long-Standing Issues and Persistent Risks
of Ship Disasters
K.Johansen
1
&O.T.Gudmestad
1,2,3
1
UiTTheArcticUniversityofNorway,Tromsø,Norway
2
WesternNorwayUniversityofAppliedSciences,Haugesund,Norway
3
UniversityofStavanger,Stavanger,Norway
ABSTRACT:The objectiveofthispaperistotakeacloserlookatthetheoryof damagestability,i.e.,origin,
construction,organizationandhumandevelopments,regulations,andinthiscontextpinpointapossiblecausal
relationshipbetweentwospecificshiplosses:thelosses ofRMSTitanic
andKNMHelgeIngstad.Thepaper
doesnotdiscussdirectcausesbutrathertriestodiscusspossiblecausallinkstothefactthatthewaterintrusion
wasnotlimitedorstoppedbytheships`watertightsubdivisions.Referencesregardingassessmentsofthewell‐
known loss of RMS Titanic are based on extensive
studies carried out while assessment of possible ship
constructiondefectsandoutcomesregardingpoordecision‐makingrelatedtotheKNMHelgeIngstadlossrefer
tofindingspublishedintheNationalSafetyInvestigationAgency(NSIA)Part2.Thepurposeofthepaperisto
setfocusontheapplicationoflessons
learnedafterthelossofRMSTitanicassociatedtothemainfindingsinthe
NSIA part 2 report. In this context, focus on whether the degree of competence we gain through Maritime
EducationandTraining(MET)issufficient,andthenhowthiscompetenceaffectsthepractice.Morespecific,
competence related to
lessons learned regarding ship damage stability aspects such as survivability and
recoverability.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 18
Number 1
March 2024
DOI:10.12716/1001.18.01.08
96
Figure1. Annual lost (sunk/submerged) ships of 100 GT+,
2012‐2021, Source: Lloyd`s List Intelligence Causality
Statistics[4].
Thisrapidhalvingofshiplossesindicatesthatthe
industryʹs efforts to combat such maritime hazards
haveproducedgoodresults.
Continuous regulatory, MET and technological
development in ship engineering, construction and
communication have contributed to a renewed and
modernwayofshipoperation.Thevesselstodayare
equipped with up
‐to‐the‐minute weather updates,
damage control and emergency response system, as
well as a team of well‐trained crews to ensure safe
andsecuredoperation.
However,despitethatshipshavebeenconstructed
and equipped in practically unsinkable way, total
losses still occur with deadly consequences. Tracing
backtothe
sinkingofTitanicin1912wheretheship
lost floatability following the hull damage after
colliding with iceberg to today’s state of the art
warships like e.g., HI, shows that challenges due to
shiplossstillremain.
Initially, it may be appropriate to distinguish
betweenshiplossesthatleadto,and
donotleadtoa
disaster. A disaster is associated to accidents that
results in many deaths or major injuries to people,
andonthebasisofthis,theTitanicaccidentresulting
many deaths is a disaster and the HI accident
resultingnodeathsisashiploss.
RMS Titanic
was a modern passenger ship when
she was launched in 1911. In many ways she was a
forerunner ship when it comes to damage stability
aspects related to survivability, and she was
considered by some the “unsinkable ship”. We all
knowwhathappened toher andthatshe,likeother
ships,
wassinkable.BoththeTitanicandtheHIwere
designed with watertight subdivisions intended to
limitspreadofoccurredwaterintrusionfollowedby
hull damage. In general, watertight subdivisions are
physical barriers aiming to prevent and limit such
spread of occurred water intrusion. For various
reasons, these barriers did not
work as intended for
bothofthesedisasters.
The loss of the Titanic led to various changes
related to the exercise of navigational aspects, ship
design development, regulations regarding damage
stability, and lifeboat requirements. Schröder‐
Hinrichsetal.[5],marked thefirstcenturysincethe
Titanic sank after colliding with an
iceberg by
discussing possible common human and
organizationalfactorsinvolvedintheTitanicandthe
Costa Concordia disasters. There is a century’s
differencebetweenthesetwodisasters,i.e.,theTitanic
sankin1912andtheCostaConcordiawasleftonher
side in shallow water after colliding with an
underwater
reef in 2012. Maritime technology has
undergonesignificantdevelopmentsfromthelossof
the Titanic to present time, but the human and
organizationalfactorsdealwithmoreorlessthesame
challenges.Schröder‐Hinrichsetal.study[5],focused
ondiscussingfactorsthatledtothesedisasters,more
specifically the underlying
factors, i.e., blunt end:
organizationalfactorsandsharpend:humanfactors.
According to Woods et al. [6], blunt end factors are
often linked to indirect causes of accidents, while
sharp end factors are linked to direct causes.
Hollnagel[7],describesthedifferencebetweenblunt
endand sharpend factorsas
distal factors(working
there and then) and proximal factors (working here
and now), respectively, and he also describes how
thesefactorsin combination canleadto anaccident.
Bothbluntendandsharpendfactorsarecontextually
related to respectively risk management and
emergency response measures, which are disciplines
that involves
in advance management for avoiding
disasters and response measures to limit the
consequences when a disaster has occurred [8]. The
impactofthesharpendfactorsisdesigndependent.
Devices with deficient design for proper emergency
responsemeasureswillnotrespondasdesired.
On8November2018,theNorwegianfrigate
KNM
HelgeIngstad(HI)andtheoiltankerSolaTScollided
in Fensfjorden on the western coast of Norway. The
consequence of the collision was materially
catastrophic, in that the frigate sank. This accident
shows that, despite ship designed according to
present standards and well‐trained crew, sinking
couldhappen.
For
theTitanic,thesharpendemergencyresponse
could not have impacted the outcome (ship loss)
because of design flaws followed by subsequent
flooding[9].HIhadamoreadaptabledesignrelated
tosharpendemergencyresponsemeasuresandcould
thushavebeensaved[10].
The study this paper is based
on has common
features with the study of Schröder‐Hinrichs et al.
(2012), in that it focuses on what lessons we have
learnedornotlearnedfromtheTitaniclosstopresent
time. What separates these studies is the focus
regardingthelessonswehavelearnedorshouldhave
learnedfrom
e.g.,thelossoftheTitanic.Morespecific,
what we have learned about the damage stability
aspect of survivability, i.e., both ship design
developments and possible operational aspects
regarding measures to prevent ships from sinking
(recoverability).
The methodological approach related to the
purpose of the paper dealt with a comprehensive
literature study combined with an analysis of the
NSIAPart2reportoftheshiplossofHI.Thefocusof
the literature study was based on the keywords:
Damage stability, Maritime Education and Training
(MET), Seamanship competence, Human Elements,
IMO, SOLAS, NavalShip Code (NSC), Construction
and Regulations. The literature
dealing with the
keywords was obtained via search engines such as
e.g.,Researchnet,GoogleScholar, Sciencedirect,Web
ofScience.
97
The NSIA Part 2 report was published by the
Norwegian Safety Authority in April 2021 with the
aim of elucidating the sequence of events from the
accidentoccurreduntiltheshipwaslost.Thecontent
isbasedontheinvestigationofdecisiveeventstaken
from interviews with crewmembers and
other
involved parties, and technical investigations on
board. In addition, the content is supported by
information obtained from the Ministry of Defence,
the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency (NDMA),
the Norwegian Armed Forces Materiel Safety
Authority, the Royal Norwegian Navy, Det Norske
Veritas (DNV) and Navantia. In the investigation,
NSIA had access
to and used classified information
that is not publishable in accordance with the
Norwegian Security Acts and defence sector
restrictions(NSIA,2021).Theresultofthetotalsearch
led to 53 citations regarding the search terms and
aspects concerning both of the aforementioned ship
losses.
1.1 Background
The need for
watertight subdivisions is self‐evident.
TheconceptdatesbacktoancienttimesbytheCode
of Hammurabi, which was legal texts sanctioned 38
centuriesagoinBabylon[2].ExcavationsfromChina
show concrete examples were watertight
compartment and bulkhead were integrated in ship
hulls, reportedly inspired by the structure of the
bamboo’s hollow sections by watertight membranes.
It is not known exactly when these examples were
introduced,buttwoboatswithwatertightbulkheads
have been found by archaeologists, dated to the
period of the Tang Dynasty (618–907). The concept
was not imitated in Europe until the late 18th and
early 19th
centuries. Chief engineer in the British
Navy, Sir Samuel Bentham (1757–1831) was the first
Europeantodesignusingthistechnology[11].
Due to the great loss of life and costs caused by
shipwrecks during the 19th century, the
implementation of regulations to increase safety for
seafarers and ships was required. One
of the first
significantcontributorstosafetyrelatedtoregulatory
requirements for reserve buoyancy regarding
survivabilitywasSamuelPlimsoll.Withhisinfluence,
a requirement was introduced for all ships to be
marked with their own allowance draft or load line
mark (Plimsoll mark), to ensure shipshad sufficient
reserve buoyancy
[12].Reservebuoyancies represent
extra buoyancy in addition to the buoyancy that
enables a ship to float. It may be defined as the
volume of enclosed spaces above the waterline,
expressed as the volume or percentage of the total
volumeoftheship[13].Intheshiploadlinemark,the
reserve buoyancy is visualized as freeboard (the
height from the water line to the main or freeboard
deck),i.e.,theuppermostcontinuouswatertightdeck,
figure 2. Plimsollʹs efforts formed the basis for the
establishment of the International Maritime
Organization(IMO)ʹsLoadLineConvention,adopted
in1930[14].
Figure2. Illustration of the freeboard – load line mark
relationship[15].
The first known legal requirement addressing
safety at sea regarding watertight bulkheads was
issued in the first Merchant Shipping Act of 1854.
Furthermore, the first damage stability requirements
wereintroducedintheSafetyOfLifeAtSea(SOLAS)
Convention of 1948, followed by the first specific
criterionforresidualstabilitystandards
intheSOLAS
Conventionof1960[16].
Theneedforinternationalregulationsfordividing
ship hulls into watertight subdivisions became
relevant after the loss of the Titanic. However,
developments regarding technological (ship design),
organizationaland operationalexperiences from this
disaster have not prevented similar disasters from
occurringsince.Well‐known
disasters,e.g.,Heraldof
FreeEnterprise,nearZeebrugge,inMarch1987,and
Estonia, in the Baltic, in September 1994, are
highlighted in several research papers like those of
Biran and Lopez‐Pulido [17] and Goulielmos and
Goulielmos[18].Inaddition,accordingtoEliopoulou
etal.[19],therewereatotalof
7391seriousmaritime
accidentsfrom2000to2012.Mostmaritimeaccidents
related to collisions, groundings, etc. connected to
their study were followed by hull damage, causing
flooding.As the title suggests, thispaper deals with
similaritiesbetweentheHIdisasterand,perhapsthe
most “famous” ship disaster of all times,
the loss of
theTitanic.
2 SHIPSTABILITY
In naval architecture, the term “stability” is used in
several contexts, such asʺdirectional stabilityʺ. This
ʺstabilityʺreferstohowwellashipholdsthedirection
(heading) and is not linked to this study. Stability
associatedwiththisstudydeals with
keepingaship
afloatanduprightandisdefinedasshipstability,i.e.,
“the shipʹs ability to return to normal upright
condition,whendisturbedbyexternalforceswithout
danger to the ship or the cargo and human life it
carries”[20].Inmoredetail,shipstabilitydealswith
both transverse
and longitudinalperspectives and is
dividedintothe followingtwocategories:intactand
damagestability.Intactstabilityreferstoshipstability
associatedwithanintactshiphull, i.e.,no impactof
waterintrusion,whiledamagestabilityappliestoship
stability associated with ship hull damage, i.e., the
impact of water
intrusion. This study focuses on
aspectsoftheshipʹsseaworthiness,morespecifically
aspectsof survivability and recoverabilityassociated
todamagestability.
98
2.1 Basicconceptsofdamagestability
Damage stability applies to conditions a ship gains
whenitisfloodedcausedbyhulldamage.Regarding
these conditions, the most fundamental goal is that
theshipremainsafloatandupright,i.e.,survivesafter
an accident involving water intrusion has occurred
[16]. The
afloat and upright conditions refer in this
context to deviations from the original longitudinal
and transverse planes, more specifically, sinkage,
heeling and change of trim, respectively. Sinkage
refers to increasingly draft, starboard, port, forward
and aft draft. Heel and trim refer respectively to
differencesinportandstarboarddrafts andforward
andaftdrafts.
Vital terms regarding damage stability on naval
ships are the relationship between the following:
vulnerability, survivability and recoverability.
Vulnerability concerns the inability to withstand
damagefromoneormorehitsandtheprobabilityof
serious damage or loss due to hits. Survivability
concerns the ship’s ability to
survive hull damages
(staystableandafloat).Recoverabilityrepresentsthe
ability of the ship and its crew to carry out
appropriate measures affecting the secondaryeffects
degradation [21], i.e., transform a possible ship loss
towards survivability, visualized in figure 3.a. The
figure 3.b. visualizes no possible recoverability, i.e.,
shiploss.According
toBoulougouris&Papanikolaou
[22], these vital terms apply to risk‐based design
conceptsrelatedtonavalshipdesign,butinprinciple
theycouldapplytoalltypesofships.
Figure3.a. Visualization of vulnerability versus
recoverability.Source:OceanEngineering2013[22]
Figure3.b. Suggested modified visualization of
vulnerabilityversusshiploss,basedonfig.3a.
According to Grech et al. [23], recoverability
involves post damage measures i.e., identifying and
controllingdamagetoashipregardingrestoringand
maintainingdegradedfunctionality.Withreferenceto
naval architecture, recoverability is equivalent to
emergencyresponse.Theshipʹssurvivabilitydepends
onthedegreetowhichashipisdesignedwith
respect
to possible survival, i.e., the ability to survive ship
damage followed by water intrusion. More
specifically, design by adding the hull with, and
dividing it into, watertight compartments
(subdivision) by using watertight bulkheads and
damage control decks (bulkhead decks). The terms
“watertight compartments” or “watertight
subdivisions”representdedicatedinternal
watertight
spaces for supporting the ship’s survivability, i.e.,
buoyancy. “Bulkhead” is the term for barriers to
water intrusion – either vertically, referred to as
watertight transverse bulkheads, or horizontally,
referred to as damage control decks or bulkhead
decks. According to established damage stability
requirements, subdivisions are calculated and
designedtoensure
thatashipcanfloatandbestable
based on different scenarios of flooded subdivisions
[17].
2.2 Generaldamagestabilityregulations
Aseriouschallengeforashipʹsseaworthinessishull
damage that leads to water intrusion in responsive
compartments or subdivisions, followed by reduced
shipstabilitycausedbychanges
indraught,trimand
heel. The changes referred to are, respectively,
draught–theverticaldistancebetweenthewaterline
andthebottomofthehull(keel),trim–shipendwise
inclination,heel–shipsidewaysinclination.Ifwater
intrusion exceeds certain limits, these changes can
individuallyorincombinationleadto
shiploss.The
ship’sabilitytoresistlossasaresultofhulldamage
largely depends on the compartmentation and
waterproofintegrity,followedbysurvivability.
The first regulations regarding seaworthiness are
foundintheCodeofHammurabi,1792–1750BC[24].
ThetextofHammurabicode235readsasfollows.
If
aboatmanbuildsaboatforamanandhedoes
not make its construction seaworthy and that boat
ends up in an accident the same year as it was put
intooperation,theboatmanshallreconstructtheboat
andreinforceitathisownexpenseandheshallgive
the boat, when it is reinforced, to the owner of the
boat.[25].
Seaworthiness deals with and covers
characteristics thataffect the ship’s ability toremain
safeatseainallconditionsandperformasintended
[26].Remainingsafeatseainallconditionsincludes
both intact and damage stability aspects,
and
regulations regarding these aspects will, therefore,
dealwiththeshipbeingseaworthy.
ThefirstMerchantShippingActof1854represents
the first known requirement regarding safety at sea
concerning watertight bulkheads. This requirement
was enacted as a result of the rapid loss of the
Birkenheadin1852.Thereason
fortherapidlosswas
that cavalry officers on board had holes cut in the
transverse bulkheads to train their horses, i.e., they
brokethebarrierstowaterspread[27].
Inordertoachievehighersurvivabilitystandards,
regulations for the division of ship hulls into
99
watertight compartments or subdivisions were
ratified. These regulations became clearer after the
loss of the Titanic. As a result of this loss, the IMO
Convention SOLAS was adopted in January 1914.
Several changes have been introduced since this
adoption, some of them affected by the
aforementionedshipdisastersinvolving
theHeraldof
FreeEnterpriseandEstonia.TheIMOConventionfor
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)
AnnexI,regulation28dealswithguidelinesforship
construction and education and training concerning
pollution prevention and, more specifically,
guidelines dealing with the prevention of pollution
fromoil,gasandchemicaltankers
[28].TheMARPOL
guidelineswillnotbeaddressedinthispaper.
Damagestabilityregulationsrelatedtothis paper
areaddressedforbothmerchantandparticularlyfor
naval warships. Regulations regarding damage
stabilityforwarshipsareingeneralgiveninthesame
regulationsthatdealwiththeirintactstability,but,in
recent years, a number of navies have cooperated
with classification societies to approach the same
regulationsasformerchantships[26].
Previousassessmentapproachwithregardtoship
damage design was based on a deterministic
framework. In this deterministic approach, specific
lengths of the ship (subdivisions) that could be
flooded until
ship loss was assessed. In this
framework, ship loss was considered when the
waterlinetouchedthemarginlineasaresultofwater
intrusion, i.e., no more reserve buoyancy [29]. The
margin line was referred to a line drawn at least76
mmbelowtheupperbulkheaddeckatthe
side[17].
Thedeterministicassessmentframeworkwithmargin
line as reference was replaced by a probabilistic
assessment framework in SOLAS 2009 and further
developedintheSOLAS2020requirements[30].This
assessmentframeworkisbasedonanevaluationofa
ship’s probability of survive, i.e., remain afloat
withoutsinkingorcapsizing
asaresultofanarbitrary
collisionin a given longitudinalposition of the ship
hull. The main requirement in this damage stability
assessment framework is that the probability of
survival of a ship (Attained Subdivision Index A)
must be higher than a certain minimum value
(RequiredIndexSubdivisionR),
A≥R[26].
2.3 Warshipdamagestabilityregulations
Surfacewarshipsdifferfrommerchantandpassenger
ships in that they are constructed for operation in
hostile environments, i.e., they must be able to
withstand the effects of anti‐ship weapons. While
merchantandpassengershipsoperateinaccordance
with IMO’s international regulations,
warships
compromise their operations between IMO safety
regulation aspects and military capabilities.
Regardingdamagestabilityregulations,warshipsare
considered part of a much broader vulnerability
assessment than merchant and passenger ships
because, in addition to possibleʺnormalʺ accident
exposureliketheHIaccident,theycanbeexposedto
war‐related
damage. The vital design objective for
warshipsisthereforesurvivabilityduetoanabilityto
“fight hurt”, i.e., to minimize the vulnerability from
the early design stages, in order to maximize
survivability[31].
AccordingtoBiran&Lopez‐Pulido[17],warships
are not directly subject to SOLAS damage stability
regulations and
recommendations. This does not
mean that these regulations and recommendations
regardingdamagestabilityarenotattractivetonaval
vesselsadaptedtodirectwarfare.Navalskipsmayin
principle be subject to these regulations and
recommendations, even if their role requires design
and operational solutions that are at least in
accordance
with this Convention. The Allied Naval
EngineeringPublication(ANEP)–77Part1coversthe
content of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Naval Ship Code (NSC), which represents
the approved goals, functional objectives, and
performance requirements for naval operations of
nations in the NATO naval armaments group [32].
The NSC
was established in 2004 in a collaboration
betweenNATOnaviesandclassificationsocietieslike
Lloyd`sRegister, DNV, and Bureau Veritas, etc. The
purpose of this establishment was to develop a
framework for standards and regulations for safety
with the same scope and level as IMO`s SOLAS
Convention [33]. The code
provides a goal‐based
structure demonstrating that the ship is safe to
operate according to navy safety objectives. It
includesgoals associated with damage conditions in
peacetime, not damageinflictedfrom extreme threat
andinvolvementincombatoperations,figure4.
Figure4.ApplicabilityofNSC[32].
ThefollowingaspectsoftheNSCinANEP‐77are
essentialandcanpossiblybeputincontextwiththe
conclusionoftheNSIA2019reportontheHIaccident,
i.e.,whataffectedtheconsequences(shiploss).
The Code assumes that the majority of persons
normallyembarked ona naval ship
are able‐bodied,
with a fair knowledge of the layout of the ship and
have received training in safety procedures and the
handlingoftheship’ssafetyequipment.
Compliance with this Code does not replace the
responsibility to comply with IMO conventions and
otherinternationalandnational treaties,conventions
and
regulationsincludingUnitedNationsConvention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applied through
nationalandinternationallaws.
Nevertheless, according to Boulougouris &
Papanikolaou [22], it seems that the main
developments of naval ship design concentrate on
improvements related to performance in peacetime,
rather than addressing ships’ risk to combat‐related
flooding conditions. According to SOLAS, damage
stability aspectsdeal with “peacetime”hullbreaches
followed by collision, grounding, brakes along the
hulllengthetc.,andnotcombatrelateddamages.
100
3 REVIEWSOFTHELOSSOFRMSTITANICAND
KNMHELGEINGSTAD
3.1 RMSTitanic
RMSTitanicwasaBritishcruisesteamlinerdesigned
andconstructedbytheHarland&Wolffshipyardin
Belfast, Northern Ireland, and launched on May 31,
1911. The ship was operated by the White Star
Line
and sank after striking an iceberg on her maiden
voyageintheNorthAtlanticOceanon15April2012
[34]. The exact number of people on board is
somewhatuncertain,but,accordingtoVassalosetal.
[35],itisestimatedthat2224peoplewereonboard,of
whom1513died
asaresultofthesinking.
Technical data and specifications: overall length:
852feet9inches(269m),beam:92feet6inches(28m),
draught:34 feet 7 inches (10.5 m)[36].According to
Stettler & Thomas [37], the pre‐collision draft is
assumed to be 30’9” forward and
33’9” aft, and she
hadadisplacementof48,300tons.
Figure5.Titanicbulkhead arrangementillustration.
As figure 5 shows, the number of transverse
watertightbulkheads was 15(A‐P),i.e., dividing the
vessel into 16 transverse watertight compartments
frombowtostern.Fromthefigureitalsoappearsthat
theshiphadnobulkhead(damagecontrol)deck.The
illustrationsinfigures5and6representmodifications
originatingfromHahnTitanic‐Plans[38].
TheTitanic sank inlessthan threehours, despite
the shipbuilderʹs statement that the ship would stay
afloat for two to three days, even if affected by the
worstpossibleaccidentatsea[39].Thewaterintruded
intotheshipthroughthehull
breachfollowedbythe
collisionwiththeicebergandspreadfurtherthrough
the vertical bulkheads. According to [39], the hull
damage caused by the collision allowed water to
intrudeintothesixforemostcompartments.Themost
likely way the sinking developed was first through
the filling of compartments two to five
and the
forepeak, as a direct result of the impact of the
iceberg. Through this filling, the ship was trimming
forward, causing water to spread to connected
compartments,asillustratedinfigure6.
Figure6. Titanic. Illustration of water intrusion spreading
overthetransversebulkheads.
3.2 KNMHelgeIngstad
In accordance with theinformation presented in the
officialreportofHIbyNSIA[10],KNMHelgeIngstad
was a Norwegian‐registered frigate (warship) in the
Fridtjof Nansen‐class, designed and built at the
Spanishstate‐ownedshipyard,Navantia.TheHIwas
owned by the Norwegian state,
represented by the
Ministry of Defence and operated by the Royal
NorwegianNavy by the followingpennant number,
313.The HI was launched on 23 November 2007. In
2018, the frigate and the tanker Sola TS collided
outside the Sture terminal in Hjeltefjorden, Bergen,
causingtheHItosink.The
frigatehadacrewof137
people,ofwhomsevenwereslightlyinjured;noone
died.
Technical data and specifications: overall length:
134m,beam:16.8m,draftmax:7.6m,displacement:
5290tons.
Figure7. KNM Helge Ingstad bulkhead arrangement
illustration.
As figure 7 shows, the number of transverse
watertightbulkheadswas12(bluelines),i.e.,dividing
the ship into 13 transverse watertight compartments
from bow to stern. The blue and green longitudinal
lines mark, respectively, the bulkhead deck and the
damagecontroldeck.Theredlongitudinallinemarks
the double bottom.
The basis for the figure 7 and
figure 8 illustrations is taken from the general
arrangementoftheFridtjofNansen‐class[10].
The HI ran aground approximately 10 minutes
afterthecollisionandsankatalaterdate,causedby
floodingofthe sevenrearmostcompartments(7–13).
In this context,
there will be no focus on the
grounding after the collision, as the NSIA report
concludesthatitdidnotdirectlycausethelossofthe
HI,as“thelackofclosurewouldinanycaseleadtoa
sinking”. The water intrusion probably spread into
the HI by the following
route (dark blue directional
arrows),accordingtoNSIA,cf.figure8:
Directly into compartments 10 and 11 (yellow)
throughthedamagedarea(red).
Through the hollow propeller axle from
compartment10intocompartment8.
From compartment 8 into the connecting
compartments 7 and 9 through stuffing boxes
in
thebulkheads.
From compartment 11 into compartments 12 and
13belowthedamagecontroldeck.
Into the quarterdeck (dark red) through open
hatches,pressurevalves,andairlocks.
101
Figure8.Illustrationofwaterintrusioncausingthesinking.
The damaged area (red) illustrated in figure 8
represents an estimate of the damage, based on
imagesofthehulldamagetotheship,andcouldthus
tosomeextentdeviatefromtheactualdamage.
Itshouldparticularlybenotedthat,inthecaseof
theHI,thewater did flow
fromcompartment8into
theconnectingcompartmentsthroughopeningsinthe
bulkheads, and that the lack of closure in any case
would have led to the sinking. The objective of
bulkheadsistoprovidefullclosurei.e.,preventwater
flowingintonearbycompartments.Inthecaseofthe
Titanic, the
limited heights of the vertical bulkheads
and lack of bulkhead deck did not provide proper
closure.The HI design allowed water to spreadinto
the ship from compartment 10 to compartment 8,
furthermore, during the construction of the ship,
openings were cut in the bulkheads for cables and
pipes i.e., the
bulkheads had reduced function.
Anyway, the NSIA part 2 report showed that this
designflawwasnotdecisiveforthesinking.TheHI
sinking was, according to the report, caused by a
combinationoftheaforementioned designflawsand
the inability of the operators to secure the ship in
advance
of the sinking and to implement propriate
recoverabilitymeasures.Morespecifically,thereport
showed that the ship was operated with openings
between bulkheads and had additionally open
hatches [10]. It is therefore a learning point for ship
operators to ensure that bulkheads and hatches are
closed.
4 TITANICVSHI,SIMILARITIES
AND
DIFFERENCESDUETODAMAGESTABILITY
ASPECTSLEADINGTOSHIPLOSS
Inordertounderstandthecausesofthelossesofthe
TitanicandtheHIandtobeinapositiontoanalyse
the progress (or lack of progress) in design and the
improved(orlackofimproved)understanding
ofship
damage stability, there is a need to compare
similarities and differences related to damage
stability.Seetable1.
Table1.Damagestabilitysimilarities/differencesbetween
theTitanicandtheHI.
________________________________________________
SimilaritiesDifferences
________________________________________________
CollisionTimeperiod
Hulldamagefollowedby Survivability
waterintrusion
KillabilityRecoverability
Transversebulkhead Shiptype
arrangement
Lossofbulkheadintegrity Designregulationavailable
LossofwatertightDamagecontroldeckand
compartmentbuoyancyeffect doublebottom
ShiplossMaritimeeducationand
training
Bluntendinfluence Sharpendinfluence
________________________________________________
4.1 Similaritiesduetodamagestabilityaspects
Collision–Bothshipscollided,withanicebergand
a ship, respectively, which led to hull damage,
followedbysubsequentwaterintrusion.
Killability–Bothshipswereexposedtototalship
kill,which,accordingtoBall&Calvano(1994),is
damage
leading to ship loss through insufficient
buoyancy.
Transverse bulkhead arrangement – The Titanic
andtheHIhad,respectively,16and13transverse
watertightcompartments,ref.figures4and6.
Loss of bulkhead integrity – The Titanic lost
bulkheadintegritybywaterspreadduetothelack
ofabulkhead
(damagecontrol)deck,ref.figure5.
TheHIlostbulkheadintegrityduetowaterspread
through the propeller shaft and through open
hatches,ref.figure7.
Lossofwatertightcompartmentbuoyancyeffect–
Due to the loss of bulkhead integrity, more
watertight compartments than survivability
demandedwereflooded,i.e.,
losttheirbuoyancy.
Shiploss–BoththeTitanicandtheHIsank.
Bluntendinfluence–FortheTitanic,thebluntend
influence refers to ship design flaws in the
construction of the watertight integrity, material
failure, and number of lifeboats in relation to
number of passengers (Gannon,
1995).
Accordingly,forthisdisaster,therewerenoblunt
endfactorsthatcouldinfluencethepossibilitiesfor
the ship’s recoverability, due to major hull
damage.FortheHI,bluntendinfluencealsorefers
to ship design through the construction of
watertightintegrity.Inaddition,thisinfluencealso
referstoorganizational
andsystematicaspectsthat
mayhaveaffectedtherecoverability,forexample,
thecrew’slackofsufficientexpertiseprovidedby
theNavy, lack of coordinationbetweentheNavy
and the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency’s
crisisplans,andtheNorwegianNavy’slackofan
overviewofthetotalrisksthathadadirect
impact
onthecourseofevents(NSIA,2021).
4.2 Differencesduetodamagestabilityaspects
Timeperiod–ThetimeperiodbetweentheTitanic
andHIaccidentsisfrom2018–1912=106years.
Survivability – The Titanic lost its survivability
due to severe hull damage, which exceeded its
recoverability. According to NSIA (2021), the
investigation shows that appropriate efforts and
measures could have prevented the HI from
sinking,i.e.,theHIhadrecoverability.
Shiptype–TheTitanicwasacruiseship(steamer),
whiletheHIwasafrigate(warship).
Design regulations available – The Titanic was
designed according to the latest innovations of
safety technology with respect to survivability.
Regulationsandrecommendationsregardingship
design were at this time based on The Merchant
ShippingAct,1854.Rule300ofthisActdescribes
thefollowingdemandsregardingthebuildingand
equippingofsteamships:
Everysteamshipbuilt
ofiron,ofOnehundred
Tons or upwards the building of which
commenced after the Twentyeighth Day of
AugustOnethousandeighthundredandforty‐
six,and every Steam Ship built of Iron of less
102
BurdenthanOnehundredTonsthebuildingof
which commenced after the Seventh Day of
AugustOnethousandeighthundredandforty‐
one (except Ships solely used as Steam Tugs),
shall be divided by substantial transverse
Water‐tight Partitions, so that the Fore Part of
the Ship shall be
separated from the Engine
RoombyOneofsuchPartitions,andsothatthe
AfterPartofsuchShipshallbeseparatedfrom
theEngineRoombyotherofsuchPartitions.
Every steamship built of iron the building of
whichcommencesafterthepassingofthisAct,
shallbedivided
bysuchPartitionsasaforesaid
intonotlessthanThreeequalParts,orasnearly
so as Circumstances permit. (Merchant
ShippingAct,1854)
TheHIcrewhadundergoneMETaccordingtothe
International IMO Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers (STCW). This convention set minimum
standardsofcompetencebyMETforshipofficers
inchargeofanavigationalwatch.STCWtablesA‐
II/1 and A‐II/2 set a minimum standard of
competence concerning damage stability at
operational and management level, respectively,
ref.table2andtable3.
Standardofcompetenceisthelevelofproficiencyto
be
achieved for the proper performance of functions on
boardshipinaccordancewiththeinternationallyagreed
criteriaassetforthhereinandincorporatingprescribed
standards or levels of knowledge, understanding and
demonstratedskills.(IMO,2018).
The very basis for the establishment and
development of IMO codes and conventions is
experiencegainedasaresultofshipaccidents.One
example is the SOLAS convention, which was
originally established as a treaty in 1914 in
response of the loss of the Titanic. The SOLAS
convention chapter II‐1 concerns international
requirements regarding survivability, i.e.,
construction and design considering watertight
integrity[43].This
conventionaffectsthestandard
of competence required by naval architects and
shipdesigners.
Sharp end influence– For the Titanic, there were
no measures that could be carried out regarding
recoverability because of the mismatch between
shipdesignduetosurvivability(bulkheaddesign)
and degree of hull damage, i.e.,
the ship was
doomedtosink[44].AccordingtotheNSIAPart2
reportconcerningtheHI,thereweremeasuresthat
could have been taken at the sharp end which
couldhaveaffectedtherecoverabilityoftheship.
The report states the following regarding
recoverability measures that should have been
taken:
Doors, hatches and other openings in the frigate that
were supposed to be closed to maintain stability and
buoyancywerenotclosedatthetimeofevacuation.A
shutdownofthe frigatecouldhavepreventedherfrom
sinking[10].
Itshouldbenotedthatopeningsinthebulkheads
should at
all times be closed, to ensure that the
damage stability, intended to be ensured by the
bulkheads,willatalltimesbefunctioning.
Table2.Minimumstandardofcompetenceatoperationallevel(tableA‐II/1.STCW/CONF.2/34)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Column1 Column2Column3Column4
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Competence Knowledge,understandingandproficiency Methodsfordemonstrating Criteriaforevaluating
competencecompetence
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Maintain ShipstabilityExaminationandassessment Thestabilityconditions
seaworthiness Workingknowledgeandapplicationofstability, ofevidenceobtainedfromonecomplywiththeIMO
oftheship trimandstresstables,diagramsandstress‐ ormoreofthefollowing: intactstabilitycriteria
calculatingequipment.1.approvedin‐service under
allconditionsof
Understandingthefundamentalactionstobe experienceloading.
takenineventofpartiallossofintactbuoyancy. 2.approvedtrainingship Actionstoensureand
Understandingthefundamentalsofwatertight experiencemaintainthewatertight
integrity.3.approvedsimulatortraining,integrityoftheshipare
Ship
constructionwhereappropriate inaccordancewith
Generalknowledgeoftheprincipalstructural 4approvedlaboratory acceptedpractice
membersofashipandthepropernamesofthe equipmenttraining
variousparts
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table3.Minimumstandardofcompetenceatmanagementlevel(tableA‐II/2.STCW/CONF.2/34).
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Column1 Column2Column3Column4
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Competence Knowledge,understandingandproficiency Methodsfordemonstrating Criteriaforevaluating
competencecompetence
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Controltrim, Understandingoffundamentalprinciplesofship Examinationandassessment Stabilityandstress
stabilityand constructionandthetheoriesandfactorsaffecting ofevidenceobtainedfrom conditionsare
stresstrimandstabilityandmeasuresnecessaryto oneormoreofthefollowing: maintainedwithinsafe
preservetrimandstability.
1.approvedin‐service limitsatalltimes
Knowledgeoftheeffectontrimandstabilityofan experience
shipintheeventofdamagetoandconsequent 2.approvedtrainingship
floodingofacompartmentandcountermeasures experience
tobetaken.3.approvedsimulatortraining,
Knowledgeof
IMOrecommendationsconcerning wereappropriate
shipstability
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
103
5 DISCUSSION
The focus of this study was to take a closer look at
possiblesimilaritiesvs.differencesbetweenthelossof
Titanic and HI when it comes to damage stability
aspects and based on this discuss what we have
possiblylearnedornotlearnedfromtheTitanicloss.
Asthestudyshows,fromadamagestabilitypointof
view, the Titanic had no recoverability, i.e., was
doomed to sink, while the HI had, according to the
NSIA investigation‐based report, recoverability.
Therefore,thisdiscussionfocusesmainlyontryingto
reveal and discuss the investigation basis on which
thereport
claimsthattheHIhadtheabilitytorecover
andsurvive.
ItisworthmentioningthatboththeTitanicandthe
HI had challenging longitudinal damage zones,
followedbysubsequentwaterintrusions,respectively
inthefrontsection(bow)andtherearend(stern)of
the ship. Such intrusions mean that,
in addition to
correspondingsinkingbythebowandthesterndue
tolostbuoyancy,bothshipsgottrim.Damagezones
bytheboworstern,followedbytrim,limittheability
tosurvive,i.e.,lesswaterintrusionisrequiredtosink
a ship. This can be displayed by the former
deterministic damage stability approach, the
floodablelengthcurve,cf.figure9.
Figure9.Compliancebetweendamagezones(L)allowance
andfloodablelengthcurve[45].
The floodable length curve represents the
maximumallowablelongitudinalfloodablelength(L)
atanypointalongthelengthoftheship,whichcanbe
flooded without immersing any part of the margin
line [17]. Although this represents an aspect of a
formerdamagestabilityapproach,itcanstillvisualize
thata
ship can withstand lesswater intrusion at the
bowandsterncomparedtomidships.
ConsideringthelessonslearnedfromtheTitanicʹs
recoverability,a similaraccidentoccurredin1989,in
which resourcefulness, communication, and
prudence, combined with destiny and luck, meant
that the outcome was different. The Russian cruise
ship
M/S Maksim Gorkiy (MG) accident west of
Svalbard,on19June1989,wassignificantlysimilarto
theTitanic accident, inthe fact that both ships were
passenger/cruise ships that suffered hull damage in
the bow section, followed by subsequent water
intrusion,asaresultofacollisionwithice.Despitethe
coldclimateandremotearea,followedbyconsequent
poorinfrastructure,theshipandpassengerssurvived
as a result of a successful joint rescue operation
betweenthecrewofboththeMGandtheNorwegian
coast guard ship, KV Senja (KVS) and two rescue
helicopters (Sea King) from Longyearbyen, Svalbard
[46].
Therecovery,leadingtothesurvivaloftheMG
was made possible due to the performance of
appropriate measures by the crew of the KVS,more
specificallytheinstallationofexternalpumpstobilge
the ship and of leakage mats to seal or limit water
intrusion,cf.figure10.Thesuccessful
survivalofthe
MGwasbasedonthefactthat,fortunately,theKVS
wascloseenoughtocometotherescue,andthatthe
crewoftheKVSshowedwisdomanddetermination.
How the successful outcome of this accident was
made possible should be an example to follow and
should
beincludedinMET.
Figure10.InstallationofleakagematsMG[46].
6 CONCLUSION
According to the NSIA Part 2 report, HI had
recoverabilityiftherightdecisionshadbeenmade.In
this investigation report, the NSIA has mapped the
sequence of events after the collision, which shows
that a number of both organizational and systemic
levelfactorsaffectedtheoutcomeofthe
accident(ship
loss).
The investigation identified and submitted 28
areasofsafetyrecommendationsforimprovingsafety
totheMinistry of Trade,Industry andFisheriesand
the Ministry of Defence. The following five main
measures apply to matters at organizational and
systematiclevels,coveringthemostimportantcontent
ofthe28
submittedareasofsafetyrecommendations.
TheMinistryofDefencemusttakestepstoclarify
the regulatory framework for the sector for the
purpose of ensuring ship safety. This includes
clearly defining the roles of authorities, avoiding
dualrolesandestablishinganoverall,independent
supervisory function for naval activities in the
defencesector.
The Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency must
ensure correct prioritizationto be able to balance
tasks and resources relating to the technical
operationofthefrigates.
The Norwegian Armed Forces must establish
mechanisms for organizational learning from
undesirable incidents and accidents and to meet
the Navy’s need
for bettersystem supportin the
operationofthefrigates.
The Royal Norwegian Navy must review and
conductariskassessmentofthemanningconcept
for the frigates and take steps to clarify the
prerequisitesfortheconceptandhowtheseareto
be followed up. The Navy must evaluate
and
implement measures in its own training and
exercise programmes to ensure that the frigate
crews have the competence required to handle
complexdamagecontrolscenarios.Theymustalso
takestepstoensurethattheNavyhasanoverview
oftherisksassociatedwithnonconformities,with
aviewtoensuring
safeoperationofthefrigates.
104
The Norwegian Armed Forces Materiel Safety
Authority must conduct supervisory activities of
the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agencyand the
RoyalNorwegianNavytoensuresafeoperationof
thefrigatesthroughlong‐termgoodconfiguration
management and updated technical
documentation[10].
Thereportpinpointsdeficienciesinthetrainingof
theoperationalpersonnelonboardtheHI.TheRoyal
NorwegianNavyisrecommendedto,e.g.,implement
measures in its own training and exercise
programmes to ensure that their crews have the
competence required to handle complex damage
control scenarios. Further, the report pinpoints
recommendationsfortheNorwegianArmedForcesto
establish
mechanisms for organizational learning
from undesirable incidents and accidents. These
measures represent parts in the establishment of
important aspects of a comprehensive seamanship‐
oriented competence. Seamanship competence is
complexinthatitconcernsallaspectsofhandlingand
sailing a ship under all conditions. According to
Kemp [47], the manifestation
of seamanship
competenceisconsideredbythefollowingasanart:
Theartofsailing,manoeuvring,andpreservingaship
or a boat in all positions and under all reasonable
conditions.
The demonstration of proper seamanship
competence depends on which MET has been
reviewed and experience gained in, in accordance
with
practice.Theterm“competence”islinkedtothe
learning of skills, knowledge and attitude by the
following:
Competence is measured by the ability to put into
practicetheknowledge,skillsandattitudeswhichhavebeen
learned and understood. It is this integration in practice
which is the crucial part, not
simply the acquisition of
knowledgeandskills[48].
AccordingtobothKemp[47]andCallman[48],the
concepts of seamanship and competence, both
individually and in conjunction, concern a
comprehensive knowledge and understanding of all
aspectsofseafaring,includingdamagestability.Inthe
concluding section of the NSIA Part 2 report,
it is
claimed that the assessmentof alternativeactions to
thosewhichwereimplementedwouldhaverequired
further competence, instruction and training of the
crew, as well as better decision support tools than
wereavailable[10].Accordingtothisclaim,thecrew
oftheHImightnothavebeengiven
theopportunity
to acquire the proper prerequisites to act in
accordance with the required seamanship‐based
competence.
It is worth mentioning that all frigates in the
Fridtjof Nansen class are ordered to operate at a
certain level of preparedness that refers to a given
degree of material safety. In general, a
vesselʹs
survivabilityinacrisisdependsoncompliancewitha
sufficientdegreeofmaterialsafety.Animportantpart
of the degree of material safety is shutdown (the
closing of watertight devices like doors, hatches,
valves,etc.)topreventthespreadofwaterintrusion.
The mentioned closing devices refer to
specific
equipment protection levels marked with the
following letters, X, Y and Z, which indicate the
vessel’s ordered safety level regarding the required
position of the specific closing device (open/closed).
TheHIwassailingatequipmentprotectionlevelYon
the day of the collision. This equipment protection
levelrefersto
usealongsidequayinwartimeand at
sea in peacetime. Subsequent investigations have
shownthattheHIhadsomebreachesregardingthis
level of equipment protection, i.e., allowing doors
between watertight compartments 12 and 13 to be
open. These doors were supposed to be closed in
accordancewithequipmentprotection
levelY.
Design and construction regulations are ratified
and developed as a result of experience gained
through accident investigations. The Titanic had no
concreteregulationsoradequateexperiencestofollow
up in the design and construction phase regarding
survivability, besides the aforementioned
recommendations by the Merchant Shipping Act of
1854.Although
thedesignerstriedtodesignandbuild
an almostʺunsinkableʺ ship, it later turned out to
have serious flaws in terms of survivability. The
investigation into the loss revealed these serious
flaws, which had direct consequencesfor the design
andconstructionofnewshipsandthemodificationof
existingships.
Aconcreteexampleisthemodification
of the Titanicʹs sister ship, the Olympic. Six months
afterthelossoftheTitanic,the Olympicreturnedto
theHarlandandWolffshipyardtoundergochanges,
as a result of the loss. These modifications involved
making her watertight bulkheads higher, fitting
significantlymore
lifeboats,and,inaddition,theship
wasgivenadoubleskin[49].
The HI had better prerequisites in relation to
design and construction for survivability, due to
regulations, recommendations, and experiences
gainedintheapproximatelyonecenturysincetheloss
ofthe Titanic. However, the ship’s designproved to
have
a lack of waterproof integrity between the
watertight bulkheads, i.e., there was water intrusion
through hollow propeller axle sleeves from
compartment 10 to compartment 8 and further into
compartments 9 and 7 through stuffing boxes in
bulkheads7and8.TheNSIAPart2reportstatesthat
thisflawdidnot
haveadirectanddecisiveimpacton
theloss,but errors ofthisnaturenormallyrepresent
an important contribution to such losses. Like the
Titanic`ssistership,theOlympic,theHI`ssisterships
intheFridtjofNansenclasshavebeenredesignedfor
improvedsurvivabilityregardingwatertightintegrity,
i.e., the propeller
shaft sleeves have been made
watertight[10].Themessagetoensuretheintegrityof
thebulkheadshastobeconveyedtostudentsandall
designersandfabricators.
Warshipsareingeneralsupposedto bedesigned
to withstand challenges beyond what applies to
merchant ships. Therefore, according to Liwong &
Jonsson[21],
itiscrucialthatmeasurestoreducethe
vulnerability of warships are implemented early in
the design process. This is to create conditions for
survival and recovery during the design and
construction process of naval vessels. A challenge
regarding keeping vulnerability to a minimum is
separate rules applicable to warships,
which can be
confusing for the classification societies which
normally follow the building processes and classify
ships in accordance with the IMO conventions.
105
AccordingtoRiola&Perez[50],thisconfusioncanbe
misinterpreted and may represent a drop in safety
standards,i.e.,contributetoincreasedvulnerability.
The Accident Investigation Board of Norway
(SHK),whichpreparedtheNSIAPart2report,gained
accesstoand usedNorwegiandefencesectorsafety‐
gradedinformation
aspartoftheinvestigation.Such
information included organizational structures, crew
perspectives, sequences of the events, detailed
drawings and stability manuals, etc. Through access
to such primary information, SHK had the best
prerequisite for their investigation that formed the
basis for the content of their report. The report
pinpointedbothblunt
endandsharpendfactorsthat
led to the loss of the HI. However, in this paper,
information about the HI was based on secondary
information, i.e., collected from the NSIA report,
considering the lack of access to graded primary
information. For example, figures 7 and 8 are based
on
the content of the NSIA report and not on the
mentionedprimarysources.Thus,thesefigurescould
probablydeviatefromthereallossoftheHI.
According to the damage stability relationship
between the Titanic and the HI, there were certain
similar aspects of damage stability, e.g., both ships
were designed
and built for water spread between
bulkheads,whichledtouncontrolledwaterflooding.
Another similar aspect was that this water flooding
resultedinbothshipsbeinglost.Literally,onecould
saythatthedamagestabilitydesignlessonsoftheHI
werenotlearned,butthisaspecthasnotbeentried
in
courtyet.Therefore,thispaperwillnotconcludeany
further in relation to this aspect,although the NSIA
Part 2 report documents how the water spread into
theship.
InaccordancewithBoulougouris&Papanikolaou
[22],bothdesignersandoperatorsofnavalshipsseem
in general to lack an appropriate
understanding of
risk‐based design and operational aspects regarding
damage survivability performance. Ship design and
construction,andorganizationalchallengeslikeMET
leading to appropriate understanding, represent the
bluntendofbothshiplossesbutperhapsmoresofor
the HI, considering the recoverability aspect. The
Boulougouris&Papanikolaou’s [22]blunt
end‐based
claimcanprobablybesupportedonthebasisofwhat
emergesintheNSIAPart2report.
Regarding the confusing rules for navy ships,
maybenavies shouldadoptmerchantand passenger
damagestabilityregulationstoensurethatnavyships
arebuiltaccordingtowell‐documentedstandards.In
this way,
both designers and operators may have
better prerequisites to gain appropriate
understandingofallaspectsofdamagestability.
According to Schröder‐Hinrichs et al. [5], the
science of human factors first became actualized
aroundandafterWorldWarII.Therefore,thisaspect
was not directly named in conjunction with the
Titaniclossin1912,althoughthehumanfactorswere
present.Therefore,thehumanelementsorfactorswas
not directly considered as similarities or differences
betweenthelossoftheTitanicandtheHI.Although,
these elements represent the sharp end of the
manifestation of executing proper seamanship
competenceandwillalways
influencewhenhumans
are involved. These aspects certainly contributed to
thelossesofbothTitanicandHI,bothinadvanceand
duringtheactualdevelopmentoftheloss.
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