75
1 INTRODUCTION
The maritime transport plays a significant role in
global trade and transportation. Approximately 90%
of global trade is transported by sea [1]. Thus, it
remainsthebackboneofglobaltrade,facilitatingthe
movementofgoodsandcommodities,includingraw
materials,manufacturedgoods,andenergyresources,
across continents,
connecting producers and
consumersworldwide.Theroleofmaritimetransport
isdynamicandsubjecttoongoingchangesinfluenced
by various factors, including global economic
conditions, geopolitical developments, technological
advancements, and environmental considerations [2‐
4].Therapidgrowthofe‐commercehasincreasedthe
demand for maritime transport [5]. As consumers
increasingly
rely on online shopping, maritime
shipping plays a crucial role in transporting goods
from manufacturing centres to consumer markets
worldwide.
The intensity of maritime transport can have an
influenceontheoccurrenceofaccidentsatsea[6‐12].
Astheintensityofmaritimetransportrises,withmore
vesselsoperatingin
agivenarea,thedensityoftraffic
increases[13].Hightrafficdensitycanleadtoahigher
riskofaccidents,includingcollisionsbetweenvessels.
Manoeuvring in congested areas becomes more
challenging, and the probability of human error or
misjudgement increases. With increased maritime
transport intensity, navigational challenges become
more prominent. Busy
shipping lanes, narrow
waterways, and areas with complex navigational
routescanincreasethelikelihoodofaccidents.Vessels
mayneedtonavigatethroughchallengingconditions,
such as heavy traffic, adverse weather, or restricted
visibility,whichcanincreasetheriskofaccidents.The
intensity of maritime transport can place additional
pressureon
crewmembers,leadingtofatigue,stress,
or reduced attention levels. Increased workload and
operationaldemandsmaycontributetohumanerrors,
which can be a significant factor in accidents at sea.
Mistakesinnavigation,communication,orjudgment
can also result in accidents [14,15]. The intensity of
maritimetransportcanimpactcompliancewith
safety
regulations.Inbusyshippingareas,somevesselsmay
Collision and Contact
–
Analysis of Accidents at Sea
M.Bogalecka
GdyniaMaritimeUniversity,Gdynia,Poland
ABSTRACT:Theanalysisofseaaccidentsincludingthecollisionandcontactofshipsistheaimofthispaper.
Theanalysisof over4,700seaaccidentsthatoccurredbetween2004and2021revealsthatthe collisionsand
contactsarethemostfrequentinitiatingeventsforsea
accidents.Itisfoundthatthecollisionandcontactatthe
sea(astheprimaryevent)canoccurthenext‐stepinitiatingeventaswellastheotherprimaryevents(e.g.fire,
grounding,anddamages)canoccurthecollisionandcontact(asthenext‐stepinitiatingevent).Moreover,the
type
and age of ships affected the collisions or contacts and the locations of sea accidents, as well as the
consequencesoftheseaccidents,areanalysed.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 18
Number 1
March 2024
DOI:10.12716/1001.18.01.06
76
be tempted to cut corners or take shortcuts to meet
tight schedules, potentially compromising safety
measures.Adequateenforcementofsafetyregulations
and oversight by maritime authorities are crucial to
ensuring that vessels maintain compliance and
minimize the risk of accidents. The intensity of
maritime transport places demands on port
infrastructure
andcapacity.Inadequateportfacilities,
suchaslimitedberthingspaceorinsufficienthandling
equipment,canleadtocongestionanddelays.These
factors can contribute to accidents during port
operations, including collisions, contact with port
structures, or accidents involving handling
equipment.
Effortstomanageandmitigatetherisksassociated
with the
intensity of maritime transport include
improved navigation technologies, enhanced
communication systems, better traffic management,
and ongoing trainingprograms for seafarers [16‐23].
Regulatory bodies and industry organizations work
towards promoting safe practices, enforcing
regulations, and raising awareness to minimize
accidents and ensure the safe and sustainable
operation of maritime transport. The
accident
investigation also contributes to increased safety at
sea. The aim of investigating sea accidents is to
determine the causes, contributing factors, and
circumstances surrounding the incident. The
investigationaimstoidentifytheunderlyingcausesof
theaccident.Thisinvolvesexaminingfactorssuchas
human error, equipment failure, environmental
conditions,
navigational challenges, or other
contributingfactors.Understandingthecausehelpsin
preventing similar accidents in the future.
Investigatingseaaccidentsprovidesvaluableinsights
into safety deficiencies and shortcomings. By
identifying areas where safety measures can be
improved, authorities, regulatory bodies, and
industrystakeholderscantakeappropriateactionsto
enhance safety protocols,
standards, and practices.
This includes implementing new regulations,
improving training programs, or enhancing
equipment and infrastructure. One of the primary
objectivesofinvestigatingseaaccidentsistoprevent
similarincidentsfromoccurringinthefuture.Lessons
learned from investigations can lead to the
implementation of measures aimed at preventing
accidents,
improving vessel design, enhancing crew
training, strengthening safety regulations, and
developing industry guidelines. The ultimate goalis
toreducetheoccurrenceofaccidentsandimprovethe
overallsafetyrecordofthemaritimeindustry.
2 INVESTIGATIONOFACCIDENTSATSEA
Investigationsofseaaccidentsaretypicallyconducted
by competent authorities, such as
maritime
administrations, accident investigation boards, or
specializedorganizationsatnationalandinternational
levels [24‐33]. The findings and recommendations
from these investigations serve as a basis for
implementing safety improvements and preventing
similar accidents in the future. There are some key
authorities involved in investigating sea accidents,
suchas:flag,
portorcoastalstateauthorities,accident
investigation boards and commissions, classification
societies,internationalbodiesandcooperationandof
course the International Maritime Organization
(IMO).
The IMO is a specialized agency of the United
Nations responsible for the safety, security, and
environmentalperformanceofinternationalshipping.
The IMO facilitates the investigation of
marine
accidents through its Casualty Investigation Code
[34], which provides guidelines and standards for
conducting investigations. The organization also
promotes the exchange of information and lessons
learned from accidents among member states. In
certain circumstances, international bodies or
cooperation may be involved in investigating sea
accidents. For example, the IMOʹ
s Marine Casualty
Investigation Facilitation Program assists member
states in coordinating and conducting investigations
into major accidents involving multiple countries or
significantconsequences[35].
The flag state of a vessel is responsible for
regulating and overseeing its operations. When an
accidentinvolving avesselflyingitsflagoccurs,the
flagstate
authorityusuallyconductsaninvestigation
[36‐38]. They examine factors such as vessel
maintenance, crew competence, compliance with
regulations,andanypotentialviolationsof maritime
laws.Portstateauthoritieshavetheresponsibilityto
ensurethesafetyandsecurityofvesselsvisitingtheir
ports [39]. If an accident occurs in port
waters or
involvesavesselinport,theportstateauthoritymay
conductaninvestigation.Theyfocusonaspectssuch
as port operations, vessel traffic management,
pilotage, and compliance with port regulations.
Coastal states have jurisdiction over their territorial
waters and are responsible for enforcing maritime
lawsandregulations withinthose
waters. Theymay
investigate accidents occurring in their waters,
especially if they involve multiple vessels or pose a
significant risk to the marine environment or public
safety. Many countries have dedicated accident
investigation boards or commissions responsible for
investigating major maritime accidents. These
independent bodies conduct thorough investigations
to determine
the causes, contributing factors, and
lessons learned from accidents. They often make
recommendations to improve safety and prevent
similarincidentsinthefuture.Classificationsocieties
are organizations responsible for certifying and
classifying vessels based on their compliance with
safety and technical standards. In some cases,
classification societies may participate in accident
investigations to assess any potential role of vessel
design,construction,ormaintenanceintheincident.
The specific authority involved in investigatinga
seaaccidentdependsonfactorssuchasthelocationof
theincident,thetypeofvesselinvolved,theseverity
of the accident, and the national or international
regulations
in place. The ultimate goal of these
investigationsisto determinethecauses,learnfrom
the incident, and take appropriate measures to
preventsimilaraccidentsinthefuture.
The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and the
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC)
of IMO jointly issued “Reports on marine casualties
andincidents”–
MSC‐MEPC.3/Circ.4/Rev.1[40].The
role of MSC‐MEPC.3/Circ.4/Rev.1 is to establish a
77
framework and provide guidance to member states
and authorities involved in the investigation of
marinecasualtiesandincidents.Thecircularoutlines
theprinciplesandproceduresforconductingeffective
investigations, promoting transparency, and
facilitating the exchange of information and lessons
learned.
According to the IMO document MSC‐
MEPC.3/Circ.4/Rev.1 [40], the
sea accidents are
classified as: very serious casualties, serious
casualties, less serious casualties and marine
incidents.Theclassificationdependsonthekinds of
initiating events or consequences of sea accidents.
Very serious casualties refer to accidents that
encompass the total loss of the ship, loss of life, or
severepollution.Serious
casualties referto accidents
that do not qualify as very serious ones and which
involvepollution,breakdownnecessitatingtowageor
shoreassistanceorinvolveafire,explosion,collision,
grounding, contact, heavy weather damage, ice
damage,hullcracking,or suspectedhulldefect,etc.,
resultinginimmobilizationofmainengines,extensive
accommodation
damage, severe structural damage,
renderingtheshipunfittoproceed.Thendescribedin
the paper collisions and contacts at the sea are
classifiedatleastastheseriouscasualties.
Moreover,accordingtotheabovementionedIMO
document [40], there are some types of initiating
events:collision,grounding,contact,fireorexplosion,
hull failure, loss of control, ship or equipment
damage,capsizingorlisting,floodingorfoundering,
ship missing, occupational accident, and others.
However,basedontheanalysisofseaaccidents,itis
concluded that a casualty was due to more than a
single initial event. An initial event (called the
primary
event)usuallycausesthenextone(calledthe
next‐step event), finally creating a chain of events
[41,42].Forexample,therearethe primary initiating
event and three next‐step initiating events of the
collisionMVEveriseGlory(bulkdrycarrier)withMV
Uni‐Concord(containership),4thJune2005.From
the
report of the accident, it is known that these ships
collided,sufferedhullfailures,andotherdamagesof
shipandequipment.Thevesselswerethenseparated,
and MV Everise Glory sank. One man was missing
and five crewmembers were injured as well as the
slight oil spill was observed
as the result of the
accident.Thismeansthattheprimaryinitiatingevent
oftheaccidentisthecollision.Ontheotherhand,the
hullfailure,otherdamagesofshipandgroundingare
the next‐step initiating event of the accident (Fig.1),
causingdangeroussituationsand threatsinthe ship
operating
surroundings.
Figure1. Primary initiating event and next‐step initiating
eventsinexemplaryaccidentatsea.Source:ownwork.
Unfortunately, the reports prepared after an
accident and according to the above mentioned
document MSC‐MEPC.3/Circ.4/Rev.1 [40] allow one
point no more than two of initial events of an
accident. It means that the determining the initial
events of sea accidents according to the IMO
documentisnotcomprehensive.Onlyfull
‐textreports
ofaccidentsgiveaviewofallaccidentreasons.
3 MATERIALSANDMETHODS
The research concerns the analysis of sea accidents
particularly focused on collisions and contacts that
happened in 2004‐2021. The data of collision and
contactattheseaweretakenfromthefree‐accessible
Global
Integrated Shipping Information System
(GISIS) of the International Maritime Organization,
section Marine Casualties and Incidents [35]. Then,
more than 4,700 accident reports collected were the
basisofthedataanalysisandinterpretation.Namely,
collisionsandcontactsweredescribedfromthepoint
ofviewoftheirinitiatingevent, thetypeand age
of
ships affected the accident, location of accident and
theirconsequencesforpeople,shipandenvironment.
Unfortunately, the GISIS data prior to 2004 lacks
completeness, rendering the study results including
previousyearswouldbeunreliable.Furthermore,the
data concerning accidents since 2022 remains
incomplete, as reports are still being gathered.
Consequently, this research is concentrated on the
timeframespanningfrom2004to2014.
4 RESULTSANDDISCUSSION
Thedetailedanalysisofmorethan4700seaaccidents
that happened in years 2004‐2021 around the world
letstopointthe collisionand contact(jointly)asthe
most frequent sea accidents initiating events.
The
collision at sea occurs when two or more vessels
collidewitheachotherwhiletravelingonthewater,
whilethecontactmeansthehittingofamovingship
withtheunmovingobject,e.g.apieroraberth.
These kinds of accidents at sea have occurred
throughout history, and
many have had significant
impacts on maritime safety and international
relations.Oneofthemostnotablecollisionsatseain
historyoccurredin1912whentheTitanic,apassenger
liner considered to be unsinkable, collided with an
iceberg in the North Atlantic Ocean on its maiden
voyage.Thecollisionresultedin
thelossofover1,500
lives and prompted significant changes to
international maritime safety regulations. Another
significant collision occurred in 1942 during World
War II when the HMS Edinburgh, a British cruiser
carrying gold bullion, was hit by torpedoes from a
GermansubmarineandsankintheBarents Sea.The
lossofthegoldbullion,worthmillionsofdollars,had
asignificantimpactonthewareffort.Inmorerecent
years,therehave beenseveralhigh‐profilecollisions
at sea. In 2017, the USS Fitzgerald, a United States
Navy destroyer, collided with a cargo ship off the
coast of Japan, resulting
in the deaths of seven U.S.
Navy sailors. Later that same year, the USS John S.
78
McCain, another U.S. Navy destroyer, collided with
anoiltankernearSingapore,resultinginthedeathsof
tenU.S.Navy sailors. In 2018, theIranianoil tanker
MVSanchicollidedwiththeHongKong‐flaggedbulk
carrierCFCrystalintheEastChinaSea,resultingin
thedeathsofall
32crewmembers onboardtheMV
Sanchi. In 2019,thecontainership MSC Zoe collided
with the Liberian‐flagged container ship YM
Efficiency off the coast of Australia, resulting in the
loss of over 280 shipping containers and causing an
environmental disaster. In 2020, the Panama‐flagged
livestock carrier Gulf
Livestock 1 sank in the East
China Sea after being hit by Typhoon Maysak,
resultinginthelossof41crewmembers.
AccordingtodatafromtheIMO[35],thenumber
of reported marine casualties and incidents
worldwide has been decreasing over the years,
including collisions at sea. However, collisions still
occur and can have serious consequences as noted
previously.Thestatisticsoncollisionsatseafrom2004
to2021basedon GISISdatapointsoutthatthetotal
number of reported collisions at sea worldwide
decreasedfrom48in2004to21in2021.Thehighest
number of reported collisions
at sea in this period
occurredin2006and2007,with130and97reported
incidents,respectively[35].
The analysis of mentioned 4,700 accidents at the
seathathappenedaroundtheworldmakescollision
andcontactthe mostfrequentsea accidentinitiating
events (31.70% jointly). Despite the collision and
contact, the
grounding and fire are the frequent
initiating events – they are the initiating event of
every5thaccident,whilecollisionandcontactarethe
initiatingeventsofevery3rdone.
Detailedanalysisofseaaccidentinitiatingeventsis
presentedinFigure2.
Figure2. Sea accident initiating events (A – stranding /
grounding,B–collision,C–contact,D–fire/explosion,E–
hull failure / failure of watertight doors/ports, etc., F –
machinerydamage,G–damagestoshiporequipment,H–
capsizing/listing,I–missing:
assumedlost,K–accidents
with life‐saving appliances). Source: own study based on
dataforyears2004‐2021.
4.1 Collisionandcontactasprimaryinitiatingevent
The collision is more frequent sea initiating events
(24.70%) than contact with unmoving infrastructure
element(7.00%).Ontheotherhand,thecontactmore
frequentdoesnotoccurthenextstepinitiatingevent
(6.40%)thancollision;thecollisiondoesnotoccurthe
nextstep
initiatingeventofevery34thone.
Collision and contact at sea usually occurs same
damagesofshiporitsequipment(35.77%and45.60%
respectively) as well as the hull failure (17.20% and
20.00%respectively).Moreover,thegroundingcanbe
expected as the next‐step initiating event of the
collision(24.54%)
andsporadicallyofcontacts(5.60%).
Theanalysisofseaaccidentsallowstoidentifythat
the collision seldom occurs ship capsizing or listing
(5.05%), fire (2.06%), contact (0.46%) and missing
(0.23%) opposite to contact that never occurs these
next‐step events. Additionally, some collisions and
contacts at sea are not very serious
and occur only
slight damage to the ship that the vessel is able to
continuethejourney(11.47%forcollisionsand12.80%
forcontacts).
Thedetailedanalysisofcollisionandcontactatsea
astheprimaryinitiatingeventsispresentedinFigures
3‐4.
Figure3.Collisionasprimaryinitiatingeventofaccidentsat
sea.Source:ownstudybasedondataforyears2004‐2021.
Figure4.Contactasprimaryinitiatingeventofaccidentsat
sea.Source:ownstudybasedondataforyears2004‐2021.
4.2 Collisionandcontactasnext‐stepinitiatingevent
The collision and contact are the primary initiating
eventofaccidentsatsearatherthannext‐stepone.
79
Thecollisionandcontactusuallymaybetheresult
of ship damage (for collision: machinery damage –
20.00%, damage to the ship or equipment – 13.33%,
andhullfailureorfailureofwatertightdoors–6.67%;
forcontact:machinerydamage–50.00%,hullfailure
orfailureofwatertightdoors
–16.67%anddamageto
the ship or equipment – 5.56%). Additionally, the
collisionisoccurredastheeffectofthefire–26.67%,
the contact – 20.00%, the grounding and listening –
each6.67%.Ontheotherhand,thecontactoccursas
the effect of the collision – 11.11%, as
well as the
grounding – 5.56%. Moreover, it was found that
missing or accidents with life‐saving appliances do
notoccurcollisionandcontact.
Thedetailedanalysisofcollisionandcontactatsea
as the next‐step initiating events is presented in
Figures5‐6.
Figure5.Collisionasnext‐stepinitiatingeventofaccidents
atsea.Source:ownstudybasedondataforyears2004‐2021.
Figure6.Contactasnext‐stepinitiatingeventofaccidentsat
sea.Source:ownstudybasedondataforyears2004‐2021.
4.3 Locationofcollisionandcontactatsea
The place of sea accidents can vary depending on
various factors such as shipping routes, traffic
density,navigationalchallenges,andlocalconditions
[43‐49]. Some areas are known for higher accident
ratesduetothesefactors.Hereareafewregionsthat
have
experiencedarelativelyhigherfrequencyofsea
accidents. Regions with heavy maritime traffic and
busyshippinglanes, suchasmajor traderoutes and
ports,aremorepronetoaccidents.Examplesinclude
the Strait of Malacca, the English Channel, the
MediterraneanSea, andthe Gulf of Aden. Similarly,
portswith high
vesseltrafficandcongestedharbour
areas can pose collision risks, especially during
periods of heavy traffic or challenging weather
conditions. Examples include major ports like
Rotterdam, Singapore, Shanghai, and New York.
Narrow or congested waterways can present
navigational challenges, such as Suez Canal, the
Panama Canal, and certain straits and channels
like
the Singapore Strait and the Turkish Straits
(Bosphorus and Dardanelles), increasing the
likelihoodofaccidents.Coastalareaswithchallenging
weatherconditions,strongcurrents,reefs,orshallow
waters,withsignificantmaritimeactivities,including
ferry routes, fishing zones, or areas near offshore
energyinstallationscanposeriskstovessels,leading
to
higher accident rates. Areas prone to storms,
hurricanes,or typhoons,suchasthe Gulfof Mexico,
theSouthChinaSea,andtheCaribbeanSea,mayhave
increased accident occurrences. Certain areas with a
higher risk of piracy or armed attacks, or regions
experiencing political or security challenges, such as
Gulf of
Aden, the waters off the coast of Somalia,
parts of the South China, and the Black Sea can be
more prone to accidents. These incidents can be a
resultofdeliberateactsbycriminalgroupsorhostile
actions and pose significant risks to crew members,
vessels,andcargo.
Mapsshowing
thelocationofaccidentsdiscussed
inthispaperaredepictedinFigure7.
Figure7. Collisions (yellow points) and contacts (green
point).of years 2004‐2021,discussedin thispaper. Source:
ownworkatGoogleEarth.
80
Figure7cont.Collisions(yellowpoints)andcontacts(green
point).of years 2004‐2021,discussedin thispaper. Source:
ownworkatGoogleEarth.
Thereare10typesofcasualtylocationdescribedin
theIMOdocumentMSC‐MEPC.3/Circ.4/Rev.1[40]:at
aberth,ananchorage,aport,aportapproach,inland
waters, a canal, a river, archipelagos, coastal waters
(within12miles),andopensea.
Due to the huge traffic around the coastal areas,
the most
sea accidents occur in these regions,
especiallycollisionsincoastalwaters(within12miles)
– 21.64% and contacts in ports – 27.74% and at the
berth–16.79%.Thenbeaches,portsandcostsarethe
most threatened areas as the result of collisions and
contactsatsea.
The detailed analysis
of collision and contact
locationatseaispresentedinFigure8.
Figure8. Location of collision and contact at sea (A – at
berth,B–anchorage,C–port,D–portapproach,E–inland
waters, F – canal, G – river, H – archipelagos, I – coastal
waters(within12miles),K–opensea).Source:ownstudy
based
ondataforyears2004‐2021.
4.4 Typeofshipsinvolvedincollisionandcontactatsea
The size and types of vessels involved in maritime
transport can impact the intensity of shipping
activitiesandpotentialaccidents[30,43,50,51].Larger
vessels, such as container ships and bulk carriers,
often carry substantial cargo volumes and have a
significant presence
in global trade. Therefore it is
expected that their operations can have a greater
impactintermsofintensityandpotentialrisks.
The IMO document MSC‐MEPC.3/Circ.4/Rev.1
[40]identifies27typesofships.Generalcargoships,
container ships and bulk dry carriers are frequent
involved in collisions (18.35%, 17.32% and
14.23%
respectively),as wellasthe passenger/Ro‐Rocargo
ships, general cargo ships and container ships are
frequent involved in contacts (26.57%, 13.99% and
12.59%respectively).
Thedetailedanalysisofshipsʹtypethathavetaken
partincollisionsandcontactsattheseaispresented
inFigure9.
Figure9.Thetypeofshipsthathavetakenpartincollisions
and contacts at the sea (A – liquefied gas tanker, B –
chemicaltanker,C–oiltanker,D–bulkdry(general,ore)
carrier,E–bulkdry/oilcarrier,F–generalcargoship,G–
containership,H–passenger/Ro‐Rocargoship,I–tug,K–
fish catching vessel, L – unspecified, M – other). Source:
ownstudybasedondataforyears2004‐2021.
4.5 Ageofshipinvolvedincollisionandcontactatsea
Theaverageageoftheglobalfleetvariesdepending
ontheshiptypesandregions.Someshiptypes,such
asbulkcarriersortankers,mayhaveahigheraverage
agecomparedtoothers.However,theaverageageof
shipsinvolved
inaccidentsdoesnotnecessarilyimply
a direct correlation between vessel age and the
likelihood of incidents [52‐54]. Therefore the age of
ships involved in collisions and contacts at sea can
81
varywidely.Shipsofdifferentagescanbeinvolvedin
such incidents depending on various factors,
including maintenance practices, vessel condition,
operational procedures, and compliance with safety
regulations. Newer ships, including those recently
built or relatively young in age, are generally
expected to have modern design features, advanced
navigation
equipment,andimprovedsafetysystems.
These ships often adhere to the latest international
safetystandardsandregulations.However,evennew
ships can be involved in accidents due to human
error, unforeseen circumstances, or other factors.
Olderships,particularlythosenearingtheendoftheir
operational lives, may be more prone to
technical
failures,equipmentmalfunctions,orstructuralissues
if not properly maintained. The age of a ship alone
does not necessarily determine its seaworthiness or
safety, as older vessels can still be operated safely
throughdiligentmaintenanceandregularinspections.
Ships, regardless of their age, are required to meet
safety and
maintenance standards set by regulatory
bodies such as the IMO and flag state authorities.
Compliancewiththeseregulationsiscrucialtoensure
the safe operation of ships and minimize theriskof
accidents.Moreover,regularinspections,surveys,and
audits are conducted to assess the condition and
safetycomplianceofships,regardless
oftheirage,in
ordertopreventaccidentsandensurethewell‐being
ofcrew,passengers,andthemarineenvironment.
Alotofshipsinvolvedincollisionandcontactat
theseaaremorethantenyearsold(13‐15years).Itis
significantfortheseaenvironmentconditionbecause
olderships aremoreexploited andtheirhull canbe
damaged easier. Then the transported cargo or fuel
maysweepoverboardandfinallycausingthemarine
ecosystempollution.
Thedetailedanalysisoftheageofshipsthathave
participated in the collision and contact at sea is
presentedinFigure10.
Figure10.Ageofshipthathavetakenpartincollisionand
contact at sea. Source: own study based on data for years
2004‐2021.
4.6 Consequencesofcollisionandcontactatsea
Accidents at sea can have serious consequences,
including loss of life or serious injurie of crew
members and passengers on board the vessels
involved[40,55,56],property damage ofshipaswell
as any cargo or other property on board and other
infrastructure in
the accident area [40,43,57].
Accidents can also result in spills of oil, hazardous
materials, or other pollutants into the marine
environment, which can have serious ecological and
economic consequences [40,58‐65]. These spills can
harm marine life, damage sensitive ecosystems, and
disrupt local fisheries and tourism industries.
Moreover,accidentscan
causedisruptionstoshipping
lanesandportoperations,which canhaveeconomic
consequences for the global shipping industry [66].
This can lead to delays, rerouting of vessels, and
increasedcostsforshippersandconsumers.
Thefrequentconsequenceofcollisionandcontact
for ship is its damages that make impossible the
further
journey(28.66%and52.80%,respectively).In
thecaseofconsequencesforpeopleit isknown that
every6thcollisionandcontactoccurslossoflife.The
pollutionistheresult of less collisionsand contacts:
every17thcollisionandevery15thcontactoccursthe
marineecosystempollution.
Thedetailed analysis
ofconsequencesofcollision
andcontactforpeople,shipsandseaenvironmentis
presentedinFigure11(oneaccidentcanoccurseveral
kindsofconsequences).
Figure11.Consequencesofcollisionandcontactforpeople,
ship and sea environment (A – loss of life, B – serious
injuries,C–totallossoftheship,D–shiprenderedunfitto
proceed, E – ship remains fit to proceed, F – pollution).
Source:ownstudybasedon
dataforyears2004‐2021.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Accurateandcomprehensivestatisticsonaccidentsat
seacanbechallengingtoobtain,asreportingpractices
82
and data collection methods vary among different
countriesandorganizations[67‐73].Accordingtothe
IMO, the number of reported marine casualties and
incidents worldwide has shown a declining trend
over the years [35]. Accident statistics can vary
significantly by region due to factors such as traffic
density, weather conditions,
navigational challenges,
and enforcementofsafety regulations. Some regions
with heavy maritime traffic or challenging
navigational conditions may experience a higher
numberofaccidents.Itʹsimportanttonotethatdata
presented in the paper provide a general overview
and should not be considered as comprehensive or
definitive. The availability
and accuracy of accident
datacanvary,andnotallincidentsmaybereported
or included in official statistics. Lloydʹs List
Intelligence, a maritime intelligence provider,
reported that between 2004 and 2021, there were
around150‐200 shipwrecks and total lossesperyear
globally [71,74]. These numbers include vessels of
various types and sizes. The number of fatalities
resulting from maritime accidents can vary
significantlyfromyeartoyear.Majoraccidents,such
asshipsinkingorlarge‐scaledisasters,canresultina
high number of fatalities. However, itʹs difficult to
provide precise global statistics due to the diverse
natureofaccidentsandreportingpractices.
Investigations of sea accidents provide not only
valuable evidence and information for legal
proceedingsandinsuranceclaims.Understandingthe
circumstances of the accident and investigations
contribute to the overall body of knowledge within
the maritime industry. By analyzing accident data,
trends,andpatterns,lessonscan
belearned,andbest
practicescanbedevelopedandshared[21,75‐77].This
knowledge sharing helps in raising awareness,
promotingsafety culture,andimprovingoperational
procedures.ThedocumentMSC‐MEPC.3/Circ.4/Rev.1
[40]alsoplaysthisrolebyemphasizestheimportance
of investigating marine casualties and incidents to
enhance safety at sea
and protect the marine
environment. The circular encourages the
identificationofsafetydeficiencies,thedetermination
ofcausalfactors,andthedevelopmentofmeasuresto
prevent similar incidents in the future. The circular
promotescooperationandinformationsharingamong
member states, authorities, and organizations
involved in marine casualty investigations. It
encourages the
exchange of investigation reports,
lessonslearned,andbestpracticesto enhance safety
andpreventaccidents.
Maritime organizations and regulatory bodies
continually work to improve safety practices and
reduce the occurrence of accidents at sea through
various initiatives, including training programs,
safety regulations, and technological advancements.
Accidentfrequenciescanvaryfrom
yeartoyear,and
improvementsinsafetymeasuresandregulationscan
have a positive impact on reducing accidents in
certainareas.Effortsarecontinuouslybeingmadeby
maritime authorities and organizations to enhance
safety practices, enforce regulations, and mitigate
risksinaccident‐proneregions.
Avoidingaccidentsatsea,includingcollisionsand
contacts,requiresacombinationofpropernavigation
practices, effectivecommunication,andadherenceto
established regulations and procedures [78‐82]. In
addition to taking steps to avoid accidents at sea,
there are several mitigation strategies and actions
taken to reduce the impact or consequences of a
collisionoracontactonce
ithasoccurred.Mitigation
measures are aimed at minimizing damage to the
vessels involved, preventing loss of life, and
mitigatingtheenvironmentalimpact.Therearesome
stepsthatcanhelppreventcollisionsandcontactsat
sea:
follow established navigation rules, such as the
InternationalRegulationsforPreventingCollisions
at Sea
(COLREGs) that provide guidance on
navigationandtheactionsthatshouldbetakento
avoidcollisions,
maintain proper lookout at all times by vessels,
using all availablemeans,includingradar, visual
observation, and radio communications,todetect
andavoidotherships,
operatingatasafespeed(thatallows
thevesselto
stop or alter course quickly in case of an
emergency),takingintoaccounttheconditionsand
thepresenceofothervessels,
use communication tools effectively (it is
importanttotransmit ownintentionsandreceive
acknowledgement from other vessels) to
communicate between vessels through the use of
signals
andradiocommunicationsorradar,sonar,
and Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to
provide information about their position, course,
and speed to help detect other vessels and
potentialhazards,
maintainsituationalawarenessbykeepingtrackof
other vessels in the vicinity, monitoring weather
conditions, and staying informed about any
changes
inthevesselʹssurroundings,
avoiddistractions,suchasusingmobilephonesor
engaginginnon‐navigationrelatedactivities,asit
can increase the risk of collision and other
accidents,
design vessels with structural reinforcements by
usage of thicker hull plates or strengthening of
critical areas such as the
bow or stern to help
minimize damage in the event of a collisionora
contact,
properly maintaining vessels and equipment to
ensuretheyarefunctioningproperlyandtoavoid
equipment failure or malfunction which can lead
toacollisionandotheraccidents,
equipvesselswithpropersafety
equipment,such
as life rafts, life jackets, and emergency signaling
devices, in case of an emergency, and also with
emergency response plans in place that outline
procedures for responding to a collision, that
includeproceduresfordamagecontrol,searchand
rescue,andcommunicationwithauthorities,
international cooperation includes sharing
information
on best practices, providing mutual
assistance in emergency situations, and working
together to develop and implement effective
regulationsandguidelines,
train the crew members in navigation and safety
procedurestoensurethatallcrewmembersknow
howtorespondinanemergency.
Followingthesesteps,vesselscanhelpreduce
the
riskofcollisionsatseaandensurethesafetyofcrew
membersandpassengersaswellastheenvironment.
83
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The paper presents results developed in the scope of the
researchproject“Monitoringandanalysis oftheimpactof
selectedsubstancesandmaterialsintermsofenvironmental
protection”, supported by Gdynia Maritime University
(projectgrantno.WZNJ/2023/PZ/10).
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