365
1 INTRODUCTION
World maritime trade is increasingly depended on
containerization. The traditional gates to Europe are
theportslocatedbetweenLeHavreandHamburg.
TheBalticSeaasabasinforocean‐goingcontainer
ships is limited by physical prerequisites. Small
marketsandlimitedhinterlandsmayalsoreducethe
competitiveness
of ports [11]. Baltic ports are
thereforeessentiallyservedbyafeedernetwork.The
BSRismainlyconnectedtoEuropewithlessthan10
regularcontainerlinestotherestoftheworldin2015.
StartingfromNorthernRange ports,therotations of
the feeder ships are either circular, serving
a small
numberofports,eitherdirecttooneortwoports.So
Baltic ports are not relays of large European and
global flows but rather secondary nodes in the
maritimenetwork,eventhemostdevelopedofthem
are connectedthroughfeeder services to some other
ports’range[19].However,this
landscapeisevolving,
asevidencedbytheincreaseoflargevesselsordirect
deep‐seaconnectionstotheBalticSea.
In2017,thelargest regionalcontainerport, Saint‐
Petersburg, stood only 15th in Europe. Even if the
composition of the 20 largest container ports
remained stable, Polish ports recorded considerable
andcontinuedgrowthincontainertraffic.
According to recent forecasts, the continuous
growth of cargo turnover is expected in the Baltic
ports[12].Shipswillbecomelargerandthetransport
of containers will continue to be the most dynamic
segment of the shipping business [4]. Maritime
transportintheBalticsea
isundoubtedlyimpactedby
its physical configurations. The basic gates are the
Polish Container Ports, New Baltic Hubs?
A.Serry
LeHavreNormandyUniversity,LeHavre,France
ABSTRACT: Over the last decade, the Baltic ports have welcomed a remarkable growth, especially oil
transportationandcontainerisedflows.Theregionalcontainernetworkismainlymadeupoffeedersservices.
Consequently,Balticportsasnodesofaregionalmaritimenetworkareintegratedintoa
largersystem.Indeed,
the port development and the evolution of maritime traffic are symptomatic of economic and territorial
mutations.
Inthiscontext,thePolishports,GdanskandGdynia,wereoriginallymainlyconnectedtothePolishhinterland
andCentralEuropeanmarket. They arenow becoming new transhipmentports forthe regional
traffic. It is
especiallythecaseforGdanskwhichrecordedconsiderableandcontinuedgrowthincontainertrafficduring
thelastyears.
Thepurposeof thispaperistoanalysetheactivityof thepolishcontainerportsandexaminetheirroleand
positionintheBalticandEuropeancontainernetwork.Thisstudy
isbasedonaliteraturereviewandmainlyon
theanalysisofastatisticaldatabaseaswellasusingAutomaticIdentificationSystemdata.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 17
Number 2
June 2023
DOI:10.12716/1001.17.02.13
366
DanishStraitsandtheKielCanal.Thenthestrongest
containerstreamstraditionallyholdtowardstheGulf
ofFinlandandtheRussianmarket.
The changes of modern seaports are affected by
many factors taking place in the global economy,
national policy, the environment of seaports, supply
chains, but also a number
of stimulants i.e.
innovation, new technologies or sustainable
development[17].Containerterminalsinseaportsare
key elements of the intermodal transport
infrastructure. In Poland, as in other countries,
container handling is playing an increasingly
important role. Until 2009, Gdynia was the largest
Polishcontainerport,butin2010Gdanskbecame
the
leaderinthisrespect[3].
Thus, this paper proposes to study the place of
PolishportsintheBalticmaritimesystem.Tothisend,
wewillusenumericaldata,includingporttraffic,to
complete a literature review. Moreover, in order to
highlight the original role of Polish ports and to
explainit,wewillmobilizedatafromtheAutomatic
IdentificationSystem(AIS).
2 POLISHCONTAINERPORTS
Polish ports of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin‐
Świnoujście are located in the central part of the
southernBalticSeacoast.Intherecentyears,thecargo
turnover of the Polish ports has significantly
increased. The most measurable increase can be
observed on the containerized cargo which turnover
rosebyalmost2timesin2012‐2022.Indeed,sincethe
early2010ʹs,thedominantgroupinthetranshipments
in Polish seaports is general cargo, which share
around48%.Thelargeshareofgeneralcargo
isdueto
increasedcontainerhandling.
ThemajorportistheportofGdansk.Itissituated
in the southwestern part of the Gulf of Gdansk. It i
playsalargeroleinthenationaleconomy,with68,2
milliontonsoftrafficin2022.Thelargestterminalis
the Deepwater Container
Terminal (DCT) which is
able to accept vessels containing more than 20,000
TEU [27]. Since 2005, the port of Gdansk was
responsibleformorethan40%ofcargotrafficandits
share among Polish seaports in 2019 reached 48.5%.
The port of Gdynia was responsible for more than
20%, with
a peak in 2007 when it reached 28.3%.
OtherPolishportswereofminorimportance[3].
Gdansk is clearly also the leader in term of
containerisationwith2,072,000TEUin2022.In2018,
through the port of Gdansk have passed 69% of all
containershandledbyPolishseaports[5].
Insecond
placeistheportofSzczecin‐Świnoujście,
which handled 36.8 million tonnes of cargo in 2022,
butonlyabout75,000TEU.Forthisreason,wedonot
include it in our study focusing on containerised
activity.
Withatrafficof28milliontonsofgoodsin2022,
the port
in Gdynia is the third largest seaport in
Poland. The port is a universal port specialized in
handling general cargo, mainly unitized cargo
transportedin containersandin a ro‐ro system. The
services are provided through a network of
multimodaltransportconnectionswiththehinterland
andthroughshortseashipping
andferryconnections.
ThePortofGdyniaisalinkintheCorridorVIofthe
Trans‐European Transport Network (TEN‐T) [15].
But,duetothelocationoftheportofGdynianearthe
city center, its further development is difficult. The
only direction of development leads to the
constructionofportfacilitiesonthewater[26].
So,themainpolishcontainerterminalsarelocated
in Gdansk and Gdynia. Due to their diversified
infrastructure, handling capacities and commercial
relations, these container terminals offer a varied
range of services. But there is also an oligopolistic
competitionbecausethereareonlyfive
mainplayers:
threeofthemarelocatedinGdynia(BalticContainer
Terminal, Gdynia Container Terminal, OT Logistic
Terminal Gdynia) and two in Gdansk (Deepwater
ContainerTerminal,GdanskContainerTerminal).
TerminalsinGdyniadonotserveanydirectocean
serviceandarefocusedonfeedershipswhich,carry
goods from the
largest ports in Western Europe.
Smallerunits(upto2,500TEUs)canbenefitfromthe
Kiel Canal, which can shorten the journey by two
days compared to the route through the Danish
straits.To attractlarger units,the portauthoritiesin
Gdyniaintendtodeepenthewaterwaysaswellasto
increasetherotations.
Infact,theGdanskportisformedbytwodistricts
(innerandouterport)whatallowsstrengtheningthe
terminalsspecialization.ThankstotheDCTterminal
established in 2007, the Port of Gdansk became the
secondlargestBalticcontainerportin2012(Figure1).
DCT is perpetually developing.
In October 2016,
Terminal2berthwasopenedattheterminal,enabling
thehandlingofvesselswithacapacityofover22,000
TEU. The handling activity is also strongly coupled
with logistics functions, for instance in the
PomeranianLogisticsCentre.
Figure1. Evolution of the ranking of the main Baltic
containerports.
Moreover,accordingtodatafromOceanShipping
Consultants Ltd., transporting a container from
Shanghai via Gdansk to Warsaw in the discussed
period cost approximatively 28% less than via
Rotterdamand approx. 20% less than via Hamburg.
SinceGdanskislocatedclosertotheeasternmarkets
thanbothoftheseEuropeanports,
DCTalsoprovided
savingsofover10%onshippinglinestootherBaltic
portsincomparisontoRotterdam,whileinrelationto
Hamburg,thesesavingsamountedtoeven15%[2].
These financial considerations and the technical
characteristics (the depth is16.5 meters) of the port
allowedGdansktogainadirect
connectionfromthe
FarEast.Since2010,DCTGdanskaccommodatesthe
directshippingroutesofMaerskfromtheFarEastto
367
Europe.Today,theportofGdanskisstilltheonlyone
in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) directly connected to
AsiawithMaerskAE10route.
With the introduction of the Maersk Line direct
vessel calls, the level of transhipment has risen
sharply in the port of Gdansk. The percent of
the
cargotranshipmentinthetotalcargoturnoverofthe
portGdanskhashighlyincreased:in2004thepartof
transitcargopassingthroughtheportwas5.0%and
in 2012 those cargoes were already 60,3 % [24].
Currently,withtheabilitytohandlethelargestships,
DCT becomes
a leading Baltic deep‐sea port, where
cargo is being transported to customers in countries
likeRussia,Sweden,FinlandandotherBalticStates.
Forits part,GdyniabenefitedfromtheBalticSea
marketintensiveprogress.Inparticular,inthemiddle
of the 2010s, MSC has launched two new ocean
services to
replace the existing MSC service
connecting the port of Gdynia with transhipment
portsinWesternEurope[6].
Consequently,Polishportsareexperiencingrapid
changes,oscillatingbetweenmedium‐sizedportswith
an essentially national vocation and intermediate
shipping hubs. As a result, Gdansk is now in first
positionintheregion
forcontainerhandling.In2019,
Gdanskhasenteredthetoptenoftheeuropeanport‐
level liner shipping connectivity index generatedfor
all container ports of the world that receive regular
containershippingservices[24]evenifGdanskranks
only 203 in the Container Port Performance Index
2021 behind some other
Baltic ports like Klaipeda
(186)orGothenburg(118)[24].
Consideringwhatwasmentionedabove,itseems
reasonabletostatethateachterminaloffersaslightly
differentserviceandyettheirofferistoalargeextent
complementary. Increasing transhipment capacity of
Polish terminals also allows to recover the cargoes
that
had previously been directed to the major
western ports. Gdansk and Gdynia are today strong
competitorsforGothenburg[18]whichhasbenefited
for a long time from its location outside the Danish
straits but is going doing in the container port
ranking.
3 AISCASESTUDY
We have seen that Polish
ports have an increasing
market share and are strengthening their position
among the Baltic ports, although the situation in
Gdynia is different from that in Gdansk. The latter
seems to be strengthening its centrality and
positioning itself in a system of
competition/complementarity with North West
Europeanports,whereasGdyniaappears
tobemore
ofaregionalport.
Fromamethodologicalpointofview,thispartof
theanalyseisbasedonadatabaseconstructedusing
theIHSmaritimedatabase(https://maritime.ihs.com/)
andwithdirectlycollectedAISdata.BroadcastingAIS
datainreal‐timemakesatangiblecontributiontothe
scientific community. The
automatic character of
transmitting vessel positioning signals and its
generalisation provide an opportunity to track and
analyse the vessels’ itineraries. Once this source of
information has been properly checked through
matchingitwithexternaldatawithregardtovessels
andports,itopensthewaytoreasoningonaglobal
scale as well as on the scale of port approaches, in
real‐time as well as long term. It is then possible to
analysethemaritimenetworks.Inreality,theresults
of AIS data analysis also concern different types of
studies like port performance analysis, shipping
companies’ strategies or regional markets
analysis
[21].
It should be noted that we were unfortunately
unabletousedatafrom2022.Indeed,theircollection
and especially their processing (which takes a
relativelylongtime)havenotbeencompleted.So,we
have chosen to start this analysis by looking at the
situationafewyearsago.
WehavealreadyestablishedthatbetweenJanuary
andNovember2016,60differentoperatorsprovided
containerised services to Baltic ports. [19]. Shipping
linesoperating in the Baltic Sea Region mainly offer
feederservicesbetweentheportsoftheBalticSeaand
the ports of the North Sea (Hamburg, Rotterdam,
Bremerhaven,Antwerp).However,
theyusedifferent
operating strategies on the market. Some feeder
companies have only one port and some up to five
suchlinesasUnifeederhaveupto20ports[13].Some
companies such as Containerships have quite local
strategieswithshipscallingonlyat3ports(Helsinki,
St‐Petersburgand
Riga)whenothersforinstanceMSC
proposeservicestoalmostallBSR.
ThecaseofGdanskisinterestingasinspiteofthe
low number of lines its traffic was relatively high.
This is mainly the results of shipping companies’
strategies. For instance, Maersk Line offered a
capacity of 966 336
TEUs in the port of Gdansk but
only40 233TEUs in Kaliningrad. It is an interesting
way to focus on the three different types of actors
present in the region. It clearly appears that
companies have different strategies: global carriers
concentrate their flows on some ports as Gdansk
while
companiesspecialisedinfeederserviceshavea
moredecentralisednetwork.
Recently,thenumberofcontainerships’port calls
inGdanskhasgrownto601in2020accordingtoAIS
dataonethirdlessthanintheportofGdynia(960in
2020).Beyondtheoverallvolumeofcallsintheports,
we
observe that while the structure of traffic in the
two ports is very different. In Gdynia, we count 32
operators whose ships call at the port, while in
Gdanskthisnumberisonly20.Wecanalsoseefrom
the outset that in Gdynia, local and regional
stakeholders(NordicHamburg,
Containerships…)are
more present than the global carriers who are very
activeinGdansk.
Moreover, in Gdansk, this structure is totally
dominated by the Maersk group (Maersk itself and
SealandEurope) whichaccountsfor40%of thecalls
in 2020 when in Gdynia, the dominating company
only represents 23% of the
total (Figure 2). This
company is Unifeeder, what also show one more
difference between the two polish ports. The use of
AISdatacorroborateswhatwassaidintheprevious
section:theportofGdyniaismainlyaportaffectedby
feedervessels(Containerships,X‐PressFeeders,etc.),
whereasGdansk
ispositionedinadifferentsectorof
368
activity, even if the presence of feeder vessels
illustratesitspositionasatranshipmentport.
On the studied period, container handling
statisticsinGdynia andGdanskwere verydifferent:
905,000 TEU were handled at the Gdynia terminals,
less than half the volume handled in Gdansk
(1,924,000 TEU) In concrete terms,
while there are
manymorecallsinGdynia,thetrafficislower.There
aretwo reasons for this:firstly, thesize of the ships
that touch the ports, and secondly, the handling
shares.
Figure2.PortscallsbayoperatorinGdyniaandGdanskin
2020.
So, to evaluate this handling share, we need AIS
data and a database that gives containerships’
capacity(IHSMaritime).Thecapacityoftransportin
eachportisconsideredbyaddingthecapacitiesofall
thecontainershipsmakingacalloveracertainperiod.
This average handling rate allows to assess the
averagenumber of containers which are loadedand
unloaded during a call. For instance, an average
handling rate of 40% on a container ship with a
transport capacity of 10 000 TEUs means that 4000
TEUswillbehandledonaverage.Themaximumrate
can be 200% under hypothesis that
the ships are
unloaded and reloaded completely. We have
calculatedthathandlingshareforGdyniaandGdansk
in 2020 and the result is that they are very similar:
66%inGdanskand67%inGdynia.Thatmeansthat
thedifferencesbetweenthetwoportsaremostlikely
duetothesize
ofthevessels.
In theother Baltic ports, the capacity providedis
generallyrelativelylowbutthehandlingrateisvery
high compared to the European average (44%). If
GdyniaandGdanskarebothinthetopfive,theyare
behindtheportsofSaintPetersburg(112%),Hamina‐
Kotka(78%)
andKlaipeda(75%).,Indeed,someports,
especially those in the Gulf of Finland, which are
served to small units, are impacted by a dead‐end
effect,whichalsoexplainstheratherhighrates[9].
Onceagain,we canhavean accurateviewof the
ships thanks to the AIS data (Figure
3). Thus, we
foundthatin2020:
theaveragesizeofcontainershipsoperatinginthe
port of Gdynia was 1,404 TEU while the average
sizeofshipsberthinginGdanskwas4,846TEU;
the largest PCs sailing to Gdansk could carry
23,756TEUcomparedto8,241TEU
inGdynia.
Figure3. Containerships’ size in Gdynia and Gdansk in
2020.
Using AIS data, it’s possible to build a maritime
network. Here, we have the simplified Northern
European Maritime Network of container‐ships in
2018 (Figure 4). We used the method of the major
flows.Theprincipleistokeepthestronglinkfroman
EuropeanporttoananotherEuropeanport.
Theport
sizeinthisgraphisthedegreethatisthenumberof
links incoming and outgoing and the colour is the
betweenness which is the fact of having to pass
throughanode(hereaport)toreachtheotherports.
It is a bit of an indicator
of the centrality of the
network.
Figure4.SimplifiedcontainerisationnetworkinNorthWest
Europein2018
From2018,theportofGdanskemergedasaport
whichremained secondaryintheEuropean network
butwhichwasdirectlyconnectedwiththedominant
ports in the network, primarily the German port of
Bremerhaven[21].Atthesametime,Gdyniawasless
directly integrated into the network but strongly
connected
to some regional ports like Klaipeda in
Lithuania.
In2020,thesituationremainssimilar.Gdanskisin
close contact with the ports of Bremerhaven and
ZeebruggeforinboundlinksandwithWilhemshaven
and, again, Bremenhaven for outbound links.
Althoughlinksarenotpresentinthisscheme,dueto
the150,000
TEUcapacitythreshold,itisincreasingly
becomingacentralportintheBalticnetwork(Figure
5). This role is confirmed by the large capacities
offeredtoandfromtheportofGdansk.
369
Figure5. The Baltic container network in capacity in 2020
(Author,accordingtoJoly&Kerbiriou[8]).
SpeakingaboutGdynia,wecanseethepersistence
ofstronglinksbetweenGdyniaandKlaipedaaswell
asitsprivilegedconnectionswithHamburgand,toa
lesserextent,Antwerp.Wecanalsostatethatinthis
containerised network, this port is of a lower rank
thanthatoccupiedbyitsneighbour.
4 GDANSK,THEBALTICHUB
Nowadays,Gdanskportworksasahubandithasa
strategic position on the main routes of shipping
companies;adistinctroleinthemaritimenetwork;a
high level of transhipment and it can accommodate
largervesselsthantheregionneighbouringports.At
the
Baltic scale, the reorganisation of traffic has
generated standardisation on all shores of the Baltic
Sea,respondingtothehubandspokemode.
4.1 ElementsofGdanskʹsaffirmationasahubport
Atfirst,DCTGdanskistheonlyportintheBalticSea,
which technical features make possible to
accommodate Triple‐E container vessels, even if
Vesselswithamaximumdraught/draftof15.3mcan
entertheBalticSea.Thishasbecomeoneofthemost
fundamental in the decision to include Gdansk in
MaersklinearoceanrouteAE10fromSoutheastAsia
to Europe (as the final ship entry
port). This
circumstance has allowed the Gdansk port to start
specialization in the transhipment operation and
transit to Russia, Sweden, Finland and other Baltic
countries[7].
In connection with the concentration of activity
regularly observed in the shipping industry, the
Deepwater Container Terminal receives also
additionalbenefitssuchas:directcalls
oceancarriers
at the terminal (2M Alliance «Hyundai Merchant
Marinealsousesthis loop service»), higherterminal
handlingcosts inother containerterminal operators,
and a faster and higher increase of containers
throughputs and consequently a rapid increase in
marketshare.
TheportofGdanskandthestate‐ownedcompany
that manages it are an excellent example of how
concession agreements and major infrastructure
development projects can generate enormous
economic benefits for the port and the country as a
whole. The port was ranked among the top 15
European ports in terms of container throughput in
2018, thanks to excellent growth
results [14].
According to UNCTAD’s port Liner Shipping
Connectivity Index, Gdansk port connectivity index
grewverystronglyfrom5.2 in2006 to46.25in2022
[23].
The financial investments made by the Gdansk
PortAuthorityhavealreadypaidoff.Theyhavealso
greatly benefited from the factthat Poland has
been
able to modernize and develop the surrounding
infrastructurewiththehelpoftheEuropeanUnionʹs
infrastructure development funds. After the
completion of the first outer harbour project and its
sale to a consortium of partners in May 2019 (PSA
International Ptd Ltd, the Polish Development Fund
andtheIFM
GlobalInfrastructureFund),theGdansk
Port Authority has started to develop a new outer
ports construction project, which is implemented
through private‐public partnership contracts. It will
be the most modern and largest investment
concession port project in Europe. The development
ofthisinfrastructurewillhelpthePortofGdansk
to
become one of the leading ports in the European
Unionintermsofcargoperformance.
Concretely, two groups of drivers have been
developed the most. Of course, port infra and
superstructure is one of them. An important factor
affectingthedevelopmentofterminalistheuseofthe
existinghandling
capacity.InGdansk,theshareinthe
handling of containers exceeded the share in the
handling capacity. Definitely, the existing Polish
container ports still had capacity reserves. It is
forecastedthat in 15–20 years, container handlingin
Polishportsmayreach8millionTEUs[24].
Hinterlandconnectivityisalsovery
important.The
Polish ports, Gdansk and Gdynia, were originally
mainlyconnectedtothePolishhinterlandandCentral
European market. They are now becoming new
transhipment ports for the regional traffic. It is
especiallythecaseforGdanskwhichbenefitsfromthe
choicesandinvestmentsofMaerskshippinglinesand
from its
alliance with Mediterranean Shipping
Company (MSC). Gdynia’s container terminals are
currentlyonitswaytoachieveagoodpositionamong
secondaryportsintheBSRandDeepwaterContainer
Terminal inGdanskisslowly aspiringto the role of
oneofthebiggesthandlingbasesintheBalticSea[16].
The
enhancementofhinterlandconnectivitywasa
key development driver for the Polish ports. It has
madeitpossibletoredirectsomegoodsthatusedto
be delivered from the Polish hinterland to German
ports of the North Sea. The scale of road
infrastructural investments, focused mainly on the
development of express
roads and highways, has
reducedtraveltimesfromthesouthofPolandtothe
ports located in the north by 23–34%. In the case of
rail development projects, the enhancement resulted
fromtherailinfrastructuralprojectsandexpansionof
the network of intermodal containers terminals in
whole Poland. While in
1995 there were only 9 of
them, in 2015 their number reached 38, which has
significantly enhanced accessibility to intermodal
transport services. Most of them have regular
370
connectionsto theleadingPolish ports intheir offer
[22].
4.2 Somefactorsofexplanationanddrivingforces
Oncemore,we canuseconcreteevidenceto explain
thedynamismofPolishcontainerports.Thequestion
ofportcompetitivenessiscentralforportauthorities
because it profoundly influences the choices of
shipping companies and operators. This especially
includes port operation efficiency levels, handling
charges,reliabilityorlandsideaccessibility.Regarding
theBalticports,wecananalyseportefficiencyusing
the duration of port calls given by AIS data. Baltic
containerportsappearverydifferently(Figure6):two
portsinparticular,namely Gothenburg
andGdansk,
areservedbyshipsofferingalargercapacitythanin
theotherports.
In the case of Gdansk, thesituation is clearlythe
resultofMaerskLinechoicetomakethepolishport
its Baltic hub as well as the important investments
made by the port authority and the
consortium
operatingDCT.
However,wenotethatthetimespentbyshipsin
both ports is on average the same, which raises
questions about the efficiency of the terminals and
suggeststhatduetotheaveragesizeofshipsinboth
ports,the Gdansk portis significantlymore efficient
than
theSwedishport.
Figure6.Containerships’capacityanddurationofportcall
insomeBalticSeaportsin2020(Source:AISdata).
By integrating the port traffic in the research
process, it is also possible to estimate the average
length of handling of one TEU in each port. In the
study, we integrated all the containerized flows.
However,theycould beweighted byintegratingthe
volumes of containers transported by ro‐ro ships.
Suchanalysiscouldbemoreprecisewiththenumber
ofcranesusedin each terminalforinstance.Despite
thesefewrestrictions,theresultsareremarkableand
give an interesting order of magnitude. Container
portefficiencyisveryvariableinthesouthernBaltic
Sea(Figure7)intheportofGdansk,
theaveragetime
to operate one TEU it is three times lower than in
Szczecin and twice as good as its main competitor,
Gothenburg. Gdansk is clearly more efficient than
other Baltic ports which also explains the quick
expansion of its container flows. The situation of
Gdynia seems to be not
so good with a lower
efficiencythantheregionalaverage.
Figure7. Evaluation of average speed per TEU in 2020,
accordingtoAISdata(authorʹscalculations).
At least, containerised cargo shipping
competitiveness compared that of the direct road
transportdepends primarilyon the cost and timeof
thewholeland‐seatransportchain[10].Itisdifficult
toknowthereality ofcost in the regionbut we can
statethat ratesarethe lowestwhere traffic
ishigher
because of potential market proximity or
transhipmentpossibilities.Thiswaywillbeexplored
inourfutureworktocompleteouranalysis.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Since the mid‐1990s, in the Baltic Sea Region, the
development of seaports took place in a very
competitive environment. The potential of ports and
thevolumeoftranshipmentswereinfluencedbythe
location in relation to the hinterland and the
connectionwithimportantinlandtransportcorridors.
The infrastructure of these corridors has been
significantly expanded over the past decade.
Bathymetricconditionswerealsoofgreatimportance
inthedevelopmentoftheports.Inthecontext
ofthe
analyses carried out, we can conclude that the
construction of a deep‐water container terminal in
Gdansk and then the launch of direct connections
withAsiawereimportantfactorsthatdynamizedthe
increaseinportturnover.
Obviation,thedevelopmentoftheportofGdansk
isnowmoreimportant
thanthatofGdynia.But,we
cansaythatthedevelopmentofcontainerizedtraffic
inbothPolishportsisalsotheresultofthestrategies
ofshippingcompanies.Whethertheabilityoftheport
of Gdynia to attract regional stakeholders or the
positioning of Maersk in Gdansk and the impact of
the2Malliance on the same port,both entities have
been able to benefit from their attractiveness to
shipping operators. Though, it is important to
consider the impact by the end of 2025 of the
disappearance of this alliance, which could be
synonymous with the flight of part of the
containerized flows (particularly those of MSC) to
otherportsintheregion
In the medium term, the competing Gdansk‐
Gdyniaduocouldaspiretobecomeatrueʺtwinportʺ
371
likeLos Angeles‐Long Beach.A powerful ecosystem
would then combine the political ambitions of the
Polishstate,theinterestsofpowerfulAsianhandlers,
thedeploymentofinternationalrailoperatorsandthe
positioning of logistics investors. Everything that
Hamburg already offers, but without the nautical
constraints of the Elbe, the
cost of land and
metropolitanpressure[1].However,thedevelopment
of Polish ports andtheir role asa hubinthe region
maybeimpactedinthemediumtermbygeopolitical
considerations. In 2022, the sanctions against Russia
do not seem to have stopped their dynamism, but
theirreinforcementover
alongperiodoftimewould
in fact constitute a brake on the development of
containertraffic.
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