219
1
INTRODUCTION
The role of Situational Awareness (SA) has become
veryimportantduetotheincreasedco gnitivenature
of the tasks that operators are asked to perform.
Failureinsuchcomplexcognitivetasksduetolossof
SAcanhavedevastatingresults.AccordingtoAsyali
studies indicate that SA has a significant
causative
factor in 88% of aviation accidents, where human
errorwasindicated.OtherstudieshavefoundthatSA
errorscountforover50%ofairtrafficcontrolerrors.
In themaritime sphere, Sharma et al. have analysed
maritimeaccidentswhichshowedthathumanerroris
responsiblefor71%ofaccidents
duetoSAlosses.
During watch‐keeping, the seafarer performs
important tasks such as collision avoidance,
navigation and other administrative duties. For
performing each ofthesetasks,ahigh levelof SAis
required. An important part of the seafarer’s job is
developingSAtothehighestlevelandkeepingit
up
to date in a rapidly changing and complex
environment especially in coastal areas, congested
waters,portsandchannelapproaches.Inrecentyears,
greatprogresshasbeenmadeintechnologyrelatedto
navigation. This primarily refers to the mandatory
implementation of the Electronic Chart Display and
Information System (ECDIS). In
addition to the
installationoftheECDISonboard,agreatburdenhas
fallen on seafarers and their training and
familiarization with new technology. ECDIS has
becometheprimarymeansofnavigation,butnotthe
only one. Accidents continued to happen even as
technologyadvanced.Therewasaneedtodetermine
thecausesofthoseaccidents.Inthispapergrounding
accidentsrelatedtoECDISwereanalysedinorderto
find out which errorledtothe groundingandtheir
connectiontoSA.Inadditiontothecauseoftheerrors
at the certain SA level, it is necessary to determine
which
SA demon affected the seafarer to make a
The Role of the ECDIS on the Development of
Situational Awareness – a Study on Grounding
Accidents
M.Baric
1
,L.Grbić
1
,L.Pericin
2
&R.Jelic
1
1
UniversityofZadar,Zadar,Croatia
2
ZadarCounty,Zadar,Croatia
ABSTRACT: Vessel grounding accidents can potentially cause catastrophic marine accidents with
environmentalpollutionandlossoflifeandeconomy.Newsystemsintroducedtoimprovesafetyofnavigation
should not be cause them. Today, the ECDIS is the main cartographic system and must therefore be an
appropriate
aidtosupportseafarersinbuildingsituationalawarenesswiththerelevantinformationneededfor
safenavigation.Thispaperdescribesthedevelopmentofsituationalawarenessanditsfeaturesafterwhichthe
maritimegroundingaccidents,intheperiodfrom2008to2019areanalysed.DuetoimportanceoftheECDIS,
onlyECDISrelated
accidentswereconsidered.Theaimofthispaperwastodeterminewhicherrorceasedthe
developmentofgood situationalawarenessandtodeterminewhetherthereisacertainpatternbywhich to
predictfutureerrorsandthusactpreventivelyonthem.Thisstudyshowsatwhichsituationawarenesslevel
those
errorsoccurredandwhichSAdemonaffectedtheseafarerstoperformanerror.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 17
Number 1
March 2023
DOI:10.12716/1001.17.01.24
220
certainerror,sothatpreventiveactionscouldbetaken
inthefuture.
2
LITERATUREREVIEW
Situation awareness is a term that, according to
Asyali,originatedfromaviationpsychologyandwas
recognizedasacrucialroleformilitaryaircraftcrews
as early as World War I. It is being widely used in
other complex and dynamic working environments
where a huge amount of data and
information is
processed by the operator to make accurate, safe,
effective,andtimelyactions.Sharma et al. statethat
expansion of Situation Awareness (SA) to an
operatorʹs comprehension of a complex system has
extendedSAresearchtootherdomainsinwhichthe
environment is dynamically changing and in which
the operator is responsible for maintaining or
achievingparticularstates.AuthorEndsleystatethat
the operator must collect, aggregate and interpret
information in order to know what is happening in
the environmentandtobeaware of the situationin
thesurrounding.
As in many high‐risk jobs, developing and
maintaining
a high level of situation awareness in
maritime watch keeping is the most critical and
challenging task. During watch keeping, Officers of
theWatch(OOWs)gatherhugeamountsofdataand
information from aids to navigation (ECDIS, Radar,
etc.),otherteammembers,othervessels(ARPA,AIS),
VTS, etc. Combining these
data and information
together,theycreateanintegratedʺwholeʺwhichwe
call aʺMental Picture or Modelʺ on which his/her
decisions and actions will be based. According to
Francis et al., a personʹs perception of the relevant
elements in the environment, as determined from
system displays or directly from senses,
forms the
basisforhisorhersituationawareness.
According to Asyali several major factors are
shown to influence this process. First, individuals
varyintheirabilitytoacquireSA,giventhesamedata
input. This hypothesized is a function of an
individualʹs information‐processing mechanisms,
influenced by innate
abilities, experience, and
training. In addition, the individual may possess
certainpreconceptionsandobjectivesthatcanactasa
filterandinterprettheenvironmentinformingSA.As
second, it is very important that the individual has
well‐presented information. Even the best‐trained
decision‐makerswillmakethewrongdecisions
ifthey
have inaccurate or incomplete SA. Conversely, a
personwhohasperfectSAmaystillmakethewrong
decision (from a lack of training on proper
procedures, poor tactics, etc.) or show poor
performance (from an inability to carry out the
necessaryactions).
Most researchers have approached SA from
a
position between these two extremes. These middle
positions typically remain very general, but some
kindsofcognitiveactivityareassumedtobeoutside
of SA. A representative definition is proposed by
Dominguez, where author defined SA as an
ʺindividualʹs continuous extraction of environmental
information,andintegrationofthis
informationwith
previous knowledge to form a coherent mental
picture,andtheuseofthatpictureindirectingfuture
perception and anticipating future eventsʺ. Endsley
definedSAasʺtheperceptionofthe elementsinthe
environmentwithinavolumeoftimeandspace,the
comprehensionoftheirmeaning,andthe
projectionof
theirstatusinthenearfutureʺ.Dominguezstatedthat
term extraction is more tied to actively perceiving
thanusingthetermperception.Bothtermsleadtoan
understandingofthesituationthroughsamplingthe
environment. Both definitions have three hierarchy
phases and primary components that can be
representedasthreelevelsofSA.
AuthorEndsleycomprisedSAinthreelevels:
10.
Level 1‐Perception: perceiving critical factors in
theenvironment.
11.
Level 2‐Comprehension: understanding what
thosefactorssignify.
12.
Level3‐Projection:anticipatingwhatwillhappen
withthesituationinthenearfuture.
These levels are cumulative, as projection cannot
occur without comprehension, and comprehension
cannotoccurwithoutperception.
3
SADEMONS
Achievingand maintainingsituationalawareness on
thehighestlevelisachallengingprocess affectedby
the individual, task, systemic factors, and
environment. The difficulty occurs inthe interaction
betweenthecharacteristicsofthehumaninformation
processing abilities of operators and technologiesʹ
design. Author Endsley labelled these difficulties as
ʺ
SADemonsʺ.SAdemonsarefactorsthatweakenthe
SA in every environment. Eight major SA demons
need to be considered when designing the SA‐
oriented system according to Wickens. SA demons
are:
1.
Attentionaltunnelling,
2.
Requisitememorytrap,
3.
Workload,Anxiety,Fatigue,andotherstressors,
4.
Dataoverload,
5.
Misplacedsalience,
6.
Complexitycreep,
7.
Errantmentalmodels,
8.
Out‐of‐the‐loopsyndrome.
The high level of SA depends on the constant
shifting between different features of the
environment. In a dynamic environment, multiple
tasks are simultaneously performed, and multiple
piecesofinformationareprocessed.Suchacondition
iscalledattentionsharing.Operatorscannotaccessall
the relevant information
simultaneously. They
establishinformationsamplingstrategies,sotheycan
update SA. Scanning across the environment may
take a second or an hour. A high level of SA is
achieved by appropriate switching the attention
between different features of the environment.
Attentional tunnelling or narrowing occurs when
operators cannot process a
certain aspect of the
environment and they lock their attention on that
certain feature. In that case, overall SA is decreased
becausetheyignoreotheraspectsoftheenvironment.
It is happening unintentionally. In their minds, they
are attending to the most important feature of the
environment. For example, the OOW
can focus on
221
avoidingcollisionwiththeothervesselbutcanignore
shallows in the vicinity and find himself in greater
danger.
During the time, operators extract information
from the environment and store it in the working
memory. Working memory is limited and easily
disrupted. SA failures occur when that limit is
reached
orduetothenaturaldecayofinformationin
the working memory. Depending on the sensor we
use, information cannot be retrieved. Auditory
informationhas the same value for achieving SA as
the visual but often visual information can be
revisitedon thevisualdisplay. Thisʹʹdemonʹʹcanbe
reduced
if the operator actively works to keep the
informationinthememorybyrepeatingorrevisiting
it. Another way to keep theinformation for a while
longer is to connect the information to another
informationoramentalmodelinlong‐termmemory.
Except for the complex dynamic environment,
operators must
perform their duty under the
conditionsthatareoftenstressful.Thosestressorscan
be psychological or physical in nature. Stress or
anxiety can occur when it comes to big stakes, like
humanlives.Psychologicalstressorsmayalsoinclude
mental workload, time pressure and uncertainty.
Physical stressors occur in the environment
with
extreme cold or heat, poor lighting, high level of
vibrations or noise, etc. Working against the
operatorʹs circadian rhythm and physical fatigue
significantly reduces the capacity of, already limited
working memory. In these conditions, the operator
has difficulties to form SA because of reduced
cognitive functions for processing and
holding
information in memory. Also, the operator becomes
lessorganizedinscanninginformation,lesscapableto
efficiently collect information and more liable to
attentionaltunnelling.
ToachievegoodSAinadynamicenvironment,in
which data is rapidly changing, the operator must
constantly scan and collect new information. Quick
information
intakecanoutpacethecognitiveabilityof
the operator. In suchconditions,attention cannot be
evenly shared among the relevant aspects of the
environment and SA soon becomes outdated. The
operatorwilllikelyhavegapsinprojectingthenear‐
futuresituation. To overcomethisproblem, thedata
presented to the operator
should already be
processed. If the operator gets simple, naked data,
thatheneedstoprocessandcombinewitheachother
togetsomepracticableinformation,itwilloccupyhis
limitedworkingmemory.Thisisaccomplishedwith
the supporting systems transition to user‐centred
designsratherthantechnology‐centreddesigns.
The operator, as a human, has natural salient
properties. That means that certain forms of
information that are determined by physical
characteristicswilldrawtheoperato rʹsattention.For
example,movement,redcolour,flashinglight,things
thatarephysicallynearer,loudnoise,orlargershapes
willcatchtheoperatorʹsattention
muchmorethanthe
otherfeature.Asimilarsituationwillbeifwehearthe
wordʹʹFireʹʹinthecrowd.Ahumanperceptualsystem
is more sensitive to particular signal features. Those
salient properties are used to improve SA, but also
maydiminishit.Propertieslikecolourormovement
are
used to draw attention to the most important
information, and this is used as a tool to design a
supporting system. Misplaced silence occurs when
thistoolisoverusedorusedimproperly.Forexample,
less important data may be presented on a larger
display than an important one, and this can
draw
attentionawayfromcrucialinformation.
Withthedevelopmentofnewsupportingsystems,
their complexity grows. Designers do that
unwittingly.Itisdifficultforpeopletoformamental
modelofhowthesystemworks.Training,asthemost
vital solution to this problem, should prepare
operators andgive them
sufficientknowledge about
thesystem.However,inrealitysystemsareconstantly
gettingmorecomplex andthereismore chancethat
operators will have insufficient experience with
systemperformanceinsituationsthatoccurrarely.
With the complexity and errant mental models,
another problem occurs in automated systems.
Automationhelpstoprocessthe
collectedinformation
but also take the operator out‐of‐the‐loop. In this
condition,theoperatordevelopspoorSA,asheisnot
aware of the performance of the automation and
featurestheautomationissupposedtocontrol.Being
out‐of‐the‐loopdoesnotpresentsuchaproblemwhen
automationisperformingwell,butwhenitfails,the
operatorwillnottimelydetecttheproblem.Thiscan
besolvedbyproperlydesignedautomatedsystems.
4
ECDISASASUPPORTINGSYSTEM
In many domains, the main goal of SA is to detect
abnormal or unusual events that can lead to
dangerous or undesired situations. Perceiving and
alerting to such anomalous situations in the vast
amounts of information is then important while
filtering out normal situations. In most
domains,
computer‐basedsupportisnecessaryforreachingthe
highest level of SA. A support system for situation
awareness helps with gathering, processing, and
interpreting the vast amounts of relevant data.
AccordingtoFrancisetal.suchasystempresentsits
outputtoahumanoperator.Withthehelpof
sucha
systemtheoperatorwillgetabetteroverviewofwhat
is happening, and consequently, can make better
decisions and take more effective actions. A system
supporting SA must present its output in an
appropriate and practicable way to a human user.
Using only textual output is not a good
option for
providing vast amounts of vesselinformation.Great
visualization methods are required to enable the
operator to quickly recognize and understand the
current situation, which is required to build event
projectionandreachahighlevelofSA.Inadynamic
environment,itishardfortheoperatorto
haveup‐to‐
date SA. Such an environment provides large
amounts of diverse information and monitoring it
without the assistance of a supporting system, is
almost impossible. The good supporting system
design provides support for individualsʹ limitations
andhelpstoovercomeknownproblems(SAdemons)
forcognitiveprocessing.
In maritime, during
watch keeping, an effective
support system todayisan ElectronicChart Display
and Information System (ECDIS). According to
SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 19‐Carriage
222
requirementsforshipbornenavigationalsystemsand
equipment,section2.1.4.,allshipsirrespectiveofsize
shallhave:nauticalchartsandnauticalpublicationsto
plan and display the shipʹs route for the intended
voyageandtoplotandmonitorpositionsthroughout
thevoyage.TheECDISisalsoacceptedasmeetingthe
chart carriage requirements of this subparagraph.
Certain benefits of the ECDIS have already been
recognized before official use. Mandatory
implementation of the ECDIS had been carried out
fromJuly1,2012,toJuly1,2018.AfterJuly1,2018,all
merchant vessels should be fitted with Electronic
Chart Displayand
InformationSystem (ECDIS).The
main purpose of the ECDIS is to contribute to safe
navigation.Theideaofdevelopingsuchasystemwas
to reduce the navigational workload of seafarers,
comparingtousingapaperchart.
Not only has that ECDIS replaced “paper”
navigation but changes the way of maritime
navigation.
ECDIS becomes the main hub for the
“Integrated Navigation Bridge”. All relevant voyage
data and information from other sources can be
presentedontheECDISdisplay.Theimplementation
of the ECDIS has been challenging in two major
aspects. There have been great requirements for
technicallydesigningthesystemandtrain
upallthe
operators.TheECDISshouldbedesignedtosupport
the SA. Good design can benefit SA by attracting
attentiontoimportantstimulithatmightotherwisego
unnoticed. Human factors specialists have made
considerableeffortsdesigningalarms,warnings,and
alerts. ECDIS is a user‐centred designed system,
where technology is
organized around the userʹs
tasks, goals and abilities. Endsley et al state that
opposite to user‐centred designs, technology‐centred
designsaredesigned ina waythateverysensorhas
its display. As technology upgraded, more displays
were added. The human has limited attention and
cannot follow so many
displays in limited time. In
suchdesigns,displaysareoftenscatteredanddonot
supporthumantasks.Asystemdesignedinthisway
involvesmorehumanerror.Toavoidthosesituations,
a philosophy of user‐centred design was developed.
For a system to be effective, it must be designed to
include
theneedsandcapabilitiesoftheoperator.In
user‐centred designs, pieces of information are
integratedinawaythatfitsthegoalsandneedsofthe
end‐user. For example, besides direct information
aboutthecourseandspeed,ECDISalsopresentsthe
ETA to some critical point on the
route or average
speed required to a particular position. Thus,
relievingtheworkingmemoryoftheOOW.
Coleatal.researchshowedthatuseoftheECDIS
hasmoreimpactonimprovingSAlevel1(perception)
and SA level 3 (projection) than SA Level 2
(comprehension).VandeLaaretal.
shareopinionthat
ECDIS decreases the navigational skill of the OOW.
Those attitudes were expressed in 2012 when the
ECDISwasnotfullyimplementedonalltheship,and
it was something new for seafarers. OOWs are
obligated to attend the mandatory, 40 hours, ECDIS
GenericCourse,andTypeSpecific
Course,whichisa
specificECDIS model familiarizationcourse.Brcicet
al.researchhavealreadyshowntheshortcomingsof
the ECDIS generic course. Although most consider
that the time for the course is sufficient, the ECDIS
shouldnotbeimportantinitself,butthebackground
knowledge should accompany the new navigation
equipment. With the rise of automation, seafarers
showed overreliance in new technology, without
gettingfully familiarizedwith it. Inpaper Car et al.
even 55% of respondents answered that they took
over the duty without sufficient time to familiarize
themselveswiththeECDISonboard.Thisshouldnot
happen, but
today, vessels stay very short in ports,
and sometimes there is not enough time for the
complete familiarization of seafarers, so they are
forced to take up duty under such circumstances.
Another shortcoming that occurs is the lack of
standardization of the ECDIS. In the future, this
problem should be solved
with implementing the
“Guidelines for the standardization of user interface
designfornavigationequipment”.
5
RESEARCHMETHODOLOGY
In this paper, ECDIS‐related grounding accidents
were analysed from the aspect of situational
awareness.Methodsusedinthisresearcharemethods
of abstraction, compilation, analysis, and the
inductive method. The aim of this study was to
determineatwhichSALevel,alossofSAoccurs,i.e.
at
whichlevel,thedevelopmentofsufficientsituation
awareness ceases. Also, there is a need to find out
which errors of seafarersare most often involved in
thelossofSAsothatpreventiveactioncanbetakenin
thefuture.
The data used in this study are based on the
accident investigation reports published by Marine
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), The Federal
BureauofMaritimeCasualtyInvestigation(BSU),The
Marine Safety Investigation Unit (MSIU). The Dutch
Safety Board (DSB) and The Transportation Safety
BoardofCanada(TSB).Analysinggroundingaccident
reportsintheperiodfrom2008to2019,25caseswere
foundtobeECDIS‐related.
Figure1.Distributionofgroundingaccidentsin theperiod
from2008to2019
Marineaccidentinvestigationreportspublishedby
MAIB, BSU, MSIU, DSB, and TSB contains all facts
related to the accident. Re‐analysing them, it was
foundthatinthesamecasesthecauseoftheaccident
isthelossofSAatsomepoint.SAiscomprisedof3
levels,whichare
cumulative,whichmeansthatLevel
2 cannot be achieved without previous achieving
Level 1, and Level 3 cannot be achieved without
achieving Level 2. Grounding accidents occur when
Level3isno tachieved.ThatmeansthattheMaster,
OOW, or the pilot cannot project the vesselʹs future
movement,or
thisprojectionisinaccurate.
Analysing grounding accident reports, several
causativefactorsrelatedtoECDISwerefound,thatto
some extent affected accidents. They are listed into
223
three parts, where each part represents one of three
SA level. Accident causative factors, assigned to
certainSAlevelsareshowninTable1.
Some cases had more ECDIS‐related causative
factorsbutinthosecases,asarepresentativefactoris
takentheonethatisassignedtothelowest
SALevel.
For example, avoiding high traffic and heading into
shallowwaterbutECDISsafetyalarmswereswitched
offandcouldnotwarntheOOW.Ortheshipdrifted
off the route and found itself in shallow waters
without triggering the XTD Alarm. In that case, the
factthat the
ECDISsafetyalarmwasswitched offis
usedinthisstudy.Withalarm,switchedoff,theOOW
was not warned and all relevant data was not
provided to him, which he or she should know to
develop sufficient SA. Those representative ECDIS‐
relatedcausativefactorsarelistedinTable2.
Table1.ECDISrelatedaccidentcausativefactorslistedby
SAlevels.
________________________________________________
SALevel1 SafetyContour/DepthAlarmsettingswrong
RouteCheckfeaturenotused
RouteCheckalarmignored
Outdatedchartused
XTDAlarmoff
SafetyContour/Depthalarmoff
WrongLookAheadSettingsused
UnsuitableChartScaleused
SafetyAlarmIgnored
WrongbuoypositioninENC
Wrongreef
positioninENC
InsufficientECDISTraining
InsufficientECDISVoyageprocedures
SALevel2 SafetyAlarmIgnored
SALevel3 WrongusageofShippredictorfeature
________________________________________________
Table2:RepresentativeECDISrelatedaccidentcausative
factorslistedbySAlevels.
________________________________________________
SALevel1 WrongSafetyContour/DepthAlarmSettings
RouteCheckfeaturenotused
RouteCheckalarmignored
Outdatedchartused
XTDAlarmoff
SafetyContour/Depthalarmoff
WrongLookAheadSettingsused
UnsuitableChartScaleused
SALevel2 SafetyAlarmIgnored
SALevel3 Wrongusage
ofShippredictorfeature
________________________________________________
6 RESULTS
The results of the study are divided into two parts.
The first part consists of an analysis of errors
committedbyOOWsoperatingtheECDIS.Analysing
thoseerrors,they are assigned toacertain SAlevel.
Theaimofthestudy was todetermineatwhichSA
level development of
good situational awareness
ceasesandwhicherrorOOWmade,thataffectedthe
lossofSA.Thesecondpartconsistsofananalysisof
SAdemon sthathaveaffectedOOWs. Analysingthe
circumstances in which the error occurred, an SA
demon, which affected the OOW to make the error,
wasidentified
foreachcase.
To find out on which SA Level, development of
Situation Awareness ceases, accident reports were
analysed.Ineverycase,severalfactorsthatcausedthe
accident were identified. In this study, only ECDIS‐
related causative factors were considered. They
neededtobeassignedtooneofthreeSALevels,
and
the one that was assigned to the lowest SA Level
presents the SA Level at which development of
Situation Awareness ceases. Those causative factors
firstoccurredonatimebasis.
Ofall25cases,22caseswerefoundinwhichthe
developmentofSAceasedatSALevel1,
intwocases
ceasedatSALevel2,andinonecaseatSALevel3.
ECDIS‐related grounding accidents causative factors
are listed in three categories where each category
presentsoneofthreeSALevels.Thenumberofeach
causative factor is presented in Figure 3. It can be
noticed
that the most occurred causative factor is
ʺSafetyContour/DepthAlarmoffʺ.Inadditiontothis
causative factor, two other causative factors,ʺXTD
Alarmoffʺ,andʺSafetyAlarmIgnoredʺdeviatefrom
the majority. Other causative factors occurred only
once.
Figure2.ThedistributionofECDISrelatedcausativefactors
bySALevels
Figure3.ThenumberofindividualECDISrelatedcausative
factors.
SAdemonsarecertaindifficultiesthatrepresentan
obstacle in the interaction between the operatorsʹ
cognitive abilities and designs of the technologies.
Analysingaccidentreports,severalSAdemonswere
recognized,affectedthegroundingaccident.Figure4
shows the distribution of grounding accidents
quantityagainstSAdemons,whichaffectedthem.
224
Figure4.ThenumberofindividualSAdemonthataffected
thegroundingaccident.
7 RESULTSDISCUSSION
Analysing these 25 grounding accident cases, it was
found that in 22 cases the development of SA
suspends at SA Level 1. SA Level 1 presents the
perception of the environment. When developing
situationalawareness,atSALevel1,seafarerscollect
therelevantinformationrequiredforsafenavigation.
With
inaccurate information, or without any
information at all, seafarers cannot develop higher
levels of SA. With the loss of situational awareness,
theycannotknowwhatishappeningwiththevessel,
andthereforecannotprojectfuturevesselmovement
and environmental conditions. With 88% cases in
whichsituationalawarenessisceasedat
SALevel1,
thereisaneed tofindwhat went wrong and found
somesignificantcause.Twomostoccurringcausative
factors, at SA Level 1 are related to ECDIS alarms.
Together,theypresent73%ofcausativefactorsatSA
Level1and64%ofallcausativefactorsatwhichthe
development of Situation Awareness ceased. The
third most occurred causative factor, also related to
ECDIS alarms, refers to SA Level 2. Together with
causative factors at SA Level 1, causative factors
relatedtoECDISalarmspresent73%ofallcausative
factors.
The distribution of SA demons over certain
grounding accidents
shows two demons,ʺErrant
mental modelsʺ andʺComplexity Creepʺ, that had a
greater impact than the others. SA demon,ʺErrant
mental modelsʺ, can be interpreted as the impact of
thelossofsituationalawarenessatSALevel1.With
faultyperceivinganddatainput,seafarerscouldnot
createaccurate
mentalmodels.Thus,itresultsinthe
development of incorrect situational awareness and
leadstoahazardoussituation.ʺComplexityCreepʺ,as
themostprevalentSAdemon,with40%oftheshare,
signifies that seafarers involved in analysed
grounding accidents did not use all the safety
functions that ECDIS
provides. The ECDIS is a
complex, software‐based system with multiple
optionsfordisplayandintegration.Theeffectiveuse
oftheECDISrequires manystakeholders, who have
tobeabletounderstandallthecapabilitiesandroleof
ECDISinthenavigation.Suchacomplexsystemwith
manyfunctionscanbe
confusingfortheoperator.In
analysedcases,onlybasicECDISfunctionswereused,
whichmayimplythatOOWswerenotawareofthe
significanceof proper use of all the ECDIS features.
This may be a result of a lack of training and
insufficientfamiliarization.
8
CONCLUSION
ThemainpurposeoftheintegrationoftheECDISinto
the bridge navigational equipment is to increase
safety by reducing the OOWsʹ workload and relieve
his attention. This was achieved by designing the
ECDIS as user‐centred design. Also, the ECDIS is
based on visualization methods, rather than
providingthe
textualoutputs,withconstantreal‐time
tracking.Inaway,wecansaythatthegoalhasbeen
achieved.Noneofanalysedgroundingaccidentsdid
happen under the influence of SA demonʺData
overloadʺ.
With the introduction of new technology into
practice, new difficulties and new SA demons, have
emerged, affecting operators. In this paper, the
demonsthatinfluencedthegroundingaccidentswere
detected.ʺComplexity creepʺ stands out as the most
common SA demon. The influence of SA demon
ʺComplexity creepʺ could be reduced, by providing
theseafarers,moreappropriatetraining.
In most cases a seafarer has become a
passive
monitor, rather than a participant in the system
control.Thisattitudeputstheseafarerout‐of‐the‐loop.
Since human has limited cognitive ability there is a
needtofindifsomeofECDISfeaturesexceedsthem.
Thereisalotofmonitorsensorsandeverysensorhas
hisown
alarmwhichisshownonECDISscreen.Ina
sensitive situation, like port approach, there can be
hightraffic,lowdepthandthevicinityoflandwhich
can give multiple alarms at the same time. For
seafarersitmaydisturbthemratherthanhelpthem.
InfutureECDISinterfacedesigns,
thisfeatureshould
havegreatsignificance.Wheneverhumanispartofa
system,therewillbeerrors.Technologywilladvance
andhumans asoperatorswillalwaysbechallenged.
To reduce the number of human errors, adequate
trainingshouldconstantlybeprovided.
LITERATURE
1.Asyali, E., 2012,ʹThe Role of ECDIS in Improving
Situation Awarenessʹ, The 13th Annual General
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