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1 INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the shipping of goods by sea has
remained the main type of trade relations with the
dominant volume of international shipments [1]. Given
the global trend toward the progress of digitization of
the economy, water transport has not become an
exception. Consequently, automation of processes on
board of a modern vessel has become a reality, which
leads to increase in size of vessels and, as a result, to
decrease in the number of crew. Shipboard systems are
being upgraded while underway and all business
correspondence and crew communication with the
shore is effected via Internet. According to a number of
experts, extremely low attention is paid to the
questions of information security of maritime and
inland transport infrastructure objects, seagoing and
river ships [2-4]. This is confirmed by the current
situation on merchant ships as well as those services
[5], products and solutions that have not yet found
their application on water transport, where the issues
of information security are almost exclusively focused
on the restriction of access through passwords and
logins or the use of network screens [6,7].
Ensuring cyber resilience of shipboard information
systems is becoming more and more important every
year [8,9]. Leading shipping organizations, launched
a set of cyber security guidelines for ships to help the
global shipping industry prevent major safety,
environmental and commercial issues that could result
from a cyber incident onboard a vessel [10,11]. Thus,
cybersecurity awareness issues in maritime transport
and cybersecurity trends in information technology
studied in [12-15]. Analysis of techniques and attacking
pattern in cyber security approach in [16]. Global
outlook and managing of cyber security issues studied
in [17,18]. Cybersecurity problems in different types of
transport of aviation, maritime and automotive
industry and their essence, enhancement of cyber
Review of Ship Information Security Risks and Safety of
Maritime Transportation Issues
O. Melnyk
1
, S. Onyshchenko
1
, O. Onishchenko
2
, O. Shumylo
1
, A. Voloshyn
1
, Y. Koskina
1
& Y. Volianska
3
1
Odesa National Maritime University, Odesa, Ukraine
2
National University “Odesa Maritime Academy”, Odesa, Ukraine
3
Admiral Makarov National University of Shipbuilding, Mykolaiv, Ukraine
ABSTRACT: In recent years, various types of commerce including transport have suffered significant damage
and costs due to cyber-attacks. The geographic scope of freight transportation has no boundaries, attacks can be
launched almost anywhere there is an Internet connection. Therefore, there is no immunity from the failure of
computer systems and information of delivery processes in the networks of organizations and companies
engaged in maritime transportation. In addition, while the consequences of cyber-attacks on major shipping lines
and ports, as well as the digital systems of logistics companies, can be comprehensively analyzed, the
vulnerability of ships remains insufficiently studied. This paper offers an analysis of the risks in the field of
maritime freight transport and the main factors of influence such as digitization on the safety of the transport
process. The basic threats to the information system of the ship are defined and the techniques of risk analysis for
the ship information security is proposed.
http://www.transnav.eu
the International Journal
on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation
Volume 16
Number 4
December 2022
DOI: 10.12716/1001.16.04.13
718
security for cyber physical systems [19,20]. General
issues on information security in logistics and
transport highlighted in [21-23]. Matters relating to the
safe operation of ships and the fundamentals of
maritime safety researched in [23-26]. Problems of
improving the efficiency of port operation and port
facility management have been studied in [27,28].
Development of economic-mathematical model of ship
loading and justification of sustainability ranges of
commercially expedient ship operation in [29,30,31].
Additional issues of ship operation arrangements and
improvement of fleet performance in [32,33].
Given the theoretical basis studied, it should be
noted that effective counteraction to risks remains in
the plane of creating levels of cyber resistance of the
ship, corresponding to high standards and following a
risk-oriented approach in the development of security
tools, where the development of methods for assessing
cyber threats is marked by relevance and practical
interest.
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 2.1 Analyses of risks in freight transportation
The maritime trade is transformed by the digitalization
of transport and logistics. Online tonnage chartering
platforms are already being introduced due to the
understandable fact of saving operational costs and the
desire of shipowners to avoid additional costs in the
form of brokerage fees. Despite the fact that shipping is
a very conservative business, online processes are not
just a trend but also a reality of our time. As an example
transition to the non-paper bill of lading leads to
potential saving of $4 billion per year and if 50% of
container industry transitions that way the annual
growth rate will be 2.4% by 2030. In addition, the
situation with Covid-19 has highlighted the
advantages of electronic bills of lading in a very
positive way. Shipments have not been stuck in ports
because papers were stuck somewhere due to
pandemic flight restrictions. It is also noted that
eliminating paper in shipping will make every aspect
of maritime transportation better, faster, cheaper, more
reliable and greener. In addition, the rise of blockchain
technology avoids the risks of data loss or hacking
attacks on the electronic bill of lading journey from
sender to receiver. Most recently, MSC launched an
online quote service for shippers called Instant Quote,
which simplifies and speeds up the booing process.
The company's customers have direct access to
shipping rates, which simplifies the supply chain
management process. In addition, Maersk has
announced an increase in the use of its mobile tracking
application that allowed customers to place and track
orders remotely during the pandemic. The company
was a pioneer along the way, then joined by Hapag-
Lloyd, Evergreen Line, ZIM and MSC. Ship’s
documents, navigation charts and other information
are already in digital form and moreover the
appearance of underwater drones capable of sailing in
front of the ship and transmitting information about
the fairway, depths and bounds to the bridge point to
the quite logical transition to unmanned pilotage and
autonomous ships, which are already being actively
implemented, but at the same time all the above is
steadily putting pressure on the safety of all processes
of ship operation without exception and primarily on
safety of cargo transportation.
It is worth noting that transportation of goods by
various modes of transport, both domestic and
international, is constantly associated with a multitude
of risks, the potential damage of which can be
calculated in significant monetary terms. In case of
maritime transportation there are a lot of risks, such as
cargo deterioration, loss, and damage during cargo
handling operations as well as risks for the ship in case
of fire, capsize, accident, grounding and flooding,
severe weather conditions - the list of main risks of
marine transportation is far from being complete. To
this entire are added modern threats in the form of
cyber risks, which universally begin to exert pressure
on safety of a vessel and cargo. Therefore, in order to
prevent these risks and avoid unforeseen costs both
shipowners and charterers need to understand them
and know the most common factors along with
measures to prevent them.
Among other things, weather conditions, the type
of cargo transported the nature of the route and other
parameters affect the reliability of shipping. In practice,
the most common risks are as follows:
− Cargo damage;
− Cargo loss;
− Delays in shipping terms;
Most common types of cargo claims according to
P&I club shown in Figure 1;
Figure 1. Most common types of cargo claims (containers)
Source P&I club
Loss of cargo, including theft, according to statistics
of insurance organizations, is the cause of more than a
third of all insurance payments. Various kinds of
accidents during transportation, which cause damage
to the cargo, take the second place, and they account
for more than 15% of all indemnities, according to
insurance companies. Delayed delivery also causes
significant economic losses, both in terms of
production disruptions and contractual penalties. In
addition to these factors, also notable that the spoilage
of goods due to violation of temperature conditions,
accidents during loading and unloading and failure to
comply with the mode of transportation. All these risks
have a negative impact both on cooperation in the field
of maritime shipping and on the reputation of the
carrier's company as a whole. Now more than ever it is
important to know and understand the threats of cyber
risks.
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2.2 Overview of cybercrimes in the shipping industry
Digitalization has spread widely among companies in
the maritime transport and logistics sector, improving
the entire process cycle in the industry. This has
contributed to an unprecedented increase in transport
efficiency, which has served to expand revenue
channels. However, digitalization has also exposed a
number of problems in shipping and maritime logistics
companies, making them extremely vulnerable to
cyberattacks. This affects every sector of the
transportation industry, including shipping, rail,
trucking, logistics and delivery. The consequences of
such cyber-attacks are costly, disruptive and can lead
to financial liability, especially if confidential
information is allowed to leak. There are many
vulnerabilities for the transportation and logistics
industry. These include the increased use of operating
technology (OT), new communication and wireless
channels directly connected to companies' digital
ecosystems, again making companies an easy target for
hackers. It is also outdated information technology (IT)
regulations and standards, lack of cybersecurity
awareness and, last but not least, the shortage of
qualified personnel capable of providing professional
protection. Ship information exchange cycle presented
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Ship information exchange cycle
It is notable that the frequency of cyberattacks
targeting the shipping sector is increasing on average,
from once every few years earlier to almost every
month today. In addition, while several of them are
quite extensive and amount to millions of dollars, other
cyberattacks targeted major transportation companies
to disrupt email systems and logistics processes.
Moreover, hackers are increasingly trying to hack into
data stored on networks that carry not only cargo
information, but also innovations and updates to
company information security, which directly affects
efficient and quality customer service. Digital
enhancements such as automated orders, shipment
tracking and access to billing information make this
possible. While such benefits are extremely valuable to
the customer, they require the storage of large amounts
of sensitive data collected through online platforms,
phone apps and other mobile devices, which are some
of the most unreliable channels due to the lack of strict
cybersecurity protocols [23]. The main ship systems
that are most vulnerable to external attacks can be
grouped into four groups as shown in the Figure 3;
Figure 3. Key systems vulnerable to cyberattacks
Cyber-attacks on seagoing ships dramatically
increased only in the first few months since the
pandemic breakout. From a cybersecurity perspective,
2021 was not a good year for the maritime and logistics
industry. The frequency of attacks on ships increased
by 33% - and that is after a huge increase in attacks on
ships and port systems in 2020. The increase in the
number of attacks probably reflects, in part, the record
increase in cybersecurity incidents of all types over the
past year. However, it is also likely that attackers have
chosen to focus on the maritime industry, given its
critical role in securing the global supply chain. In the
scenario of hackers taking control of a ship, that is
carrying something truly vital, like food, water, or
medicine. They could such as stopping the ship for as
long as they want, and the shipowners can do nothing
but give them whatever they ask for. The above would
lead to significant delays, the economic damage of
millions of dollars as well as a political and social crisis.
According to information security experts, different
types of malware are behind these cyberattacks. They
infiltrate a computer or network; it locks computers,
preventing personnel from using them, and demands
payment to unlock the machines. The payment can be
made in cryptocurrency, such as bitcoins. Even,
sometimes computers are not unlocked after payment.
Experts and governments have made numerous
accusations against attackers, from accusations against
individual hackers and organized crime, to accusations
against some governments. The attacks were not
primarily directed at the cargo facilities, but at the
business infrastructure, that supports this core
business of moving cargo around the world. According
to statistics, the total value of damage from cybercrime
in 2021 was the most significant compared to previous
years, Figure 4.
Figure 4. Total cost of cybercrime
(Source FBI internet crime report – 2021)
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The processes of digitalization are increasingly
taking a prominent place in the management of
systems and instruments of various types of ships.
Today, such sophisticated engineering structures,
necessary in today's global economy, can be halted by
a new generation of computer users, and the merchant
ship, like any digital system, can be hacked. There is an
opinion that it is often easier to hack into the websites
of logistics and shipping companies that operate in
ports than to gain access to the ship's systems.
According to SMM Maritime Industry Report 2021,
84% of ship owners and operators are already aware of
the threat and consider cybersecurity important or very
important, given that the global supply chain has
become a favorite target for cybercriminals, as
evidenced by recent attacks on numerous shipping
companies and vessels. According to a maritime cyber
risk-consulting firm, an average of one new incident
per day. While it is encouraging that the shipping
industry is becoming more aware of the problem, it
looks like there is more work to be done. According to
hackers themselves, ships are often wide open to cyber-
attacks. Increasingly more processes on board ship are
elements of an automated control system, which in
turn can be divided into systems that carry out the
navigation and motion control process, the working
process of ship operations and the cargo handling
process, including cargo stowage, storage and carriage,
Figure 5.
Figure 5. Systems of automatic control and monitoring of
processes on board ship
All these processes are implemented by means of
technical systems consisting of many structural
elements, units, mechanisms, aggregates, i.e. a complex
of technical facilities, which serve for automatic
control, and monitoring of the vessel processes. This
includes all measuring and control devices, including
shipboard computers for control or monitoring of
processes, which can inevitably serve as a target for
cyberattacks and consequently paralyze the operation
of each of the systems presented.
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Cybersecurity in maritime transport, especially in
relation to moving objects such as ships, is crucial since
it has a potential impact on personnel, ship,
environment, company and cargo and is primarily
aimed at protecting information and data from
unauthorized access, manipulation and breach. The
reasons for which cyber incidents can occur are as
follows: cybersecurity incident, unintentional system
failure, loss or manipulation of external device data,
system failure due to software failures or crew
influence leading to the infiltration of malware into
ship systems [10].
Information security risk in the classical form is
defined as a function of three variable components,
including:
− probability of existence of a threat to the ship's
information security;
− probability of system vulnerability (level of
insecurity);
− potential impact of external factors.
If any of these variables tends to zero, then the total
risk for the ship's information systems tends to zero.
The main categories of factors of destabilization of
normal operation of ship information systems include:
− Physical damage to the technical (technological,
navigational) systems of the vessel as a result of
cybersecurity breach caused by intentional or
accidental physical impact on the system or its
components (fire, water, electrostatics,
environmental impact, theft, loss, inept handling of
equipment or data storage medium);
− Violation of safety due to failure of basic system
components and functions that support the
functioning of the systems (for example, failure of
the power supply network, main engine speed
control system, direction finding, positioning, etc;);
− Violation of safety due to disturbances caused by,
for example, electromagnetic radiation, voltage
fluctuations, electronic interference;
− Technical failure or violations caused by system
failures or related non-technical capabilities
(hardware or software failure, overload,
unrepairable);
− Technical attacks. Security breach caused by attacks
and exploitation of its vulnerabilities in
configuration, protocols, programs, etc. (network
scanning, login attempt, interference, denial of
service).
Thus, the information exchange process of the
voyage details, cargo and ports of call remains largely
unprotected, which opens the door to manipulation
and unauthorized access shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Scheme of ship information exchange process
According to [2], which developed jointly by the
International Organization for Standardization and the
International Electrotechnical Commission, the
proposed security assessment technique should ensure
that risk assessments produce comparable and
reproducible results. At the same time, the standard
does not contain a specific formula for calculating the
risk assessment. However, according to [3] the
following classic formula for calculating risk is given:
( )
R P t S=
(1)
721
where R is the risk value; P(t) - probability of
realization of the threat to the information security of
the vessel (a mixture of qualitative and quantitative
scales is used); S - degree of threat impact on a
particular system (system cost in qualitative and
quantitative scale).
As a result, it becomes possible to determine the
value of risk in relative system, which in turn can be
ranked according to the degree of importance for the
risk management procedure for the information
security of the ship.
According to security management techniques for
information technology, risk calculation occurs
according to the following formula:
( ) ( )
R P t P v S=
(2)
where P(t) - probability of a threat to the information
security of the ship; P(v) - the probability of a system
security vulnerability; S - value of the system (the
amount of damage) in USD.
As an example of the values of threat probabilities
P(t) and P(v), a qualitative scale with three levels (low,
medium and high). Numerical values in the range from
0 to 4 are presented to estimate the value of the system
S. The shipping company in which the information
security risk assessment is carried out must compare
their qualitative values. According to [7], the risk level
is calculated taking into account the following
indicators: resource value, level of threat and degree of
vulnerability. As the values of these parameters
increase, the risk increases. Thus, the formula can be
presented in the following form:
( ) ( )
R S L t L v=
(3)
where S - the value of the system (the amount of
damage); L(t) - level of threat; L(v) - level (degree of
vulnerability).
In practice, the technology for determining risks to
the information security of the ship takes place on the
table positioning values of the threat level, the degree
of probability of exploitation of the vulnerability, and
the value of the asset. The risk value can vary from 0 to
8, resulting in a list of threats with different risk values
for each asset. The standard proposes the following
risk ranking scale: low (0-2), medium (3-5) and high (6-
8). This allows identifying the most critical risks [4].
In common techniques for the assessment of
information security risks, the assessment of the degree
of possibility of information security threat realization
the threat level is assessed by the following qualitative
and quantitative scale: unrealizable - 0%, medium
threat - 40%, means average - from 21% to 50%, etc.
Determining the severity of consequences for different
types of information system is proposed to be assessed
using a qualitative-quantitative scale, i.e. minimum -
0.5% of component value, high – from 1.5% to 3%.
To make a qualitative assessment of information
security risks, a table of correspondence between the
severity of consequences and the probability of threat
implementation is used. If it is necessary to make a
quantitative assessment for cargo system as example,
the formula can be presented in the following form:
( )
R P v S=
(4)
where S - the value of the loss (the degree of severity of
the consequences).
Having considered all the above methods of risk
assessment in terms of calculating the value of
information security risk, it is worth noting that the
calculation of risk is performed using the value of
threats and cargo value. A significant disadvantage is
the assessment of the value of cargo (the amount of
damage, damage, delay) in the form of conditional
values. Conditional values have no units of
measurement applicable in practice; in particular, they
are not a monetary equivalent. As a result, it does not
give a real representation of the level of risk, which can
be transferred to the particular ship system. Thus, it is
proposed to divide the risk calculation procedure into
the following stages:
− Calculation of the value of technical risk;
− Calculation of potential damage.
Under the technical risk is understood the value of
information security risk, consisting of probabilities of
realization of threats and use of vulnerabilities of each
component of ship information structure taking into
account the level of their confidentiality, integrity and
availability. For the first step, the following formulas
can be given:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
cc
ii
aa
R I P T P V
R I P T P V
R I P T P V
=
=
=
(5)
where Rc - confidentiality risk value; Ic - information
system confidentiality factor; P(T) - threat realization
probability; P(V) - vulnerability usage probability; Ri -
integrity risk value; Ii - information system integrity
factor; Ra - availability risk value; Ia - information
system availability factor.
The application of this algorithm will allow making
a more detailed assessment of risk, to obtain as a result
a dimensionless value of the probability of damage risk
for each type of ship systems separately. Subsequently,
it is possible to calculate the value of damage. For this
purpose the average risk value of each type of ship’s
system and the damage of potential losses are used.
The value of damage (D) is calculated by the following
formula:
av
D R S=
(6)
where Rav - the average value of risk; S - losses, USD.
Thus, the proposed technique enables to correctly
assess the value of information security risk and
calculate monetary losses in case of incidents that
threaten the safety of cargo transportation process.
4 CONCLUSION
For many maritime companies, a premeditated
cybersecurity policy for both their own fleet and the
entire shipping process has so far not been a priority.
However, the rapidly growing number of cyberattacks
and emerging regulatory tools have made them realize
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that they cannot continue to remain relatively
indifferent for long. Attacks are becoming more active,
and they are a consequence of the fact that hackers get
enough information about cargo and routes to know
which companies pay insufficient attention to
cybersecurity. Therefore, in order to effectively
counteract the risks to ships and shipping companies,
it is necessary to build a multi-layered cyber resilience
system that meets high standards to protect the supply
chain including the ship in the process of maritime
transportation and to follow a risk-oriented approach
in the development of security tools. There is also a
need to develop tools to allow the shipowners to evolve
in this direction and take appropriate cyber resilience
measures covering several dimensions - technology,
regulation, processes and personnel including ship
crew.
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