685

1 INTRODUCTION

According to the International Maritime Organization

“Shipping is perhaps the most international of all the

world's great industries - and one of the most

dangerous” [1]. The high-risk nature of the shipping

industry is confirmed by the European Maritime Safety

Agency (EMSA) that registered 6921 persons being

injured and 550 persons losing their lives at sea in the

period 2014-2020 [2]. 43% of all casualty events in this

time period was what EMSA categorise as navigational

casualties which includes collisions, contacts and

grounding/strandings [2].

Navigation is a complex interaction between

human, organizational, environmental, and

technological factors on the ship’s bridge [3-5]. The

ship’s bridge can thus be characterised as a

sociotechnical system [6, 7] where the design of

technology interact with, and thus influence, other

parts of the system [8, 9]. Since the general introduction

of computerized equipment in the 1970s, there has

been a steady increase in electronic and digital

products for maritime use, and today, ships bridges

include a broad suite of equipment with both digital

and analogue interfaces, covering a range of functions

and purposes. There is rarely any consistent user

Somebody Else’s Problem? Usability in Ship Bridge

Design Seen from the Perspective of Different Maritime

Actors

B.E. Danielsen & E.S. Petersen

Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

ABSTRACT: Navigation is a complex interaction between human, organizational, environmental, and

technological factors on the ship’s bridge. Today, ships bridges include a broad suite of equipment with both

digital and analogue interfaces, covering a range of functions and purposes. Suboptimal usability in equipment

and interface design as well as layout of the ships bridge has been reported by researchers for decades. This paper

aims to contribute to our understanding of why there has been limited progression in usability in ship bridge

design over the last decades, by investigating the stakeholders’ different perspectives of their influence, interest

and responsibility for usability in ship bridge design. The study is based on interviews with seafarers, shipowners,

equipment manufacturers, shipyard, insurance companies, classification societies and a flag state. Usability in

navigational equipment and systems on a ship’s bridge is required by the International Maritime Organization

(IMO) SOLAS Regulation V/15. We find that this goal-based requirement is challenging to follow up both in

design, development, and survey work. To achieve usability in maritime equipment and bridge systems ideally

requires the actively involvement of end-users throughout the design and development process. We find that the

seafarers, the direct end-users, do not have a clear voice in the ship bridge and bridge equipment design and the

associated purchasing processes. The other stakeholders appear to recognize the existing shortcomings, and some

do show interest in improvements, but the responsibility for usability seem to be fragmented, and they see the

potential solutions as being somebody else’s problem. We conclude by suggesting both long-term and a short-

term way forward for improving usability in ship bridge design.

http://www.transnav.eu

the International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 16

Number 4

December 2022

DOI: 10.12716/1001.16.04.10

686

interface design across these systems [10] and

suboptimal usability in equipment and interface

design has been reported by researchers for decades

[11-16].

There may be several factors contributing to the

current situation on the ship’s bridge. One factor is the

challenge of designers and developers of technical

systems to foresee how factors like time and resource

constraints, management pressure or motivation will

influence real use at a different time and in a different

place [17]. As a result, it is often seen that the human

component of sociotechnical systems do not behave as

designers expect, or plan for [18]. Technology being

designed without appropriate information about the

user or context of use is a concern as, for instance, a

systems designed-in safety features may not function

as expected. For example, when of the bulk carrier

Muros grounded in 2016 the accident investigation

identified the use of some of the safety features in the

Electronic Chart Display and Information System

(ECDIS) as a contributing factor to the accident. The

investigation report states that “The ECDIS on board

Muros had not been used as expected by the regulators

or equipment manufacturers.” [19]. It thus seems there

were limitations in the regulators and equipment

manufacturers knowledge about the end-users and the

context of use; knowledge that is however crucial when

designing for usability [20].

The importance of considering human factors has

been recognised by the International Maritime

Organization (IMO) through its human element vision

[21]. IMO has also addressed ship bridge design

through the SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) convention

regulation V/15. Regulation 15 requires that ship

bridge equipment and procedures inter alia shall aim

to “facilitating the tasks to be performed (...) making

full appraisal of the situation and in navigating the ship

safely under all operational conditions”, “promoting

effective and safe bridge resource management”,

“enabling (...) convenient and continuous access to

essential information which is presented in a clear and

unambiguous manner“, “preventing or minimizing

excessive or unnecessary work, “minimizing the risk of

human error”.

The IMO instrument also outlines specific

requirements for the equipment that ships shall have

installed through SOLAS regulation V/19. For all the

equipment in V/19, there are also IMO Performance

Standards, providing descriptions of high-level

functionality required in a particular instrument, and

much more detailed IEC Test Standards, where the

individual test clauses must be fulfilled to obtain the

required type-approval.

Despite the maritime stakeholders’ commitment to

regulatory compliance, suboptimal usability – which

we claim is an indicator of a design which to some

degree is unfit for the purpose it is intended for, and

thus can be termed ‘poor design’, seems to be a

persistent challenge in the maritime industry. In

Reason [22], poor design is the terminology used to

describe a latent condition that can be present for many

years in a system before it combines with local

circumstances and active failures that may result in a

maritime accident [23-27]. In practice, the impact of

poor design is often mitigated by the ability of users to

find creative ways to make systems work [11, 18].

Seafarers are no exception, and they make the bridge

system work through both adapting to design and

making adaptations of design [3, 28]. Adaptations to

design is occurring when seafarers adapt their work

strategy to cooperate with the technology. This has also

been described as integration work [3]. Adaptations of

design can be very visible in the form of self-made

covers for dimming screens, covering non-functioning

buttons, pallets to stand on, lengthening of levers,

written notes etc. [28]. Although seafarers apply

strategies to handle their work environment, poor

design have the potential to lead to design induced

errors [29].

To mitigate, considerable design and development

efforts aiming to improve usability in ship bridge

design have been performed [10, 30-34], also

attempting to increase the understanding of the

fundamental issues underlying the present situation

The persistence of suboptimal usability has been

connected to the multiple stakeholders being involved

in the ship building and ship bridge design processes

[35]. There may be differences in the level of

knowledge of human factors and human-centred

design posited by different stakeholders [36]. The

stakeholders may represent different interests that are

difficult to align during the design process [37] and

communication and cooperation between the

stakeholders may be challenging [38, 39].

Yet another factor is the competitiveness of the

maritime industry, in which many organizations work

on very small profit margins and thus prioritize short-

term economic gains [7, 16]. As new ship development

is driven by economics, human-factor interventions

need to be justified in terms of their likely benefits

exceeding their anticipated cost [7, 40]. However, there

is a lack of knowledge about, and especially methods

for, measuring the financial effects of ergonomics

which could enable maritime companies to make well-

informed ergonomic prioritizations [41] – in other

words, developing a convincing business-case based

purely on objective data is difficult.

This paper aims to contribute to our understanding

of why there has been limited progression in usability

in ship bridge design by investigating the issue from

the perspectives of a broad set of stakeholders in the

maritime industry. The study is based on interviews

with seafarers, shipowners, equipment manufacturers,

shipyard, insurance companies, classification societies

and a flag state. We seek to find factors influencing the

low prioritisation of usability in the maritime industry

by investigating the stakeholders’ different

perspectives of their influence, interest and

responsibility for usability in ship bridge design. We

also suggest a way forward.

The paper is structured as follows: The next section

will provide the theoretical background as well as

information concerning the ship operation and

purchasing process and the maritime design

regulations. Section 3 explains the methodological

approach, followed by the presentation of the findings

in Section 4. The findings are discussed in Section 5,

and Section 6 concludes the study.

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2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Key concepts

Design has been defined in multiple ways. For

example, Herbert Simon viewed design as a problem-

solving activity that concerns devising “courses of

action aimed at changing existing situations into

preferred ones” (Simon, 1969, p. 55). Design and

development of products and systems in the maritime

(or any other) industry must adhere to regulations and

stakeholder- or customer requests which constrain or

define what the ‘preferred situation’ may be. Design

processes are also limited by factors like time and cost.

Thus a more specific definition of design is used: “a

specification of an object, manifested by some agent,

intended to accomplish goals, in a particular

environment, using a set of primitive components,

satisfying a set of requirements, subject to some

constraints” [42]. In this paper ship bridge design refers

to the design of the physical bridge including the

equipment, systems and layout of consoles.

The human factors discipline is concerned with

achieving two related outcomes of sociotechnical

systems: human well-being and overall system

performance [43]. It requires a conscious approach of

applying human factors theory, principles, data, and

methods to the design process to achieve these two

outcomes [44]. An essential characteristic of a well-

designed system or product is its usability. The ISO

standard 9241:210 defines usability as “the extent to

which a system, product or service can be used by

specified users to achieve specified goals with

effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified

context of use” [20]. To achieve a goal with

effectiveness refers to the accuracy and completeness

with which users achieve the specified goals while

efficiency refers to the resources used, which may be

time, human effort, costs, materials, in relation to the

results achieved. In this paper, the user is the people

who operate the system and make use of the output of

the system.

One approach to achieve usability – i.e., what we

have chosen to define as ‘good design’ versus ‘poor

design’, as discussed above - is the Human-centred

design (HCD) process. The HCD process as outlined in

the ISO standard 9241:210 “aims to make systems

usable and useful by focusing on the users, their needs

and requirements, and applying human

factors/ergonomics, and usability knowledge and

techniques” [20].The ISO standard outlines a

framework for an iterative design process where the

major activities are

− Understanding and specifying the context of use

− Specifying the user requirements

− Producing design solutions

− Evaluating the design

A key success-factor in human-centred design is the

actively involvement of users throughout the design

and development process [20, 45], recognizing that it is

only the users that can provide a profound

understanding of their needs and the context of use in

which the design object is to function. The users can be

involved in all the activities outlined in the HCD

process, they are an important source for relevant data

obtained through methods like for example

observation, interviews, task analysis, the users can

participate in design activities, or they can evaluate and

test prototypes and design solutions.

In general, the benefits of usable systems are

increased productivity, reduced errors, reduced

training and support, improved user acceptance and

enhanced reputation [20, 46]. Research in the maritime

industry has found that usable systems benefit

seafarers in terms of improved physical, psychological,

and social well-being, higher motivation and job

satisfaction, as well as improved performance [13, 43,

46, 47]. Cost-benefit trade-offs are in general a key

consideration for adopting HCD methods [45]. Hence,

it is important to note that usability may also benefit

the shipowners through a safety gain arguably

achieved through good design, as well as improved

operational performance in terms of productivity,

efficiency, quality, a better reputation for hiring and

retaining personnel, reduced training and operating

costs [46, 47].

2.2 Maritime stakeholders

Stakeholders may be individuals, groups or

organizations “who have an interest (stake) and the

potential to influence the actions and aims of an

organization, project or policy direction” [48]. The

stakeholders are thus identified in relation to a specific

issue or project. The relation to the issue can also be

described as “those who are affected by or who can

affect a particular decision or actions” [49]. The

purpose of collecting and analysing data about

stakeholders is to develop an understanding of how

decisions are taken in a particular context and to

possibly identify opportunities for influencing the

decision-making processes [48]. Maguire [46]

recommends identifying a broad set of stakeholders as

part of the HCD process, including recipients of output

from the system, marketing staff, and purchasers, and

to this end, Dul [43] identified four main stakeholder

groups of system design:

− System actors: i.e., employees, product users, who

are part of the system and who are directly or

indirectly affected by its design and who, directly or

indirectly, affect its performance.

− System experts: i.e., professionals such as engineers

who contribute to the design of the system based on

their specific professional backgrounds.

− System decision makers: i.e., decision makers (e.g.,

managers) about the (requirements for) the system

design, the purchasing of the system, its

implementation and use.

− System influencers: i.e., media, governments,

standardisation organisations, regulators.

Seeing this in the maritime context, this industry

comprise numerous actors that are either directly

involved in the transport of goods or people, or in

supporting areas of activities, inter alia: ship operators,

shipowners, the crews, shipbuilders, design firms,

equipment suppliers, brokers, agents, repairers, the

IMO, flag states, coastal states, classification societies,

insurance companies, , education/training providers,

financiers, cargo owners as well as port/terminals [50].

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2.3 Maritime design considerations

In the ship design process, different stakeholders can

represent vastly different interests and their

expectations towards the design solution may for such

reasons not be aligned. Indeed, a lack of relevant

information, ineffective collaboration, conflicts and

trade-offs may result in an excessive addition of

features to satisfy the expectations of all stakeholders

as the design process unfolds [37] but such additional

capabilities may not cause a premium on the charter

rate that can justify the added cost and thus negatively

affect business outcome [37]. Of particular interest to

maritime design is the issue of system design where

authority is distributed within and among several

organisations with design decisions spread over time,

has been described as “sequential attention to goals”

[51]. The sequential attention leads to decisions to be

taken without being aware of how they influence other

decisions. Gernez [52] differentiate between two

stakeholder groups involved in ship design: designers

(ship designer, sub-contractors, shipyard) and the end-

users (ship owner, ship manager, operator, and crew).

The difficulties of sharing information between the

technical expertise of the designers and the operational

experience of the end-users, is a factor that may

contribute to suboptimal or unsafe ship design

solutions [52]. Part of this picture is that designers and

developers tend to assume that their experiences are

similar to the users’ experiences so they can see

themselves as fair representatives of the users they

design for [53]. Both the interest in, and the power to

influence human factors in the maritime industry is

greatly differentiated between stakeholders [54], and to

illustrate this issue, the human factors community have

stronger relationships with system actors than with

systems experts and decision makers, i.e., the

stakeholders that have the power to influence system

design [43]. Also, the competitive nature of the

industry entails the relation between usability and

profitability is perceived as a trade-off rather than

synergy [55].

2.4 Ship operation and purchasing process

The shipping industry is international and “a ship can

be owned in one country, operated from another

country, and registered by a third country, and crew

can hail from any country” [50]. The industry consists

of different business sectors depending on the type of

cargo being carried (bulk, tank, container or

specialized cargo, to mention a few), whether it is

providing services like port tugs and bunker ships,

services running on fixed schedules like container

lines, passenger and cruise ships, or whether it is

organized as tramp. The different sectors may have

differently organized economic models or

organizational structures to compete for business.

What the sectors do have in common is the highly

competitive terms of its business [56]. An essential

activity in shipping is thus to match the capacity to

carry cargo or perform given services with the needs of

customers, shippers or charterers. “This includes not

only providing the right service at the right price, but

also the buying, building, chartering-in and chartering-

out of ships in anticipation of international, but also

local and regional, market conditions.”[56].

The shipping companies has access to a global

labour force as the IMO International Convention on

Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping

for Seafarers (STCW) ensures basic requirements on an

international level, and the STCW certificates of

competence are internationally accepted. Crewing

management can thus be outsourced, and shipowners

have the possibility to optimize cost structures through

replacing the crew, or parts of the crew, with workers

from a different nationality. The recruitment period for

seafarers may be limited to a single voyage or a

contract for up to a year. Seafarers employed through

a crewing agency mainly interact with the crewing

agency despite that their contract of employment may

be with the shipowner. (Walters & Bailey, 2013).

Shipowners can decide to expand their fleet by

investing in second-hand ships or new ships, as well as

through the use of outsourcing and chartering, which

occurs frequently and makes a distinction between

ownership and the operation of a ship [56]. Investing

in a new ship can be done through buying a standard

ship type developed and ‘mass’ produced by a yard. In

this case the shipowner has little or no influence on

choice of equipment on board. An alternative approach

is to initialize a ship design process based on the

shipowner specific needs in terms of market, cargo

type, expected area of operation, and possible

equipment preferences and hull or machinery

constructional feature preferences. Shipowners may

approach shipyards with a preliminary specification

and general arrangement plan prepared by a ship

design bureau, or shipyards may have their own in-

house naval architect departments that can provide

both design and, subsequently to an agreement

between the parties, the production specifications and

drawings of a ship, usually also including the ‘maker’s

list’. In some detail, the maker’s list is a list of suppliers

negotiated and approved for delivery of equipment,

machinery or services to a particular (series of) ship to

be built, which forms an important part of the contract

between the shipowner and the shipyard, considering

that it sets a certain agreed standard and limits the

potential purchasing choices for the shipyard. The

main participants contributing to the ship design

process are the shipowner, the shipyard, and the ship

designer [57]. The suppliers of materials and

equipment are selected through negotiations and the

number of suppliers for a single ship may add up to

350 [57].

2.5 Maritime design regulations

The global nature of the shipping industry has led to

regulations mainly being developed internationally

through the International Maritime Organization

(IMO). The international Convention for the Safety of

Life at Sea (SOLAS) was incorporated by IMO when it

was founded in 1958, and this convention continues to

be the most important international maritime safety

mechanism [58]. The SOLAS convention governs

safety through 14 chapters that specify minimum

standards for the construction, equipment and safe and

secure operation of ships [59]. Chapter V, Safety of

Navigation, identifies a number of navigation safety

services which should be provided by Contracting

Governments and include subjects like maintenance of

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meteorological services for ships, the ice patrol service,

search and rescue services and routeing of ships.

However, SOLAS Chapter V also relates to

equipment onboard ships conforming with the

convention, which counts almost all ships in the global

trading fleet. As such, SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 15

(V/15) sets forth “Principles relating to bridge design,

design and arrangement of navigational systems and

equipment and bridge procedures” [60]. Important in

the present context, these seven principles require a

series of usability considerations to be considered in

bridge design, bridge equipment and procedures.

Regulation V/15 is a goal-based regulation (also

referred to as function-based regulations) that sets

forth objectives which the designed product or system

shall achieve, however without offering a detailed

description of how to achieve them. Detailed

guidelines for physical ergonomic criteria for bridge

equipment and layout is made available in the IMO

MSC/Circular 982 [61].

The principles in Regulation V/15 are applicable for

decisions made for the purpose of applying the

requirements of several other regulations in Chapter V,

including Regulation V/19 “Carriage requirements for

shipborne navigational systems and equipment”.

Regulation V/19 outlines specific requirements for the

equipment that ships shall have installed, for example

compass, charts, ECDIS, radar, automatic identification

system (AIS), echo sounder, speed measuring devices,

track and heading control. For each of such

instruments, and underlying /supporting Chapter

V/19, IMO has issued Performance Standards for the

devices in question. One-by-one, the Performance

Standards outline, usually in rather high-level

language, the functionalities, and qualities of the

particular instruments, and thus serves the purpose of

ensuring that seafarers are provided with the

equipment and tools deemed needed to perform a

particular task, independently of the manufacturer of

the devices. However, due to the brevity and nature of

the IMO Performance Standards, they are less usable as

test standards to prove conformance, and for this

purpose, the International Electrotechnical Committee

(IEC) develops highly detailed test standards matching

the IMO performance standards. In other words, the

practice is so that manufacturers relate to the IEC Test

Standards when they develop their instruments, and

the IEC Test Standards in turn form the base for the

issuing of Type Approval certificates of navigational

instruments. This goes for any kind of requirements,

i.e., also including requirements to ergonomics of

equipment, where the combined requirements

contained in the appropriate IEC Test Standard and the

over-arching ergonomics requirements contained in

IEC 60945 [62] and IEC 62288 [63] are to be fulfilled in

entirety.

Ships flying the flag of a European Union (EU)

country, or one of the European Free Trade Association

(EFTA) countries, are further constrained to only install

marine equipment marked with the EU Marine

Equipment Directive (MED) mark of conformity, also

known as the “wheel mark”. The “wheel mark” is

issued by notified bodies that verify the equipment is

in compliance with all applicable standards for design

and production, including the IEC Test Standards

IEC60945 and IEC 62288, all together specifying the

minimum performance requirements, methods of

testing and required test results of particular devices.

There are several test methods outlined in IEC62288

that can be applied for validating the equipment’s

compliance: inspection of documented evidence,

measurement, observation, and analytical evaluation.

Of particular relevance for this paper, it is noted that

this standard describes how testing according to the

requirements of ‘analytical evaluations’ are to be

performed:

“Analytical evaluations may be made by a relevant

expert with the necessary education, skills and/or

experience to make an informed and reliable

judgement concerning the presentation of information,

its appropriateness and usability. It is used for the

evaluation of properties which can be judged only in

the context of other information or knowledge which

requires the tester to make an informed assessment of

the likely performance of a typical user of the

presentation.” [63]. The appointment of “a relevant

expert” is at the discretion of the notified body.

The flag state is responsible for national

enforcement of the international maritime regulations.

The Norwegian legislation directly addressing ship

bridge design is found within Regulation 1157 2014-09-

05 [64] where SOLAS Chapter V/15 is implemented.

The flag state administrations are responsible for

surveying and issuing certificates that confirm ships

are designed, constructed, maintained, and managed

in compliance with the IMO regulations for ships

flying their flag, a task which the flag state

administrations at their own discretion may delegate

either to surveyors nominated for the purpose or to

recognized organizations (ROs), to perform the

inspections and surveys required to validate

conformance.

3 METHODS

The empirical foundation for this paper consists of

interviews with seafarers, shipowners, a shipyard,

equipment manufacturers, a flag state, classification

societies and insurance companies. In total, 42

informants have been interviewed in the period 2018-

2021. An overview of the informants is presented in

Table 1. The maritime sector consists of a vast array of

possible stakeholders in ship bridge design. The

stakeholders in this study were selected using a

snowball sampling approach, initiated through the

interviews with the end-users - the seafarers - and

further developed through the subsequent interviews

with informants from other stakeholder groups.

All seafarers, except one, worked as captains or

deck officers in Norwegian companies at the time of

the interviews. One seafarer was a lecturer in nautical

studies with previous sailing experience as a captain.

Semi-structured interviews were performed during

field trips on board three passenger ships and two

offshore supply vessels. The onboard visits allowed for

observations that complement the interview data. In

addition, a focus group interview with six high-speed

coastal vessel deck officers was performed at a

Norwegian education facility.

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Table 1. Overview of informants in the study.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Stakeholder group Job titles No. of persons

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Seafarers (working on passenger ships, high- Deck officer/Captain 21

speed coastal vessels, offshore supply vessels)

5 Shipowner companies (with fleets consisting Head of HSEQ & Human Factors/ Electro Automation 5

of bulk-carriers, oil- and gas-tankers, cruise Engineer/Marine and HSEQ Manager/Vice president

ships, offshore support vessels newbuilding/ Senior Marine Advisor

3 Equipment manufacturer companies Vice President R&D/Senior Designer/ Principal engineer HF 5

and maritime HMI/ Service engineer and Project

Manager/Salesperson

2 Classification societies Head of Section/HF Consultant 4

1 Flag state (The Norwegian Maritime Senior engineer/Senior Advisor 3

Administration)

2 Marine insurance companies Senior Loss Prevention Executive/ Loss Prevention 3

Director/Vice President

1 Shipyard Naval Architect 1

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Total number of informants 42

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table 2. The findings from each stakeholder group in this study.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Stakeholder group Influence & Interest

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Seafarers Design issues

Takes responsibility for handling suboptimal usability through adaptations

No/low design influence, high interest

Shipowners Low interest, perceived influence varies from low to high

Responsibility for usability sits somewhere else

Profitability prioritised

Equipment High interest in involving end-users through HF methods

manufacturers Influence through design and development, however HCD processes are challenging (cost

(profitability), regulations, customer requirements, barriers to including end-users)

Shipyard Have influence but low interest (due to lack of awareness about HF and usability)

Prioritize completing project within time/budget/contract specs (profitability)

Classification SOLAS V/15 a «dormant» requirement

societies HF not part of standard packet class

Market competition forces minimum notations (profitability)

High interest but influence through voluntary notations (chosen by shipowner)

Flag state Interest and influence on conventional ship building is medium

SOLAS V/15 not followed up through supervisory work

No national requirements beyond international due to risk of ships flagging out (economic

considerations)

Industry have responsibility for challenging regulations

Insurance Not responsible, low interest, low influence

Work on behalf of shipowner

Indirect influence through awareness campaigns (towards seafarers)

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

The interview with the other stakeholder groups

took place in the informant’s workplace or remotely

using a web conferencing tool. The shipowner

informants had different roles in company

management, they were all decision-makers

concerning ship bridge design and equipment. They

were employed in shipowner companies with

international operations, four which have their main

office in Norway and one in UK. The shipyard

informant was a naval architect that had worked for

several years in a shipyard in Asia. The equipment

manufacturer informants worked as designers or

engineers in Norwegian companies or in a Norwegian

department of an international company. The Flag

state informants worked in relevant departments in the

Norwegian Maritime Authority. The informants from

the classification societies worked at either the

company head office in Norway or in the head office in

UK. The insurance companies operate internationally,

and the informants worked either in the company head

office in UK or in Norway.

All interviews were semi-structured [65], lasted for

about one hour and were conducted by one or two

researchers. In the interviews, we asked the informants

about their role, their interest in and influence on ship

bridge design and usability, and how they perceived

other maritime actors’ role, equipment preferences and

priorities, and design related to performance and

safety. The interviews consisted of open questions

focusing on the informants’ experiences and opinions

and allowed the informants to talk freely about

different aspects of the topics we introduced.

The data material consisted of field notes and

audio-recorded interviews that were transcribed

verbatim. The transcriptions are the source of the

quotes in Section 4.

3.1 Analysis

Thematic analysis (Braun and Clark 2008) was initially

used to analyse the data in this study. This method

allows for identification of themes across the data in a

systematic manner. The data material for each

stakeholder group was first analysed separately.

Initially the data from the three stakeholder groups

seafarers, equipment manufacturers and shipowners

were subjected to open coding, which broke down the

material to smaller sections before comparing, refining,

and clustering codes into themes. This work was

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published in[28, 55]. The topic of stakeholders’

influence and interest in ship bridge design was then

further developed through performing additional

interviews with a shipyard, a flag state, classification

societies and insurance companies. The additional data

allowed for a re-analysis and comparison of findings

across the seven stakeholder groups. The findings

concerning interest and influence on ship bridge

design for each stakeholder group are shown in Table

The approach of generating knowledge about

stakeholders’ behaviour, inter-relations, interest and

influence on a particular process or decision-making is

known from the stakeholder analysis literature [48, 66].

This knowledge can be used to develop strategies for

managing stakeholders of projects or organisation in

order to facilitate the implementation of specific

decisions or organisational objectives [48], however, in

the present case, the knowledge generated focused on

the informants perceived influence and interest in ship

bridge design, with the ultimate aim of shredding light

on existing factors that may hamper progress in this

direction. Moreover, the resulting insights were used

to suggest possible ways forward.

3.2 Scientific quality

Several measures have been applied to ensure the

trustworthiness [67, 68] of the current study. The initial

coding was performed by the first author. In addition

to the authors of the current paper, five researchers

with extensive experience from research within the

maritime sector, human factors and safety, have been

involved in both the data collection, analysis, and

writing during the course of the research, which

strengthens the credibility of the study. When

performing interviews, one cannot be sure whether the

informants are providing an accurate account of their

experiences and thoughts or if their accounts are

adjusted to what they think the researcher is interested

in, or what others, like company management, would

like to hear. However, the topics raised in this study

were not of a personal or sensitive nature. The

informants seemed to find the topic interesting and

willingly shared their experiences and opinions. In

addition, serving as a kind of triangulation,

information obtained from previous interviews and

observations was continuously discussed during

subsequent interviews.

There are some factors relevant for the

transferability to other contexts of the study. First, the

data sample does not include all sectors within the

maritime industry. The authors acknowledge that

there is an extensive network of actors and

stakeholders in the maritime industry in addition to the

stakeholder groups included in this study. There is also

a limited number of informants from each stakeholder

group. However, the richness of the data collected has

allowed for an analysis that identified patterns across

the stakeholder groups concerning their perceived

interest, influence and responsibility for usability in

ship bridge equipment design. Second, the majority of

informants in the study are Norwegian and the

findings may first and foremost reflect a situation

specific for the Norwegian and/or European maritime

sector. Considering the international nature of the

maritime industry where the stakeholders operate,

compete, and are regulated internationally, the

conclusions drawn may still have broad relevance. The

results provide descriptions from which readers can

make judgements relating to the transferability of

results to other, specific contexts. Further research is

needed to establish the relevance of the findings for

specific maritime sectors, geographic areas, or the

maritime industry in general.

4 RESULTS

In this section the findings from the interviews with the

stakeholder groups seafarers, shipowners, shipyard,

equipment manufacturer, flag state, classification

societies and insurance companies are presented.

4.1 Seafarers

The navigators are the stakeholder that has the most

obvious interest in ship bridge design. Navigating a

ship requires management and interaction with many

pieces of equipment. The function and design of

individual equipment as well as how the equipment is

physically organized to constitute the overall work

environment have direct impact on seafarers’ work

tasks and work performance. In our fieldwork and

interviews with seafarers we found many examples of

suboptimal usability in ship bridge design and

equipment. The frequent existence of suboptimal

usability was also confirmed by the other stakeholder

groups.

One example of equipment not fit for the context-

of-use is the lack of possibility to dim screens during

night-time, an issue that frequently came up during the

interviews and field trips:

“That screen, you have it in front of you all the time, it

cannot be dimmed properly so you lose your night vision

while you are steering the ship. We used to cover it with a

patch. In return we could not see the alarms from the

propulsion system, we heard the alarm and had to lift the

patch. When you are in a narrow fairway and a pilot is

shouting at you, it starts beeping and you have to lift the

patch and in addition lose your night vision”

The seafarers expressed frustration over systems

and equipment that do not accommodate their tasks

and the context. Still, they manage to do their job

through creative ways of adapting to less successful

designs, as also described in [28].

All in all, the seafarers describe they have little or

no influence on ship bridge design. The seafarer’s

involvement in ship bridge design in a newbuilding is

usually restricted to a captain being part of a site team

or being allowed to give his opinion during the final

assembly e.g., regarding placement of certain items in

the consoles. The seafarers would like to have more

influence, however finding ways to give feedback can

be challenging. In our study we did not find any

systematic feedback system in place and the seafarers

may find it difficult to be heard, as this quote

exemplifies:

“I have tried but got the message: ‘thanks for the input but

we have already paid for this solution’. Then designers,

engineers and sales have related to classification,

regulations, and authorities, then they deliver the order to

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the yard, and on top is the owner that has paid for the

solution already. When you as the end-user express what you

would like to have the message is ‘Sorry, you are half a year

to late”

This quote also sums up who the seafarers think

have influence on ship bridge design, designers,

engineers, sales, class, regulations, authorities,

shipyard and shipowner. Several seafarers pointed to

the fact that many actors and competitors are involved,

as contributing to the lack of usability.

4.2 Shipowners

Shipowners can be organized in different ways, it can

be a company, a person or an investment fund owning

ships. Shipowner companies can range from small

family-run companies owning one or a few ships to

multinational companies owning hundreds of ships.

The different functions like ship management,

technical management, purchasing, insurance and

human resources may be departments within the

company, or it may be outsourced to a third-party

company.

The shipowners in our study span from describing

their interest and influence in ship bridge design from

being high to low. In the high end of this scale, the

offshore support vessel company expressed an explicit

interest in ship bridge design, not only to ensure safety

and production but as part of ensuring crew well-

being. During the ship building processes they

described following up both on the equipment

manufacturers and the yards closely to make sure the

bridge design had the intended standard. Their own

judgement was that they spent more resources than

most shipowner companies on ship bridge design, but

that it paid off in the form of good working conditions

for the crew:

“I think we gain on that. We have spent resources on this,

but throughout the ship’s lifetime the everyday life of people

on board is much better, that way it is worth it.”

The other four companies in our study, ranged both

their interest and perceived influence on usability in

ship bridge design to be medium to low. They all

emphasize that building a ship is a considerable

investment, and shipowner management is focusing

on big picture issues of a ship’s construction and

specifications, such as cargo carrying capacity, the

number of passengers, speed, efficiency, i.e., the factors

that are important for a profitable investment. For

these owners it is important to keep the costs to a

minimum and usability on the ships bridge is not

worth an additional investment. The large bulk and oil

tanker companies described buying ships more or less

off-the-shelf. They also prefer buying several ships in a

series with standard design as they find this decreasing

investment cost and crew training cost.

One of the informants from these companies did

think that they have some influence on bridge

equipment through what they choose to buy and how

much they are willing to invest:

“We do have some power, we build maybe 10 boats per year,

and we are buying them, so we have the possibility to make

requirements and invest more money if we want to. If we get

in early, we can request to redesign the whole bridge without

additional costs. So, the owners have a lot of power in this,

we can drive things forward, but in almost all shipowner

companies they now use equipment made in Asia”

Although this shipowner found they have some

influence, the shipowner informants pointed to the

regulators, shipyards and equipment manufacturers as

the stakeholders with the main influence on ship

bridge design. The informants expressed that safety of

navigation is ensured by complying to regulations:

“…as long as you follow the rules and requirements you are

safe”

The belief that safety is ensured by regulations may

have influenced their interest in safety and ship bridge

design. This was currently not a topic of specific

interest for these shipowners:

“Of course, safety is always an important thing, but that is

not where you feel it is urgent right now, after all, we do have

relatively safe equipment already”

It was also emphasized that if there is a need to

change anything it should be done through regulations

as both equipment manufacturers and shipowners are

forced to prioritize compliance:

“I think the easiest way to make changes is through

regulations, because they will be followed by both the

equipment manufacturers and shipowners”

When the shipowner signs a contract for the whole

ship, the shipyard has the design responsibility. The

shipyard chooses equipment suppliers depending on

their negotiations and agreements with suppliers and

if the shipowner would like a different supplier it will

come with an additional cost, as explained by one

informant:

“We had in the contract what they call a makers list, so you

had to have at least three possible suppliers for the bridge

equipment that the ship yard could choose and then we would

get the specifications for the supply and either approve it, but

if you wanted an alternative supply we had to pay the

difference in the cost between the supplier we wanted and the

supplier that the ship yard had chosen. (…) then we would

say ‘I’m sorry we are not going to pay the extra’”

Usability was perceived to be the responsibility of

equipment manufactures and the equipment

manufacturers should also bear the cost for developing

usable equipment. The competitiveness of the

maritime industry was emphasized, and one informant

described themselves as ‘the weak link in the food

chain’, thus other actors must take responsibility for

the equipment on the bridge:

“Everybody is always turning towards the shipowners to

pay more, but financially it must be very critical for the

shipowners to do more. The shipowners might think that the

equipment manufacturers have the responsibility to deliver

safe equipment that is easy to use and of course the maritime

institutions have a responsibility to educate people, so they

are capable of handling the equipment”

In other words, as this quote additionally illustrates,

the shipowners also pointed to the seafarers’ training,

competence and their responsibility for being able to

handle the available equipment.

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4.3 Shipyard

The shipyard is where new ships are being constructed

or where service and maintenance repairs or

conversions, modifications or upgrades of ships are

performed. Most shipyards have a design department

and an engineering department. Naval architects are

important professionals in this context as they work

with ship design at the conceptual and construction

levels, as well as often being involved in project

management.

The building time which consists of both the design

phase and the building phase, is an important cost

parameter for a shipyard. Depending on the market

situation, ships like tankers and bulk carriers are

increasingly built in larger series from a standard

design to increase the production efficiency of the

shipyard. After the first vessels in a series have been

built and construction bugs have been ironed out, there

is seldom much more to be done by the design and

engineering departments, leading to a per-ship cost

reduction and shortened delivery time. Shipping

companies do not need to be involved during this type

of building process. Neither is it usually being

considered in any detail what particular kind of

operations the ship will be used for, where should the

ship sail, what kind of crew will operate it etc.; designs

of this nature are aimed a world-wide, unrestricted

trading.

Naval architecture is an engineering-based

profession and according to our informant, ship

operations or the human-factors needs of end-users are

not part of their professional focus. The informant

describes the ship design process being about going

into the ship design spiral and try to complete the

design fulfilling all main requirements within the

given time. An alternative approach, experientially

very often used as a starting point for a new design, is

to use the drawings from an already approved (sister)

ship.

Concerning the ships bridge, the naval architect

designs the outline of the bridge and can also be

involved during the detailed design at the shipyard.

The equipment manufacturers may deliver finished

consoles, or consoles can be designed and produced by

the shipyard and their sub-suppliers, in which case the

equipment suppliers deliver components and

drawings. Bridge equipment may be bought as

individual sub-systems or components, resulting in

equipment coming from perhaps 5-10 different

equipment manufacturers, which all may have

different operating philosophies.

The informant is of the impression that usability

and implementation of human factors considerations

into design differs considerably between equipment

manufacturers. However, the informant emphasize

that a naval architect will not start a discussion with

stakeholders regarding human-factors related end user

needs. As long as there are no compulsory

requirements regarding usability or human factors this

is not on a naval architect’s agenda. According to the

informant, although being aware of guidelines for

implementing human factors in design, both from

classification societies and standardization

organizations, it is not clear who should be responsible

for using them.

4.4 Equipment manufacturers

Equipment manufacturers are companies that make

maritime equipment for ships, including specialist

hardware, software, diesel and electrical propulsion

systems, bridge equipment or DP systems. The

equipment manufacturers in our study were either

delivering a few specific pieces of bridge equipment or

a whole range of bridge equipment, including consoles

and integrated bridge solutions.

All equipment manufacturer informants in our

study expressed high interest in usability and in

involving seafarers in their design and development

processes. However, there is a trade-off between this

interest and time and cost considerations in the

development processes. The price of their product is an

all-important factor when competing in the maritime

market.

Their influence is considerable in the sense that they

design and develop the equipment and systems to be

used on board. However, the informants depict several

factors that limit this influence. Regulations are an

important factor. The intention of regulations, to

ensure a certain standard that contributes to safety, are

perceived as positive. However, they also experience

regulations, i.e., the IMO Performance Standards and

the IEC equipment test standards described above, as

being a hinder for innovation and restricting design

solutions towards lower usability. As an example, one

of the equipment manufacturers has ECDIS as the main

part of their portfolio and ECDIS, like all other

mandatory bridge systems required by SOLAS

Regulation V/19, must comply with detailed

regulations. In their opinion some of the requirements

lead to solutions that create unnecessary challenges for

the users:

“We would like to see that the experiences we have from

being close to the user group would be taken into account.

We see so many times that the standards have things that

works directly opposite of the intention, it reduces safety

although the intention has been the opposite”

Another factor limiting equipment manufacturer

influence is the customer requirements. The customer

is either representing the shipowner or the shipyard,

not the end-user directly. The equipment manufactures

experienced that shipowners can have their own

subjective opinions regarding the bridge which may

lead to altering the design in ways that designers think

makes the bridge less usable.

“In the end the owner decides, not the people using it. He

(the owner) overruled it even though all the users wanted the

ergonomic solutions.”

It may be difficult to get a position in the market

based on selling the concept of usability. The maritime

market is focused on cost effectiveness and equipment

developed through user-centered design process does

not mainly compete on price, but in addition on

intangible benefits like increased safety, efficiency,

effectiveness and user satisfaction, which are difficult

to quantify in a business case or purchase decision.

In addition, it may be a challenge to get access to

seafarers and ships and none of the equipment

manufacturers had any systematic way of collecting

feedback from operations. The informants also

described tensions within their company regarding

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time and cost spent on design and development

processes:

“We would like to be more out (in the field) but it is

challenging to achieve (…) we have technical personnel that

does it, in a way we who have the user-centred design part

we do not have any tasks or system to fix, at least not

something that everybody sees. We do see the need for it.”

4.5 The Flag State

The flag state is responsible for the enforcement of

national and international maritime regulations on

ships flying their flag. The Norwegian Maritime

Authority (NMA) is subordinate to the Ministry of

Trade, Industry and Fisheries and the Ministry of

Climate and Environment. The Norwegian legislation

directly addressing ship bridge design is found within

Regulation 1157 2014-09-05 Navigation and

navigational aids for ships and mobile offshore units,

where SOLAS Chapter V and the IMO MSC circular

982 is implemented. However, the focus on regulation

V/15 through supervisions seem to be limited:

“The intention to include it in the regulations, regulation 15

states the considerations that must be taken when designing

and placing equipment on a bridge. The guideline (MSC

circular 982) addresses these considerations but from there

to being good at actually using it in our supervisory work is

to go a bit far”

Concerning ships being built within existing

regulations the flag state informants considered

NMA’s interest and influence to be medium. The

influence is essentially through providing the

framework conditions through regulations, including

supervision and auditing to ensure compliance with

legislation. The informants express being comfortable

with having general regulations with minimum

requirements, as that provide the same conditions of

competition in some areas. The informants are of the

opinion that prescriptive regulations may limit

innovation; however, goal-based regulations are

difficult to follow up:

“The issue with goal-based and function-based, the problem

is its all good but when you have to measure something and

set an acceptance criterion or standard for what should be

allowed, you need to have some known factors to measure up

against, so that everything does not become completely

abstract”

The NMA is aware of existing challenges regarding

design of ship bridges and bridge equipment. They

point to the lack of standardisation considering a

holistic view on the bridge work environment guiding

how the different pieces of equipment should be placed

together. Currently it is up to equipment

manufacturers, yards, and shipowners to decide how

this is done and the practice varies between ship types

and within different segments in the industry. In

general, the informants have the impression that HMI

and human factors developments is not fully exploited

in maritime sector, which can be connected to the

strong focus on profitability. Still, it is important for the

NMA that Norwegian requirements do not go beyond

IMO regulations, due to the goal of ensuring

predictable conditions for the industry and to reduce

the risk of ships flagging out.

The NMA is responsible for bringing issues to the

IMO, however, the NMA is of the opinion that the

industry also has a responsibility for pushing

regulations forward.

“I would like to see the industry challenge the regulations.

As new equipment becomes available or new research that

says something about which resolutions and colors are best,

I would like to see that automatically forwarded. I am unsure

if this is the case, you do get the impression that they are most

concerned with staying within the regulations when

building a vessel. I understand that they do, but someone has

to take the fight.”

4.6 Classification Societies

Classification societies are non-governmental business

organizations that establish technical standards for the

construction of ships. Based on plan approval and

onboard inspections during the building period of a

ship, they issue classification certificates that verify

that the construction of a vessel complies with their

standards; certificates that are maintained throughout

the lifetime of the ship through renewed surveys. The

class certificate is necessary for the shipowner to

insurance. The certificate of class will include class

notations that signify which rule requirements are

applicable for the assignment and retention of class.

While the basic class notation is mandatory, other

descriptive class notations are optional and can cover

different aspects, for instance ship type, special

structural or engine standards, or, depending on the

ship type and the wishes of the owner, there are also

notations regarding navigation and manoeuvring. In

addition to delivering their own services, classification

societies can also have a role as Recognised

Organisation (RO), meaning the flag state has

delegated the responsibility for inspection and

supervision of the flag state rules to the classification

society.

Bridge and bridge equipment is not part of

classification unless the shipowner wants a specific,

navigation-related voluntary notation. Following up

SOLAS V/15 is not a priority for class societies:

“Regulation 15 says something about bridge design, but it is

almost a dormant requirement in relation to SOLAS ships.

There are not many requirements for it in relation to normal

standard class or SOLAS ships, but some flags i.e., Germany

and Norway have said that IMO circular 982 applies, that

they are minimum requirements. So, when you build a main

class ship according to SOLAS, the 982 also applies and then

it is quite significant, however the follow-up I do not want to

say much about”

The informants experience from the role as RO is

that it is common for the flag to give exemptions from

this part of the regulations. The informants think that

traditionally class societies have focused on the

technical solutions and not been concerned with

operations. Also, the majority of surveyors from class

societies have technical background and human factors

knowledge is not part of their training. The class

surveyors follow guidelines and checklists concerning

technical systems and equipment and they often work

under considerable time pressure.

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All mandatory equipment required by SOLAS

Chapter V/19 has type approval, and according to the

informants, installation and placement are equipment

manufacturer and shipowner responsibility. From

class point of view the shipowner has the main

influence on ship bridge design, illustrated by the

following quote:

“We think it is entirely driven by the owner/operator. Every

other player in the industry is just selling stuff or providing

services. (…) the only ones putting money in in the end,

either by buying stuff or by running stuff, is the

owner/operators. Everyone else are passengers. (…) if the

owner/operator is not interested and does not provide

sufficient information and requirements, nothing is ever

going to happen. That is a big problem, because increasingly

owners are banks”

Class considers their interest in ensuring safety

through bridge design as being high. However, their

influence on ship bridge design is through selling and

developing the optional navigation and maneuvering

notations. These are adapted to different ship types

and may include requirements for different working

positions, what kind of equipment should be there,

placement, visibility etc. The sales argument being put

forward is that navigation notations will give lower

insurance, meaning that although investment in design

is higher cost is saved on lower insurance. One of the

informants emphasize that through developing these

notations they contribute to push the industry forward.

If the shipowner chooses a high navigation notation

their influence through this notation is high. However,

this classification society recently had to develop a new

notation that only have minimum requirements in

addition to SOLAS. This notation was described as

necessary due to the demand in the market for a simple

notation that requires minimum investments.

Providing such as notation is part of the competition

with other classification societies that provide these

types of notations.

4.7 Insurance

Insurance is the shipowner’s protection against

financial loss due to accidents and incidents. Marine

insurance has two main areas: 1) hull and machinery

that cover the risk of property damage and 2)

Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance that cover

open-ended risks, like third party liability for cargo,

injuries to people or environmental damage. (The loss

associated to not operating is still with the owner).

Insurance companies are impacted by ship bridge

design in terms of claims due to navigational incidents

and accidents. According to the insurance companies,

although the ship accident rate is declining every year,

the risk remains the same as the consequences are

higher, the ships are larger, systems are more complex,

and claims are larger. However, collisions and

groundings do not lead to the largest claims:

“Pollution claims are high cost as you can imagine but not

very frequent (…) but what we get they are very expensive

so in terms like that collision claims, groundings, in real

terms are not a huge problem, they are acceptable within

insurance terms anyway.”

The insurance company informants state that both

their interest and influence in ship bridge design is low.

They have no direct influence on shipowners regarding

ship design or choice of bridge equipment. Especially

the P&I club emphasized that they are working on the

shipowner’s behalf, they are brought in by the

shipowner to protect him/her from the unexpected and

interfering with the design of ships is not part of their

responsibility.

According to the insurance companies it is a

misconception in the industry that insurance premium

can be influenced by the choice of ship bridge

equipment. The insurance premium is calculated in a

conservative way based on the historical number of

claims. The reward in the form of lower insurance

premium will only occur when no claims have been

shown over time:

“Insurance is just gambling you know, insurance gamble

that you are not going to have a claim and proceeds the

premium (…) answer to the underwriters is: well if you do

this claims will go down so you will clearly get less premium,

but at the end of the day insurance is a market place, it’s all

down to if you have a lot of claims that you have to pay a lot

of premium, that’s the system.”

One of the insurance companies stated that they

would like to have more impact on safety and ship

bridge design, especially the opportunity to connect

insurance premium level to class notations but they

claim that will not be agreed to by the underwriters.

The insurance companies do regard they have

indirect influence through the awareness campaigns

run by their loss prevention departments towards

seafarers:

“We have had lots of awareness presentations on what we see

in navigation accidents, including the use of systems,

understanding of positioning. It is based on the requirements

we see, to try to avoid seafarers making the same mistakes

(…) and the problem is that our audience is the seafarers, the

navigators and not the superintendent or the technical

personnel in the shipping company”.

5 DISCUSSION

5.1 SOLAS V/15 – a ‘dormant’ requirement

SOLAS V/15 requires that human factors’

considerations are the basis for all decisions “which

affect bridge design, the design and arrangement of

navigational systems and equipment on the bridge”,

i.e., in our interpretation, that the navigational

equipment and systems must be usable; must be good

design. Achieving usability requires however requires

active involvement of end users throughout the design

and development process [20, 45, 46]. In this study we

find that the core regulation underpinning this

demand, SOLAS V/15, is neither applied systematically

in the design and development processes, nor is it

having a significant position and impact during the

ship design and purchasing processes, and nor is it an

explicit, or even implicit, part of the survey work by the

regulators.

The seafarers in our study have high interest in

usability in ship bridge and equipment design as they

are directly affected by it [49] through their daily work.

However, they experience having little or no influence

on ship bridge design or the selection of equipment,

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whether it is the design and development process or

the purchasing process. With the widespread use of

crewing agencies and short employment contracts [56]

there are few possibilities for seafarers to interact with

the shipowners or other stakeholders to give feedback

from the use of ship bridge equipment. Even in

organizations where owners’ representatives –

superintendents – are recruited among seafarers, and

thus understand the end-user needs from their own

practice, there is little impact to be observed.

Speculatively, the underlying cause for this paradox

could be that their freedom of action is tuned to the

same agenda as most other members of a ship owning

organization: ensuring compliance to rules, cost-

neutrality (or cost-reduction), and timely delivery of

the ship so that a return of investment can commence.

Seen from the perspective of the other stakeholders

there are differing reasons for not involving seafarers

in design and purchasing decisions. The equipment

manufacturers in our sample expressed high interest in

usability and in involving seafarers in the design and

development process. However, they experienced that

their access to ships and seafarers is limited. To involve

seafarers arguably also adds time and cost to a

development project which reduces the profitability

margin, and since there does not seem to be an explicit

market demand for usability, ‘going the extra mile’

could be considered as a luxury.

The purchasing process is another opportunity for

involving seafarers in bridge design decisions and

equipment selection, where seafarers’ experience

would be able to influence the choice of equipment

towards instruments with superior usability. The ship

purchasing process is however usually a negotiation

between the shipyard and the owner/buyer, and these

negotiations often revolves around the main

characteristics of a newbuilt ship like speed, fuel

consumption, capacity, delivery time, and cost.

Usability is not on the table, apart from the implicit

assumption that compliance to the IEC test standards

provides usable systems. This was emphasized by

some of the shipowner informants, that believed as

long as you comply with regulations, the level of safety

is good enough, and there is no reason to invest more

time and money.

Based on the maritime actors focus on cost

efficiency it would seem like a viable idea to connect

insurance premium to the choice of ship bridge

equipment. However, according to the insurance

companies’ informants, the insurance premium is

conservatively calculated based on the historical

number of claims. Despite running awareness

campaigns directed towards seafarers on how to use

equipment on the bridge, the state that they are in

general neither interested nor involved in ship design

processes.

Regulators can ensure compliance through their

plan approvals and subsequent survey work.

However, they seem to have conflicting relationships

between balancing safety and economic

considerations. The class societies express high interest

in usability in ship bridge design but their only

possibility to influence design is through voluntary

navigation notations. Class societies are also part of the

competitive maritime market and must provide

‘cheap’ notations that require minimum investments to

compete for business. As such, they are in the main no

driver for usability in the industry. One class society

informant described SOLAS V/15 as a ‘dormant

requirement’ not followed up by anyone in the

industry: “It says something about bridge design in

regulation 15, but it is almost a dormant requirement

in relation to SOLAS ships”.

The flag state is, as described, responsible for

enforcing the international regulations on ships flying

their flag. One example is Norway, where it is

important for the NMA to ensure a level playing field

also on a world-wide scale, i.e., predictable competitive

and reasonable conditions for the shipping industry,

and thus avoiding any additional national

requirements that can enhance the risk of ships

flagging out. SOLAS Regulation V/15 is, it transpires,

not actively followed up within the NMAs supervisory

work, and moreover, one of the flag state informants

brought up the challenge of following up goal-based

regulations: “you need to have some known factors to

measure up against, so that everything does not

become completely abstract”. As opposed to the chain

of prescriptive regulations and standard tests

underpinning the implementation of SOLAS V/19 –

IMO performance standards and IEC test standards,

the goal-based requirements in SOLAS Regulation

V/15 requires both specialized human factors and

seafaring knowledge, as well as an out-of-the-ordinary

effort from designers and surveyors to be

implemented. So, while the benefit of goal-based

regulations is the freedom in developing technical

solutions to meet the goals, there seem to be a need for

providing the required knowledge to follow up SOLAS

Regulation V/15 in a form that can be understood and

applied by the relevant actors.

5.2 Usability – somebody else’s problem?

The stakeholders in our study varies in the expressed

interest in ship bridge design, and represents a

continuum that spans from ‘high’ when it comes to the

seafaring end-users, all the way to ‘low’ when it comes

to the shared tacit understanding by other stakeholders

that is agreeable to consider SOLAS V/15 as dormant

and settle for compliance to SOLAS V/19. The

perceived possibility to influence ship bridge design

was often seen in the context of responsibility for

design and design processes. One common pattern is

that stakeholders refer to the shipowners as

responsible for the equipment on board their ships.

Another pattern is the stakeholders referred to the

regulators, or the regulations, as responsible for

ensuring safety and as a major influence on usability.

Maritime stakeholders are in general committed to

regulatory compliance, as it is necessary to be allowed

to operate. We wholeheartedly agree to the impact of

maritime regulation and see the IMO instruments as

essential for the safety of shipping. However, we do

not immediately support that IMO is lacking behind

when it comes to the institutionalization of maritime

usability. On the contrary, we suggest that the IMO in

this case have made the necessary provisions through

SOLAS V/15; however, and much to be considered,

what appears to be the less-than-vigilant enforcement

of this regulation leaves usability up to the different

maritime actors. The resulting fragmentation of

responsibility for usability is evident, as the actors

697

suggest – think - that the responsibility for usability sits

somewhere else, as illustrated in Figure 1. The figure

illustrates the fragmentation of perceived

responsibility but also that the distribution of arrows is

not symmetric, most arrows points towards

shipowners. Most shipowners meant usability is the

responsibility of shipyards, equipment manufacturers

and regulations. They also pointed out the seafarers’

responsibility for being able to handle the equipment.

On the other hand, seafarers, equipment

manufacturers, class societies, flag state and insurance

companies are of the opinion that the shipowners are

responsible for ensuring usability in ship bridge

design. It is also interesting to note that the insurance

informants believed shipowners are responsible for

usability while their awareness campaigns are directed

at seafarers and their use of equipment. In other words,

the stakeholders believe responsibility for usability sits

somewhere else - it is somebody else’s problem.

Ideally, the knowledge from research and design

efforts already undertaken would lead maritime

stakeholders involved in ship bridge equipment design

to understand the value of ergonomics and prioritize it,

regardless of whether it is supported by mandatory

rules and regulations. However, as usability arguably

is associated with cost, we find it is unlikely that

improved usability of bridge systems and equipment is

something that will appear by itself within the world

fleet, unless practice is changed, and – everything else

equal – a more subjective drive for safer and cleaner

oceans becomes a part of the decision-making fabric.

This unfortunate notion also springs from the

consideration of the difficulty of constructing a

credible business case in favour of good bridge system

usability, unless the cost of potential accidents is

included – accidents, which however, in the eyes of the

insurance companies, are ‘not a huge problem, they are

acceptable within insurance terms anyway’.

Figure 1. The allocation of responsibility for usability in ship

bridge design, as perceived by the different stakeholders. The

arrows pointing towards seafarers is about their

responsibility for handling the equipment. The background

circles indicate the existence of additional stakeholders, who

may also have influence on usability in ship bridge design.

5.3 A way forward?

One could believe the closing statement above to be a

kind of stalemate, at least unless a workable shortcut

could be found. In the foregoing, the present situation

arguably resulting in poor usability of bridge systems

and equipment has been outlined. Stakeholders appear

to recognize these shortcomings, appear to show an

interest in improvements, but see a potential solution,

or solutions, as somebody else’s problem. Moreover, in

spite of the provisions of SOLAS Regulation V/15,

expectations apparently are that a change of rules is

needed to make usability requirements more explicit

than they already are, also considering IEC 60945 and

IEC 62288, and from our data it seems that the industry

is waiting for the IMO to initiate such a process.

Pursuing this line of thinking, it seems relatively

clear to the authors that usability considerations

relating to bridge design and the design of bridge

equipment could be made more explicit, and that the

provisions of SOLAS Regulation V/15 could be made

more operational through descriptions of usability

inspection methods, and the transfer of generic human

factors knowledge to more technically-oriented

stakeholders, i.e. tuned to the typical audience of

maritime design engineers, marine superintendents,

surveyors and plan approvers. We suggest that actions

towards such a change are initiated, towards what we

see as long-term improvements of maritime safety

through improved usability and the associated

reduction of errors and mishaps that often are

attributed to humans. On the other hand, we also

recognize that such actions, as well as the

corresponding cultural adaptation that rather likely is

also a component necessary for success of such a

scheme, is a very far reaching, serious and time-

consuming venture, ignores the need of a here-and-

now return-of-investment (ROI), and all in all, such a

scheme is possibly to the timescale of decades, rather

than years.

With this in mind, our thinking keeps reverting to

the position that the present regulations actually do

seem to state what appears to be needed in way of

usability requirements, especially considering the

powerful wording of SOLAS Regulation V/15, but also

the wording and the test regime included in IEC 60945,

IEC 62288 and the individual equipment test standards

which could suffice in many respects. On that basis, we

ask ourselves, could there be a short-cut, a simpler,

more expedite and less complicated way forward,

without a major revision of rules, and a massive change

of culture in the maritime industry? We have arrived at

the conclusion that there could be such a solution. Our

suggestion is that a shorter-term, potentially

immediately effective approach, could possibly be

brought about if end-users were to be much more

clearly represented in the process of plan approval,

system assessment and type approval of maritime

instruments. As mentioned above, the present test

methods often call for expert evaluation, but leaves the

definition of experts open – but, if the norm for the

definition of ‘expert’ was to include current seagoing

experience and a relevant seafaring career, many of the

‘pass’ criteria in the various standards would not need

explicit explanations. The term ‘intuitive’, which is

seen in both IMO Performance Standards and IEC Test

Standards would, for instance, take on a much more

real meaning when evaluated by an experienced

seafarer, as would – again as an example – the term

‘logical grouping’, which is also a usability heuristic

that is used in the present rules and test standards.

Considering that the relevant, present-day IEC Test

698

Standards call for the assessment of navigational

instrument features and functions according to such

terms, the evaluation of seafaring experts would

probably be more to the point and several degrees

more relevant for fellow seafarers than similar

assessment made by any other discipline.

Taking a change of practice towards giving the

seafarers a louder and clearer voice during type

approval, plan approval and potentially onboard

surveys, could possibly, and possibly even in a rather

short time span, help building up a more

comprehensive understanding of the actual context-of-

use and perspective of the end-users, thus aiding

bridge design and bridge equipment development. In

the slightly longer run, such a pool of knowledge could

also become a resource that design engineering could

tap into to improve their products and services.

6 CONCLUSION

To achieve improved usability in maritime equipment

and bridge systems ideally requires the actively

involvement of end-users throughout the design and

development process. Usability in navigational

equipment and systems on a ship’s bridge is required

by the IMO SOLAS Regulation V/15 regulation.

However, this is a goal-based requirement that is

challenging to follow up both in design, development,

and survey work, considering that the surveyors

overwhelmingly have a technical background not

having been trained in human factors, and – perhaps

for this reason - the regulation is seen as a ‘dormant

requirement’ by the maritime stakeholders. In this

study, the usability in ship bridge design and bridge

equipment is investigated from the perspective of

different stakeholders in the maritime industry:

seafarers, shipowners, equipment manufacturers,

shipyard, insurance companies, classification societies

and a flag state. From these sources, we find that the

seafarers, the direct end-users, do not have a clear voice

in the ship bridge and bridge equipment design and

the associated purchasing processes. In other words,

the stakeholder with highest interest in usability have

what seems to be a low, or even the lowest, influence.

Indeed, the other stakeholders appear to recognize

these shortcomings, and some do show interest in

improvements, but the responsibility for usability is

fragmented, and they see the potential solutions as

being somebody else’s problem.

In our understanding of the wider picture, there

seems to be a lack of incitement for prioritizing

usability, since it is not strictly followed up through

certification of bridge and bridge equipment designs,

and neither is it perceived as cost-effective as usable

equipment, which conceivably may have a higher

investment cost, does not seem to result in lower

insurance premiums or other tangible economic

benefits. We suggest long-term improvements of

usability can be made through making the usability

considerations relating to bridge design and the design

of bridge equipment in current regulations more

visible and subject to more focused validation. In

addition, we recommend that the transfer of generic

human factors knowledge to more technically oriented

stakeholders become a best practice, highlighting the

importance of catering for end-user needs. We also

argue that small steps to improve usability within a

shorter time span can be taken, and to this end, we

suggest that seafarers are included as ‘experts’ when

‘expert evaluation’ is required in the process of plan

approval, system assessment and type-approval of

maritime equipment. Such a practice can potentially be

effective within a very short time span and within the

current structure of the maritime sector and the present

regulations governing the usability of bridge

equipment and bridge design. From our vantage point,

we believe that the perspective of the end-users, and an

immediate and direct understanding of the context-of-

use, can almost immediately be brought into the ship

bridge design and equipment manufacturing processes

without any change of rules, regulations or other

practices.

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