1 INTRODUCTION

On 30th March, 2020, in a landmark decision which

followed fifteen years of litigation, the US Supreme

Court held that the safe port clause in the standard

ASBATANKVOY form constitutes an express

warranty of safety by the charterer as a matter of US

law.

On 26th November, 2004, the ATHOS 1 was

berthing on the Delaware River in New Jersey when

an abandoned ship anchor punctured the ship’s hull.

This caused approximately 264,000 gallons of crude

oil to spill into the river, creating the third worst

marine oil spill in US history. The charterers, CITGO

Asphalt Refining Co, who were also the owners of the

discharge terminal, had chosen the berth.

Legal Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court Position Upon

a Safe Berth Warranty and Evaluation of the UK Legal

Position

M. Boviatsis & G. Daniil

University of Piraeus, Athens, Greece

ABSTRACT: This research is focused upon the evaluation of safe berth clause pursuant to US law, in conjunction

with UK law, based on the recent US Supreme Court ruling over “ATHOS I”, which was fixed pursuant to an

ASBATANKVOY charterparty to carry a cargo of heavy crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey.

The dispute arose during the final stretch of the voyage, as the vessel entered the Delaware River, an uncharted

abandoned ship anchor ruptured the vessel’s hull causing 264,000 gallons of oil to spill. The Oil Pollution Act

1990 required the Owners to fund the clean-up costs in the first instance (limited to US$45 million) and the US

Federal Government’s Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund reimbursed Owners for an additional US$88 million in

clean-up costs. Owners and the US Federal Government filed suit against voyage charterers for breach of the

ASBATANKVOY charterparty safe berth clause. The case went through two trials, and before the Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit twice, before the Supreme Court were asked to determine ultimate liability.

The question before the Court was whether the safe berth clause was a warranty of safety, which meant that

liability for an unsafe berth would be imposed on voyage charterers irrespective of whether they exercised due

diligence. The answer to that question was yes; the language of the safe berth clause in this case was

unambiguous and unqualified. The obligation on the voyage charterers was to designate a berth that was free

from harm or risk such that the vessel come and go from always safely afloat. The Court went on to comment

that “charterers remain free to contract around unqualified language that would otherwise establish a warranty

of safety, by expressly limiting the extent of their obligations or liability. In the absence of any such qualifying

language however the Supreme Court has made it clear that a charterer is liable to the owner for any

consequences arising out of the ship being ordered to an unsafe berth, an obligation unfettered by any issues of

due diligence or the degree of knowledge on the part of the charterer.

http://www.transnav.eu

the International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 16

Number 1

March 2022

DOI: 10.12716/1001.16.01.01

The question before the court was whether the safe

port clause in the charterparty was a promise by the

charterer that the port would be safe for the ship, or

merely an undertaking to “exercise due diligence” or

reasonable care to ensure that it would be safe.

The United States Supreme Court was asked to

consider clause 9 of the widely used ASBATANKVOY

form charterparty, which provides: “the vessel shall

load and discharge at any safe place or wharf…which

shall be designated and procured by the Charterer,

provided the Vessel can proceed thereto, lie at, and

depart therefrom always safely afloat, any lighterage

being at the expense, risk and peril of the

Charterer…”

The court held that the plain language of the clause

established a warranty of safety, upholding the

decision reached by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeal.

The clause imposed on the charterer a duty to select a

safe berth and, given the unqualified language of the

clause, that duty was absolute. There was no

requirement for the clause to state the term

“warranty”, as long as the clause included a statement

of material fact regarding the condition of the berth

selected by the charterer [12].

2 THE CASE OF ATHOS I

2.1 The Facts

The voyage charterer of the fully laden tanker ATHOS

I was also the owner of the refining complex in

Paulsboro, New Jersey, which the vessel was

approaching when its (single skin) hull was torn open

by an anchor that had been lost/abandoned by some

unknown vessel. The anchor was lying on the bottom

of a federally-maintained anchorage ground through

which the ship had to transit on its way to the berth

from the federally-maintained ship channel. The

anchor, which had not been previously discovered or

removed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, had

evidently laid on the bottom with its flukes down for

at least three years, during which time many ships

had passed over it without incident. But, at some time

prior to the ATHOS’ arrival, the anchor was somehow

flipped over so that its flukes could be in position to

rake the ATHOS I’s hull and tear open a number of its

cargo tanks. ATHOS I’s cargo was Venezuelan heavy

crude oil, which the charterer/wharfinger was

importing to use in making asphalt. Because the

anchorage was maintained by the federal government,

the charterer/wharfinger had never expected that the

anchorage would have obstructions within it so,

although passage through the anchorage en route the

berth commonly involved passage through the

anchorage, the charterer/wharfinger never took steps

on its own to conduct sonar surveys. An estimated

263,000 gallons of Venezuelan crude oil was released

into the Delaware River when ATHOS I was

punctured, giving rise to enormous (U.S. $180

million+) cleanup and business interruption expenses

[7].

The vessel was operated under the separate charter

parties. Namely, the first was a time charter between

the ship’s owner and a charterer which agreed to

exercise “due diligence” to ensure that the vessel was

only sent to “safe places.” The time charterer then

subchartered the vessel under a voyage charter to the

operator of the Paulsboro refinery on the

ASBATANKVOY form, which contained a “safe

berth” or “safe berth” warranty that was not expressly

limited to the exercise of due diligence. Based upon

the privity of contracts, the vessel owner was not

under a contractual relationship with the subcharter.

The owner of the ship remained its operator and was

therefore the responsible party for the consequences

of the oil spill under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 [10].

The origin of the anchor being unknown, the

shipowner sued the charterer/wharfinger for breaches

of both the contractual “warranty of safe berth”

(Charterer “shall select . . .always safely afloat”) found

in the ASBATANKVOY charter party and of the

maritime law duty of care to properly maintain its

berth and the approach(es) thereto. The United States

was a party to the suit both for recovery of funds from

the national Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which had

made partial reimbursement payments to the innocent

ATHOS I and her underwriters, and as the subject of a

counterclaim for having failed to properly maintain

the anchorage [8].

2.2 Third Circuit Decision

The case was originally tried for 41 days to the bench

in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania (Hon. John P. Fullam presiding), which

found that the charterer/wharfinger was not liable for

harm caused by the casualty on any theory. But the

Third Circuit reversed in a precedential opinion (In re

Petition of Frescati, 718 F 3rd 200 (3rd Cir. 2013). The

Third Circuit held that the ship owner was a third-

party beneficiary of the voyage charter warranty

because that warranty was certainly intended for the

benefit of the vessel. That contractual warranty had

been breached as a matter of law irrespective of the

amount of diligence exercised by the

wharfinger/charterer under the circumstances because

the approachway to the berth was in fact obstructed

and the contractual warranty did not have a due

diligence limitation. (“[The] safe berth warranty is an

express assurance of safety.” The ship’s captain was

not in a better position to ascertain the safety of the

berth than the charterer because the charterer was

itself on scene and “had selected its own berth.”) It

further held that the contractual warranty obligations

were not avoidable, as had been argued by the

charterer/wharfinger, as a result of the ship’s captain

having impliedly accepted the berth as safe when it

had been nominated [7].

It further held that the contractual warranty

obligations were not avoidable, as had been argued by

the charterer/wharfinger, as a result of the ship’s

captain having impliedly accepted the berth as safe

when it had been nominated.

In its opinion, the Third Circuit declined to follow

the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh

Grain Corp., 913 F. 2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1990), which had

adopted a due diligence limitation for the reasons

suggested by notable admiralty law scholars Gilmore

and Black, but instead followed the reasoning of a line

of cases decided by the Second Circuit going as far

back as 1935, citing Venore Transportation Co. v.

Oswego Shipping Corp., 498 F. 2d 469 (2nd Cir. 1974)

as the most recent in the line.

The ATHOS I case was remanded to the district

court for findings as to causation. The district court

(Hon. Joel H. Slomsky in place of the by-then-retired

Judge Fullam), found that the breach of the charter

party warranty—as defined by the Third Circuit

opinion—was a proximate cause of the casualty and

its resultant costs, entering judgment against the

charterer/wharfinger [13].

2.3 Supreme Court Decision

The U.S. Supreme Court, recognizing the split

between the circuits as to the interpretation of the

contractual safe berth language, granted the writ of

certiorari and the case was argued in 2019. In an

opinion by Justice Sotomayor issued on March 30,

2020, joined by all but two dissenters (Alioto and

Thomas, JJ), the Court used the traditional contract

analysis principles said to have been adopted by the

general maritime law to find that no ambiguity

existed in the ASBATANKVOY language as to the

agreement or intent of the parties. “Our analysis

begins and ends with the language of the safe-berth

clause.” The use in the charter of the words “shall . . .

designate and procure” a “safe place or wharf” and

“always safely afloat” created a strict contractual

warranty obligation upon the Charterer as to the

ship’s safety, not a mere duty to exercise due

diligence. “Due diligence” is a tort concept that has no

place in the analysis because no such language is

anywhere found in the charter form at issue. The

Court found that the decisions of the Second Circuit,

which had been followed by the Third in this case,

were in tune with the longstanding contract

interpretation rules; the contrasting decision of the

Fifth Circuit relied upon by the charterer was based

less upon contract language analysis and more upon

considerations of public policy. According to the

majority, the dissent’s central pillar, the idea that the

charter gave the charterer the right to select a berth

rather than an obligation, was “atextual”. “The word

shall usually connotes a requirement,” says the

majority in a brief footnote [4].

The charterer had argued that unless a “due

diligence” limitation was read into the charter, the

charterer would be “strictly liable” for damage caused

by the breach of contract. The Court showed little

sympathy for this view because contract law does not

consider notions of “fault.” If a contractual promise is

breached, damages are awardable whether or not the

breach was in any sense the fault of the promisor. The

parties could easily have agreed to limit or condition

the charterer’s safe berth promise if they had chosen

to, according to the Court, citing examples of such

limits elsewhere in the charter. The Court also pointed

to other forms of charter party that explicitly

incorporate the “due diligence” limitation in their

safe-berth clauses [2].

The Court in similar fashion rejected the argument

that the charter somehow imposed a duty upon the

ship’s master to refuse to enter a berth chosen by the

charterer, based upon the concept proposed by legal

commentators that the master is usually in a better

position than the charterer to learn whether or not a

berth is safe. The Court holds that no such duty exists

merely because the master has the admitted right of

refusal and the existence of such a right does not

relieve the charterer of its warranty obligation.

3 LEGAL ISSUES ASSESSED IN ATHOS I

3.1 Significant Claim

Owners and their insurers handled the matter in

accordance with protocols at the time, owners being

the responsible party under OPA 90. Clean up costs

totalled USD 133 million which owners’ insurers

attempted to recover from the charterer, a US refining

company.

After 16 years of litigation and doubtless excessive

legal costs, the Supreme Court has given judgement

that has significant implications for charterers who

elect their charterparties to follow US legal

jurisdiction.

The Court had to decide whether charterers had

breached the safe berth provision in the charterparty.

Charterers had argued throughout that their duty was

of due diligence only and that no amount of due

diligence could have identified an uncharted anchor

in an approach channel, which was the proximate

cause of the loss [8].

3.2 Absolute Contractual Warranty

In a majority decision the Supreme Court ruled that

an unqualified safe berth clause is an absolute

contractual warranty of safety which imposes strict

liability for its breach. It was not an obligation to only

exercise due diligence, which Charterers proved they

had undertaken. Charterers were liable to owners for

breach of the safe berth warranty [13].

Claims for breach of the safe berth / port provision

have therefore become easier under US law with this

judgement as it now forms the backstop that owners

can rely on when arguing that a port was safe or

unsafe, albeit they have to pass a very similar “Eastern

City” style test to get a claim home i.e. “this vessel

could proceed to discharge her cargo and depart from

the port and that in the absence of some abnormal and

unforeseen occurrence and given good navigation and

seamanship this could be done without undue risk of

physical damage to the vessel.” (The Oceanic First,

SMA 1054)

3.3 Covid-19 implications

The shipping industry is adapting to the Covid-19

crisis impacting the globe. Interestingly, an advisory

paragraph in the Supreme Court’s decision is

informative for any owner and charterer facing

concerning when entering port. The Court reminded

the parties that vessel masters have an "implicit" right

to refuse entry to a port should they find it unsafe and

that refusal requires charterers to pay the associated

costs. The refusal, though, has to be a "justifiable

refusal.' This is a high bar, but one we may very well

face in US ports with hotspot Covid-19 ratios let alone

in ports worldwide. While it is less likely an entire

port will be deemed unsafe today, given the safety

precautions being taken to keep people healthy and

cargoes flowing, conditions continue to evolve. If a

master refused to enter port due to coronavirus

conditions, he or she would have to keep a careful

evidentiary record of conditions on the ground as

guided by shoreside operations [13].

4 UK LEGAL POSITION OF SAFE PORTS- SIX

STEPS ASSESSMENT

Pursuant to UK law, just as the charterer has a clear

commercial interest in ensuring that the vessel is

delivered in accordance with its description in the

charter and at the time and place there stipulated, and

that the vessel is delivered in a seaworthy condition,

so the shipowner has a clear interest in ensuring that

the vessel is looked after by the charterer. In

particular, the owner is concerned to ensure that the

vessel is only used between safe ports and that the

termini chosen by the charterer do not expose the

vessel to physical or political danger.

In order to evaluate the UK position upon the

charterer’s duty to nominate safe ports/safe births in

comparison the the UK position, as depicted in

“Athos I”, six parameters will be initially assessed,

namely: a) the effect of express warranties in time and

voyage charters; b) can the warranty upon safe birth

be implied? c) can the warranty be excluded? d) when

must the port be safe? e) which parts of the port must

be safe? f) the effect of accepting an invalid

nomination [1].

4.1 Express warranties in time and voyage charters

Both time and voyage charters typically impose a

duty on the charterer to nominate only safe ports

and/or berths through an express clause in the charter.

The two examples below are taken from

ASBATANKVOY voyage charters under UK

legislation and are indicative of the safe birth

nomination: “The vessel shall load at one or two safe

berths each at one or two safe loading ports or places

in the River Parana, not higher than ................... and/or

one or two safe berths at each of one or two safe

loading ports or places in the River Uruguay not

higher than ...................... in Charterer’s option…”

“[The vessel shall with all convenient speed]

proceed to 1/2 safe berth(s)/safe anchorage(s)

Mississippi River not above but including Baton

Rouge, which in case of named port(s) Owners

acknowledge as safe and suitable for this vessel and

there load always afloat in such (safe) berth, (safe)

dock, (safe) wharf or (safe) anchorage as Charterers or

their Agents or Shippers may direct...”

The first issue which arises is whether the fact that

the charterparty itself names the port or ports which

can be nominated by the charterer means that the

owner has acknowledged any and all of those ports as

safe, and thus whether he is precluded from claiming

damages if the nominated port turns out to be unsafe.

For obvious reasons, this issue is more likely to arise

in a voyage or a time-trip charter [5].

In this part three options should be distinguished,

namely: (i) Express safe port warranty - where the

charter expressly imposes a safe port warranty and

consecutively the charterer is liable if the port

“chosen” among the range proves to be unsafe. Thus,

when the charter names only one loading and/or

discharging port and contains a safe port warranty,

the only named port must be safe! (Livanita, 2008). (ii)

“which Owner acknowledges as safe” - here the

charter contains a clause stating that the owner

acknowledges the safety of the port or ports described

in the charter, then the charterer is clearly not liable

for wrongful nomination if the port nominated turns

out to be unsafe. (iii) No express warranty - where the

charter is silent, then the charterer is not liable for

breach of the safe port warranty, given that the owner

has agreed to the vessel going to the ports mentioned

in the charterparty [11].

4.2 Implied warranty upon birth/port safety?

It follows from what has been said earlier – at any rate

where the charter is a voyage charter, or a time trip

charter, or even a time charter where the ports to be

used are expressly named in the charter – that the

charterer does not undertake that the nominated ports

are safe in the absence of an express term imposing

such a duty [3].

It is still, however, possible to argue that where the

charter is a time charter which does not name the

ports between which the vessel may be used and yet

does not include an express safe port warranty, such a

duty is implied in favour of the owner by the common

law, such as The Evaggelos Th [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.

200 (QB), a case which does not appear to have been

cited to the court in The APJ Priti. From an owner’s

point of view, it is always wise to provide for the duty

expressly in the charterparty.

4.3 Exclusion of warranty?

There is no rule imposing the obligation upon the

charterer. The charter can explicitly exclude liability

for breach of the duty. This is usually done in charters

favouring the charterer, more commonly through the

device of a stipulation that the owners have

acknowledged the safety of ports mentioned in the

charter.

4.4 Under which circumstances a port should be safe?

The issue here is whether the port must be safe at the

time of nomination, at the time of the arrival of the

vessel at the nominated port or at both and in

between. Until The Evia [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 307

(HL), the rule was that the charterer was under an

obligation to ensure that the port nominated was

actually safe at all those times, with the exception of

situations where the port was unsafe only through

temporary or abnormal circumstances.

Since the decision in The Evia, however, it is now

clear that the port only has to be prospectively safe,

namely at the time of nomination, the charterer is

under a primary duty to nominate a port which is

likely to be safe by the time of arrival.

If, during the voyage, the nominated port ceases to

be prospectively safe, or if it ceases to be actually safe

at the time of arrival, the charterer is under a

secondary obligation to re-nominate a safe port. If the

vessel is trapped in a port which was prospectively

safe at the time of nomination and actually safe at the

time of arrival, the charterer is under no secondary

duty to re-nominate a port [6].

4.5 Which parts of the port must be safe?

The port must be such as to allow the vessel to reach,

use and leave the port, with the exercise of competent

navigation and seamanship.

In a recent and important decision, Teare J held:

“[A] port will not be safe if the vessel will be exposed

to a danger which cannot be avoided by good

navigation and seamanship. Counsel's emphasis upon

“reasonable” safety and whether a port “is to be

criticised” for not having a particular system suggests

that the warranty of safety is not broken so long as

reasonable precautions have been taken by the port. In

my judgment counsel's submission is mistaken. A port

is not saved from being unsafe where, although the

vessel will be exposed to a danger which cannot be

avoided by good navigation and seamanship, the port

has taken precautions designed to protect vessels

against that danger but which in fact do not protect

the vessel from that danger. If, despite the taking of

such precautions, the vessel remains exposed to a

danger which cannot be avoided by good navigation

and seamanship then the port is unsafe.

The charterers' warranty is of safety, not of

reasonable safety. The enquiry in an unsafe port case

is not into the conduct of the port authority, for

example, whether it has acted reasonably or

otherwise. Rather, the enquiry in an unsafe port case

is into the prospective exposure of the vessel, when

arriving using and leaving the port, to a danger which

cannot be avoided by good navigation and

seamanship. Of course, aids to navigation, the

availability of weather forecasts, pilots and tugs, the

quality of the holding ground for anchoring, the

sufficiency of the sea-room for manoeuvring and the

soundness of the berths and of the fendering

arrangements are, as with all aspects of the port set-

up, relevant when deciding whether the vessel will be

exposed to a danger which cannot be avoided by good

navigation and seamanship. But if, having taken into

the account the set-up in the port, the vessel will be

exposed to such danger then the port will be unsafe.”

(The Ocean Victory [2014). This case was overruled in

CoA, but finally confirmed in Supreme Court, which

endorced the decision in the “CMA Djakarta”

4.6 The effect of accepting an invalid nomination

This issue is distinguished in three separate instances

[8]: a) The master is not entitled to take leave of his

senses and accept a manifestly invalid nomination. If

accepting an order was obviously absurd in the

circumstances, then the cause of the loss is not the

charterers’ nomination, but the owner’s conduct. b) If

the Master stays with the order and makes for the

port, this does not mean that he waives- he has a

reasonable time in which to make his mind up (Jute,

1971). c) If the master gives a Notice of Readiness to

load, or gives some other indication that he is

accepting the nomination of the port as contractual,

the owner cannot then be heard to say that the loss

was caused by an invalid nomination (The

Kanchenjunga, 1990).

5 REMARKS

It can be safely stated that the position under US law

has therefore hardened against charterers; but there

are important takeaways [9]:

1. Firstly, the parties are still free to contract using

language that reinstates the due diligence

obligation albeit that language must be

unambiguous and clear.

2. Secondly whilst the risk under US law is enhanced,

the position realistically only mirrors English law,

the most common jurisdiction in shipping, where

there has been a warranty of safety for many years.

3. And finally the judgement effectively balances the

position between the two jurisdictions; it’s up to an

individual Assured to determine which legal

system and jurisdiction to use.

6 CONCLUSION

The final decision in the ATHOS I saga has recently

been issued by the U.S. Supreme Court, upholding the

decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit to the effect that a plain reading of the

language found in the ASBATANKVOY charter form

creates a warranty of safety rather than merely a duty

of due diligence.

This decision brings US law into line with the long

established position under English law, namely that

clause 9 of ASBATANKVOY is an absolute warranty

of safety of the load and/or discharge port or ports

nominated by the charterer.

As similar safe port/berth clauses appear in other

industry standard charterparty forms, such as the

NYPE form, Members should be aware that the

decision is not limited to the tanker trade, and may be

of wider application. That said, it is of particular

relevance to contracts based on the ASBATANKVOY

form, which is subject to US law as a matter of default.

Whilst the ruling will be welcome news for

owners, the decision provides certainty for both

owners and charterers when using the standard

industry form. Importantly, the court made clear that

the decision did no more than provide a legal

backdrop against which future charterparties may be

negotiated, reinforcing that parties remain free to

contract as they wish.

Claims for breach of the safe berth / port provision

have therefore become easier under US law with this

judgement as it now forms the backstop that owners

can rely on when arguing that a port was safe or

unsafe, albeit they have to pass a very similar “Eastern

City” style test to get a claim home.

Freedom of contract is the basis of the Court’s

decision. In its concluding paragraph, the Court states

that “our decision today ‘does no more than to

provide a legal backdrop against which future

[charter parties] will be negotiated.’ Charterers remain

free to contract around unqualified language that

would otherwise establish a warranty of safety, by

expressly limiting the extent of their obligations or

liability.”

REFERENCES

1. Baatz, Y.: Maritime Law. Informa Law from Routledge

(2020).

2. Burtchaell, R.A.I.: Paved with Good Intentions: The

Supreme Court’s Plain Meaning Approach in CITGO

Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co. Tulane

Maritime Law Journal. 45, 443 (2020).

3. Han, N.-H., Kim, E.-J.: A Study on the Implied Terms of

Safe Berth under Voyage Charterparty. Journal of Korea

Port Economic Association. 26, 3, 92–113 (2010).

4. Hartman, P.G.: Safe Port/Berth Clauses: Warranty or

Due Diligence. Tulane Maritime Law Journal. 21, 53

(1996).

5. Hawkins, D.: Breach of Contract Warranty Safe-berth

Clause. Wisconsin Law Journal. (2020).

6. Hurley, J.N., Walker, C.M.: Charter Parties: Safe Harbor

Warranty and Cargo Liabilities. Journal of

Transportation Law, Logistics, and Policy. 80, 4, 255–268

(2013).

7. Jarvis, R.: What is the Meaning of a “Safe Berth” Clause

in a Charter Party? Preview of United States Supreme

Court Cases. 47, 13–16 (2019).

8. Maass, D.R.: The Safe-Berth Warranty and Its Critics.

Tulane Maritime Law Journal. 39, 317 (2014).

9. Paré Jr, A.M.: The Safe Port/Safe Berth Warranty and

Comparative Fault. Journal of Maritime Law and

Commerce. 45, 141 (2014).

10. Rubin, S.: Safe Port and Berth Provisions in Time

Charter Agreements: Apportioning Liability to Deter

Accidents and Minimize Costs. University of Miami

Law Review. 36, 3, 465 (1982).

11. Smith Jr, J.: Time and Voyage Charters: Safe Port/Safe

Berth. Tulane Law Review. 49, 860 (1974).

12. Weintrit, A., Neumann, T.: Miscellaneous problems in

maritime navigation, transport & shipping introduction.

Transport Systems and Processes: Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation. 1 (2011).

https://doi.org/10.1201/b11347-4.

13. Zhang, Y.: Case Note on Citgo Asphalt Refining Co. v.

Frescati Shipping Co., 140 S. Ct. 1081 (2020). Oil and

Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal. 7, 1, 43

(2021).