825

1 INTRODUCTION

Although the maritime industry continuously

develops and introduces new technologies and

systems that increase ships' safety, accidents at sea are

still happening. Marine accident is an extraordinary

unintentional sequence of events that caused adverse

outcomes that put human lives, property, and the

marine environment in direct distress. Unlike

accidents, near-miss could have caused harmful

consequences for human lives, property, and the

marine environment but did not [15, 16]. The adverse

outcome was only inhibited by a fortuitous break in

the chain of events. Injuries, marine pollution, or a

negative business impact are examples of negative

consequences of a near-miss that did not occur [10, 16,

22, 36]. A near-miss might include inadequate

training, human error, defective or unsatisfactory

design, management error, a flawed procedure or

system, an unanticipated outcome, or any

combination of the above [10].

The maritime sector is considered a high-risk

sector, and its stakeholders need to minimize accident

risks. Marine accidents are investigated and analyzed

to discover immediate and root causes and implement

corrective measures to reduce accidents. It presents an

active approach in an attempt at accident reduction

[14]. Nevertheless, lessons learned are based on

accidents that have already occurred. Another tool for

accident prevention is the implementation of an

effective near-miss management system [14]. Near-

miss reporting is the best practice in safety awareness,

and it helps to identify hazards that may be caused by

specific equipment or actions before they lead to an

actual accident. Recurrence of accidents and near-

misses that share root causes can be prevented by

reporting them and implementing adequate corrective

measures. Lessons learned from near-misses can be

Near-miss Reporting as Seen from Seafarers'

Perspective

N. Hasanspahić

, V. Frančić

, S. Vujičić

& L. Maglić

University of Dubrovnik, Dubrovnik, Croatia

University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia

ABSTRACT: The maritime industry is a high-risk sector, and there is a large number of accidents its

stakeholders need to reduce. Lessons learned from the near-miss analysis can prevent accidents and improve

safety in the maritime sector. However, to be able to accomplish this task, near-miss events have to be identified

and reported. Identification and reporting are dependent on seafarers. If they cannot identify or are unwilling to

report a near miss, there will be no analysis, and valuable knowledge will be lost forever. Seafarers' knowledge,

attitudes, and opinions on near-misses are important factors in determining the near-miss management system's

effectiveness. The authors created a survey to gain insight into these factors. A total of 223 experienced seafarers

participated in the survey. The results confirmed that near-misses are underreported and that seafarers do not

report every observed near-miss because of reporting barriers. This paper reflects seafarers' perceptions of near-

miss reporting and suggests measures to overcome reporting barriers.

http://www.transnav.eu

the International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 15

Number 4

December 2021

DOI: 10.12716/1001.15.04.15

826

used to prevent potential accidents [30]. Because near-

misses are considered accident precursors, the near-

miss analysis presents a proactive approach to

reducing accidents [13]. Near-misses could be studied

as leading indicators of a company's safety

performance [39].

Many researchers dealt with near-miss reporting of

near misses in the shipping industry. Erdogan [11]

pointed out the best near-miss reporting systems and

defined obstacles affecting a reduced number of

reports. In his research, he assumed that near-misses

in the shipping industry are not reported as they

should and tried to find the reasons for this. The

companies surveyed succeeded in increasing their

safety levels and implementing a just culture through

open communication onboard ships and learning

from analyzed near-misses. Storgard et al. [33] argue

that it is possible to prevent severe accidents by

implementing lessons learned from the analysis of

accidents and near-misses. The study aims to

highlight best practices for near-miss reporting and

better use of reported near-miss data. Preconditions

for a functioning reporting system were defined,

namely: the presence of a just culture, the

commitment of management ashore to improve

safety, adequate communication, feedback on

reporting, and training on the use of the system.

Oltedal & McArthur [26] analyzed shipboard

reporting practices and singled out factors influencing

reporting frequency. The research findings confirmed

that higher reporting frequency was positively related

to increased safety-related training, trusting

relationships between crew members, safety-oriented

shore management, and feedback on reported near-

misses, and negatively related to lack of shore

management safety attention and the demand for

efficiency. Georgoulis and Nikitakos [12] interviewed

35 seafarers and four representatives of shipping

companies' safety departments to uncover best

practices in reporting near-misses. In addition, they

aimed to investigate the seafarers' perspective on

reporting near-misses. Some of the conclusions were

that seafarers perceive reporting as an obligation to

the legal framework and consider a just culture as a

promoter of near-miss reporting instead of the blame

culture. Bhattacharya in [5] analyzed the effectiveness

of increased reporting of hazards, near-misses, and

incidents onboard ships. He tried to investigate

whether the increased number of hazardous

occurrences reports results in a decrease of

incidents/accidents at sea. Research results showed

that an increased number of reports did not decrease

near-misses or incidents/accidents. He concluded that

the increase of reports to satisfy company

requirements reduces the value of reporting process.

Previous research shows that specific elements

either enhance reporting or hamper it and act as an

obstacle. Another serious problem is that near-misses

are underreported, resulting in the loss of valuable

data. Although most companies have written near-

miss management procedures, it has also been shown

that they did not help to improve reporting practices

onboard ships [28, 29, 36]. Seafarers have not adopted

near-miss reporting well despite IMO

recommendations and company policies requiring

reporting. Indicators of the inadequate near-miss

management system are [32]:

− Seafarers take reporting as a standard checklist,

− There are many insignificant reports,

− Seafarers feel that safety cannot be improved by

reporting,

− Fear of punishment for reporting,

− Seafarers see reporting as unnecessary extra work.

Another practical problem is the unwillingness of

lower-ranking crewmembers to report [32, 33]. It is a

serious problem because they carry out most of the

physical job onboard during which near-misses occur

[16]. Some seafarers stated that they do not have time

to report and that the ship's officers should do it. In

their opinion, too many "minor" near-misses happen

every day during everyday tasks, and it would take

too long to report them all. Some lower-ranking

seafarers believe that reporting is not part of the

maritime culture, and therefore do not do it. Some of

the reasons why lower-ranking crew members usually

do not report are ignorance of the near-miss concept,

fear of blame and punishment, cultural differences,

and the complexity of the near-miss report form [14,

20].

Reporting near misses, analyzing them, and

implementing appropriate corrective actions will

prevent severe accidents and other adverse events in

the future [8, 18, 35]. ISM Code (Section 9) requires

reporting accidents and near- misses to determine the

root causes [16]. However, there is inconsistent

approach and analysis and inadequate reporting and

investigation of near-misses in the maritime industry.

It is up to ships' masters and shore-based management

to improve the reporting of every actual near-miss

because, as can be seen from the available literature

[14, 28, 29, 36], seafarers do not report all the near-

misses they observe. It is necessary to find appropriate

solutions and implement them in the Safety

Management System (SMS). Reporting is of utmost

importance to analyze and learn lessons from near

misses.

Since reporting near-misses is a proactive

approach to reduce accidents and is much cheaper

than reporting accidents because no harm has been

done, it can be considered a cost-effective and

appropriate tool to improve safety at sea [14]. For the

adequate implementation of near-miss reporting in

the maritime industry, it is crucial to gain insight into

seafarers' opinions and attitudes on near-miss

reporting as they are the ones who report, and based

on this, corrective measures are derived and new

knowledge is gained. The purpose of this paper is to

analyze seafarers' knowledge, opinions, and attitudes

on near-miss reporting, identify the most common

barriers to reporting, and propose measures and

solutions that could improve near-miss reporting

systems in the maritime industry. The research

instrument was a survey.

2 METHODOLOGY

The authors prepared a survey based on their expert

opinions and literature review. The analysis of the

data obtained was to reveal the seafarers' views on

near-miss reporting in the maritime industry. The

authors served as senior officers on several types of

827

ships and dealt with near-miss reporting system

during their service. A tool used to validate the

survey questions was the expertise of the authors. All

questions were worded as neutrally as possible to

avoid stereotype bias. A pilot survey was conducted

prior to administering the final survey to avoid

response bias. The authors contacted several crewing

agencies and requested them to share a link to the

online survey to their employees to redistribute to

other seafarers. The survey was available online, and

the authors used a virtual snowball method. Seafarers

were free to choose whether or not to participate in

the survey. The survey was anonymous and

confidential to avoid biased participation.

The survey included 45 questions to gain insight

into seafarers' opinions and attitudes on near-miss

reporting, shipboard reporting practices, and opinions

on the suitability of applied near-miss management

systems. A total of 28 questions (7 demographic

questions and 21 questions from the second part) out

of the 45 are used in this study because they are

closely related to the study's topic. The survey

questions were predominantly closed-ended:

demographic questions, simple yes/no/I do not know

questions, and ranking questions (measured on a five-

point Likert scale). Open-ended questions were used

when asked to define near-miss and for comments on

the survey.

A total of 223 seafarers responded to the survey.

There were 15 nationalities represented, the majority

being from Croatia (73.4%), followed by Indonesia

(12.1%) and the Philippines (4.3%). There were 69.5%

of seafarers under 42 years of age. A total of 57% of

the respondents reported being educated at a

maritime college, and 78.4% of them served at sea for

more than five years. Senior ranking officers made

just over 50% of the respondents. Respondents served

in different shipping sectors, including tankers, cruise

ships, bulk carriers, and container ships.

The survey is part of a doctoral research project

looking at improving the safety culture in shipping by

implementing a near-miss management system.

3 SURVEY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The authors grouped the survey questions to facilitate

understanding and presentation of the results.

Knowing the definition of a near-miss is a prerequisite

for identifying it. If there is no identification, there is

no reporting, and without it, there is no analysis and

lessons learned. The survey question "What is a near-

miss?" (Q1) was the only one that stood on its own. A

total of 22% of responses were acceptable (definition

described or recounted). From the further analysis of

the question data, conclusions that lower-ranked

seafarers were unaware of the definition of near-miss

could be made. Instead of defining a near-miss, they

gave an example from practice closely related to their

work aboard a ship. These seafarers would most likely

not be competent to recognize the near-miss event if it

had happened in another ship's department.

In addition to knowing the definition of near-miss

definition, seafarers should also know about their

ship's near-miss management system. Knowledge of

near misses includes questions about the "why,"

"how," "when," and "outcome" of reporting, as well as

how to conduct training on near-misses. A group of

questions on knowledge about management of near-

misses on respondents' ships is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. The knowledge about the near-miss management

_______________________________________________

Question No.

_______________________________________________

Q2 Are you familiar with Near-miss Management System

in your Company?

Q3 Have you received any Near-miss Management

training?

Q4 Do you think that Near-miss management training

should be mandatory?

_______________________________________________

Descriptive statistics on knowledge of near-miss

management onboard participants' ships is presented

in Table 2.

Table 2. The knowledge about the near-miss management –

descriptive statistics

_______________________________________________

Question No. Yes (%) No (%) I do not know (%)

_______________________________________________

Q2 94.6 2.7 2.7

Q3 60.8 37.4 1.8

Q4 62.6 28.8 8.6

_______________________________________________

As shown in Table 2, many respondents believe

that they are aware of the systems in place to manage

near-misses on their ships (Q2), and more than half of

them have received training on near-miss

management and believe that such training should be

mandatory (Q3 and Q4). One respondent made the

following comment: "Reporting and analyzing near-

misses onboard is essential to improve safety culture

onboard but for reducing the number of incidents

more critical is proper education and shore-based

training as well as common sense."

Seafarers' attitudes towards reporting are a key

indicator of whether reporting is working properly

onboard a ship. A group of questions on attitudes

towards near-miss reporting is shown in Table 3, and

descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.

Table 3. Near-miss reporting attitude

_______________________________________________

Question No.

_______________________________________________

Q5 Do you think that near-misses should be reported?

Q6 Have you ever reported a near-miss?

Q7 Do you regularly report near-misses?

Q8 Do you report every near-miss that you see?

Q9 Do you think that near-miss reporting is just

additional paperwork and that it should be avoided

to report near-misses?

_______________________________________________

Table 4. Near-miss reporting attitude – descriptive statistics

_______________________________________________

Question Yes No I do 4 5 Mean Std

No. or 1 or 2 not (%) (%)

(%) (%) know

or 3 (%)

_______________________________________________

Q5 95.5 3.6 0.9

Q6 82.9 17.1

Q7 61.7 36.5 1.8

Q8 38.5 59.7 1.8

Q9 42.8 28.4 20.7 4.5 3.6 1.98 1.07

_______________________________________________

Q5 through Q8: yes, no, I do not know. Q9: 1=strongly

disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither disagree nor agree, 4=agree,

and 5=strongly agree.

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A large number of participants (95.5%) believe that

near-misses should be reported, but only 38.5% of

them report every observed near-miss, which

corroborates the results of the literature reviewed and

implies that a large number of near-misses are not

reported. It could be concluded is that seafarers have

realized the importance of reporting near-misses but

do not report every near-miss they observe due to

various reporting barriers. One seafarer commented

as follows: "I think that significant near-misses and

accidents must be reported to the company. Minor

near-misses should be discussed only onboard the

vessel, not send to the company. Because they do not

report their near misses to us, neither should we to

them".

Knowing the definition of near-miss is a key factor

in the reporting culture aboard a ship. If a

crewmember is not familiar with the definition, he

will not know what a near-miss is, so he will not

report it or possibly report something that was not a

near-miss. For the system to be effective, all

crewmembers must be familiar with the definition of

near-miss and other reporting concepts. The survey

results confirmed that only a minority of the seafarers

surveyed could define near-miss, but most believe

they are well versed in the near-miss management

system. One solution is to include the definition and

management of near-misses in the maritime students'

education and the shore- and ship-based training of

existing seafarers. Good knowledge of the subject

would significantly increase reporting behaviour and

awareness of the importance of near-misses onboard

ships.

A report form is a means of reporting near-misses.

It can be in paper or electronic form. According to

some research [25], it is not only easier for seafarers to

report by computer, but it is also easier to check

feedback on the report [7]. However, some seafarers

have difficulty using computers, so it is easier for

them to prepare and check reports and feedback in

paper form [11]. The report form must contain all the

essential data about the near-miss event as its content

is crucial for root cause analysis. In preparing a report

form, the company must make the following efforts

[38]:

− The forms should be easy to read and understand,

− The company should provide multilingual forms if

required,

− The report forms should be short and

straightforward,

− The forms should be easily accessible to

crewmembers,

− They should be designed to help solve the

problem.

The shorter and more precise the report form

questions, the more likely seafarers will report the

near-miss. Therefore, it is critical to tailor the

reporting form to the seafarer. The near-miss report

form can be complicated or straightforward. If the

form is complicated, it is expected that many

crewmembers will not report near-misses or will

report fewer observed near-misses [1, 9, 12, 37, 38].

When designing the form, attention must be paid to

the content to increase the willingness to report. Table

5 provides a group of questions on near-miss report

forms, and Table 6 provides descriptive statistics

Many respondents (92.3%) have a near-miss report

form on their ship, and 63.4% have it in electronic

form. Most of the seafarers interviewed believed that

the reporting form was relatively simple and reported

no problems completing it.

Table 5. Near-miss report form

_______________________________________________

Question No.

_______________________________________________

Q10 Do you have a near-miss report form on your vessel?

Q11 If you have a near-miss report form on your vessel, is

it a paper form or electronic form?

Q12 If you have a near-miss report form on your vessel,

please rate the difficulty of filling it

_______________________________________________

Table 6. Near-miss report form – descriptive statistics

_______________________________________________

Question Yes or No or I do 4 5 Mean Std

No. paper electronic not (%) (%)

form form know

or 1(%) or 2(%) or 3(%)

_______________________________________________

Q10 92.3 5 2.7

Q11 36.6 63.4

Q12 22.2 35.4 29.2 12.3 0.9 2.35 0.99

_______________________________________________

Q10: yes, no, I do not know; Q11: paper form, electronic

form; Q12: 1=very simple; 2=simple; 3=nor simple nor

difficult; 4=difficult; 5=very difficult

The existence of a blame culture onboard a ship is

one of the factors preventing reporting. Seafarers

should not be ashamed to report, nor should they fear

being blamed and punished for doing so. The absence

of a blame culture is reflected in the fact that the

individual is seen as a means to improve safety rather

than someone who can be held responsible for a

mistake [3]. According to the available literature,

seafarers who feel ashamed, fear blame and

punishment, are not inclined to report near-misses [2,

19, 27, 37]. The seafarers who are not reporting a near-

miss because of feeling shame believe that their

colleagues onboard a ship will later make fun of them

for not being able to perform the task and being

incompetent [11]. In a survey conducted by Erdogan

[11], some senior officers said blame culture does not

exist in the company, but it still exists on some ships.

Crewmembers may feel ashamed if they make a

mistake at work [21, 33, 36]. According to [21],

seafarers are reluctant to report near-misses involving

their colleagues because they think it may be a

problem. However, reporting near-misses involving

another ship and its crew is not considered a problem.

Fear of blame and criticism is an obstacle that the

shipboard leadership must overcome to increase the

number of near-misses reported [4, 9, 16, 21, 24, 31,

37]. A blame culture may be present onboard a ship

and prevent reporting or may not be present and not

create barriers to reporting. Table 7 shows seafarers'

opinions on blame culture onboard their ships, and

Table 8 provides descriptive statistics.

Table 7. Existence of blame culture

_______________________________________________

Question No

_______________________________________________

Q13 Do you feel free to report a near-miss on your

company?

Q14 Do you feel embarrassed once reporting a near-miss

on your vessel?

Q15 Do you think that you might get someone into trouble

if you report a near-miss?

Q16 Do you feel guilt once reporting a near-miss on your

vessel?

Q17 Do you think that you will be blamed if you report a

near-miss?

_______________________________________________

829

Table 8. Existence of blame culture – descriptive statistics

_______________________________________________

Question Yes No I do 4 5 Mean Std

No. or 1 or 2 not (%) (%)

(%) (%) know

or 3 (%)

_______________________________________________

Q13 88.7 7.2 4.1

Q14 51.6 26.7 10.9 5.9 5 1.86 1.14

Q15 38.9 28.5 20.4 9 3.2 2.09 1.11

Q16 57.2 26.1 12.6 2.7 1.4 1.65 0.9

Q17 49.5 27 14.9 5.9 2.7 1.85 1.05

_______________________________________________

Q13: yes, no, I do not know; Q14 through Q17: 1=strongly

disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither disagree nor agree, 4=agree,

and 5=strongly agree.

It can be concluded that a blame culture presents a

reporting barrier to the minority of surveyed

seafarers. It seems that just culture is successfully

implemented and instilled in the maritime sector. One

comment on a survey was: "Any near-miss reporting

should not be the tool for the company to use as a

blame culture and finger-pointing but as a learning

tool. "Another crewmember's comment was: "Scared

from Company response after reporting near miss. "

The presence of a blame culture on ships is a

barrier that prevents reporting and degrades a

maritime safety culture. Crew members could blame

each other when they report a near-miss, making the

reporters feel uncomfortable and disrupting

teamwork onboard a ship. The absence of a blame

culture increases reporting. Some companies have

made it clear in their safety management or near-miss

management policies that seafarers will not be blamed

for reported near-misses unless they have been

committed by negligence, gross negligence, or willful

misconduct. Seafarers who do not have a

straightforward reading of the policies and do not

have in writing how they will be treated after

reporting near-miss are in fear of punishment, and

thus the likelihood of reporting is reduced. Therefore,

it is suggested that companies make clear in their

safety (or near-miss) management systems that blame

culture does not apply to the company, and that crew

members will not be blamed for reported near-misses

if they were not due to negligence, gross negligence,

or intentional misconduct. It is further suggested that,

when familiarizing with near-miss management, this

should be clearly explained to all crew members to

provide a ship environment in which the seafarer can

report the near-miss without fear (just culture and

reporting culture).

The leadership style onboard a ship influences

crewmembers' behaviour. If the master has a negative

attitude towards near-miss reporting, the crew will

likely not report them [23]. The master should be a

role model to crew members in everything, including

near-miss reporting [17, 34]. A high level of safety

onboard a ship cannot be achieved without teamwork,

and in order to achieve this, the traditional

hierarchical order onboard must be replaced by

leadership that will introduce a safety culture. The

master should strike a balance between his authority

and the initiative of the crew members. The master

must avoid a blame culture and encourage reporting

on accidents, near-misses, and non-conformities from

the crew, without fear of punishment for reporting [6].

Leadership style can be an impetus or obstacle to

developing a safety culture and, thus, near-miss

reporting [2, 26]. Safety leadership is an essential

instigator to near-miss reporting. Table 9 shows

seafarers' opinions on safety leadership onboard their

ships.

Table 9. Safety leadership

_______________________________________________

Question No

_______________________________________________

Q18 Do you discuss near-misses onboard your vessel (for

example, during safety meetings)?

Q19 Do you receive follow-up reports from Company or

Master regarding near-misses on your vessel?

_______________________________________________

Safety leadership descriptive statistics are

presented in Table 10.

Table 10. Safety leadership – descriptive statistics

_______________________________________________

Question No Yes (%) No (%) I do not know (%)

_______________________________________________

Q18 96.4 2.7 0.9

Q19 89.2 3.6 3.6

_______________________________________________

According to the survey data, senior officers share

all information on near-misses with crewmembers to

no small degree and thus encourage reporting on their

ships. Companies' safety departments should closely

monitor each ship's performance and guide master,

and senior officers were needed.

From the authors' experience, some shipping

companies award "best "near-misses reported during

the month. The number of reports is undoubtedly

more extensive than on ships where the award is not

given, but the problem of the made-up report arises.

Because of those reports, false conclusions can be

made, and wrong and inadequate corrective measures

implemented. To examine seafarers' opinions on the

incentive for near-miss reporting, we prepared two

questions presented in Table 11. Table 12 presents

descriptive statistics on incentives for reporting.

Table 11. An incentive for near-miss reporting

_______________________________________________

Question No.

_______________________________________________

Q20 Do you get awarded for reported near-miss on your

company?

Q21 Do you think that near-miss reporting should be

awarded?

_______________________________________________

Table 12. An incentive for near-miss reporting – descriptive

statistics

_______________________________________________

Question No Yes (%) No (%) I do not know (%)

_______________________________________________

Q20 16.2 76.6 7.2

Q21 31.1 64 5

_______________________________________________

As shown in Table 12, many respondents are not

rewarded for near-miss reporting, but almost one-

third of respondents consider reporting awards as a

fair reimbursement for their effort.

Unfortunately, false reports are unavoidable

because some companies have prescribed a fixed

number of near-miss reports they want to receive

monthly. Following was a comment of one seafarer:

"The biggest problem with near-miss matter is the

fixed number (minimum number) of cases to be

reported per vessel per month. I would say that 80%

of reported near-misses are made up to fulfil the

minimum required number of reports. Out of the 20%

left, at least a half are repeated near-misses ". Another

respondent gave the following comment: "The

830

reporting of near misses should be more

straightforward, and you cannot define a minimum

number of near misses to be reported every month on

each ship, just based on the average number. There

can be fewer near-misses than required. This way you

have to make up stories which can lead to corrective

actions for events that did not occur ". As

Bhattacharya concluded in his study [5], safety cannot

be improved with just an increasing number of near-

miss reports; without implementing adequate

corrective measures based on lessons learned, safety

will remain at the same level.

4 CONCLUSION

Research gave insight into seafarers' attitudes and

opinions on near-miss reporting in the shipping

sector. Survey results confirmed that near-misses in

shipping are not reported as they should be due to the

barriers. Seafarers' perspective on near-miss reporting

is an essential factor for successful safety

improvements onboard ships. Maritime sector

stakeholders should react and work on minimizing

the effects of reporting barriers and overcoming them

to improve shipboard safety. Seafarers' answers can be

used as guidance for proposed measures and actions

which could eventually improve near-miss

management systems in shipping.

Authors believe that identified barriers can be

overcome by introducing the near-miss topics in

education for seafarers as well as shore- and ship-

based near-miss training for existing seafarers.

Another aspect for successful and effective near-miss

reporting is adequate safety leadership that will instil

just culture and reporting culture. Maritime sector

stakeholders should ensure that senior shipboard

officers are well trained and acquainted with the

subject to increase maritime safety. According to

survey data, near-miss report forms are simple and

easy to fill out, so they should be in the future. A

possible solution could be the standardization of

report forms, which could facilitate near-miss

reporting and enable easier data handling. Another

possible reporting problem could be reporting

incentives. Giving near-miss reporting incentives

could also be one of the barriers and the wrong

approach. Many seafarers report imaginary events,

thus leading analysis and conclusions to the wrong

side because of the rewards. As per the authors'

opinion, the fixed monthly number of near-miss

reports could be considered the wrong requirement.

To comply with the company's instructions, senior

officers usually demand their subordinates to report

near-miss events. If such events did not occur, they

would be imagined and reported as real to comply

with the demand. Such an approach should be tried to

be avoided for obvious reasons.

Near-miss reporting is only part of the near-miss

management system, and a first step towards

improving safety and further research will seek to

determine the overall management model. Future

research will try to identify all near-miss reporting

barriers and build a reporting model applicable in the

maritime sector.

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