International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 2

Number 3

September 2008

303

Safety and Security Aspects for the Effective

Shipment of Radioactive Materials with

Maritime Transportation

Z. Er

Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey

ABSTRACT: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that 10 million shipments of radio-

active materials are transported annually. Each shipment is made up of either a single package or a number of

packages transported from one location to another. The vast majority of these shipments, some 95%, relate to

non-fuel cycle transports such as the transport of smoke detectors, and cobalt sources for medical purposes.

Only 5% relate to nuclear fuel cycle transports. This study investigates the safety stability aspect, harmonized

regulation based transportation, sustaining shipment aspect for the transportation of radioactive materials by

ships. Consequently the originality of this paper appears the alignment of existing maritime rules and

regulations with the IAEA regulations in order to provide easy understanding and usage for the establishment

of code of safe and secure practices for seafarers with the countermeasures and harmonized regulations that

are practically implemented by the navigation officers and Master.

1 INTRODUCTION

Each day thousands of shipments of radioactive

material are transported on international and national

routes. These consignments, which are carried by

road, rail, sea, air and inland waterway, can range

from smoke detectors, and cobalt sources for

medical uses, to reprocessed fuel for use in

electricity generation. The IAEA regulations for the

Safe Transport of Radioactive Material were first

published in 1961 and have been revised regularly

to keep pace with scientific and technological

developments. Today, more than 60 member States

and the UN Model Regulations for the Transport of

Dangerous Goods along with modal agencies such as

the International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization

(IMO) have adopted safety requirements and

standards based on the IAEA Regulations. As a

result, the IAEA Regulations apply to the transport

of radioactive materials almost anywhere in the

world.

In addition, shipments comply with the safety

requirements of the shipping states’ governments.

Packages used for the transport of nuclear materials

are designed to retain their integrity during the

various conditions that may be encountered while

they are being transported and to ensure that an

accident will not have any major consequences.

Regulatory performance tests include fire, impact,

immersion, pressure, heat and cold. Maritime

transportation is integral to the whole process of

matching product to markets. The transport of

dangerous goods, such as Class 7 – radioactive

materials – must be conducted in a manner to assure

safety to life and the environment (IMDG Code,

2005). It must also be done cost-effectively taking

into account the ISPS Code which is not technically

focused on the transportation of dangerous goods in

general sense.

304

The transport of radioactive materials is

intentionally regulated to protect human, property

and the environment. Shipments of radioactive

materials must comply with relevant physical

protection requirements developed by the IAEA, as

well as the safety requirements of the Modal

Organizations such as the IMO and ICAO.

1.1 Transport security

After the Second World War the increased pace of

industrialization around the world led to growth in

the transport of goods classified as dangerous,

including petroleum products, gases, explosives,

petrochemicals, acids and radioactive material.

Because of the safety related issues linked to the

intensifying international and multimodal movement

of dangerous goods, in the early 1950s the Transport

and Communications Commission of the United

Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

acknowledged a need for a uniform system of

transport regulation. It was recognized that a

consistent approach to regulating dangerous goods

transport provided the best way of ensuring

consideration of all hazards (WNTI Review Series

No. 1, 2006).

After the attacks of September 11th, 2001,

concerns intensified over the vulnerability of U.S.

ports to acts of terrorism. One particular concern

involves the possibility that terrorists would attempt

to smuggle illegal fissile material or a tactical

nuclear weapon into the country through a cargo

container shipped from overseas. This testimony

discusses the programs already in place to counter

such attempts, new initiatives now under way to

enhance the nation’s security against such attempts,

and the key challenges faced in implementing these

various efforts.

Maintaining secure as well as safe transport

remained a priority at the IAEA in 2005. Work

continued on developing guidelines on transport

security. These guidelines were the subject of a

Technical Meeting in 2006.These guidelines also

request the IAEA Secretariat to report on the

planning and work of the International Expert Group

on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) (ICCP, 2004).

The safe and efficient transport of radioactive

materials is vital to many aspects of modern life,

from the generation of electricity, to medicine and

health, scientific research, and agriculture. All these

industries are becoming increasingly global in terms

both of products and services. Maintaining safe and

secure national and international transport by all

modes is essential to support them. Radioactive

material is only one of a total of nine classes of

dangerous goods that are routinely transported

worldwide (Dixon, 2001).

The IAEA General Conference, in 1998,

recognized that “compliance with regulations which

take account of the Agency’s Transport Regulations

is providing a high level of safety during the

transport of radioactive materials. in accordance with

Resolution GC(42)/RES/13 (Croxford, 2005).

Transport of nuclear fuel cycle materials is

conducted within a rapidly changing environment.

Transporters of radioactive materials have an

outstanding safety record. Indeed, the transport of

radioactive materials could be regarded as a model

for the transport of other classes of dangerous goods.

The industry has a long track record over several

decades. It is noteworthy that where there have been

transport incidents involving radioactive materials,

and these have been few relative to the number of

such transports, they have been without major

radiological consequence for health and the

environment. The incidents there have been, have

largely been transport events involving radioactive

materials, not radiological events involving

transport. There is good evidence that packages

conforming to the International Atomic Energy

Agency standards offer sufficient protection under

accident conditions. That is not the conclusion only

of those in the industry; that is the conclusion of

the international community of nations, members

of the IAEA.

There are two principal reasons for this

outstanding safety record. It is due primarily to well-

founded regulations developed by such key

intergovernmental organizations as the International

Atomic Energy Agency with the essential

contributions of the Member States who participate

actively in the regulation implementation and

revision processes, and their reflection in the

international transport safety regime of modal,

regional and national regulations. It is due also to the

professionalism of those in the industry. There shall

be a necessary synergy between the two, between the

regulators whose task it is to make and to enforce the

rules for safe, reliable and efficient transport, and

those whose job it is to transport within the rules.

Both, the regulator and the transporter, can be more

effective in achieving their purposes when they co-

operate in the interest of mutual understanding.

1.2 The Recommended safe and secure transport

of radioactive materials

Nuclear power industry is generating electricity in 31

countries, supplying over 16% of the world’s

demand. To sustain this important source of energy,

it is essential that nuclear fuel cycle materials

305

continue to be transported safely and efficiently

(Dixon, 2001). When the transportation of nuclear

materials is examined they can be mainly

categorized with the following manner:

Front end materials- Uranium ore concentrate:

Uranium ore is widely distributed. The main sources

are in North America, Australia, South Africa and

Eastern Europe.

Uranium hexafluoride: Hex produced from the

conversion of UOC is a very important intermediate

in the manufacture of new reactor fuel. In storage

and during transport the Hex material inside the

cylinders is in a solid form. Hex is also stored in

these cylinders prior to being transported to an

enrichment plant. Hex is routinely transported by

road, rail or sea, or more commonly, by a

combination of transportation modes. Hex cylinders

are transported using trailers, rail wagons or standard

ISO flat rack containers.

Enriched uranium hexafluoride: Only 0.7% of

natural uranium is ‘fissile’, or capable of undergoing

fission, the process by which energy is produced in a

nuclear reactor. This is enriched to the level required

for most common types of nuclear reactors.

Commercial enrichment plants are in operation in

the USA, Western Europe and Russia and this gives

rise to extensive international transport operations

involving Hex between conversion and enrichment

plants. Smaller universal cylinders are used to

transport enriched Hex. These cylinders are some

76 cm (30”) in diameter and are loaded in overpacks

to guard against a criticality excursion i.e. an

unwanted fission reaction. The loaded overpacks are

generally transported using ISO flat rack containers

for transport to fuel fabrication plants.

Fabricated uranium fuel: Reactor fuel is generally

in the form of ceramic pellets. The pellets are

encased in metal tubes to form rods which are then

arranged into a fuel assembly ready for introduction

into a reactor. The fuel assemblies are transported in

specially designed packages and the configuration of

packages during transport guarantees that criticality

excursions could not occur.

Back end materials, Spent fuel, MOX fuel, and

vitrified high-level waste: Fuel is discharged

periodically from nuclear reactors, typically after

about three to five years as it becomes less efficient.

This highly radioactive ‘spent’ fuel can either be sent

to a reprocessing plant or stored pending final

disposal.

Non-fuel cycle radioactive materials: Radioactive

materials are also widely used in gamma processing

which provides 40% of the world’s sterile medical

disposables and devices (from swabs and syringes to

hip joints and heart valves) as well as sterile

ingredients for pharmaceuticals. Large sources are

also used for sterilisation purposes in the food

industry and in many industrial applications, for

example in the radiography of highduty metal

fabrications. These gamma sources are manufactured

in very few countries and sea transport is therefore

vital to distribute them from the manufacturers to

several hundred users worldwide. Radioactive

materials are also used in medicine for diagnostic

purposes and therapy, and in the manufacture of

radiopharmaceuticals (Dixon, 2001).

IAEA has been the body responsible for

developing requirements governing radioactive

material transport for more than 40 years.

Radioactive material is considered as one of the nine

classes of dangerous goods, which are transported all

over the world on a regular basis. The transport of

the so-called Class 7 radioactive material, like that

of the other eight classes of dangerous goods, is

regulated by the international community through

the organizations established by the UN in the

second half of the 20th century. The dangerous

goods transport safety regime is established under

the United Nations umbrella. In compliance with the

ECOSOC request, IAEA works in close co-operation

with the UN Committee of Experts, as well as with

specialized UN agencies such as the International

Maritime Organization (IMO), the International

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the UN

Economic Commission for Europe, responsible for

the various sets of modal transport requirements

(WNTI Review Series No.1, 2006).

2 IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTERPARTS

INVOLVED IN TRANSPORTATION

The World Nuclear Transport Institute has

consultative status with the International Maritime

Organization (IMO) and with the United Nations

Committee of Experts on the Transport of

Dangerous Goods. World Nuclear Transport

Institute has observer status with the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA Director

General, Dr. ElBaradei invited WNTI to attend

meetings of the Transport Safety Standards

Committee (TRANSSC), the premier IAEA body

charged with considering implementation and

revision of the IAEA Transport Safety Regulations.

Through the WNTI participation in this committee

and the related cycle of IAEA meetings industry

collectively now has the opportunity to register its

views on implementation of the IAEA transport

safety regulations, which forms a basis for

international, regional and domestic regulation, to

identify any problems arising from existing

regulations, and to propose changes to them (WPP-

306

01, 2001). There is a great deal attendant on

transport, particularly and properly for the transport

of dangerous goods. There are national, regional and

international standards and regulations to govern

transport safety, efficiency and reliability (WPP-04,

2004).

3 MARITIME TRANSPORTATION CONCERN

3.1 Port security concern on nuclear materials

The current security environment of course has an

impact on the manner in which nuclear materials are

moved within, and between, countries. Seaports, rail

yards, airports – all have adopted increased security

to guard against unauthorized access to radioactive

materials. For example, ocean ports have

significantly reduced the amount of time that

radioactive material may be held at terminals prior to

loading or after unloading and yet, the latter often is

a function of waiting for customs clearance before

freight can be removed from the port premises.

Material in transit now frequently has to be moved to

specially guarded, secure facilities, where the total

length of time between unloading and reloading is

also limited. Rising security concerns also have an

impact on the risk assessments carried out by

insurance companies providing coverage for both

vessels and cargo. Owners of the materials are

concerned about the ‘perceptions of risk’ attached to

the movements of their materials, because it affects

not only premiums, but the potential for delays as a

result of increasing restrictions imposed by ports,

recognized organizations in accordance with the

ISPS Code or inland transport authorities. Security

related communication between all parties involved

in shipment of radioactive materials is essential to

ensure that current warnings are received in a timely

manner for assessment, and incorporation into

transport plans, and to ensure a prompt response

from qualified entities in the event of an incident

(Green, 2006).

3.2 Shipping aspect and carriage of nuclear

materials

There are 63 non-governmental organizations,

including the World Nuclear Transport Institute

(WNTI), which have consultative status with IMO,

while 36 intergovernmental organizations have

concluded Co-operation Agreements with IMO. In

relation to dangerous goods, the IMO committees

with responsibility for technical decisions are the

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and the Marine

Environment Protection Committee (MEPC).

Amongst the sub-committees, the Sub-Committee

on Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers

(DSC), which reports to MSC, is the most active in

this field. When IMO adopts instruments, it strives

for consensus in order to have them implemented

by as many States as possible. IMO adopts both

conventions and codes. Member governments are

responsible for implementing a convention by

agreeing to make it part of national law, whereas

codes have the status of recommendations (WNTI

Review Series No.1, 2006).

Radiation sources used in the oil and gas industry

are frequently transported between service company

bases and points of use; they are sometimes

transferred or redirected to new locations and may be

moved, removed for temporary storage or reallocated

within a field or between sites. They are vulnerable

to loss or theft or simply to being misplaced. Service

companies and operators must keep detailed and

accurate records to account for the whereabouts of

sources at all times so as to prevent accidental

occupational exposure or unauthorized disposal. For

sources used on offshore platforms and rigs, the

keeping of an up-to-date record at an appropriate

onshore location would aid recovery of the sources

in the event of a serious incident. The likelihood of

loss or damage is greater for portable or mobile

sources (particularly small items such as smoke

detectors and beta lights). Every effort must be made

to locate radiation sources that are not accounted for

and the regulatory body must be notified promptly of

any loss. Sources that are lost or ‘orphaned’ present

a radiological risk to the public and constitute a

potentially serious hazard to any individual member

of the public who attempts to remove a source from

safe containment. They may become a significant

economic burden and risk to the wider public if, for

example, they are recycled with scrap metal.

Unnecessary risks that may result in the loss of a

source ought to be avoided; for example, it is

desirable that source containers are not lifted over

the sea. When sources must be manipulated and

where there is a risk of loss, suitable precautions

need to be taken (IAEA-TCS-0103, 2002). A plate

covering the annulus around a well logging tool, or a

chain connecting the source to the handling rod

while it is being inserted into the tool, is sufficient to

prevent a disconnected source from falling into a

well. A tarpaulin may be used to cover deck grating

during an emergency procedure to recover a

disconnected source from the projection tube of a

radiographic exposure container (IAEA Safety

Report Series No.34, 2003). .

3.3 Packaging of nuclear materials

The containers in which radiation sources are

transported, moved and stored are generally designed

to provide adequate shielding and radiation safety

307

under most climatic conditions. They demand a

degree of maintenance that may need to be increased

in more arduous working environments, for

example, in salty or sandy environments where

corrosion and increased wear may be of concern.

Installed gauges often remain in position for long

periods of time and it is important that they are kept

clean so that identification markings, labels or other

safety markings. Otherwise, in the longer term, the

obvious profile, discernible relevant markings and

even the source’s identity may be lost. The care and

maintenance of ancillary equipment for controlling

the radiation source (tubes and cables used for

radiography and handling rods used for well logging)

are similarly very important (IAEA Safety Report

Series No.34, 2003). The 1985 Edition of the IAEA

Regulations provided for four types of packages,

depending on the activity and physical form of their

radioactive content, these are expressed as follows:

excepted; industrial; Type A; and Type B (WNTI

Review Series No.1, 2006).

3.4 Development of Regulations for the Sea

Transport of Dangerous Goods

The need for international regulations governing the

carriage of dangerous goods by sea was recognized

by the 1929 International Conference on the Safety

of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which recommended that

rules on the subject should have international effect.

The Safety of Life At Sea Conference of 1948

adopted a classification system for dangerous goods

and certain general provisions concerning their

carriage in ships in Chapter VI of the SOLAS

Convention. It also recommended further study with

the object of drafting international regulations.

Meanwhile, in 1956 the UN Committee of Experts

published its first Recommendations, which offered

a general framework to which existing modal

dangerous goods transport regulations could be

adapted and within which they could develop. The

ultimate aim of the UN Orange Book was to bring

uniformity to maritime and other modal transport

rules on a worldwide basis.

As a further step towards meeting the need for

international rules governing the carriage of

dangerous goods in ships, the International

Conference on Safety of Life at Sea in 1960 laid

down a general framework of provisions in Chapter

VII of the SOLAS Convention. The Conference also

invited IMO to undertake a study with a view to

establishing a unified international code for the

carriage of dangerous goods by sea in co-operation

with the UN Committee of Experts, taking account

of existing maritime practices and procedures. The

Conference further recommended that the unified

code prepared by IMO should be adopted by the

governments party to the SOLAS Convention.

Following completion of the necessary development

work, the International Maritime Dangerous Goods

(IMDG) Code was adopted by the fourth IMO

General Assembly in November 1965. Like the other

modal dangerous goods requirements, the IMDG

Code covers nine classes of dangerous goods. Class

7 radioactive material is covered through

incorporation in the IMDG Code of the relevant

provisions of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe

Transport of Radioactive Material (IMDG Code,

2005). During the 1980s, the scope of the IMDG

Code was extended to include provisions and

requirements for the transport of substances and

materials harmful to the marine environment,

identified as marine pollutants. Inclusion of marine

pollutants in the Code also assisted in the

implementation of Annex III of the International

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from

Ships, 1973, as modified by its 1978 Protocol 61

(the 1973/78 MARPOL Convention). Annex III

contains the regulations for preventing pollution by

harmful substances carried in packaged form,

including packages in portable tanks, freight

containers, road tankers and rail tank wagons. The

harmful substances covered by MARPOL Annex III

are thus those identified by GESAMP 63 as marine

pollutants in the IMDG Code. GESAMP has not

considered packaged radioactive material in the

context of marine pollutants and Annex III does not

apply to radioactive material. In addition to the

IMDG Code, the IMO introduced the Code for the

Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium

and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on

Board Ships (the INF Code) in 1993 (WNTI Review

Series No.1, 2006).

The gamma and neutron sources used in these

tools are normally transported in separate heavy

containers termed shipping shields or carrying

shields. They are Type A transport packages (or

sometimes Type B for the neutron source) that meet

the specifications for Category III labelling as

defined by the IAEA Regulations for the Safe

Transport of Radioactive Material (IAEA Safety

Requirements, 2005). They may be transported by

road in the vehicles of the logging companies to the

land well. When they are to be used offshore, the

shields are usually contained in an overpack. This

may be a large thickwalled box (external dimensions

about 1.75 m × 1.75 m × 1.75 m) that also serves as

a storage container at the well site. The dose rates of

the 137Cs source are significant but not normally

isotropic owing to the construction of the source

assembly. Dose rates may exceed 7.5 μSv/h for up to

30 m in the forward direction and about 4 m behind

the operator. The radiation from the source is

directed away from any occupied areas. The dose

308

rates of the neutron sources can exceed 7.5 μSv/h for

distances of up to about 4 m. In addition to a ‘set’ of

sources used in the logging tools, the logging

engineer will need a number of field calibration

sources to carry out final checks on the tools before

beginning the log. Master calibrations are

periodically performed on the tools at the logging

company’s operations base. These tests will involve

putting the sources into the tools or into a section of

the tool and either placing the tool inside a

calibration block or placing a block over the source

position on the tool. The master calibration for the

neutron–gamma logging tool involves generating

neutrons while the tool is inside a tank filled with a

suitable fluid (for example, clean water). The tank

and its contents remain radioactive for a short time

(up to 30 min) after the tool has been switched off.

The logging tools and the sources they contain are

subjected to very high downhole temperatures and

pressures. The sources normally fall within the

definition of ‘special form radioactive material’ as

sealed sources satisfying the test criteria specified by

the IAEA and ISO standards. Nevertheless, the

sources are normally given the further protection of a

special container (a pressure vessel) whenever they

are in the shield or logging tool. The sources also

need frequent checks for leakage of radioactive

substances in accordance with test criteria specified

by ISO standards (IAEA Safety Report Series No.34,

2003).

4 CONCLUSION

Radioactive material plays an important role in our

lives. Radioactive material being shipped includes

uranium ores, nuclear fuel assemblies, spent nuclear

fuel, radioisotopes and radioactive waste. Every

year, millions of packages containing radioactive

material for use in medicine, agriculture, industry,

defence and science are transported across

international borders via roads, rails, air and sea.

Transport of these materials must be carefully

regulated to ensure the safety of transport workers

and the public, as well as property and the

environment.

The IMO has established international standards

for ships carrying certain high activity radioactive

material, such as irradiated nuclear fuel, high

level waste and plutonium, called the INF Code.

The INF Code sets forth requirements in areas of

ship design or equipment including damage stability,

fire protection, temperature control of cargo

spaces, structural considerations, cargo securing

arrangements, and electrical arrangements. The

analysis and results in this study are primarily

focused on these high activity materials.

While this study encompassed marine transport

of packaged radioactive material on four different

types of ships: container ships, roll-on/roll-off

(Ro-Ro) ships, general cargo (breakbulk) ships,

or purpose-built ships, the results of the study are

applicable to any ship transporting radioactive

material that complies with the applicable cargo ship

requirements of the International Convention for

Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), as well as with the

specific requirements of the IMDG Code for the

radioactive material considered. In addition, for

ships that carry shipments of INF code materials,

this study takes into consideration special provisions

of the three separate classes of ships, depending on

the total maximum radioactive quantity that may be

carried on board:

− Class INF 1 Ships: ships that are certified to carry

INF cargo with an aggregate activity less than

4000 TBq,

− Class INF 2 Ships: ships that are certified to carry

irradiated nuclear fuel or high level wastes with

an aggregate activity less than 2 × 106 TBq and

those certified to carry plutonium with an

aggregate activity less than 2 × 105 TBq,

− Class INF 3 Ships: ships that are certified to carry

irradiated nuclear fuel or high level wastes and

those certified to carry plutonium with no

restriction of the maximum aggregate activity of

material.

Consequently this study was mainly concentrated

on safety and environmental awareness issues for the

carriage of nuclear materials via by ships. The

outcomes would be utilized not only the industry

itself but the Maritime Training and Education

(MET) institutions that are providing relevant

training on the carriage of dangerous goods such as

Class 7.

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