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1 INTRODUCTION

Growing society’s energy needs cause the

development and utilization of nuclear power in

combination with nuclear fuel recycling. Nuclear

energy is very important in the sectors of industry,

agriculture and medicine. Countries with nuclear

reactors need to transport radioactive materials to

reprocessing plants prior of storage of residuals.

Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that sea

transportation of radioactive materials will be

increasingly involved. Coastal countries, including

maritime industry in general, have to provide

transportation of radioactive materials that include

irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level

radioactive wastes by ships in safe, reliable and

secure manner.

Today nuclear power provides approximately 10%

of the world’s electricity. Due to the clime change,

80% of all electricity will need to be clean and low

carbon by 2050. Therefore, nuclear capacity should be

considerably increased to meet climate goals. Russia,

India and China are currently leaders in expanding

nuclear power production. For instance, China has

now nine reactors under construction. Finland,

United Arab Emirates, Belarus, Bangladesh and

Turkey are also building new reactors. Currently, in

total 450 nuclear power reactors operate worldwide

[11].

However, nuclear power is a controversial energy

source. Plans for increasing nuclear capacity are

always connected with huge and high risk

investments. The Londonderry (Pennsylvania) in

Modelling Radioactive Materials Tracking in Sea Transportation by

RFID Technology

S. Bauk

Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa

ABSTRACT: The demand for radioactive materials has been increasing over the past decades, and therefore it is

to be expected that the need for radioactive cargo transportation shall also increase. The Radio Frequency and

Identification (RFID) technology has become the most spread for tracking and tracing radioactive cargo in road

and rail transportation. The easy installation, simple and fast data transfer from the sensors through RFID

readers have provided a safe and easy way of using this technology. A variety of sensors, such as seal,

temperature, humidity, shock, gamma radiation and neutron detector are the key, but not the only ones of the

complex system that is responsible for the safe transportation of radioactive cargo. By the appropriate software,

on-site databases and secured Internet, the operator has insight into the condition of the radioactive material

inside the containers without the risk of exposure to radiation, and without compromising the safety and

security of the data exchange at any time. Thanks to the latest-generation crypto tools, security is additionally

guaranteed. Within the context, this article presents a model of radioactive cargo tracking by RFID technology

in sea transportation. The model is based on the ARG-US RFID system successfully deployed in road and rail

transportation and its possible implementation at ships specialized for nuclear cargo transport.

http://www.transnav.eu

the International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 14

Number 4

December 2020

DOI: 10.12716/1001.14.04.29

1010

1979, Chernobyl (Ukraine) in 1986 and Fukushima

(Japan) in 2011 accidents have raised serious safety

concerns. Consequently, several countries moved

away from nuclear power, citing safety risks and

financial costs.

Small modular reactors as an alternative solution

allow combining nuclear power with renewables, i.e.,

sources of energy that are not depleted by use, such

as water, wind, solar power, etc. The environmental

consciousness is generally rising and it becomes

evident that energy needs could not be satisfied in the

future by sole use of coal or natural gas. Besides for

producing electrical power, nuclear energy is used for

variety of research, industry, agriculture, and

medicine purposes.

With increase of nuclear capacity worldwide, it is

to be expected that the need for massive radioactive

materials (RAM) transportation will increase.

Thereby, sea transportation shall undoubtedly play

an important role in satisfying requirements for

irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and radioactive

waste [27].

In this article, we focused on literature review in

the field of RAM transportation by means of sea, road

and rail transport (Section 2). An overview of the

ARG-US project achievements, when it comes to

tracking and tracing RAM in road and rail

transportation, is presented (Section 3). Then, an

attempt to conceive a similar model of RAM tracking

in sea transportation is presented at high level of

abstraction (Section 4). Finally, conclusion and some

directions for further investigation in this domain are

given (Section 5).

2 SECONDARY LITERATURE SOURCES

There is a scarcity of research studies on nuclear

cargo transportation available online. Below are

shortly presented some of the articles, which have

been found after an extensive web search.

Legislative framework of maritime transportation

of irradiated nuclear fuel (INF), plutonium and

radioactive wastes together with widely expressed

concern that an accident may occur to a ship carrying

such cargo has been studied in [27]. The same study

reviews the legal issues associated with the right of

emergency access to a foreign seaport by a ship

transporting nuclear materials. It also considers

whether seabed characteristics should be assessed in

determining the routing of such ships, bearing in

mind that ocean floor topography and seawater depth

will be crucial in determining whether recovery of

nuclear materials would be practicable in the event of

ship sinking.

The description of ship carrying nuclear cargo

construction requirements has been given in [5]. This

paper presents INF Code requirements due to the

ship’s construction, fire safety measures, electrical

power supply, cargo stowage and segregation,

emergency planning and security measures.

World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI) has

published a fact sheet on the transport of nuclear fuel

[28]. This study gives relevant data on the nuclear

fuel cycle, front-end operations, fuel fabrication,

reprocessing, transport packaging, sea transport,

purpose-built vessels, etc.

A model of radioactive transportation accident

response in Japan has been presented in [26]. The

authors have given an overview of the tracking

system for radioactive material transport including

sensor unit, communication network, central

monitoring center and sub-terminals, which provide

trend viewer, abnormal situation detection support

system, current situation and next step during the

shipment.

The authors of the references [6;7;25] have given

description of applying RFID technology in nuclear

material-cargo management. They have provided

prototype tag design and production, prototype

application software including graphical user

interface and preliminary test results in terms of read

range, sensor performance, memory read/write, seal

sensor, battery life, etc. It is worth to mention that

reference [23] gives a general insight in RFID

technology and its applications.

The authors of the reference [18] have dealt with

mathematical modeling and simulations, based on

special tran function theory (STFT), in estimating

temperature of plutonium in transportation.

The authors of [14] have investigated efficiency of

detectors for intercepting illicit trafficking of

fissionable material in container cargo in maritime

transportation. They have suggested tagged neutron

inspection system in addition to container content X-

ray scan, etc.

3 TRACKING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN

ROAD AND RAIL TRANSPORTATION

In 2008 Argonne National Laboratory (Chicago,

Illinois, USA) Packaging Certification Program (PCP)

team has developed RFID tracking and monitoring

system for the management of RAM packages during

storage and transportation [24]. This system, called

ARG-US, is composed of appropriate hardware

modification, application software, secured database,

protected web access, and irradiation experimental

measurements. The B fissile material drums (models

9975, 9979 and ES-3100) certified by US Department

of Energy and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

have been used for testing the prototype. The

demonstration of the system successfully integrated

Global Positioning System (GPS) for vehicles and

railway wagons positioning, including their RAM

cargo, satellite and cellular General Radio Package

Service (GPRS) wireless communications, the RFID

tags attached to the RAM drums, and Geographic

Information System (GIS) technology in geo-fencing

purposes [17], etc. The RFID tags and GPS technology

in combination with GIS enable dedicated software to

trigger a response when a mobile device enters or

leaves certain geographical area. The RFID in

combination with GPS generate an alarm in the case

of an incident with the RAM drums. An ARG-US

sensor’ unit sealed at each RAM drum is presented in

Figure 1. The ARG-US tags enable sophisticated

sensing, monitoring and communication capabilities

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directly from the packages-drams. These

customizable tags with integrated communications

platform for tracking and monitoring nuclear

materials in real time are designed to protect facilities

and population in comprehensive and cost-effective

way [2].

Figure 1. ARG-US sensors’ unit sealed at each RAM drum

(Source: [1])

Figure 2. A stand-alone RFID temperature monitoring

system on mobile platform (Source: [16])

The ARG-US RFID system consists of tags

(transponders), readers (interrogators) and

application software. The tag, with a built-in

temperature sensor, is attached to the exterior of the

package using flange bolts. The application software

enables remote reading, via radio waves, of the sensor

temperature. The system monitors temperature

continuously, records the data periodically and

reports off-normal conditions instantly. The

temperature data and event histories are stored in the

tag’s internal memory, as well as in the control

computer to which the reader is connected (Figure 2).

In a large installation, the system may be linked to a

server and accessible via secured Internet.

The first experiment with ARG-US system has

been made with road transportation of a vehicle with

14 RAM drums along the route Chicago (Illinois) to

Augusta (South Carolina). Sensor data were updated

every 10 minutes, while several incidents of seal (i.e.,

loosening the drum bolts) and shock sensor violations

were observed. At two mountain spots lost of

satellite/cellular connection has been noticed. In

addition, an incident with low battery level at

sensors’ unit attached to the RAM drum has been

indicated (Figure 3).

Figure 3. The ARG-US graphical interface: round symbols

represent RAM drums (Source: [9])

The RAM dram marked yellow indicates a

potential danger since battery is low at the moment.

A drum marked red means serious danger and

instigates an alarm, while drums marked green

indicate that everything is in order and there is no

danger of an incident. The system tracks the drums in

road transportation in close to real time.

After this experiment in road transportation of

RAM cargo, a series of experiments at Argonne

(Chicago, Illinois, USA) radiological facility has been

realized across the RAM drums storage areas. Two

layers of network for tracking and tracing stored

RAM drums have been set: a multi-sand wired one as

the first layer based on Ethernet, and the second one

based on wireless network. Blink sensors have been

used to communicate only upstream with the Remote

Area Modular Monitoring (RAMM) infrastructure

nodes. They enable fast connection to the existing

wireless sensor network. A digital video camera, or

optical sensor, has been also incorporated into the

RAMM platform. More about these second term set

of the ARG-US experiments can be found in

references [8;15;17]. There is no technology, besides

ARG-US, which can track, monitor, report,

communicate and enable rapid response to potential

emergencies related to nuclear wastes in storage and

transportation [2]. This system has contemporary

design and flexibility. It demonstrated high

performances and it is commercially available.

Due to the lack of research articles when it comes

to tracking RAM drums at the level of single items in

sea transportation, we have used the experiences

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from the ARG-US project realization to conceive and

propose a model for RAM cargo tracking in sea

transportation. Prior to the presenting this model, a

short overview of some technical-structural

requirements that ships for transportation of nuclear

cargo have to comply with, in order to ensure safe

RAM transportation, is given.

4 SEA TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE

MATERIALS

The main sea trade routes of nuclear material are

between Japan, UK and France, including routes

targeting Russia, Sweden, Canada, Argentina, Brazil,

Chile, Ireland, South Africa, etc. Legislative

framework for coastal states regarding sea

transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium

and radioactive wastes correspond to the

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

(SOLAS), the International Maritime Dangerous

Goods (IMDG) Code, the United Nations Convention

for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Irradiated

Nuclear Fuel Code (INFC), etc. The International

Maritime Organization (IMO) sub-committee of

Safety of Navigation (NAV) regulations cover the

route planning, notification and consultation with

coastal states, including possible restrictions and

exclusion of certain routes. Aids, equipment and

devices that would facilitate location and salvage of a

ship and/or nuclear cargo in the case of emergency

are covered by IMO sub-committees on Carriage of

Dangerous Goods (CDG) and radio Communications

(COM) including both terrestrial and satellite

channels [2].

The world’s most experienced shipper of nuclear

materials is Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited

(PNTL). The homeport of this company is Barrow-in-

Furness in England (UK). The company has

successfully completed 180 shipments during the last

40 years. The PNTL have safely sailed over five

million miles. This is the equivalent of going to the

Moon and back over ten times. More than 2000 casks

(drums) of nuclear material have been safely

transported by PNTL since its establishment. The

company has the most experienced nuclear transport

crew in the world. On average, each crewmember has

more than twenty years of experience with PNTL.

Today, three PNTL ships are in service: Pacific Heron,

Pacific Egret and Pacific Grebe. These vessels are

capable of carrying spent fuel, mixed oxide fuel

(MOX) fuel assemblies and vitrified high-level waste

[19-22]. The process of cask with nuclear material

unloading in a PNLT ship is shown in Figure 4.

The PNTL ships have double hull construction,

dual navigation monitoring and calling systems, twin

engines, rudders and propellers, backup power

generators, radioactivity monitoring, secured cargo,

enhanced buoyancy, bow thrusters, backup

generators, additional firefighting equipment and

weather routing system. It is important to emphasize

that during the past forty years and numerous PNTL

ships voyages, there has never been a single incident

resulting in the release of radioactivity. Security is a

top priority for ships carrying nuclear materials.

Shipments must comply with coastal state

requirements, as well as physical protection measures

developed by the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) and IMO.

Figure 4. Unloading cask with nuclear cargo from PNTL

ship’s hull (Source: [19])

4.1 Model of radioactive materials tracking

Since in the focus of this paper is tracking and

tracking RAM via RFID in sea transportation, the

attempts towards compiling results and experiences

from ARG-US and similar projects and proposing a

framework of an appropriate info-communication

model (Figure 5) have been done [4]. As reference are

used previously presented PNTL ships.

Figure 5. Model of a nuclear cargo ship’s communication

scheme with manned Report Center (Source: [4])

All PNTL ships have satellite navigation and

weather routing equipment, as well as tracking

equipment. These systems enable PNTL ships to

follow the safest route and avoid severe weather

conditions. Ship’s position is monitored at any stage

of her voyage. This voyage monitoring system

automatically reports the vessel’s latitude and

longitude, speed and heading every two hours. If the

report center does not receive message within a pre-

determined time, PNTL’s emergency response system

is automatically activated [20]. If a ship accounts

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difficulty, trained and fully equipped PNTL

emergency team is 24 hours on stand by to offer

assistance. All emergency arrangements are in

accordance to IAEA regulations [21]. Special monitors

in the holds of each PNTL ship would provide

information about the status of the cargo to a salvage

team.

By the proposed model is assumed that each

ship’s cargo hold is treated as a Remote Area

Modular Monitoring (RAMM) sub-system connected

with central monitoring system on board refereeing

to AGR-US project attainments [6;7;8;15;17;25]. A

digital video camera or optical sensor might be

incorporated into each RAMM (RAM cargo hold).

The RFID active tags attached to each RAM drum’s

bolt contains following sensors: temperature, 3-axis

digital accelerometer, gamma sensor, neutron sensor,

electronic loop seal and rechargeable Li-ion battery.

All these sensors are connected with monitoring

system via two-layered network, i.e., via wired

Ethernet and wireless network for security purposes.

Due to [10] ships carrying RAM cargo are equipped

with an automatic voyage monitoring system which

transmits details of the vessel’s position, speed and

heading to the Report Center (Barrow, UK) every two

hours. These transmissions are performed

automatically and without any intervention of the

crew. If message is not received at the allotted time

the Emergency Response System would be activated.

In [10] is stated: “It is probable that the transmission

system would be based on, or similar to, the widely

used INMARSAT C communication system which

uses geo-stationary satellites positioned over the

equator to receive and transmit the data.” As an

alternative, one can conjecture that Officers on Watch

(OoW) and/or Master should monitor and control

cargo holds through back-end info-communication

system with the appropriate software architecture

and interface similar to ARG-US system. In addition,

they might be responsible for regular reporting to the

Report Center. If we assume that VHF Data Exchange

System (VDES) is used for this purpose, than the

reports should be sent via Application Specific

Message (ASM) 6 (dangerous cargo indication +

following communication) to the land based control-

report center. The ASM 6 contains the information as:

MMSI, flag, unit of quantity of dangerous cargo, code

under which cargo is carried, BC class, IMDG class,

and like [12]. Following communication should

contain the data set on: temperature sensor, 3-axis

digital accelerometer, gamma sensor, neutron sensor,

electronic loop seal and Li-ion battery status. Within

the context, it is important to underline that

mandatory reporting from ships is usually

encapsulated into ASM, while Maritime Service

Portfolio (MSP) cover a number of Vessel Traffic

Service (VTS) related and other services [3].

Additionally, possibilities of using Iridium GMDSS

[13] should be further elaborated. Apart from the

proposed model based on the assumptions, through

further research work some efforts should be made to

identify exact extraterrestrial communication

channel(s) and method(s) of (automatic) reporting,

used as a bidirectional link between ships carrying

nuclear cargo and ground based (control) report

center(s).

5 CONCLUSION

The paper proposes a model, at rather high level of

abstraction, of communication between a ship

carrying nuclear cargo and land based control center

in sea transportation. The model is based on the

experiences from Argonne ARG-US RFID projects.

Conceiving and designing a model has been adopted

to the PNLT ships performances and ship to shore

and vice versa communication channels. After

extensive web search, it has been concluded that

online literature sources in this field are scarce.

Further investigation should go in two directions: (i)

exploring data transfer between sealed and tagged

RAM drums and monitoring system on board ship,

and (ii) exploring in more detail communications

between the ship carrying nuclear cargo and (control)

report center ashore. Due to the lack of available

information, we can only assume which form of data

exchange and which communication channels are

used. We have conjectured that ASM 6 reporting

method within VDES might be used, but it might be

also INMARSAT C, Iridium GMDSS, or some other

extraterrestrial communication mode for providing

safety and security at sea while transporting nuclear

cargo. However, this is to be elaborated in more

detail in forthcoming research.

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