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1 INTRODUCTION

In 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground near

the coast of Alaska, and one of history’s largest

environmental disasters at sea was a fact. The

accident subsequently raised public awareness and

speeded up the process of establishing a mandatory

international regulation for ship traffic in polar

regions [13]. International laws and the laws of coastal

states with territorial sovereignty regulated marine

activity in these waters, and these laws could be

contradictory [3]. From the early 1990s, the

International Maritime Organization (IMO) started

the work to develop a regulation which could meet

the extraordinary risks associated with voyages in the

Arctic and Antarctic regions, as additional

requirements applicable for ship operations in polar

waters were lacking. In 2016, the work was finalized,

resulting in the International Code for Ships

Operating in Polar Waters (The Polar Code) [9], a

function-based regulation, applicable from January

1st, 2017. The Polar Code was developed in a

The Polar Code's Implications for Safe Ship Operations

in the Arctic Region

. Engtrø, O.T. Gudmestad & O. Njå

Unive

rsity of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway

ABSTRACT: Simultaneously with a decreasing sea ice cover in the Arctic region an increase in ship traffic is

experienced in these waters, meaning a higher probability of accidents and incidents to occur. The capability to

handle emergency situations for shipowners, operators and rescuers in a cold climate environment are heavily

affected by the risks present in polar waters and depends on limited emergency response resources covering

extremely large areas. In 2017, the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (The Polar Code) was

adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), applicable for the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The

goals of the functionally based regulation are to provide for safe ship operations and the protection of the polar

environment, by addressing risks present in polar waters and to ensure these are mitigated sufficiently. A

qualitative pilot study, with individual expert interviews, has been conducted in order to examine the Polar

Code's implications for safe ship operations in the Arctic region. The study concludes that the discussions

raised in the aftermath of the Polar Code has led to an increase in focus and a strengthen consciousness about

hazards and risks associated with polar water ship operations and additional measures required to mitigate

these. Further, the implementation of the Polar Code is considered as a milestone by establishing an

international regulation, mandatory for polar water ship design and for voyage planning. However, the study

points out that the main principle of the Polar Code is risk-based, meaning the performance of safe ship

operations are depending on those subjects to the regulation, to conduct thorough operational risk assessments

covering al

l actual hazards, and to ensure that those are mitigated sufficiently. In this regard, authority

presence is found crucial, to validate the adequacy and the dimensioning of the implemented measures. Key

words: Arctic ship operations; regulatory governance; emergency response; risk management.

http://www.transnav.eu

the

International Journal

on Marine Navigation

and Safety of Sea Transportation

Volume 14

Number 3

September 2020

DOI:

10.12716/1001.14.03.18

656

collaboration between member states of IMO,

amongst which Norway, represented by the

Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA), had a leading

role.

2 THE POLAR CODE CONTENT

The Polar Code is a continuation of existing IMO

regulations, made mandatory under the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); the

International Convention for the Prevention of

Pollution from Ships (MARPOL); and the

International Convention on Standards of Training,

Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW). The

regulation contains requirements regarding the

design and construction of vessels and equipment,

operational conditions and training, and the

protection of the environment. The Polar Code

consists of two parts; Part I contains provisions on

safety measures, made mandatory under SOLAS

Convention, defining minimum performance

standards for ship systems and equipment; Part II

contains provisions on measures to prevent pollution,

made mandatory under the MARPOL Convention.

The provisions on safety measures (Part I) are of

interest in this article, applicable to passenger ships

carrying more than twelve passengers or cargo ships

with a gross tonnage of 500 or more engaged in

international voyages [11].

The geographical area of application in the Arctic

is shown in the figure 1. In the Antarctic, the

regulation is applicable at 60th parallel south.

Figure 1. Maximum geographical extent of the Polar Code`s

area of application in the Arctic. The figure extracted from

the Polar Code is for illustrative purposes only. For exact

coordinates, the regulation refers to SOLAS Chapter XIV/1.3

[11].

Ships which comply with the requirements in the

regulation are issued a Polar Ship Certificate on

behalf of IMO. The certificate shall specify vessel type,

ice class, polar service temperature, maximum

expected time of rescue, vessel restrictions and

operational limitations for ice conditions, temperature

and high latitudes. The Polar Code acknowledges that

the risk level may differ depending on the

geographical location and time of year, and

mitigating measures required to address hazards may

therefore vary within polar waters. Capabilities and

limitations identified in the operational assessment

performed for a vessel shall be documented in the

Polar Water Operation Manual (PWOM), to be carried

onboard when on voyage.

3 METHODS FOR INTERPRETING “THE POLAR

CODE EFFECT”

The topic in this article is risk regulation of marine

activities at an international and governing level, with

complex problems of concern, to be handled by a

variety of industries and regulated parties. Several

uncertainties exist, in particular the capability to

handle emergency situations, both for shipowners,

operators and rescuers in a cold climate environment,

heavily affected by the risks present in polar waters.

As the requirements in the Polar Code are based on

risk factors in the operating areas, the problem for

discussion is the extent to which the regulation

attributes for enhanced risk management of polar

water shipping operations, considering all the

uncertainties associated with voyages in these waters.

Areas of interest in this regard are:

− Expectations towards regulatory compliance and

the establishment of practical solutions.

− Interpretation of the Polar Code's requirements

and developmental trends.

− The Polar Code’s contribution in defining best

standards for ship operations in polar waters.

Empirical research is conducted to provide data to

assess the Polar Code's implications as regulation for

ship operations, in this study limited to the Arctic

region. The data for this research comes from

interviews, academic papers, guidelines and reports.

Academic research covering various aspects and

challenges associated with Arctic ship operations and

emergency preparedness in polar waters is

comprehensive [1], [2], [19], [21], [38] and the

implications and consequences associated with the

implementation of a mandatory regulation for polar

water ship operations are of interest. Research

covering the topic is, for example, found in the

extensive SARex I, II & III exercise reports from 2016,

2017 and 2018, respectively [34], [35], [36]. During

these exercises the Polar Code was used as a base for

testing life-saving appliances (LSA) and rescue

equipment in a cold climate; personal capabilities for

survival in real-event situations were studied, and

training in emergency scenarios was conducted [34],

[35], [36]. The exercises, each lasting one week, were

held north of Spitzbergen in ice-infested water or to

onshore, with an objective to identify and explore the

gaps between the functionality provided by the

existing SOLAS approved safety equipment and the

functionality required by the Polar Code [34], [35],

[36]. The reports from the SARex exercises, with their

individual contributions from the participants in the

appendices, are valid sources of data, containing

detailed descriptions and evaluations of emergency

response resources and requirements for polar water

operations, both from a technical, operational and

organizational point of view.

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3.1 Interviews

A pilot study has been conducted in order to gain

data about the Polar Code and its implications for safe

ship operations in the Arctic region. Individual

interview as method was selected, which is the most

commonly data collection strategy in qualitative

research [31]. The method of interviewing experts

enables for in-depth examination to capture the

informant’s knowledge and understanding of the

studied topic [12], [18]. The selection criteria for

choosing informants for this study were thorough

expertise and knowledge about the Polar Code,

gained through work experience in the making of the

regulation prior to 2017, after the regulation was

implemented, or both. Six informants who met all the

defined criteria were selected, represented by the

NMA, the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA),

the classification societies and the academia (ice

navigation specialist). The interviews were conducted

during January 2020 - four interviews in person and

one via telephone. In addition, formal conversations

were held with one of the informants during the same

period, in person, via telephone and mail

correspondence. An interview guide was developed

containing questions concerning safe ship operations

in northern areas and challenges associated with the

enforcement of the Polar Code. The interviews were

conducted in a semi-structured manner, allowing

flexibility to explore spontaneous issues raised by the

interviewees [30], all lasting approximately one hour

with use of the interview guide. The following

regulatory topics were addressed during the

interviews, all considered as a result of the Polar Code

implementation, provided as additional guidance and

clarifications for regulatory compliance:

− Guidance on methodologies for assessing

operational capabilities and limitations in ice;

Polar Operational Limit Assessment Risk Indexing

System (POLARIS) (2016) [7].

− Amendments to STCW on qualifications and

certificates for seafarers (2018) [26].

− Guidance for navigation and communication

equipment intended for use on ships operating in

polar waters (2019) [8].

− Interim guidelines on life-saving appliances and

arrangements for ships operating in polar waters

(2019) [10].

− Regulations on the construction, equipment and

operation of passenger ships in the territorial

waters surrounding Svalbard (2020) [28].

The collected data were analyzed utilizing

thematic analysis as a method, which is a widely used

qualitative analytic method for identifying, analyzing

and reporting patterns and themes in data [4]. Themes

were identified using a deductive and theoretical

approach, providing a detailed analysis of certain

aspect of the collected data [4]. The thematic analysis

were conducted with the following steps: (1)

familiarizing by transcribing the data, (2) generating

initial codes by exploring features of interesting data

across the entire data set, (3) collating the data

relevant to each code in a systematic manner, (4)

collate codes into potential themes and review these

themes by checking logical relationship to the coded

extracts and the entire data set, (5) defining and

naming the themes, (6) final analysis of selected

extracts [4]. However, analyzing data is not a process

conducted in a linear manner moving from first phase

to second and third. Instead, the process is dynamical,

moving back and forth as needed, throughout the

phases [4]. The themes identified in the thematic

analysis forms basis for the topics discussed in

chapter 4.

4 DISCUSSION - REGULATORY GOVERNANCE

AND FUNCTION-BASED REGULATIONS

Function-based regulations, as the Polar Code, are

increasingly applied in regulatory governance, where

the responsibility for developing and establishing

operational standards and procedures is delegated

from government officials to the subjects and target

groups that the regulations are intended to regulate.

From a rational approach, functional requirements

enable shipbuilders, owners and operators to choose

flexible solutions, suitable to own activities and

operations. Self-regulation as principle demands

strong professional integrity and high levels of

competence, from those subject to the regulation but

also from the assigned authorities, represented by the

flag states, the port states and the recognized

classification societies.

During the interviews it became evident that the

implementation of the Polar Code initially did not

have a great impact for the experienced operators and

shipowners, already engaged in polar water

operations in the Arctic region. Their fleet generally

consisted of winterized vessels, designed for low

temperatures and built according to recognized ice

classes, and in most cases only minor technical

modifications were necessary for reaching compliance

with the new regulation. Routines for developing

operational procedures for operating in ice were also

well-established, and often only cross-references to

the individual sections of the Polar Code were

sufficient for reaching compliance with the regulation.

One informant pointed out that the Polar Code has

gained criticism for its functional formulations, but at

least a minimum standard and expectation for

operational elements and for vessel design and

construction is established. Even so, the informant

explained, ship builders or ship owners lacking polar

experience and knowledge have difficulties to

acknowledge this minimum expected standard, which

manifests when operational capabilities and

limitations in ice are addressed in the early stages of

the design phase of a vessel. Another informant

pointed out what he called the function-based

paradox; the Polar Code addresses a minimum of

specified hazards and risks to be treated in an

operational risk assessment for the vessel and its

intended voyages, however, unexperienced personnel

will have great difficulties identifying and assessing

all the related ones.

4.1 From function-based regulations to descriptive

guidelines

International shipping operations are regulated by

IMO Conventions and regulations, established

through extensive cooperation and often time-

658

consuming work, characterized by the time it took to

develop and agree on the Polar Code (> 25 years). In

these forums scientific facts can be diminished in

favor of political and economic interests, as visions

and goals are to be agreed on amongst differing

cultures, institutions and states with competing

agendas and financial situations [32]. In the making of

the Polar Code, one informant recalled the

discussions within IMO, addressing requirements for

LSA, describing them as controversial, resulting in

less descriptive requirements for this chapter

compared to the other chapters of the Polar Code.

However, in parallel with the ongoing work of

finalizing the regulation in 2015, the same informant

participated in the development of interim guidelines

for LSA and arrangements, which was put on the

agenda by the NMA, in order to provide additional

guidance and clarification to the Polar Code. The

strategy of first developing interim guidelines within

IMO were debated, but according to the informant

consensus were easier achieved by establishing

voluntary guidelines compared to mandatory ones.

During the next three years, findings from the SAR

exercises [34], [35], [36] raised concerns regarding the

suitability and efficiency of equipment to be provided

in an emergency abandonment situation of vessels,

and the exercises proved that vessels in polar voyages

likely were equipped with insufficient survival

equipment and resources, including food and water

rations. The results from the exercises and the

discussions that arose after these events contributed

in the development of the interim guidelines, which

were put to force in 2019 [10].

The interim guidelines for life-saving appliances

and arrangements for ships operating in polar waters

[10] states that survival after abandonment relies on

several factors, such as the types and combination of

equipment, crew training and good leadership of each

survival craft. Guidance is also provided for the type

and amount of survival equipment related to the

maximum expected time of rescue. One informant

acknowledged the guidelines for its scientifically

based content, developed on experience from the

SARex exercises, and considered the guidelines to be

useful in verification activities of vessels and as a

guiding tool for voyage planning. The informant also

considered the chronological process within IMO, of

first developing interim guidelines before being made

mandatory, to be a sustainable way to handle

controversial matters, considering that acceptance is

easier achieved in the making of voluntary guidelines.

A controversial topic during the development of

the Polar Code and in the making of the interim

guidelines for LSA and arrangements, according to

one informant, was the requirement regards

maximum expected time of rescue, set to never be less

than five days. The requirement is still debatable and

by some considered more as a theoretical statement,

questioning the capability for LSA to keep (elderly)

people alive for a minimum of five days, after a vessel

abandonment [39]. According to the informant, many

operators adopt to the requirement without any

further assessment, in particular to assess if the

expected time of rescue may also exceed five days,

which can be the case for ships with a large number of

persons on board, operating in the most remote parts

of the Svalbard archipelago. A dilemma in the

discussion concerning time of rescue [33], addressed

by one informant, is the lack of a shared

understanding or a definition concerning when one

can be considered rescued, adding another

uncertainty to the topic.

4.2 Function-based requirements - expectations and

obligations

Due to the Polar Code's risk-based principle,

sufficient measures will highly be depending on

geographical and seasonal variations. The Polar Code

requires operational limitations, including limitations

related to ship structural ice capabilities, to be

established and documented in the Polar Ship

Certificate and the PWOM, utilizing an acceptable

methodology, namely the POLARIS. The basis of

POLARIS is an evaluation of the risks posed to the

ship by the expected ice conditions in relation to the

ship's assigned ice class [7]. The main challenge by

applying a risk-based ship design is related to the

definition of the ice environment and the ship-ice

interaction in this varying environment [15].

Comparing ice environments is a complex matter as

ice can have various forms and can be first, second or

multiyear ice, which will have large impact on the

strength properties of ice as well as on the possible

thickness [16]. In addition, ice fields are dynamic and

changes on the ice cover characteristics can happen

rapidly e.g. due to the wind and currents [16]. In

voyage planning, shipowners or operators

responsible for conducting adequate operational

assessments, can deliberately mislead or non-

deliberately underestimate the risks of encountering

first-year ice or older and thicker ice or large ice

ridges. Certain calculators can take advantage and

exploit the risk-based principle in the regulation,

which raises questions about the authority’s role in

the regulatory regime [29]. One informant pointed out

the importance of authority presence in Norwegian

ports and waters, enforcing compliance with

operational limitations, Polar Class (PC) and the

maximum expected time of rescue, as specified in the

Polar Ship Certificate for the vessels. The informant

suggested an ad-on to be established to existing vessel

reporting systems, for submission of operational

assessments, to be reviewed and verified by the

authorities before approval for polar voyages is given.

According to two informants, there is limited

experience in Norway utilizing POLARIS in the

establishment of operational limitations, which partly

was explained by lack of data in existing ice charts;

Norwegian ice charts do not have a standard colour

code system separating ice types from each other,

used by other Arctic nations as Canada, Russia and

Greenland. In POLARIS, a ship is assigned a Risk

Index and the Risk Index Values within the Risk

Index are values corresponding to a relative risk

evaluation for corresponding ice types [7], meaning

detailed and accurate information about ice types and

ice conditions is essential input to the system. Canada

with long traditions for ice navigation uses two

systems: The Zone/Date System (ZDS) and the Arctic

Ice Regime System (AIRSS); the last-mentioned

enforced in 1996 and considered as an equal

acceptable alternative methodology to the later

developed POLARIS. The ZDS, however, is a fixed

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system based on historical data on ice conditions,

dividing the Canadian Arctic waters into control

zones and stipulates the opening and closing dates for

each zone for different vessel types [14]. The system

encounters that ice conditions are consistent from

year-to-year and does not reflect long term trends and

inter-annual variability in ice conditions, leading to

the development and introduction of the more flexible

AIRSS [14].

The ongoing EU earth observation program,

“Extreme Earth”, involving the Norwegian

Meteorological Institute / Norwegian Ice Service,

working with large scale analysis of remote sensing

data which can support information in the

development of more advanced ice charts, was

mentioned by the two informants. In these

discussions it was pointed out the importance of

obtaining high quality data about ice conditions when

utilizing a risk-based ship design system.

4.3 The establishment of international maritime norms

In 2018, amendments to the STCW on qualifications

and certificates for seafarers [26] were laid down on

the background of the Polar Code implementation.

The amendments primarily involve training

requirements for masters, chief mates and officers in

charge of a navigational watch on ships with a Polar

Ship Certificate operating in open and other polar

waters. During the training courses topics concerning

legislations, ice classes, ice types and ice conditions,

metrological and oceanographic conditions, and LSA

are addressed. The training must be documented with

a certificate of proficiency from an educational

institution offering Polar Code training courses (basic

and advanced). Two of the informants were lecturers

in the above-mentioned courses and recommended

the training to be applicable for additional personnel

with non-navigational duties, e.g. engine department,

where cold climatic conditions also will affect

equipment and human performance. Both informants

expressed their concern for the competence level for

personnel on vessels operating in ice-free polar waters

or in waters outside the application area to the Polar

Code; icing, low temperature, extended periods of

darkness or daylight, rapidly changing and severe

weather conditions and lack of suitable emergency

response equipment are hazards and concerns also

applicable in waters not regulated by the Polar Code.

A general concern was addressed towards non-

SOLAS vessels operating in cold climate areas,

including cargo ships of less than 500 gross tonnage;

pleasure yachts not engaged in trade; and fishing

vessels [11]. The safety provisions (Part I) of the Polar

Code is mandatory for certain ships under the SOLAS

Convention and non-SOLAS vessels are therefore not

regulated by the Polar Code. However, IMO's

Maritime Safety Committee and related sub-

committees are currently looking at the application of

the Polar Code to vessels not regulated by SOLAS

Convention. The IMO assembly meeting in end of

2019 adopted a resolution on interim safety measures

for vessels not certified under the SOLAS Convention

operating in polar waters, which urges the IMO

member states to implement, voluntarily, the safety

provisions (Part I) of the Polar Code on non-SOLAS

vessels.

January 1st, 2020, the NMA laid down new

Regulations on the construction, equipment and

operation of passenger ships in the territorial waters

surrounding Svalbard [28], making the Polar Code,

with a few exceptions and additions, applicable as

regulations in these waters [28]. Until that date, ships

with national certificates have not been subjects to the

safety provisions (Part I) of the Polar Code but to

MARPOL and national requirements for certificates

required to operate passenger ships at Svalbard [27].

The Polar Code`s safety provision applies, per

definition, only to passenger ships or cargo ships

engaged in international voyages [11]), where an

“international voyage means a voyage from a country

to which the present Convention applies to a port

outside such country, or conversely” [11]. For this

reason, passenger ships or cargo ships in voyages in

the territorial waters surrounding Svalbard, going

from and returning to a port in Norway, have not

been subjects to the Polar Code`s safety provisions.

According to one informant, interpreting the Polar

Code in this manner was not supported by the

NMA representatives in IMO during the making of

the regulation, and the NMA recommended all

SOLAS vessels operating within the Polar Code

application areas should comply with the regulation.

According to one informant, varying interpretation

of the Polar Code and enforcement of the regulation

amongst flag states can be mitigated when the new

Regulations on the construction, equipment and

operation of passenger ships in the territorial waters

surrounding Svalbard [28], is put in to force, as future

development of the legislation in Svalbard will take

place in line with new legislation being negotiated

internationally in IMO. Due to Svalbard’s judicial

position [37], the necessity for equal rules for all flag

states, will cause predictability and clear legislation,

which is an advantage point for the NMA also

regulating ships flying foreign flags [28].

5 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

The shipbuilding industry delivering polar expedition

vessels for the Arctic region is peaking, with 28 new

builds expected launched in a four-year period going

from 2018 to 2022. This is additional to the almost 80

polar vessels already in voyage in these waters [39].

The increase seen in activities related to science,

tourism, shipping, fisheries and commercial aviation

in polar regions, means a higher probability of

accidents, incidents or requirement for emergency

response, depending on limited resources covering

extremely large areas [6]. New polar expedition

vessels are in general delivered with higher ice-classes

(PC) than existing ones, enabling voyages in even

more remote areas outside the regular sailing season

during summertime [39], going from May to

September in the Arctic region. This concern was

shared by one informant, who by use of the

Automatic Identification System (AIS) for vessels, had

observed the same trend; more vessels in voyages in

remote and less explored areas. The informant

elaborated about his concern for the increased risk for

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grounding, with better equipped and larger vessels

with deeper drafts, exploring new areas with limited

hydrographic data, and expressed his concerns

related to the human element of risk, highly

influenced by personnel skills, competency and

knowledge.

The use of POLARIS and equal analytical models

quantifying risk levels are depending on reliable

input, however, a significant uncertainty is

represented by the analysts' risk perception of

descriptive scenarios [5]. These concerns were

discussed several times during the interviews; the

importance of gaining access to accurate data about

weather and ice conditions, acquired on a daily basis,

and that the capacity to fully understand the

characteristics and severity of risks and hazards

associated with ship operations in polar regions

comes with experience. Operational assessments

performed to identify capabilities and limitations for

vessels must be re-assessed frequently before found

reliable. Research from comparable industries has

shown that thorough re-verifications of conducted

risk assessments very rarely occur [23], [24], [25],

which is a concern that needs to be addressed. The

management of control mechanisms and constraints

enforcing the Polar Code is of essence and key players

in this control regime are port states, flag states and

classification societies, followed by the Arctic Council

and other nations with interests in the Arctic region.

The use of sanctions – fines and withdrawal of the

Polar Ship Certificate – are possible reactions, as well

as, in extreme situations, the arrest of vessels.

Authority involvement, by addressing responsibilities

within the industry in a competent manner, is crucial

to reduce and eliminate favourable conditions for

disreputable parties. Previous experiences from

maritime disasters indicate a business sector with

some members posing a challenging reputation.

Regulating ship operations, both during design of

vessels and for voyage planning, utilizing function-

based requirements should be further evaluated,

considering the uncertainties represented by

geography, environmental conditions and challenges

associated with search and rescue (SAR) operations in

remote areas with limited resources. Parallels can be

drawn with the heavy vehicle transport industry,

where research indicates that functional requirements

are being stretched [17], [22]. A systemic theoretical

approach [20] in the assessment of regulatory

constraints, and their functionalities for polar water

ship operations could be enlightening, considering the

use of function-based provisions supplemented with

descriptive guidelines. However, the use of

descriptive requirements can turn out to be counter-

effective, if compliance is achieved in a mechanical

manner, with just checks and controls of predefined

measures without conducting re-assessments of the

operational conditions.

During the interviews and in the conversations

concerning the Polar Code's implications for safe ship

operations in the Arctic region, the interviewed in

unison acknowledged the implementation of the

Polar Code as an important milestone achieved; an

international and mandatory regulation, defining

minimum expected requirements for polar water ship

design and for voyage planning have been

established. One informant pointed out that the

“reactive” parts of the Polar Code, e.g. the chapter

covering LSA and arrangements, have gained more

attention than the “proactive” parts of the regulation,

e.g. the chapters concerning ship structure, safety of

navigation and voyage planning. In the discussions

regards minimum expected standards and the way

forward, the establishment of buddy-systems, with

two vessels operating together in the same area, was

mentioned as a mitigating measure that should gain

more focus in the operational assessments and during

voyage planning.

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